Lectures

Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace (Video)

From Iraq to Syria, from energy to counterterrorism, Iran and the United States share many common interests across the Middle East and ought to put aside their decades of hostility, said author and former Iranian diplomat Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

Speaking at an IPI Distinguished Author Series event on June 25th featuring his book Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, Mr. Mousavian said that both countries are to blame for their failure to reach a rapprochement after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but that today’s challenges in the Middle East are a unique opportunity for mending relations.

Mr. Mousavian said that in his book he had tried to explain the Iranian perspective of the relationship, a view that he said has so far been overlooked by the predominantly Western approach to US-Iran relations.

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“Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” Presentation at the International Peace Institute (IPI), June 25, 2014.

Interviews

Inside view of Iran, Iraq, & US relationship (Video)

To understand the questions of the present, we have to look to the answers of the past. U.S. relations with Iran carry a long and complex narrative that is overflowing from decades before.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian served in Iran’s Foreign Ministry, was an advisor for their national security council, and worked with current Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. His extensive knowledge of the area and their foreign relations with the U.S. led to his latest work, Iran and the United States: An insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.

MSNBC sat down with the ambassador to discuss the path for a peaceful relationship between the superpowers.

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Watch Part 2

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“Inside view of Iran, Iraq, & US relationship,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Krystal Ball, MSNBC, June 25, 2014. (Video)

Articles, Publications

How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001

The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, exclusively sent to Iran Review.Org by Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 could have opened a new chapter in Iran–US relations. Iran was among the first countries to denounce the 9/11 Twin Tower terror attacks in New York. Immediately following the condemnation, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of Iran actively began to work within the new paradigm that was created by the September 11 terrorist attack and the subsequent US declaration of a “war on terror.” We were also concerned with the extremist Salafis and the Taliban, whose ideologies we viewed as hostile towards Shia Iran and also dangerous to the broader region.

During a fall 2012 conference in Berlin, James Dobbins told me that Hamid Karzai was the United States’ favored candidate to lead the new Afghan government. “Iranians also supported us,” Dobbins said.

Dobbins highlighted the role of Javad Zarif in the success of the Bonn Conference and the establishment of the new Afghan government. According to a report by Michael Hirsh, in an interview Dobbins,“pointed out that Karzai was a Pashtun from the south, like the majority of the Afghan population.” Tajiks from the Northern Alliance, historically rivals to the Pashtuns, led by Yunus Qanooni, tenaciously demanded the majority share in the new government “since they were the people that had captured Kabul according to Dobbins.” Dobbins  says “that by 4.00 a.m., they had reached a very critical moment. Nobody was able to change Qanooni’s mind. Zarif finally and authoritatively whispered in Qanooni’s ear that, ‘This is the best deal you can get.’ And Qanooni said, ‘OK.’”

Even after the creation of a new Afghan government at the Bonn Conference, talks continued. But suddenly, there came a veritable bombshell. President Bush, only a few weeks after the Bonn Conference, stunned us by including Iran in the “axis of evil” during his January 2002 State of the Union address. Talks continued but the Iranians’appetite for cooperation was diminished. Every person involved, from Khatami down, had the same feeling—betrayed! The word namaknashnas (a person one feeds, and later expresses betrayal rather than appreciation) was the word frequently used to characterize George Bush’s behavior.

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“How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, June 24, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Opinion: A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East

The Middle East is witnessing too many challenges: a return of a regional cold war, the increasing role and weight of non-state actors, the threat of failed or failing states, the reemergence of strong transnationalism through the rise of Islamism and sectarianism, the rise and consolidation of jihadist terrorism on the shores of the Mediterranean, and the revival of sub-national identities fearful of the present or of the future. All of this threatens the fabric of existing states, providing an attractive space for interference, intervention, and confrontation by proxy.

The people of the Arab world, Iran and Turkey are forever condemned to live together in this region. They need to talk to, rather than about, each other. They are facing common threats, and they each have huge potential and influence in the region and beyond. Restoring peace and stability in the Middle East will not be possible so long as individual preferences and influences are not channeled into a coordinated approach to securing the common interest.

Once established, the conference would convene at the ministerial level at regular intervals; it could convene any other time at a lower level as well. It could also entrust small committees of experts and officials with exploring solutions to certain crises or ways to contain issues, or with developing confidence-building measures for such purpose. Such committees could, perhaps, report to the general conference with policy suggestions.

The four major regional powers—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Turkey—can and should take the initiative to launch such a process. This quartet, along with other countries in the region, have too many overlapping, intersecting and interdependent issues and areas of mutual interest. Such concerns can be better addressed within the framework of a conference such as we are proposing, which would give the opportunity to avoid new crises, contain existing ones, develop better understandings, and work out common approaches to problems.

Indeed, there are crises in this region that could escalate into war—and this is a region witnessing a proliferation of crises. Most of them are complex in nature, bringing together internal and external factors in a highly volatile Middle East. Even more, all sorts of links exist between these various crises.

The question that remains now is whether these four main powers will rise to this challenge and take the initiative to develop a comprehensive vision of the role of such a forum. Will they join forces with others to turn this idea into a working reality, or will they remain entangled in an increasingly fragmented Middle East?

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“Opinion: A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian with Nassif Hitti, Asharq Al-Awsat, June 10, 2014.