Articles

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Eye, 9 June 2026

Weekend strikes highlight Tehran’s shifting strategic calculus – and a refusal to remain bound by one-sided agreements

As conflict flared up again this weekend between Israel and Iran, negotiations with the US have failed to produce any agreement. Neither side can afford another war, but the path towards a diplomatic settlement has been stymied by Washington’s demands for far-reaching concessions from Iran, without any offer of commensurate reciprocal measures, such as the release of even a portion of Iran’s frozen assets.

After the US and Israeli military strikes on Iran in 2025 and again this year, western discussions largely focused on the physical damage inflicted on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure, its uranium enrichment capabilities, and its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. 

In Iran, however, the central question is different: did negotiations and nuclear restraint produce greater security, or did they ultimately create heightened vulnerability?

The reality is that the US-Israeli wars on Iran inflicted significant damage on its nuclear and military facilities. But the ongoing conflict has also imposed enormous costs on the US – including more than $1 trillion in expenditures, significant damage to US military assets, global economic disruption, and substantial civilian and military casualties.

At the same time, the US-Israeli campaign has achieved few of its stated objectives, namely to eliminate Iran’s missile capabilities, end its nuclear programme, and facilitate political change. What the wars did change, however, was Iran’s strategic calculus, producing four major shifts in this regard. 

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

Firstly, we have seen the collapse of a strategy built on restraint and engagement. Despite a broad consensus among observers that Iran had complied with the 2015 nuclear deal, accepting extensive restrictions and unprecedented inspections, the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement just three years later, and the military attacks followed. 

As a result, confidence in the idea that diplomacy and nuclear restraint can guarantee security has been severely damaged. For many Iranians, restraint is now increasingly viewed not as protection, but as vulnerability.

Central question

Secondly, public trust in the US has collapsed. While Iran’s leadership has long been sceptical of Washington, public opinion was often different. 

After the signing of the nuclear agreement a decade ago, optimism in Iran was widespread, with a Gallup survey at the time finding that 68 percent of Iranians believed their leaders had negotiated a good deal, 66 percent expected economic improvement, and 51 percent anticipated better relations with the US.

Today, the debate inside Iran is no longer primarily about centrifuges or enrichment levels. The central question has become: if Iran accepts new restrictions, what guarantees exist that a future US administration will not abandon the agreement, or that another military confrontation will not follow? For many Iranians, the current crisis is less a nuclear dispute than a crisis of trust.

Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities

Thirdly, we have seen a shift from ideology to nationalism. For decades, confrontation with the US and Israel was framed primarily in ideological terms. The recent conflict appears to have produced a different dynamic: while many Iranians remain opposed to war, sanctions and isolation, public sentiment has increasingly shifted towards a form of everyday nationalism.

Rather than strengthening ideological narratives, external military pressure has reinforced broader feelings of national identity and collective solidarity. This trend may become one of the most enduring political consequences of the wars.

Finally, perhaps the most important shift concerns deterrence. Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities.

This does not necessarily imply support for nuclear weapons; rather, it reflects a growing belief that no political agreement can remain sustainable unless Iran possesses sufficient means to deter future attacks.

This shift played out in real-time over the weekend, as Iran launched strikes against Israel over the latter’s continuing assault on Tehran’s ally Lebanon – marking the first time Iran has hit Israel not as retaliation for attacks on its own territory, but as a warning over continuing ceasefire violations in Lebanon.

Strategic framework

Following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran’s security doctrine rested on three pillars: strengthening indigenous military capabilities (which eventually produced the missile, drone and cyber capabilities displayed in the recent conflict), achieving self-sufficiency in nuclear technology and domestic fuel production, and extending deterrence beyond Iran’s borders through its regional “axis of resistance”.

When it comes to shaping Iran’s future security doctrine, the strategic impact of the 2025 and 2026 wars may ultimately exceed even that of Saddam Hussein’s invasion, since the US-Israeli assaults were widely perceived inside Iran as direct threats to national survival and sovereignty. 

Consequently, a revised strategic framework appears to be emerging around four principles.

The first can be summarised as “security for all or security for none”. After the 2025 US-Israeli attacks, Iran’s military response was largely confined to Israel and a single American base in the Gulf. 

During the 2026 conflict, however, Iran’s strategic calculations expanded to include US military installations across the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and broader global economic interests. From Tehran’s perspective, the lesson is clear: security can no longer be treated as a unilateral privilege. Either there is security for all regional actors, or security for none.

Secondly, we have seen the emergence of a new key factor: public opinion. Before the wars, Iran’s strategic debate largely revolved around two concepts: the “battlefield” and “diplomacy”. The recent wars added a third: the street. 

The wave of nationalism that emerged was reflected in large public gatherings across major cities. While supporting national defence, many participants also conveyed a message to policymakers that excessive trust in negotiations with Washington is no longer acceptable.

As a result, Iranian diplomacy today increasingly operates under the influence of both military institutions and public opinion.

Thirdly, the emerging consensus emphasises deterrence through a combination of instruments: stronger military capabilities, preservation of nuclear expertise, continued regional partnerships, and incorporation of the Strait of Hormuz into broader security calculations. The result is a more comprehensive understanding of deterrence than the one that existed before the wars.

Finally, the loss of Iran’s supreme leader, military commanders, regional partners and hundreds of civilians has created a powerful collective memory that will shape Iranian perceptions for years to come. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was not only the leader of a state; he was also one of the most prominent Shia religious authorities, with millions of followers worldwide. 

For the first time in modern history, a leading Shia religious authority was killed in military action by foreign states. This is not an event that many Iranians or Shia communities around the world are likely to forget.

After the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in 2020, US officials openly expressed concerns over possible Iranian retaliation. Recent conflicts have led not only to the killings of numerous senior Iranian military leaders, but also to the assassinations of key figures within the broader “axis of resistance”, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas negotiator Ismail Haniyeh. 

It would be unwise for policymakers and security institutions to dismiss the potential long-term security consequences of these events.

Window for diplomacy

Meanwhile, despite widespread mistrust, diplomacy remains far from dead. Although some Iranian political figures fear that another military confrontation may be on the horizon, significant support for diplomacy still exists within Iran. 

What has changed is not the desire for negotiations, but the expectations surrounding any future agreement. If the nuclear deal focused primarily on nuclear restrictions, many in Tehran now argue that any future agreement must contain three key elements.

Firstly, nonproliferation within the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must protect Iran’s right to enrich uranium, while building confidence that Tehran will not pursue nuclear weapons.

Secondly, meaningful economic benefits must come through substantial sanctions relief. And thirdly, any deal needs to include credible assurances that this military conflict will not be repeated.

Despite the deep mistrust generated by recent wars, diplomacy remains the only viable path forward – because neither Iran, nor the US, nor indeed the region as a whole can escape the realities of coexistence. The central challenge is in breaking a decades-long cycle of crisis, sanctions, negotiations, agreements, collapse and renewed conflict, which neither military force nor economic pressure has resolved. 

The most important consequence of the recent wars is not a shift in Iran’s relative strength, but a transformation in its understanding of security. 

A broad consensus is emerging inside Iran that security, trust, deterrence and diplomacy are inseparable. Unless Washington and its regional allies recognise this shift, future agreements are likely to remain temporary, while the cycle of confrontation continues.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-will-no-longer-accept-endless-talks-it-creating-deterrence-its-own-terms

Seyed Hossein Mousavian-NDTV-India- May 18, 2026

The Strait of Hormuz has evolved from a regional maritime chokepoint into the central geopolitical fault line of the global economy. During the past several weeks, tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran escalated sharply following military exchanges near the Strait, US naval operations connected to “Project Freedom”, attacks on commercial shipping, and reciprocal accusations of ceasefire violations. Commercial traffic through the Strait has been severely disrupted, oil prices have surged, and global shipping insurers have warned of systemic economic risks extending far beyond the Middle East.

Today, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz has become more consequential than the Iranian nuclear dispute itself. The nuclear issue had already been addressed diplomatically through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a binding international framework. The unilateral US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, followed by unlawful and unnecessary military attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, fundamentally undermined the agreement and transformed the Iranian nuclear issue from a multilateral diplomatic matter into a broader geopolitical confrontation between Iran and a coalition composed of the United States, Israel, and several US-aligned Arab governments in the Persian Gulf.

Iran Has Suffered Massive Damage

Unlike the nuclear issue, however, instability in the Strait of Hormuz directly affects the entire global economy, including energy markets, supply chains, inflation, food security, and maritime commerce. Iran frames the Strait of Hormuz within the doctrine of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. From Tehran’s perspective, repeated military attacks by Iraq under Saddam Hussein during the 1980s, the extensive economic sanctions regime imposed by the United States, cyber operations, targeted assassinations, and the more recent Israeli and American military strikes in 2025 and 2026, have cumulatively imposed trillions of dollars in damage on Iran’s infrastructure, economy, and national security. Iranian government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said an early estimate indicates that Iran has suffered about $270 billion in damages since the start of the US-Israel war on February 28, 2026.

The United States and several European governments have argued that Iran cannot lawfully impose transit tolls or fees on vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz because such a precedent could encourage other littoral states to impose similar charges in international straits. “Not only is this illegal, it’s unacceptable. It’s dangerous for the world, and it’s important that the world have a plan to confront it,” said the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Legally, the concern reflects the transit passage regime under Articles 37-44 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which protects freedom of navigation through international straits.

An Inaccurate Argument

However, the comparison between Iran and other coastal states is fundamentally flawed. No other littoral state governing a strategic strait has experienced three major illegal military confrontations – Saddam Hussein’s invasion, prolonged US coercive policies, and direct Israeli-American military operations against its territory – while also bearing the primary burden of maintaining regional maritime security and environmental protection.

While Iran has never ratified the convention, however, under international law, Iran may not be legally entitled to impose unilateral tolls merely for innocent or transit passage. Nevertheless, several alternative legal and institutional mechanisms could provide a lawful framework for cost-sharing and compensation.

First, UNCLOS permits coastal states to recover costs for specific services rendered, including pilotage support, environmental protection, emergency rescue operations, anti-pollution measures, maritime traffic management, demining, and navigational safety systems. Iran could, therefore, lawfully establish specialised maritime service regimes tied to concrete operational services rather than simple passage itself.

Second, Article 43 of UNCLOS explicitly encourages burden-sharing agreements between user states and coastal states in international straits. This provision has remained largely underdeveloped globally. Iran could, therefore, advocate the establishment of a multilateral “Hormuz Maritime Security and Environmental Protection Fund” under United Nations or International Maritime Organization supervision. Such a mechanism would allow energy-importing states, shipping companies, insurers, and Persian Gulf energy exporters to contribute financially toward maintaining safe navigation, environmental protection, anti-piracy operations, and post-conflict reconstruction in the region. This approach would transform the debate from “illegal tolls” into lawful cooperative burden-sharing.

Third, Iran could invoke emerging principles within international environmental law and the law of state responsibility. The recent military confrontations in the Persian Gulf have significantly increased risks of environmental catastrophe, including oil spills, destruction of marine ecosystems, and contamination of fisheries and coastal infrastructure. Under the “polluter pays” principle and broader doctrines of state responsibility, states contributing to militarisation and conflict in the Strait may bear obligations toward remediation and reconstruction. Iran may, therefore, argue that states participating in military escalation should contribute financially to environmental protection and maritime stabilisation efforts in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Question Of Compensation

Fourth, there is a historical imbalance in international compensation mechanisms that remains unresolved. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations Compensation Commission established an international mechanism to process claims and compensation. Iran, despite suffering enormous destruction during Iraq’s invasion of Iran initiated by Saddam Hussein in 1980, never received a comparable compensation framework. The absence of such mechanisms has contributed to long-term regional instability and mistrust between Iran and the Arab neighbouring countries, which supported Saddam’s invasion of Iran.

An Imbalanced Framework

A future Hormuz framework could, therefore, integrate both maritime security financing and broader reconstruction arrangements connected to decades of regional conflict. The strategic reality is that the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be treated merely as a narrow legal issue of navigational rights. It has become a test case for whether international law can adapt to asymmetrical burdens imposed on regional states in periods of prolonged geopolitical confrontation. The existing framework places the overwhelming responsibility for securing one of the world’s most vital energy corridors on the coastal states of Iran and Oman in the Hormuz Strait, while the economic benefits are distributed globally. Such an imbalance is politically unsustainable under conditions of war, sanctions, and repeated military escalation.

Ultimately, the future of the Strait of Hormuz depends not on military coercion but on diplomatic innovation. A durable solution requires de-escalation between Iran, the United States, and the international community, restoration of lawful diplomacy, and creation of a multilateral framework balancing freedom of navigation with equitable burden-sharing, environmental protection, and regional reconstruction. Without such a framework, the Strait risks becoming a permanent epicentre of global economic instability. With it, however, Hormuz could evolve from a symbol of confrontation into a platform for cooperative security and international legal innovation.

https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/us-iran-war-coercion-cant-calm-hormuz-innovation-might-11510523

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

By Frank von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian | Analysis | April 18, 2026

The current crisis over Iran’s nuclear program has reached an extraordinary level, climaxing shockingly with President Trump’s April 7 threat to destroy Iran’s “civilization” if it did not comply with his demands—a barely veiled threat of a massive nuclear attack on Iran’s cities. Any country faced with such a threat would want its own nuclear deterrent.

More broadly, the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the expression of a global near consensus that the world would be better off without nuclear weapons and that, in the interim, the fewer fingers on nuclear triggers the better—is fraying.

In the NPT, the “P5” (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States; the Soviet Union, succeeded by Russia; the United Kingdom; France; and China— committed to eliminate their nuclear arsenals if the non-weapon states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor their use of nuclear material to make sure that none was diverted to weapons use.

Surprisingly few countries have acquired nuclear weapons. In 1995, the negotiators of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty judged 44 countries to be technologically capable of making nuclear weapons. But, in the 56 years since the NPT came into force, only three countries—Israel, India, and Pakistan—decided to acquire nuclear weapons outside the NPT and only one, North Korea, defected after it joined the NPT.

The nonweapon states initially agreed to membership in the NPT for 25 years. In 1995, when the 25 years were up, the Cold War had just ended and US and Russian nuclear warheads were being dismantled at a combined rate of 3,000 per year. Nuclear disarmament seemed in sight, and the NPT was made permanent. Unfortunately, during the past decade, the shrinkage of the global warhead stockpile stopped, with about 10,000 warheads still in existence, and it has begun to grow again as China builds up.

The 190 parties to the NPT that are to meet at the UN during May to review the state of compliance with the treaty have failed to reach consensus in the previous two reviews since 2010.

And then there is Iran.

The Iranian proliferation quandary. In 2011, the IAEA concluded that, prior to 2003, Iran had a nuclear weapon development program. In 2003, then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni published a religious edict that weapons of mass destruction are “haram” (religiously forbidden). The force of this edict has been debated, but the most recent Congressional Research Service report on Iran’s nuclear-weapon program states, “According to official U.S. assessments, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and has not resumed it.”

In 2018, President Trump capriciously withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by the Obama Administration, in which Iran had agreed to strong limits on different parts of its nuclear program for 15 years or longer. To force Iran to give him a “better deal” than it had given Obama, Trump reinstated crushing primary and secondary sanctions on Iran’s economy. Neither the UN Security Council nor the IAEA Board of Governors said anything, but UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres did:

“I am deeply concerned by today’s announcement that the United States will be withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and will begin reinstating US sanctions… I have consistently reiterated that the JCPOA represents a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy and has contributed to regional and international peace and security.”

Given the widespread opposition to the JCPOA in Congress, the Biden administration did not give a high priority to negotiating its revival. Since President Trump’s reelection, the situation has rapidly deteriorated.

On June 12, 2025, the IAEA’s Board of Governors found that “Iran has failed to co-operate fully with the Agency, as required by its Safeguards Agreement.” The focus of the board’s complaint was Iran’s inadequate explanations of the activities it had carried out during the period ending in 2003. Those were issues that the IAEA had declared closed after it summarized its conclusions in its December 2015 “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” just before the JCPOA came into force in January 2016.

The day after the IAEA Board’s statement, while the United States was negotiating with Iran, Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear sites. President Trump ordered US forces to join in and bomb Iran’s buried centrifuge halls with massive bunker busters.

Again, on February 27, in a pause in a second US negotiation with Iran, the foreign minister of Oman, who was mediating the talks, reported in a “Face the Nation” interview that the negotiators had made “substantial progress” toward a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program and that Iran was willing to end its production of highly enriched uranium and blend down its existing stock. The next day, Israel attacked and killed Iran’s supreme leader and much of its military leadership, and Trump again ordered US forces to join in the intense follow-on bombing of Iran.

The UN Security Council has not condemned these attacks on Iran but has condemned Iran for its retaliatory attacks on its US-allied Persian Gulf neighbors and for its closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The IAEA also has not condemned Israeli and US attacks on facilities it safeguarded, even though the result has been Iran’s decision to block IAEA access to Iran’s bombed sites (presumably out of fear that IAEA inspections could be used by the US and Israel for targeting intelligence).

US negotiations with Iran. The key sticking point in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program since it became public in 2003 has been uranium enrichment. Iran claims it has a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, uranium enrichment provides a route to nuclear weapons.

Our own view is that there is no economic justification for a small enrichment program like Iran’s. The four big suppliers: Russia; URENCO (a firm jointly owned by Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK); China; and France have more than enough capacity to supply the world’s nuclear power reactors at lower cost. Even the United States, with the world’s largest nuclear-power capacity—one quarter of the global total—has bought enrichment services from these suppliers since 2013 when it shut down the last of the three energy-inefficient enrichment plants it built to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons during the Cold War.

If countries insist on building uneconomic enrichment plants, we have advocated that those plants be under multinational control, as is the case with URENCO, which was founded in 1971 when there was still some concern that West Germany might seek nuclear weapons. Iran has expressed a willingness to put its enrichment program under multinational control but is unwilling to have it relocated to a neutral country as we recommended.

After President Trump took the United States out of the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration had negotiated and reimposed the sanctions that had been lifted as part of that agreement, Iran responded by enriching uranium, step-by-step, to higher levels than the 3.67 percent limit on uranium 235 it had agreed to. Ultimately, Iran was enriching some uranium to 60 percent, just short of weapon-grade (90 percent). By the time Israel and the US began bombing in June 2025, Iran had produced about half a ton of uranium enriched to that level. Using that as feed material, Iran could, with a single “cascade” of 175 of its most advanced centrifuges, produce enough weapon-grade uranium for about 10 bombs at a rate of one bomb equivalent per 25 days,

Since Iran shut down traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the apparent abandonment (or as Iran has claimed, failure) of a plan to sieze Irans highly enriched uranium, US-Iranian negotiations were launched in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad. Success or failure in reaching agreement on Iran’s nuclear program will have enormous implications for Middle East peace—and for nuclear proliferation around the world.

An inconsistent nonproliferation policy. Despite going to war over Iran’s uranium enrichment program, President Trump has inconsistently given both South Korea and Saudi Arabia his blessing to acquire uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel-reprocessing programs. “Reprocessing” is a chemical process used to separate plutonium, another nuclear-weapons material, from irradiated uranium fuel.

As explained above, there is today no economic justification for any new national enrichment program. There is currently a churn of customers for uranium enrichment as URENCO and France expand their capacities in response to the scrambling of US and European nuclear utilities to reduce their dependence on Russia’s enrichment capacity. But small national enrichment plants are still not financially competitive, and the big suppliers are diverse enough so that no country with a nuclear power plant needs to feel vulnerable to to being cut off from nuclear fuel for political reasons. Russia, for example, has been supplying low-enriched uranium fuel for Iran’s single commercial nuclear power reactor since France broke its enrichment contract with Iran after Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Recycled plutonium is not economically competitive with low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power generation on any scale. France and the UK proved that by trying to sell plutonium recycling services to other countries. The UK reprocessing company shut down in 2018 after escalating costs resulted in it losing all of its foreign customers. The only remaining significant reprocessing customer of France’s government-owned fuel-cycle company is France’s government-owned nuclear utility.

Nevertheless, without the required consultations with the relevant congressional oversight committees, President Trump has committed to both South Korea and Saudi Arabia that the United States will support their efforts to acquire both uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation facilities.

The reasons for concern are clear: At the end of May 2025, a poll of South Koreans found 76 percent supported acquiring a nuclear deterrent against North Korea. In the case of Saudi Arabia, its ruler, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, stated in a 2018 interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes that, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” President Trump has also agreed to support Saudi Arabia’s refusal to accede to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which 144 other countries, including Iran, have agreed to. The Additional Protocol requires countries to provide the IAEA access to their nuclear facilities while they are under construction to check the safeguard-ability of their designs before they go into operation and to make sure that the IAEA knows when they do start up.

President Trump made these agreements with the leaders of South Korea and Saudi Arabia in his usual transactional style. Rules, he apparently believes, need not be followed if a government is willing to pay enough.

President’s Trump’s disdain for the rules is endangering world order in many ways. We cannot leave defense of the nonproliferation regime for later, however. If we do, we may find ourselves in a nuclear-armed crowd.

https://thebulletin.org/2026/04/taking-a-sledgehammer-to-the-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/#post-heading

نویسنده سید حسین موسویان-میدل ایست آی-چهارم می 2026

به گزارش ایسنا، «سید حسین موسویان» سفیر پیشین ایران در آلمان در گزارشی مطرح کرد که هم‌زمان با برگزاری کنفرانس بازبینی پیمان منع گسترش تسلیحات اتمی(ان‌پی‌تی) در نیویورک اعتبار این پیمان تحت فشار بی‌سابقه‌ای قرار گرفته است، چراکه این پیمان بین‌المللی که بر اساس یک «معامله بزرگ» میان محدودیت‌های هسته‌ای تضمین‌های امنیتی طراحی شده، اکنون با بحران عمیق‌تری روبه‌روست

به گفته موسویان، این بحران ناشی از عدم پایبندی فنی نیست، بلکه بحرانی ناشی از از دست رفتن اعتماد سیاسی است

او با اشاره به سابقه مذاکرات پیرامون حل‌وفصل مسئله برنامه هسته‌ای ایران، همکاری‌های ایران با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی ذیل توافق جامع پادمانی و اجرای توافق ان‌پی‌تی در ایران که از زمان توافق هسته‌ای در سال ۲۰۱۵ تحت یکی از سختگیرانه‌ترین مقررات نظارت و راستی‌آزمایی آژانس قرار داشته است، نوشته هیچ گاه شواهدی برای اثبات ادعای وجود یک برنامه فعال تسلیحات اتمی در ایران در گزارش‌های فنی متعدد آژانس و ارزیابی‌های اطلاعاتی آمریکا وجود نداشت است

این سیاستمدار ایرانی با اشاره به خروج «دونالد ترامپ» رئیس‌جمهور آمریکا از توافق هسته‌ای در سال ۲۰۱۸ و حصول برخی پیشرفت‌ها در مذاکرات هسته‌ای با دولت دوم او در سال‌ ۲۰۲۵ و ۲۰۲۶ نوشته در نهایت، این  پیشرفت‌ها با تشدید تحریم‌ها تجاوزات آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی علیه ایران تحت‌الشاع قرار گرفت

شفافیت می‌تواند آسیب‌پذیری راهبردی را افزایش دهد

موسویان در گزارش خود که در وبگاه خبری میدل ایست آی منتشر شده است، نوشت: این تجربه به درس‌های راهبردی مشخصی مبدل شده است که اکنون نگاه هسته‌ای ایران را شکل می‌دهد. اول این که پایبندی به قوانین امنیت را تضمین نمی‌کند. عضویت در ان‌پی‌تی و اجرای پادمان‌های آژانس، نه‌تنها تضمین امنیتی به همراه نداشت، بلکه آسیب‌پذیری را تشدید کرد که در اقداماتی از جمله تحریم‌های جامع، حملات سایبری مانند ویروس استاکس‌نت، ترور و به شهادت رساندن دانشمندان هسته‌ای-از شهید «محسن فخری‌زاده» در ۲۰۲۰ تا ۱۴ دانشمند هسته‌ای  دیگر در عملیات موسوم به «شیر غران» رژیم صهیونیستی و نهایتا حملات نظامی به تاسیسات هسته‌ای ایران در نطنز، اصفهان و اراک

 دومین درس این است که شفافیت می‌تواند آسیب‌پذیری راهبردی را افزایش دهد. افزایش جزئیات و بازرسی‌های دقیق اطلاعات حساس درباره تاسیسات و کارکنان را در اختیار طرف‌هایی قرار می‌دهد که از آن در اقدامات قهری بهره‌برداری می‌کنند

سوم این که از دیدگاه ایران آژانس سیاسی شده است. مقامات ایرانی دیگر آژانس را یک نهاد منحصرا فنی نمی‌بینند بلکه معتقدند دیده‌بان هسته‌ای سازمان ملل تحت تاثیر فشارهای ژئوپولیتیکی غرب است و گزارش‌های آن را دارای «انگیزه سیاسی» می‌دانند که از بی‌طرفی فنی فاصله گرفته است

اعتماد ایران به آژانس تضعیف شده است

نگارنده معتقد است: بی‌اعتمادی فزاینده ایران به آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی طی دو دهه گذشته شکل گرفته است. «حیدر مصلحی» وزیر اطلاعات پیشین ایران در سال ۲۰۱۰ آژانس را به جاسوسی متهم کرد. پس از حملات متجاوزانه آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی به تاسیسات اتمی ایران در سال ۲۰۲۵ این  بدگمانی تشدید یافت و «محمود نبویان» نایب رییس کمیسیون امنیت ملی و سیاست خارجی مجلس شورای اسلامی مدعی شد که ریزتراشه‌های جاسوسی در کفش بازرسان آژانس هنگام تفتیش امنیتی در تاسیسات اتمی ایران کشف شده است

درس راهبردی چهارم برای ایران این بود که روند راستی‌آزمایی اقدامات قهری را تسهیل می‌کند؛ ‌گزارش‌های پادمانی و قطعنامه‌ها از دیدگاه ایران یک توجیه حقوقی و سیاسی برای اعمال تحریم‌ها، انزوای دیپلماتیک و دیگر اشکال اعمال فشار محسوب می‌شود

در همین راستا، «سرگئی لاوروف» وزیر امور خارجه ایران پس از حملات متجاوزانه به تاسیسات اتمی ایران آژانس را متهم کرد که بهانه‌هایی برای حملات هوایی به این تاسیسات فراهم آورده است

در نتیجه، اعتماد ایران به بی‌طرفی آژانس کاهش یافته و درخواست‌ها برای محدودسازی دسترسی‌های آژانس را در تهران افزایش داده است

درس پنجم ایران این بوده است که آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی نقش اصلی و تعیین‌کننده‌ای در پرونده هسته‌ای ایران داشته‌اند و نهادهای چندجانبه مانند شورای امنیت سازمان ملل و آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی نقشی ثانویه و تشریفاتی داشته‌اند. بی‌عملی این نهادها و ناتوانی آن‌ها از موضع‌گیری‌های هرچند جزئی مانند محکومیت آشکار ترورهای دانشمندان هسته‌ای یا حملات به تاسیسات اتمی ایران پرسش‌هایی را درباره بی‌طرفی و استقلال این نهادها برانگیخته و رویدادهایی مانند کنفرانس بازبینی ان‌پی‌تی را سازوکاری نه‌چندان اثرگذار و عمدتا روندی وقت‌گیر بدون در بر داشتن نتیجه‌ای هدفمند جلوه می‌دهد

بازدارندگی راهبردی تضمین نهایی بقاست، نه پایبندی به پیمان‌ها

در بخش پایانی این مطلب مطرح شده است: این تحولات اعتبار ان‌پی‌تی، ‌ آژانس و شورای امنیت را در نگاه بسیاری از کشورها، به‌ویژه ایران تضعیف کرده است. از دید تهران، سال‌ها پایبندی، بازرسی‌های دقیق و توافقات نه‌ منجر به امنیت شد و نه عادی‌سازی؛ ‌ بلکه تحریم، اجبار و خرابکاری و نهایتا حمله نظامی به همراه داشت. در همین حال، ‌ برخی از کشورهایی که سلاح اتمی ندارند توانمندی و ظرفیت پیشرفته غنی‌سازی اورانیوم را بدون درخواستی برای برچیدن آن حفظ کرده‌اند. از سوی دیگر نیز بازیگران غیرعضو در ان‌پی‌تی که سلاح اتمی دارند، ‌ عمدتا در برابر فشارهای مشابه مصون هستند

رژیم صهیونیستی که از عضویت در ان‌پی‌تی رویگردان بوده و به طور موثری مانع از اجرای قطعنامه‌های دیرینه سازمان ملل برای منطقه عاری از سلاح‌های کشتار جمعی در غرب آسیا شده است با فشار هدفمندی از سوی شورای امنیت، آژانس و قدرت‌های بزرگ در زمینه زرادخانه هسته‌ای خود مواجه نشده است. تضاد رویکردی که نسبت به برنامه هسته‌ای رژیم صهیونیستی وجود دارد در مقایسه با کره شمالی نشان می‌دهد که بازدارندگی راهبردی تضمین نهایی بقا است، نه پایبندی به پیمان‌ها

موسویان معتقد است که احیای مشروعیت نیازمند اقداماتی فراتر از تاییدهای تشریفاتی بوده و نیازمند بازسازی اعتماد نسبت به بی‌طرفی نهادهای بین‌المللی و بستن شکاف رو به گسترش میان اصول حقوقی و واقعیت‌های ژئوپولیتیکی است

https://www.isna.ir/news/1405021508638/

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Eye, May 4, 2026

As diplomats convene in New York from 27 April to 22 May for the latest session of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, its credibility is under unprecedented strain.

Designed as a grand bargain between nuclear restraint and security assurances, the treaty now faces a deeper crisis – one not of technical compliance, but of political trust. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the case of Iran.

For over two decades, Iran has been the most intensively monitored state under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of the IAEA’s entire budget, the highest portion is dedicated to monitoring, verification, and oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme – more than any other state.  

In the past two decades, successive IAEA reports, alongside publicly available US intelligence assessments, have not established conclusive evidence of an active nuclear weapons programme.

Since 2003, Tehran engaged in sustained negotiations with major powers, most notably reaching the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which it undertook significant nuclear restrictions and remained in compliance.

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However, the subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the agreement marked a critical rupture. In the years that followed, diplomatic efforts resumed, including US Iran talks in 2025 and 2026 as well as the Islamabad track, both of which reportedly achieved meaningful progress.

Yet these negotiations were ultimately overshadowed by renewed military action involving the US and Israel, alongside intensified sanctions and forms of economic and political blockade.

Strategic lessons

This experience has crystallised into a set of strategic lessons that now shape Iran’s nuclear outlook.

First, compliance does not guarantee security. Membership in the NPT and adherence to IAEA’s safeguards not only failed to provide security guarantees, but instead coincided with escalating vulnerabilities – manifested in comprehensive sanctions, sustained cyber operations such as the Stuxnet attack that damaged nuclear infrastructure, and ultimately military strikes – contributing, in Tehran’s view, to an existential threat reinforced by war and economic blockade.

Second, transparency can increase strategic exposure. Detailed disclosures and intrusive inspections reveal sensitive facilities and personnel, potentially increasing vulnerability by providing information that will be exploited in coercive actions, including cyber operations, sabotage incidents, targeted killings of nuclear scientists, and military strikes against key nuclear infrastructure, such as enrichment and heavy water facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak during US and Israeli operations.

At least 14 nuclear scientists are believed to be among those killed in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, launched on 13 June 2025. Prior to 2025, several other Iranian scientists were killed in assassinations spanning from 2010 to 2020, including Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (2020), Majid Shahriari (2010), and Masoud Ali Mohammadi (2010).

Third, the IAEA is perceived as politically influenced. Iranian officials increasingly view the IAEA not as a purely technical body, but as one shaped by geopolitical pressures, particularly from western states.

Senior bodies – including Iran’s foreign ministry and Atomic Energy Organization – publicly criticised the agency’s reporting as “politically motivated” and reflective of external influence, especially in the context of Board of Governors resolutions and post-conflict assessments. Such statements underscore a growing perception in Tehran that the IAEA has deviated from strict technical neutrality and operates, at least in part, within broader political dynamics.

Erosion of trust

Distrust of the IAEA inside Iran has grown steadily over the past two decades, particularly amid allegations that inspections were exploited for intelligence purposes. In 2010, Iran’s Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi accused the IAEA of sending “spies working for foreign intelligence gathering organisations among its inspectors”.

After the 2025 Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, such suspicions intensified. Senior Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian accused IAEA inspectors of espionage and alleged that surveillance microchips had been discovered concealed in inspectors’ shoes during security checks at nuclear sites.

Years of compliance and intrusive inspections did not produce security or normalisation; instead, they culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack

These accusations, whether accurate or not, further eroded Iranian confidence in the IAEA’s neutrality and strengthened calls in Tehran to restrict access to inspections.

Fourth, verification processes facilitate coercive measures. Safeguards reporting and resolutions are perceived as providing legal and political justification for sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and other forms of pressure. 

A few days after the 2025 Israeli-US strike on Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the IAEA of providing “pretexts” that enabled Israel to justify its recent air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

Fifth, US and Israeli primacy in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier. The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear negotiations since 2003 – culminating in the JCPOA and followed by subsequent developments, including the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and escalating tensions that extended to military action by the US and Israel – leaves little doubt that these two actors have played the primary and decisive role in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier.

In practice, the direction, pace, and outcomes of the process have been driven largely by Washington and Tel Aviv, while multilateral institutions have occupied a secondary and largely ineffective position. Bodies such as the UN Security Council and the IAEA, along with the broader framework of the NPT, appear in this context to have functioned primarily in reactive or procedural capacities rather than as independent and influential actors.

From this perspective, their inability to adopt even minimal positions – such as issuing clear condemnations of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or military strikes targeting nuclear facilities – has been interpreted as evidence of diminished effectiveness and constrained autonomy.

This pattern raises critical questions regarding the capacity of the nonproliferation regime to function as an impartial and authoritative framework in the face of major geopolitical conflicts.

Viewed through this lens, the recurring review conferences of the NPT risk being perceived not as effective mechanisms of governance, but as largely procedural exercises that consume time and resources without delivering meaningful outcomes.

Credibility undermined

Taken together, these developments have severely undermined the credibility of the NPT, the IAEA, and the UNSC in the eyes of many states, particularly Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, years of compliance, intrusive inspections, and negotiated agreements did not produce security or normalisation; instead, they culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack.

At the same time, other non-nuclear-weapon states continue to maintain advanced enrichment capabilities without facing demands for their elimination, while nuclear-armed states outside the NPT framework remain largely immune from comparable pressure.

Most notably, Israel has remained the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East while refusing to join the NPT, effectively blocking implementation of long-standing UN resolutions calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

Yet neither the IAEA, nor the UNSC, nor the major world powers have exerted meaningful pressure on Israel regarding its nuclear arsenal. The contrast with North Korea has further reinforced the perception that strategic deterrence – not treaty compliance – provides the ultimate guarantee of survival. As a result, the foundational bargain of the NPT is increasingly being called into question.

If states conclude that adherence to nonproliferation obligations neither protects their security nor ensures equal treatment under international law, then confidence in the entire nonproliferation regime will continue to erode.

Restoring legitimacy will require far more than procedural reaffirmations; it demands rebuilding trust in the impartiality of international institutions and closing the widening gap between legal principles and geopolitical realities.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/war-iran-fundamental-crisis-trust-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty