By Seyed Hossein Mousavian
Interview with Parapolitika, Greece, March 22, 2026.
Interview- Yanni Moutsios with Mousavian, Parapolitika newspaper / MEGA NEWS TV
- Ambassador Mousavian, Operation Epic Fury is already underway. Iran has warned that states assisting Western forces will face retaliation. Does that now include Arab countries that have traditionally maintained friendly relations with Tehran?
Iran had already conveyed to its neighbors before the war that if the United States attacked Iran, Tehran would retaliate by targeting U.S. military bases in the region. Since many of those bases are located in Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, Iran argues that any strikes there are directed at U.S. forces rather than against the host countries themselves. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that if regional states allow their territory or facilities to be used for attacks on Iran, those locations could become legitimate targets in a retaliatory response. However, while Iran insists it seeks to maintain friendly relations with its neighbors and frames its actions as self-defense against the United States, the countries do not accept that justification and view attacks on their territory as violations of their sovereignty.
- Iran has launched missile and drone strikes since the operation began. How long can Iran realistically sustain this level of retaliation? Weeks, months, or longer? Critics say Iran’s missile arsenal is large but not unlimited. At what point would Iran risk be exhausting its strategic capabilities if this conflict drags on?
According to Iranian military statements, retaliation could continue for at least six months. However, the more objective assessment is that the sustainability depends on two factors: existing stockpiles and production capacity. Iran is largely self-sufficient in missile and drone production and can continue manufacturing during wartime, including through dispersed and underground facilities. Estimates suggest Iran possessed thousands of ballistic missiles before the current conflict, with production rates ranging from dozens to over 100 missiles per month depending on the system. This means Iran can continue producing missiles 24/7 even during the war, which allows it to replenish some losses. However, high-intensity barrages cannot be sustained indefinitely because consumption in major salvos can exceed monthly production.
- If the war intensifies, will Iran expand its target list to include energy infrastructure, shipping lanes, or civilian economic assets in the region?
Iran’s stated military approach is largely based on reciprocity. Iranian officials have indicated that the nature of Iran’s response would mirror the actions taken by the United States or Israel. If attacks are limited to military targets, Iran is likely to respond in a similar manner. However, if Iranian energy infrastructure, economic facilities, or civilian assets are targeted, Tehran has signaled that it would respond in kind. In such a scenario, Iran could expand its target list to include regional energy infrastructure, oil and gas facilities, and strategic shipping routes, particularly in and around the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. These areas are critical to global energy flows and lie close to Iran, making them vulnerable during an escalatory conflict. In essence, Iran’s strategy suggests that escalation would likely be symmetrical: attacks on Iranian economic or energy infrastructure would likely trigger retaliatory strikes against comparable regional economic assets and maritime routes.
- We have already seen strikes affecting neighboring states. Is Iran prepared for the possibility that countries like Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, or Pakistan could be pulled directly into this conflict?
Iran’s stated policy is to avoid confrontation with neighboring countries and to preserve good relations with them, including states such as Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. Iranian officials argue that their military responses are directed at U.S. or Israeli military assets, not at the host countries themselves. Tehran’s expectation is that neighboring governments will not allow their territory, airspace, or military facilities to be used for attacks against Iran; if such attacks originate from those locations, Iran says it reserves the right to respond against the attacking forces there. At the same time, Iranian leaders have emphasized that they do not seek to expand the war or draw neighboring states into the conflict and have even apologized for incidents affecting nearby countries, stressing that Iran wants to maintain friendly and stable relations with the region
- There is growing speculation about the next phase of the operation. Do you believe the United States would risk sending ground forces into Iran?
At this stage, a large-scale U.S. ground invasion of Iran appears unlikely, although it has not been completely ruled out by President Donald Trump. Most military assessments suggest Washington will rely primarily on-air power, naval forces, and other forms of pressure rather than committing to a massive ground war in a country as large and difficult to occupy as Iran. At the same time, the political calculations may be evolving. The initial expectation in Washington and Tel Aviv was that the operation would bring Iran to the brink of collapse within 48 hours, but Iran’s military responses have proven far stronger and more sustained than many anticipated. As a result, if the conflict continues to escalate without achieving its original objectives, it is possible that Trump could look for an off-ramp and announce a ceasefire or pause in operations while claiming that the main strategic goals of the campaign have been achieved.
- If that happened, could Washington try to work with Kurdish militias or other internal groups to destabilize the Iranian government from within?
It is often speculated that Washington could try to rely on Kurdish militias or other internal groups to destabilize the Iranian government, but such a strategy would face serious limitations. Using Kurdish forces would not only risk destabilizing neighboring countries like Turkey, Syria, and Iraq—where Kurdish issues are already highly sensitive—but could also create wider regional instability. Moreover, the situation of Kurds in Iran is different from some other parts of the region. Kurds are historically part of the broader Iranian civilizational sphere, and Iranian Kurds generally see themselves as part of Iran’s national fabric. For these reasons, it is unlikely that Iranian Kurds would support a foreign-backed effort to undermine the Iranian government, and any attempt to instrumentalize Kurdish groups could easily backfire both inside Iran and across the region.
- And if foreign troops did enter Iranian territory, what would Iran’s military response look like?
If foreign troops were to enter Iranian territory, Tehran’s military response would aim to turn any such intervention into a protracted and costly conflict for the invaders, much as the United States experienced in Vietnam and later in Afghanistan, where local resistance and difficult terrain led to drawn‑out wars that wore down foreign forces. Iranian military doctrine and statements by senior commanders have emphasized that any incursion into Iran’s sovereign territory would be met with sustained and widespread resistance using a combination of conventional forces, missile and drone strikes, and asymmetric tactics, making occupation extremely difficult and costly for any foreign power
- Some Western officials say the ultimate objective of this operation could be political change in Tehran. Do you believe regime change is actually part of the strategy?
While some Western officials frame the U.S. objective as promoting political change in Tehran, the broader regional context suggests multiple overlapping goals. Israeli leaders have consistently stated that their strategic aim is to weaken or disintegrate Iran to advance what they call the Greater Israel Agenda. (timesofisrael.com) From Washington’s perspective, senior officials have indicated that controlling Iran’s oil reserves is a central objective of the military campaign. In practice, this translates into a strategy aimed at undermining the current government, echoing patterns seen in the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh, when the United States sought to replace Iran’s leadership to secure control over energy resources. (history.state.gov) Thus, while the rhetoric emphasizes political change, U.S. action reflect longstanding strategic and economic interests .
- Would Iran consider giving up its ballistic missile program or curtailing its nuclear ambitions to end the war? Iran remains a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the country is now under direct military pressure. Could this conflict push Iran to rethink the limits of its nuclear program?
Iran’s leadership has long made clear that it will not agree to give up its ballistic missile capabilities or curtail its peaceful enrichment of uranium even to end a war, because Tehran views both as essential to deterring foreign invasion and preserving the country’s integrity. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the missile program is “non‑negotiable” and rooted in national defense, framing it as necessary to prevent any repetition of scenarios like Gaza or other foreign interventions, and they have refused to pause enrichment despite external pressure. From Tehran’s perspective, without its missile deterrent and nuclear advances, the risk of external powers seeking regime change or further strikes would only increase, so it would not be prepared to trade away those core defense capabilities to secure a ceasefire.
- Iran’s Assembly of Experts has appointed Mojtaba Khamenei as the country’s Supreme Leader. President Trump stated that he should have a say in the selection of Iran’s new leader and issued a threat of assassination if his demand was not met. What is your opinion on this situation?
The assassination of the previous Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was a grave violation of international rules and norms. Following his killing, Iran’s constitutional body, the Assembly of Experts, appointed Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader during wartime conditions. Statements suggesting that the United States should decide who leads Iran, or threatening assassination if such demands are not met, would also be seen as clear violations of international law and Iran’s sovereignty. The decision by the Assembly of Experts sends a strong message that Iran, with thousands of years of history and civilization, will not accept foreign dictates over its leadership or political system. In my view, rather than relying on military strikes, assassinations, or threats, the wiser course for Washington would be to pursue diplomacy and seek a resolution with Iran based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.
- Ambassador Mousavian, from Tehran’s perspective, what would it take to force Western governments to stop Operation Epic Fury?
From Tehran’s perspective, the continuation or end of Operation Epic Fury will largely depend on Iran’s ability to withstand U.S. and Israeli military pressure while maintaining the country’s territorial and political integrity. Iranian officials argue that if Iran successfully resists aggression and demonstrates that foreign forces cannot impose their objectives by force, Western governments will be compelled to reconsider their approach. Rather than achieving regime change, the West would then be forced to negotiate with Iran on terms of mutual respect, shared interest, and non‑interference, recognizing that sustainable compromise can only occur when Iran’s sovereignty and national resilience are fully acknowledged.
https://www.parapolitika.gr/diethni/article/1697944/i-teherani-borei-na-kataskeuazei-puraulous-kai-en-meso-polemou-ti-apokaluptei-sta-parapolitika-proin-ekprosopos-tou-iran-stis-purinikes-diapragmateuseis/?fbclid=Iwb21leAQvKlRjbGNrBC8qQWV4dG4DYWVtAjExAHNydGMGYXBwX2lkDDM1MDY4NTUzMTcyOAABHmeF6R3f4tFrZP6y3TqvpAxbf-f6fpx2NjudJFyJdvTIx606K1sg7akSv0be_aem_unf10Qes5PzCy2e5uavz1Q