Essays, Publications

Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy

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An early version of this article appeared online June 9 because of the high interest in the ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The version below, which also appears in the print edition of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, was updated to reflect minor editorial changes to the previously posted version. 

Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014. The goal is to agree on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and thus enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.

A key challenge is to agree how to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for nuclear weapons.

This article proposes a compromise based on a two-stage approach that involves Iran maintaining a capacity for enriching a small amount of uranium annually for research reactor fuel in the short term and developing a potential enrichment capacity in the longer term that would be appropriate to fuel power reactors. Iranian supply needs for its power reactors will develop in 2021 if Tehran decides to fuel the existing Bushehr power reactor domestically, in whole or in part, rather than renewing its fuel supply contract with Russia or buying fuel from another foreign supplier.

The proposed compromise also reflects Tehran’s plan to shift from its current low-power, first-generation centrifuges to high-capacity machines that are still under development.

This article therefore suggests that, during the next five years, Iran should modernize its enrichment facilities and in doing so, keep its operating capacity at about the current level rather than begin to operate the many thousands of first-generation machines that it already has installed and continue setting up more. During this period, Iran could phase out its first-generation machines in favor of the second-generation centrifuges it already has installed but has not yet operated. At the same time, it could develop, produce, and store components for a future generation of centrifuges that would be suitable for commercial-scale deployment. These later-generation centrifuges would not need to be assembled, except for test machines, until at least 2019.

To maintain the confidence of the international community that there will be no diversion of centrifuge components to a secret enrichment plant, the current transparency measures that Iran has undertaken for its centrifuge program would continue. These transparency measures should become the standard for transparency for centrifuge production worldwide.

Finally, the article suggests that the five-year period created by this proposal be used as an opportunity by Iran, the P5+1, and other interested states to explore in a second stage of the negotiations a multinational uranium-enrichment arrangement that would see Iran deploy its advanced centrifuges in a new regional, multinational facility rather than a national enrichment plant. By committing to working on such multinational arrangements for the Middle East and, ultimately, around the world, Iran and the P5+1 could chart a path to greatly reduce the proliferation risks that stem from national control of enrichment plants, regardless of location.

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Latest Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, July/August, 2014.

Older Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, June 9, 2014.

Interviews

A compromise proposal for nuclear talks with Iran

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As American and Iranian officials meet in Geneva to try to find a way through the impasse holding up a comprehensive multilateral deal onIran‘s nuclear programme, a group of Princeton University academics have sent them a proposed road-map on how to get around the blockage.

The Princeton report, published on the Arms Control Today website, focuses on the core issue that has proved most problematic in the four months of talks so far – Iran’s future capacity for enriching uranium. This has hitherto been such a gap to bridge because Iran and the West come at it from entirely different perspectives.

The Princeton compromise is a two-stage approach, allowing a very limited enrichment capacity for the existing research reactor in Tehran in the short term, but with the flexibility to expand that capacity to keep pace with the construction of future nuclear power stations in the long term. The existing contract for Russian nuclear fuel rods for Bushehr expires in 2021. If Tehran decides it wants to use it own rods after that, then its enrichment capacity would be stepped up as that deadline approaches, but not before 2019.

In the intervening five years, Iran would focus on modernising its enrichment plant, replacing the now ancient and inefficient IR-1 centrifuges, based on half-century old technology, with a new generation of IR-2m centrifuges, with about five times the capacity. As the new machines were installed in this first phase, total capacity would remain the same. Even more advanced centrifuges would be developed with an eye to the future.

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“A compromise proposal for nuclear talks with Iran,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Julian Borger, The Guardian, June 9, 2014.

Interviews

Princeton experts propose possible solution on Iran centrifuges

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As American and Iranian officials meet June 9 in Geneva, a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators, Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, and several physicists at Princeton are proposing a possible solution to the dispute over how many centrifuges Iran can retain under a long-term nuclear agreement.

Their draft proposal, prepared for publication by the magazine Arms Control Today and made available to Al-Monitor, would permit Iran to transition from the rudimentary machines it currently employs to enrich uranium to more-advanced centrifuges over the course of five years. This would reduce the numbers of centrifuges Iran would require to meet the needs of even an expanded civilian reactor program, but it still raises concerns about Iran’s ability to “break out” and produce fuel for nuclear weapons.

To deal with these concerns, the authors — Mousavian, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel — suggest that Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, the P5+1 nations, explore creating a multilateral uranium enrichment facility that could supply Iran and other countries in the region with nuclear fuel. Such an arrangement, they say, “could provide a long-term solution to the proliferation concerns raised by national enrichment plants in the Middle East and elsewhere.”

With the interim agreement due to expire July 20, there is mounting pressure on all sides to resolve disputes over the scope of Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. If no deal is reached, the interim agreement can be renewed for six months, but political and bureaucratic realities argue for resolution by this fall, when the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, and US Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns are due to retire and Americans will vote in congressional elections that could flip control of the Senate to the Republicans. Without a deal, pressure is sure to increase in the US Congress for more sanctions legislation against Iran, which could embolden Iranian hard-liners.

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“Princeton experts propose possible solution on Iran centrifuges,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Barbara Slavin, Al-Monitor, June 9, 2014.

Lectures

Asia Society: Iran and the US: Where Things Stand (Video)

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Ambassador Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian diplomat and nuclear negotiator, and Gary Sick, Iran expert and former National Security Council member, explore root causes of the misperceptions Iranians and Americans have of each other and the missed opportunities for dialogue over several decades. Hamid Biglari moderates the discussion.

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“Iran and the US: Where Things Stand,” Presentation at the Asia Society, June 3, 2014. (Video)

Lectures

Atlantic Council: Toward Better US-Iran Relations (Video)

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Lessons can be learned from 30 years of mistrust, misperception, and misconception that has persisted between the United States and Iran. While rapprochement is far from inevitable, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author, outlined the path to success for current negotiations while speaking at a South Asia Center panel. Mousavian argued that, rather than focusing on the nuclear dimension alone, the United States and Iran must complement negotiations with extensive unilateral dialogue on all outstanding issues, including human rights, terrorism, and regional cooperation. However, the underlying key to rapprochement is simply “to reciprocate goodwill with goodwill.” Fellow panelistJohn Marks, founder and president of Search for Common Ground, urged the need for significant people-to-people diplomacy for the two nations to reconcile with the past and enable alternative solutions. “To pursue a better future, we must face the past—understanding differences & acting on commonalities.”

“Without Iran, you would have never dismantled Syria’s chemical weapons,” said Mousavian, citing an example of how the United States and Iran can cooperate at the highest levels to solve the most challenging regional issues of the day. Emphasizing Iran’s role as a predominant regional actor and the United States’ role as a preeminent international actor, both nations ought to make up for the multitude of missed opportunities –most notably the lack of cooperation in Afghanistan. Mousavian emphatically endorsed the idea that Iranian Americans are a unique asset capable of shifting the tide in favor of rapprochement due to their ethnic links to Iran and cultural affinity to both nations. Alternatively, Marks suggests that the best way to eradicate, if not reduce, the fog of misperception is via “the exchange of technical expertise and scientific insights that can promote alternative solutions.”

Both speakers agreed that the two states stand on the brink of progress on the nuclear conflict. Peace on this issue alone, however, would be temporary and unstable if other sources of mistrust are ignored. For that reason, any resolution on the nuclear front “should be regarded as the foundation for greater cooperation or a grand bargain between the two states.” The Iranian-American relationship does not have to be a zero-sum game. “Peace between Iran as a regional power and the United States as a global power could lead to the creation of a framework for cooperation that would bring stability to the Middle East, from Lebanon in the west to Afghanistan in the east.”

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Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014. 

Event Coverage: “Toward Better US-Iran Relations,” Derek Davison, LobeLog, June 4, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014. (Video)

Lectures

Atlantic Council: U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future

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On Tuesday June 3, 2014, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted a conversation called “U.S.- Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future.” The discussion featured Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, and John Marks, President and Founder of Search for Common Ground. The conversation was moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Seyyed Hossein Mousavian began by separating the history of U.S.-Iran relations into three periods. The first period, between 1856 and 1953, was characterized by cordial relations between the two countries, where the U.S. supported Iranian independence and democracy. The second period, from 1953 to 1979, saw relations start to sour beginning with the American supported coup toppling democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. Mousavian calls this period the “dominant era,” a time where the American-backed Shah ruled as a dictator. The third and final period, from 1979 to present day, began with the Islamic Revolution that deposed the Shah. Mousavian said this era represented the “most hostile type of relations” between two countries, surpassing even U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

The question Mousavian posed was: why? Having spent time in both Iran and the U.S., Mousavian suggests that foreign policy experts in the U.S. and Iran are disconnected from one another and thus misunderstand each other. Despite the hostilities, Mousavian argues that every Iranian administration has approached the U.S. with a desire to normalize relations, but all efforts have failed. The objective now is to look to the future as Mousavian believes the current state of affairs between the U.S. and Iran cannot be maintained. In a Middle East region that is “on fire,” U.S.-Iran cooperation is necessary. Mousavian proposes that comprehensive negotiations should cover a range of issues, instead of the routine “piecemeal approaches.” Within this discussion, the U.S. must not insist on the nuclear issue being paramount, and must be willing to discuss other issues. Mousavian thinks rapprochement should begin with areas of common interest; the U.S., he argues, mistakenly tends to focus on issues of disagreement. After all, he recalls, Henry Kissinger once said that the U.S. and Iran have more common interests than any other two countries. Areas of mutual interest include stopping organized crime and drug trafficking, to supporting governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When inevitably the differences do arise, both countries must approach the areas of contention with flexibility. Finally, Mousavian believes American and Iranian politicians must recognize and apologize for past grievances that have polarized the countries from one another; otherwise, the relationship will be unable to move forward.

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Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless.

Part (1): Four major, interrelated elements shape Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the US

Page: 161

First, he wholeheartedly believes that regardless of all the ups and downs, pushes and pulls between Iran and the US, Washington’s ultimate intention is to topple Iran’s Islamic system and subordinate them within a Pax Americana, as it did during the Shah’s era after the 1953 coup. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains that the US, no matter which school of thought and party is in power or which president has taken office, intends to “wipe out the Islamic Republic”with all possible means at its disposal. The conclusion he draws from US rhetoric, policies, and behavior is that the US will not relent from its desire for regime change unless the current government surrenders its principles, religious beliefs, political structure, and independence. The United States’ tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and provision of material support, its covert operations, support for belligerent groups and the Islamic Republic’s opposition (including a budgetary provision), its denial of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment under the NPT, and its intrusive and paralyzing economic sanctions are all viewed by Ayatollah Khamenei as indisputable attempts to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. He maintains that the US’s primary objective is to undermine the Islamic government by fostering internal disorder and, ultimately, regime change.

The second element that shapes Ayatollah Khamenei’s disposition towards the US is his firm belief that US foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically regarding Iran, is overwhelmingly dominated by the pro-Israel lobby. From his point of view, even the president of the United States does not have any authority over US foreign policy. He is surprised that year after year, the president or other high-level officials of the most powerful country on earth attend American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) gatherings and report what they have done to undermine the Iranian government and satisfy pro-Israel lobby demands. Although there is in general a consensus within the nezam about Israel’s influence on US Middle East policy, some argue that it is the Zionists who determine the US foreign policy, and not Americans.

The third element shaping the Supreme Leader’s perception of the US is his extreme mistrust of American politics. The documents confiscated by students after seizing the US Embassy seemed to justify such a stance by many high-echelon Iranian politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei. According to those documents, the embassy was involved in espionage and the fostering of covert links to members of the new government and army.

Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei’s sees the American government and the system it represents as addicted to arrogance and hegemony. He feels that if a country is not seen as a “great power,” then a lord–serf relationship is the only kind of relationship that the US is prepared to accept.

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“Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, June 1, 2014.