Lectures

Atlantic Council: Toward Better US-Iran Relations (Video)

Lessons can be learned from 30 years of mistrust, misperception, and misconception that has persisted between the United States and Iran. While rapprochement is far from inevitable, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author, outlined the path to success for current negotiations while speaking at a South Asia Center panel. Mousavian argued that, rather than focusing on the nuclear dimension alone, the United States and Iran must complement negotiations with extensive unilateral dialogue on all outstanding issues, including human rights, terrorism, and regional cooperation. However, the underlying key to rapprochement is simply “to reciprocate goodwill with goodwill.” Fellow panelistJohn Marks, founder and president of Search for Common Ground, urged the need for significant people-to-people diplomacy for the two nations to reconcile with the past and enable alternative solutions. “To pursue a better future, we must face the past—understanding differences & acting on commonalities.”

“Without Iran, you would have never dismantled Syria’s chemical weapons,” said Mousavian, citing an example of how the United States and Iran can cooperate at the highest levels to solve the most challenging regional issues of the day. Emphasizing Iran’s role as a predominant regional actor and the United States’ role as a preeminent international actor, both nations ought to make up for the multitude of missed opportunities –most notably the lack of cooperation in Afghanistan. Mousavian emphatically endorsed the idea that Iranian Americans are a unique asset capable of shifting the tide in favor of rapprochement due to their ethnic links to Iran and cultural affinity to both nations. Alternatively, Marks suggests that the best way to eradicate, if not reduce, the fog of misperception is via “the exchange of technical expertise and scientific insights that can promote alternative solutions.”

Both speakers agreed that the two states stand on the brink of progress on the nuclear conflict. Peace on this issue alone, however, would be temporary and unstable if other sources of mistrust are ignored. For that reason, any resolution on the nuclear front “should be regarded as the foundation for greater cooperation or a grand bargain between the two states.” The Iranian-American relationship does not have to be a zero-sum game. “Peace between Iran as a regional power and the United States as a global power could lead to the creation of a framework for cooperation that would bring stability to the Middle East, from Lebanon in the west to Afghanistan in the east.”

Watch Video

Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014. 

Event Coverage: “Toward Better US-Iran Relations,” Derek Davison, LobeLog, June 4, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014. (Video)

Lectures

Atlantic Council: U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future

On Tuesday June 3, 2014, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted a conversation called “U.S.- Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future.” The discussion featured Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, and John Marks, President and Founder of Search for Common Ground. The conversation was moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Seyyed Hossein Mousavian began by separating the history of U.S.-Iran relations into three periods. The first period, between 1856 and 1953, was characterized by cordial relations between the two countries, where the U.S. supported Iranian independence and democracy. The second period, from 1953 to 1979, saw relations start to sour beginning with the American supported coup toppling democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. Mousavian calls this period the “dominant era,” a time where the American-backed Shah ruled as a dictator. The third and final period, from 1979 to present day, began with the Islamic Revolution that deposed the Shah. Mousavian said this era represented the “most hostile type of relations” between two countries, surpassing even U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

The question Mousavian posed was: why? Having spent time in both Iran and the U.S., Mousavian suggests that foreign policy experts in the U.S. and Iran are disconnected from one another and thus misunderstand each other. Despite the hostilities, Mousavian argues that every Iranian administration has approached the U.S. with a desire to normalize relations, but all efforts have failed. The objective now is to look to the future as Mousavian believes the current state of affairs between the U.S. and Iran cannot be maintained. In a Middle East region that is “on fire,” U.S.-Iran cooperation is necessary. Mousavian proposes that comprehensive negotiations should cover a range of issues, instead of the routine “piecemeal approaches.” Within this discussion, the U.S. must not insist on the nuclear issue being paramount, and must be willing to discuss other issues. Mousavian thinks rapprochement should begin with areas of common interest; the U.S., he argues, mistakenly tends to focus on issues of disagreement. After all, he recalls, Henry Kissinger once said that the U.S. and Iran have more common interests than any other two countries. Areas of mutual interest include stopping organized crime and drug trafficking, to supporting governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When inevitably the differences do arise, both countries must approach the areas of contention with flexibility. Finally, Mousavian believes American and Iranian politicians must recognize and apologize for past grievances that have polarized the countries from one another; otherwise, the relationship will be unable to move forward.

Read More

Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States

The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless.

Part (1): Four major, interrelated elements shape Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the US

Page: 161

First, he wholeheartedly believes that regardless of all the ups and downs, pushes and pulls between Iran and the US, Washington’s ultimate intention is to topple Iran’s Islamic system and subordinate them within a Pax Americana, as it did during the Shah’s era after the 1953 coup. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains that the US, no matter which school of thought and party is in power or which president has taken office, intends to “wipe out the Islamic Republic”with all possible means at its disposal. The conclusion he draws from US rhetoric, policies, and behavior is that the US will not relent from its desire for regime change unless the current government surrenders its principles, religious beliefs, political structure, and independence. The United States’ tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and provision of material support, its covert operations, support for belligerent groups and the Islamic Republic’s opposition (including a budgetary provision), its denial of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment under the NPT, and its intrusive and paralyzing economic sanctions are all viewed by Ayatollah Khamenei as indisputable attempts to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. He maintains that the US’s primary objective is to undermine the Islamic government by fostering internal disorder and, ultimately, regime change.

The second element that shapes Ayatollah Khamenei’s disposition towards the US is his firm belief that US foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically regarding Iran, is overwhelmingly dominated by the pro-Israel lobby. From his point of view, even the president of the United States does not have any authority over US foreign policy. He is surprised that year after year, the president or other high-level officials of the most powerful country on earth attend American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) gatherings and report what they have done to undermine the Iranian government and satisfy pro-Israel lobby demands. Although there is in general a consensus within the nezam about Israel’s influence on US Middle East policy, some argue that it is the Zionists who determine the US foreign policy, and not Americans.

The third element shaping the Supreme Leader’s perception of the US is his extreme mistrust of American politics. The documents confiscated by students after seizing the US Embassy seemed to justify such a stance by many high-echelon Iranian politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei. According to those documents, the embassy was involved in espionage and the fostering of covert links to members of the new government and army.

Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei’s sees the American government and the system it represents as addicted to arrogance and hegemony. He feels that if a country is not seen as a “great power,” then a lord–serf relationship is the only kind of relationship that the US is prepared to accept.

Read More

“Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, June 1, 2014.

Interviews

Book Review: US-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue

Written by several policy experts from the US and Iran, this book is a must read by anyone seeking to grasp the inventory of the past and present issues between the two countries and the possibilities that exist to move beyond the long-standing stalemate toward a new chapter in relations between Tehran and Washington.  The authors do not necessarily agree with each other in their assessments of the sources of enduring hostility between US and Iran and or their extent of optimism regarding any breakthrough in the stalemated relations, yet their narratives commonly hammer the need to move these relations forward by, first and foremost, learning from the past history and avoiding the “highly counterproductive” misperceptions, such as those that reinforce Manichean enemy images of the other side.

With respect to the Iranian leader’s perception of US, the contribution by Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat sheds light on Ayatollah Khamenei’s nuanced political ideology that evinces rational thinking and valid suspicions of American intentions toward Iran, intermixed with his willingness to pursue the diplomatic track with Washington within the framework of Iran’s national interests.  It is important to add to Mousavian’s insight, however, the importance of “value-rationality” that needs to be distinguished from “practical rationality,” following a well-known Weberian and Habermasian tradition, so that the kernel of Iran’s antipathy to nuclear weapons on both practical and moral and ethical grounds can be better understood.

Editors: Abbas Maleki & John Tirman
Paperback: 176 pages
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic (February 13, 2014)
ISBN-10: 1623569362
ISBN-13: 978-1623569365
“Book Review: US-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue,” Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, American Iranian Council, May 27, 2014.
Articles, Publications

US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity

The talks between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Iran are moving “very slowly and with difficulty,” Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said May 16 after the conclusion of the latest round of negotiations in Vienna. The next day, lead Iranian negotiator and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “Back from Vienna after tough discussions. Agreement is possible. But illusions need to go. Opportunity shouldn’t be missed again like in 2005.”

A comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers, ending three decades of estrangement, hostility and sanctions, has never been closer, but it would be a tragedy if the current round of talks ended up on the list of missed opportunities between the United States and Iran, as I recount in my new book co-authored with Shahir Shahidsaless, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.”

The current precarious state of affairs cannot be sustained. If no common ground is created between Iran and the United States and the other world powers on the nuclear issue, one of two scenarios with similar outcomes, is likely to occur. As pressures build over time, patience for long diplomatic processes will wane and military confrontation could take the place of diplomacy. Or, as the United States tightens sanctions even further, Iran’s retaliatory actions may lead to an inadvertent or deliberate confrontation. The already crisis-stricken Middle East and the potential for a wider military confrontation should give greater urgency for the opportunity not to be missed this time.

Read More

“US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 26, 2014.