Democracy Now, April 14,2026-Interview with Malley & Mousavian
Transcript
We’re joined now in the studio by two former negotiators for the U.S. and Iran in this Democracy Now! exclusive.
Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian served as spokesperson for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005. He also served as Iran’s ambassador to Germany. He’s author of two books, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir and, most recently, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.
And we’re joined by Rob Malley. He was one of the negotiators on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He served as a senior Middle East official under Presidents Clinton, Obama and Biden. Under Biden, he served as the special envoy for Iran. He is now a lecturer at Yale University, former president of the International Crisis Group, co-author with Hussein Agha of a new book, Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine.
AMY GOODMAN: Why don’t we start off, in this exclusive we have with the two of you at the table, American and Iranian negotiator, with your assessment of what’s taken place? It can be right through to this week, the failed negotiations, and before that, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. Why don’t we begin with you, Rob Malley?
ROBERT MALLEY: Well, first, I think — thanks for having me.
You know, we can’t ignore the fact that this war was unlawful, unjustified, unnecessary. And I think even if we’re now going to talk about negotiations, even if the negotiations are to succeed, none of that could let us forget or excuse how we got here. So, I do want to insist on that, because, you know, if negotiations succeed, it’s going to be too quick for the administration to say, “You see? We were right.”
But I think the real question now is whether the U.S. and Iran are engaging in these negotiations, trying to find a solution that will meet both their sides’ core needs, or whether, in this case, the U.S. takes the attitude that “we won the war because we’re stronger, and if you’re not accepting the war, then you’re going to — we’re going to inflict more pain.” That won’t work. And it won’t work because Iran believes, and with some justification, that it has inflicted pain on the U.S. and that every day that goes by, it’s going to inflict more. So, they’re not in a position right now where Iran is sort of begging for a deal because it wants to avoid an escalation. They believe, again, rightly or wrongly, that they could sustain the pain longer than the U.S. can.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, as you talk about what Iran believes, let’s go to the Iranian ambassador, Hossein Mousavian. Your assessment of what has taken place? Now it seems to be coming down to the nuclear negotiations, around, well, Iran saying they’ll do a moratorium for five years and the United States demanding 20. But, overall, the picture?
SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: I think Iranians are now coming to the negotiating table with more mistrust than ever, because once the deal was agreed in 2015, Iran was in full compliance, and the U.S. withdrew. Then there was a nuclear negotiation between Iran and the U.S. in 2025. The negotiations, as the foreign minister of Oman said, had significant progress; a deal was within reach. The U.S. withdrew and attacked Iran. We had negotiations in 2026. Again, as the Omani foreign minister said, negotiations had significant progress, and a deal was within reach. Again, the U.S. attacked. Then we had the latest round in Islamabad. It was a one-day negotiation—the highest level after the revolution, after 48 years. The U.S. side said there was progress; only the nuclear issue was not agreed. We agreed on everything, as President Trump said. The Iranian foreign minister also said we were very close to a final deal. And then immediately the U.S. imposed a blockade, a maritime blockade. That is why they really do not know whether the U.S. is genuinely committed to diplomacy or not.
If we are talking now about the nuclear issue, first of all, every assessment of all U.S. intelligence establishments since 2007 has consistently stated no evidence of weaponization and no evidence of an Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons—even in 2025 and 2026. This is the U.S. security assessment: no decision to go nuclear and no evidence of weaponization. Every IAEA report since 2003 has also said there is no evidence of weaponization. Therefore, there was no imminent threat. And I believe it was an illegal war, no doubt. The overwhelming majority of the international community has also insisted the war was illegal. Now we are coming to the negotiations.
The biggest issue you have heard during the last two years is Iran’s 450 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. They say Iran could make 10 nuclear bombs if it decides to do so. And even you hear from American officials that they are insisting on this stockpile. But I don’t know whether people know that in the 2025 negotiations, Iran said it was ready to dilute all 60% material down to below 5%. In the 2026 negotiations, Iran officially told the Americans it was ready to dilute. This was confirmed by the Omani foreign minister in his interview with Face the Nation, stating that Iran was and is ready to dilute its entire stockpile to below 5%. Iran accepted to suspend enrichment for some years. Iran accepted to have zero stockpile. Therefore, there is no worry—and there was no worry—about high-level enriched uranium stockpiles.
The other issue is the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. They have ambiguities and technical questions about Iran’s nuclear program. Iran was in full compliance with the JCPOA. The JCPOA was the most comprehensive agreement in the history of nonproliferation, with Iranian commitments going far beyond the NPT. But Iran accepted it. And then, in the 2025 talks and again in the 2026 nuclear talks in Islamabad, Iranians said: “We are ready to go to the highest level of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA to address every technical ambiguity.” Therefore, when Iran was ready to dilute its entire stockpile, when Iran was ready to reach the maximum level of cooperation with the IAEA to remove concerns about possible military dimensions, and when Iran was also ready to suspend enrichment for some years and accept zero stockpile, then why the blockade?
I really do not understand whether the issue is nuclear or not, because we have heard from American officials who have publicly said the aim was controlling Iranian oil reserves. And we have also heard from American officials that the aim was regime change. If the aim is controlling Iranian oil reserves like Venezuela, or if the aim is regime change while using the nuclear issue as a pretext, then we are not going to have any deal.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Ambassador, I wanted to ask you precisely about this issue of how the Trump administration often tries to confuse in the American public the difference between enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes versus — which Iran, like all signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have a right to do — and the actual development of bombs, of a nuclear bomb, and also the fact that the former Ayatollah Khamenei specifically had a fatwa against Iran developing a nuclear bomb. Could you explain that position of the leader who was killed by the United States?
SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: Actually, what Iranians are saying concerns their legitimate legal rights under the NPT. Argentina has enrichment. Brazil has enrichment. Germany has enrichment. Japan has enrichment. And none of them has nuclear weapons, while all are members of the NPT. Iran does not accept any deal that would make it the only NPT member discriminated against with respect to its legitimate legal rights under the treaty. Therefore, respecting Iran’s rights, like those of any other NPT member, to enrichment is one issue; the exercise of those rights is another.
Iran was ready, as a confidence-building measure, not to exercise those rights for a specific period. What the U.S. is demanding—zero enrichment—is, in Iran’s view, a clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of course, Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that all weapons of mass destruction are religiously forbidden (haram). Iran is a member of the NPT, and the important point is that despite being one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world, Iran has never diverted its nuclear program toward weaponization, as confirmed by all U.S. intelligence assessments and the IAEA.
Therefore, we need to distinguish between respecting Iran’s rights, like those of other NPT members, to peaceful nuclear technology—which is one issue—and confidence-building measures, such as temporary suspension of enrichment, transparency steps, or zero stockpile arrangements, which are another. I think we need to keep a clear distinction between these two.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And I’d like to ask Rob Malley — the negotiators for the Trump administration in the latest round have continued to include Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, two people who would have, some would say, virtually no knowledge of the complexity of negotiations over nuclear enrichment and the development of nuclear bombs. Your assessment of their role in all of this, and also why, in all of this talk about Iran coming under some kind of international control, there is no mention of the fact that there’s one power that does have nuclear weapons in the Middle East — Israel — and it is not a party to the NPT?
ROBERT MALLEY: So, first, allow me to — you won’t be surprised that I have a little bit of a different appreciation from Hossein in terms of Iran’s nuclear program. I think there is some evidence, certainly at some point, that they did have a military program. And my view is that they’ve always — their view was “We’re going to hedge. We’re going to have a nuclear program, so that if we do want to develop a weapon, we can.” I think that’s — you know, one could understand why they did. But I think it’s pretty clear that they did have that. So, I don’t think that there was anything — that there was anything — and that’s why, by the way, President Obama negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was a way to contain — and, I think, successfully — Iran’s nuclear program, to make sure that if they were tempted to try to dash for a bomb, they couldn’t do it in a quick way, and it would be immediately verified. I think one of the dramatically tragic mistakes of the first Trump administration was to tear that deal up. So, I don’t think one has to be naive about what Iran was doing, and still see that in what Trump was doing was — produced exactly the wrong effects.
Now, in terms of the current negotiations, no, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff are not nuclear experts — by the way, nor am I. That’s not the issue. The issue is whether they’re surrounded by nuclear experts. And everything — all the reports that I’ve received is that when they negotiated with the Iranians in the past — I don’t know what happened in Islamabad, but in the past, they didn’t have nuclear experts. And so, there was — and I think this has been well documented, that they misunderstood Iranian positions. They couldn’t appreciate what they were actually trying to convey.
And part of it, I think, is because of the oddity of this administration, where so many of the decisions seem to rely and reside in one person, not the most reliable of all people. It’s the president of the United States. And he is very mercurial, and he’s very unpredictable, and he changes his mind, and he changes his objectives. We don’t really know what his objectives are in this conflict.
And so, I think what Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner did is they relayed what they heard from the Iranians. They didn’t really fully understand them. And then, depending on the president’s mood, he varied on whether he was in the mood to accept a negotiated deal or was more eager for confrontation. And my assessment is that, in this case, a bit emboldened by Venezuela — and we just saw the clip of where things are with that country — he felt he could not fail at a military endeavor. He was going to win. He was going to bring Iran to knees and then be able to dictate the terms of a settlement. That’s not what happened.
AMY GOODMAN: When the U.S. attacked and Israel attacked Iran, I thought it was very interesting that the Omani foreign minister, who was negotiating, who was mediating, actually took a plane to Washington, because he didn’t feel that Kushner and Witkoff were conveying what Iran was agreeing to. And he went on all the U.S. media he could, so that he could get President Trump’s attention, particularly on Fox. But I want to go to what he said on Face the Nation. This is Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi. He said Iran had agreed to abandon its nuclear enrichment and stockpiling program.
BADR BIN HAMAD ALBUSAIDI: If the ultimate objective is to ensure forever that Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb, I think we have cracked that problem through these negotiations by agreeing a very important breakthrough that has never been achieved anytime before. And I think if we can capture that and build on it, I think a deal is within our reach.
AMY GOODMAN: So, that was the Omani foreign minister. He actually kept repeating in all these interviews — he had a phrase — “This is better than Obama.” You know, someone had trained — it’s like they had said to him, “This is what Trump needs to hear,” because that’s Trump’s main motivating factor, “better than Obama.” You are, Rob Malley, one of the lead negotiators for the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. If you can explain why you — if you think this was better than what you achieved, and why, anyway, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked the very next day? And what happened that very next day, the Iranian girls’ school in Minab was taken out, it looks like with a U.S. missile, and 175 people, about, died, overwhelmingly primary school girls.
ROBERT MALLEY: So, I mean, I said it at the same time, either before or after the Omani foreign minister, because based on the reports, and Hossein just said that, Iran was agreeing to suspend enrichment for a period of years. That is beyond anything that either President Obama achieved or President Biden was — could have achieved. I mean, at that time, Iran was not talking about suspending; it was accepting limits. I think those limits were sufficient to contain Iran’s nuclear program. But if what President Trump wanted was to be able to say at the end of these negotiations, “I beat President Obama,” I would have granted him that, if it could have spared us a war, because it was — you know, it was a truism. Suspension is better than the limited enrichment that Iran had.
Now, again, I want to emphasize that marginal gain between suspension of enrichment or very low enrichment does not justify in any way, does not excuse, an illegal war that has caused the deaths that you mentioned, far more than that, destruction and now disruptions of the world economy, that then hurt the poorest nations first and foremost. And that’s, of course, also because of Iran’s reaction, but the trigger was the war that was launched by the United States and Israel.
So, if that was his goal — but I think it goes back to the point that I was making earlier. I think the war was launched by President Trump because he felt he could and he felt that he was on a roll, was on a roll after Venezuela, after the attack on Iran a year ago, that he could be the president who finally deals with this issue. He’s changed, in his view, the regime in Venezuela. He thought he could change the regime in Iran, and then, next, Cuba, and that he would go down in history as this person. The details didn’t matter. And I think he really felt unstoppable. And he felt that the experts who were warning him didn’t know what they were talking about; he knew better.
AMY GOODMAN: In his gut.
ROBERT MALLEY: In his gut, whatever gut he has, yes.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: I’d like to ask Ambassador Mousavian: Where do we go from here? Especially now that — after Trump announced this blockade of Iranian ports, and yet he’s getting no support from the European Union on this. And, of course, China has made it very clear that they are going to continue to expect to be able to get through, have their ships go through the Strait of Hormuz and to trade with Iran. What is the — what are the options for the United States? And also, can Iran survive a long-term blockade, economic blockade, by the United States?
SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: The naval blockade, based on United Nations Resolution 1974, is an act of war and an act of aggression. Therefore, internationally and legally, what the U.S. is doing constitutes a clear act of aggression or war, because it is causing suffering for a 90 million-strong nation, with the fear of famine and hunger affecting the population. This is not just about a state.
Nevertheless, regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the reality is that this strait remained open and free for navigation for 47 to 48 years. There was never any problem. Even after the first U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in 2025, Iran did not impose any restrictions on navigation. But when the U.S. and Israel attacked for the second time in 2026, Iranians felt this was an existential threat. That was the key difference. That is why they considered using all the tools available to them, one of which was the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, they did not close the strait; they imposed limited restrictions. Internationally, this strait should remain open to free navigation, and there should be no restrictions. Legally and internationally, Iran cannot close it. However, there are also international rules that during wartime, a country that is attacked may impose limited and calculated restrictions on navigation, but not broad restrictions, and it cannot close the strait.
For the future, if the U.S. is looking for a nuclear deal—as we have already discussed—and as Rob said, they have already achieved what they wanted, more than in the Obama period and more than under the JCPOA, they can still achieve one additional major breakthrough on the nuclear issue. President Trump could propose that Iran move toward a multilateral enrichment mechanism in the Persian Gulf. I, together with nuclear scientists at Princeton University, have published multiple articles on this. The latest was 10 days before the 2025 war. We argued that rather than national enrichment—since Saudi Arabia is also seeking enrichment, and if Saudi Arabia obtains it, Egypt will seek it, and if Egypt obtains it, Turkey will follow—this trend could spread across the region and undermine nonproliferation. Instead, a multilateral enrichment arrangement in the region would be the best solution, fully under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S., Russia, China, and other powers could also participate. This would be an international arrangement, similar to Urenco in Europe, where Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the Netherlands share enrichment. Therefore, beyond what nuclear negotiators have already achieved under President Trump—which is more than the JCPOA under President Obama—they could reach an additional major agreement: a regional arrangement that would help make the entire Persian Gulf free of nuclear weapons.
Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has not closed it. Iran says that if there is a deal—if the U.S. agrees not to attack Iran or to end the war—it will reopen it fully. Therefore, the U.S. could say, “OK, we will continue negotiations, and we are committed not to attack Iran again.” Because the U.S. has, directly or indirectly, been involved in conflicts with Iran multiple times: it indirectly cooperated with Saddam Hussein against Iran in the 1980s, including providing material and technical support for chemical weapons use; the second conflict was in 2025; the third in 2026; and now the blockade in 2026 is again being seen as an act of war. If the U.S. is truly serious about diplomacy, then diplomacy is possible, but it requires a commitment not to attack Iran again. In that case, Iran would open the Hormuz issue. That would be a good solution.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And I’d also like to ask Rob Malley the situation with Israel, which is not — which has been attacking Iran but is not part of the current negotiations. What do you feel has happened between Israel and the Trump administration? Is there a divergence occurring between the two?
ROBERT MALLEY: So, I think they have different objectives. I mean, first of all, we don’t know what President Trump’s objectives are, so it’s hard to say how they’re different or they’re similar to Israel’s. But I think Israel has been consistent in its actions. What it wants is to weaken its neighbors, whoever they are. I mean, it’s happened in Gaza, which they destroyed. The West Bank, you just saw — we just saw what they’re doing there. Lebanon, which we could talk about, which is — they’ve devastated the country. A million people now have fled the south. They’ve killed hundreds of people even since the recent ceasefire, which apparently didn’t apply to Lebanon. And they would like to weaken, fragment Iran as much as possible, because they have this view that this is their opportunity to extinguish any threat, real or pretextual, imminent or into the future.
That’s not really, I think, President Trump’s view. Again, it’s hard to define it. But what that means is, Israel would prefer to prolong this war as long as possible. I don’t think that that’s President Trump’s ambition. And I think the day President Trump says it’s it, I think he will — that Prime Minister Netanyahu will not be able to do anything but acquiesce. So, we have to wait for that moment to happen, for the president to tell the Israelis it’s over, it’s over both in Iran and in Lebanon. I’m not sure what he’ll say about Lebanon, but at least in Iran. I don’t think Prime Minister Netanyahu could afford to stand in his way.
AMY GOODMAN: And I wanted to ask you, finally, Ambassador Mousavian, about — we’ve talked to so many Iranian professors, dissidents, you know, the thousands of Iranians who were killed in the streets recently. And, I mean, we haven’t talked to them, but noting that. I wanted to ask you about the — my surprise at how many of those, even people who have been on death row in the Evin Prison, have condemned the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. They say it will make the regime more right-wing, that this does not accomplish their ends. I’m wondering your thoughts on all of these people who are coming out now and saying they want to be in charge of their own country; they don’t want these outside forces, because they’re destroying Iran.
SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: I think what Americans need to understand is that there is a clear distinction between Iranian dissatisfaction with the current governing system in Iran—I would say about 80% of Iranians are not happy with the system. They face problems of economic inflation, poverty, corruption, mismanagement, and general dysfunctionality of the system—there is no doubt about that. I am sure the majority of Iranians want major reforms. Their main concerns are economic issues, corruption, mismanagement, and systemic dysfunction.
Having said that, when they are attacked by the U.S., or especially by Israel, the whole nation tends to become united in defense of its integrity, independence, and identity—particularly when they hear statements from the U.S. president that he would eradicate Iranian civilization, or when Iranians are referred to as “animals” or “bastards.” Such language—humiliation, threats, bullying, and attacks—has a strong effect. I mean, Iran has suffered about 30,000 people killed or injured during the two wars, and hundreds of millions in damages. Over 100,000 non-military buildings have been destroyed. In such circumstances, it is normal that a nation becomes united to defend its country.
AMY GOODMAN: I’m going to leave it there, but, of course, we will not leave the discussions about what’s happening there, as we continue to cover them every day on Democracy Now! Ambassador Hossein Mousavian served as spokesperson for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005, also served as Iran’s ambassador to Germany. And Robert Malley served as the special envoy for Iran under President Biden, also served as one of the negotiators on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal under President Obama.
Coming up, the president versus the pope. We’ll speak with Father James Martin, a Jesuit priest. Stay with us.
AMY GOODMAN: “Rican Beach” by Alynda Segarra and Hurray for the Riff Raff, performing in our Democracy Now! studio. To see her performance at our 30th anniversary, along with Bruce Springsteen and Patti Smith and Michael Stipe, you can go to democracynow.org. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.