Interviews, Media

‘Why Is Israel Allowed Nukes But Not Others?’ Will Iran & Trump Make A Peace Deal? | Counterpoints,

Al Arabiya English, June 24, 2026

President Donald Trump has repeatedly declared that the US has won the war and that a deal with Iran is either done or close to completion. As debate intensifies over the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, Counterpoints asks a critical question: who is really coming out on top?

Host Melinda Nucifora

Guests: Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Former Iranian Diplomat and Former Senior Nuclear Negotiator George Papadopoulos, Former Foreign Policy Adviser to Donald Trump Chuck Freilich, Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser

The central question: Why one standard for Israel and another for Iran?

The discussion opened with what the interviewer described as one of the biggest questions in Middle East politics:

Why is Israel allowed to possess nuclear weapons while Iran is denied even an advanced civilian nuclear capability?

Hossein Mousavian argued that this double standard has become one of the principal obstacles to regional stability.

His main point was:

  • Israel possesses an undeclared nuclear arsenal.
  • Israel is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
  • Israel does not permit IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities.
  • Yet Western governments rarely pressure Israel on its nuclear status.

By contrast,

  • Iran remains an NPT member.
  • Iran accepts IAEA inspections.
  • Yet Iran has been subjected to sanctions, military threats, and repeated crises.

He argued that this asymmetry creates resentment across the Middle East.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RJJOBZ4NCs

Interviews, Media

Aljazeera: While the recent war has increased mistrust and political opposition on both sides, it may also have clarified the costs of conflict,” said Mousavian

Interview with Aljazeera, June 16, 2026

At the heart of this particular aspect of the dispute is a longstanding disagreement over the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program, according to Seyed Hossein Mousavian, an Iranian policymaker and former diplomat who served on Tehran’s nuclear negotiating team in talks with the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The hardest battle will be “to reconcile Iran’s insistence on maintaining a peaceful enrichment program under the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], with Washington’s demand for stringent restrictions that ensure the program cannot be diverted toward military purposes,” Mousavian told Al Jazeera.

Mousavian, however, does not view the phased release of frozen assets as leverage, but rather as a confidence-building measure.

“Iran has previously indicated flexibility on measures such as limits on enrichment levels, enhanced monitoring, and reducing or relocating portions of its enriched uranium stockpile, provided that its right to enrichment is formally recognized and that it receives tangible economic benefits,” he said.

The next 60 days may determine not only whether Washington and Tehran can agree on enrichment and sanctions relief, but whether a ceasefire designed to end a war can evolve into a broader agreement capable of preventing the next one. “Ironically, while the recent war has increased mistrust and political opposition on both sides, it may also have clarified the costs of conflict,” said Mousavian.

https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/16/optics-of-peace-first-details-later-the-us-iran-60-day-challenge

Interviews, Media

The New Yorker: Iran Can Hold America Hostage in Either War or Peace

Robin Wright’s Interview with Mousavian-June 12, 2026

“Hormuz from now on is not going to go back to the situation of past decades,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former nuclear negotiator for Iran who is now a researcher at Princeton, told me. Hormuz will continue to be “a major element of deterrence of Iranian strategy.” Mousavian balked at the idea that Iran was taking the world hostage. He called it leverage. “Iran has been faced with the madman policies of Israel and the U.S.,” he said. “If you are mad, we are going to be more mad than you. This is what they are doing practically.”

https://www.newyorker.com/preview/article/6a2c3a3b88a3e5594c324707?status=draft&debug_config=copliot;t=1781284158550

Articles, Media

Iran will no longer accept endless talks. It is creating deterrence on its own terms

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Eye, 9 June 2026

Weekend strikes highlight Tehran’s shifting strategic calculus – and a refusal to remain bound by one-sided agreements

As conflict flared up again this weekend between Israel and Iran, negotiations with the US have failed to produce any agreement. Neither side can afford another war, but the path towards a diplomatic settlement has been stymied by Washington’s demands for far-reaching concessions from Iran, without any offer of commensurate reciprocal measures, such as the release of even a portion of Iran’s frozen assets.

After the US and Israeli military strikes on Iran in 2025 and again this year, western discussions largely focused on the physical damage inflicted on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure, its uranium enrichment capabilities, and its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. 

In Iran, however, the central question is different: did negotiations and nuclear restraint produce greater security, or did they ultimately create heightened vulnerability?

The reality is that the US-Israeli wars on Iran inflicted significant damage on its nuclear and military facilities. But the ongoing conflict has also imposed enormous costs on the US – including more than $1 trillion in expenditures, significant damage to US military assets, global economic disruption, and substantial civilian and military casualties.

At the same time, the US-Israeli campaign has achieved few of its stated objectives, namely to eliminate Iran’s missile capabilities, end its nuclear programme, and facilitate political change. What the wars did change, however, was Iran’s strategic calculus, producing four major shifts in this regard. 

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

Firstly, we have seen the collapse of a strategy built on restraint and engagement. Despite a broad consensus among observers that Iran had complied with the 2015 nuclear deal, accepting extensive restrictions and unprecedented inspections, the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement just three years later, and the military attacks followed. 

As a result, confidence in the idea that diplomacy and nuclear restraint can guarantee security has been severely damaged. For many Iranians, restraint is now increasingly viewed not as protection, but as vulnerability.

Central question

Secondly, public trust in the US has collapsed. While Iran’s leadership has long been sceptical of Washington, public opinion was often different. 

After the signing of the nuclear agreement a decade ago, optimism in Iran was widespread, with a Gallup survey at the time finding that 68 percent of Iranians believed their leaders had negotiated a good deal, 66 percent expected economic improvement, and 51 percent anticipated better relations with the US.

Today, the debate inside Iran is no longer primarily about centrifuges or enrichment levels. The central question has become: if Iran accepts new restrictions, what guarantees exist that a future US administration will not abandon the agreement, or that another military confrontation will not follow? For many Iranians, the current crisis is less a nuclear dispute than a crisis of trust.

Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities

Thirdly, we have seen a shift from ideology to nationalism. For decades, confrontation with the US and Israel was framed primarily in ideological terms. The recent conflict appears to have produced a different dynamic: while many Iranians remain opposed to war, sanctions and isolation, public sentiment has increasingly shifted towards a form of everyday nationalism.

Rather than strengthening ideological narratives, external military pressure has reinforced broader feelings of national identity and collective solidarity. This trend may become one of the most enduring political consequences of the wars.

Finally, perhaps the most important shift concerns deterrence. Even voices that previously advocated de-escalation now emphasise the need for credible deterrent capabilities.

This does not necessarily imply support for nuclear weapons; rather, it reflects a growing belief that no political agreement can remain sustainable unless Iran possesses sufficient means to deter future attacks.

This shift played out in real-time over the weekend, as Iran launched strikes against Israel over the latter’s continuing assault on Tehran’s ally Lebanon – marking the first time Iran has hit Israel not as retaliation for attacks on its own territory, but as a warning over continuing ceasefire violations in Lebanon.

Strategic framework

Following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran’s security doctrine rested on three pillars: strengthening indigenous military capabilities (which eventually produced the missile, drone and cyber capabilities displayed in the recent conflict), achieving self-sufficiency in nuclear technology and domestic fuel production, and extending deterrence beyond Iran’s borders through its regional “axis of resistance”.

When it comes to shaping Iran’s future security doctrine, the strategic impact of the 2025 and 2026 wars may ultimately exceed even that of Saddam Hussein’s invasion, since the US-Israeli assaults were widely perceived inside Iran as direct threats to national survival and sovereignty. 

Consequently, a revised strategic framework appears to be emerging around four principles.

The first can be summarised as “security for all or security for none”. After the 2025 US-Israeli attacks, Iran’s military response was largely confined to Israel and a single American base in the Gulf. 

During the 2026 conflict, however, Iran’s strategic calculations expanded to include US military installations across the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and broader global economic interests. From Tehran’s perspective, the lesson is clear: security can no longer be treated as a unilateral privilege. Either there is security for all regional actors, or security for none.

Secondly, we have seen the emergence of a new key factor: public opinion. Before the wars, Iran’s strategic debate largely revolved around two concepts: the “battlefield” and “diplomacy”. The recent wars added a third: the street

The wave of nationalism that emerged was reflected in large public gatherings across major cities. While supporting national defence, many participants also conveyed a message to policymakers that excessive trust in negotiations with Washington is no longer acceptable.

As a result, Iranian diplomacy today increasingly operates under the influence of both military institutions and public opinion.

Thirdly, the emerging consensus emphasises deterrence through a combination of instruments: stronger military capabilities, preservation of nuclear expertise, continued regional partnerships, and incorporation of the Strait of Hormuz into broader security calculations. The result is a more comprehensive understanding of deterrence than the one that existed before the wars.

Finally, the loss of Iran’s supreme leader, military commanders, regional partners and hundreds of civilians has created a powerful collective memory that will shape Iranian perceptions for years to come. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was not only the leader of a state; he was also one of the most prominent Shia religious authorities, with millions of followers worldwide. 

For the first time in modern history, a leading Shia religious authority was killed in military action by foreign states. This is not an event that many Iranians or Shia communities around the world are likely to forget.

After the killing of General Qassem Soleimani in 2020, US officials openly expressed concerns over possible Iranian retaliation. Recent conflicts have led not only to the killings of numerous senior Iranian military leaders, but also to the assassinations of key figures within the broader “axis of resistance”, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas negotiator Ismail Haniyeh

It would be unwise for policymakers and security institutions to dismiss the potential long-term security consequences of these events.

Window for diplomacy

Meanwhile, despite widespread mistrust, diplomacy remains far from dead. Although some Iranian political figures fear that another military confrontation may be on the horizon, significant support for diplomacy still exists within Iran. 

What has changed is not the desire for negotiations, but the expectations surrounding any future agreement. If the nuclear deal focused primarily on nuclear restrictions, many in Tehran now argue that any future agreement must contain three key elements.

Firstly, nonproliferation within the framework of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must protect Iran’s right to enrich uranium, while building confidence that Tehran will not pursue nuclear weapons.

Secondly, meaningful economic benefits must come through substantial sanctions relief. And thirdly, any deal needs to include credible assurances that this military conflict will not be repeated.

Despite the deep mistrust generated by recent wars, diplomacy remains the only viable path forward – because neither Iran, nor the US, nor indeed the region as a whole can escape the realities of coexistence. The central challenge is in breaking a decades-long cycle of crisis, sanctions, negotiations, agreements, collapse and renewed conflict, which neither military force nor economic pressure has resolved. 

The most important consequence of the recent wars is not a shift in Iran’s relative strength, but a transformation in its understanding of security. 

A broad consensus is emerging inside Iran that security, trust, deterrence and diplomacy are inseparable. Unless Washington and its regional allies recognise this shift, future agreements are likely to remain temporary, while the cycle of confrontation continues.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iran-will-no-longer-accept-endless-talks-it-creating-deterrence-its-own-terms

Articles, Media

Opinion | Hormuz And The Case For Shared Responsibility-Hormuz Strait: A Four-Point Proposal for Exiting the Crisis

Seyed Hossein Mousavian-NDTV-India- May 18, 2026

The Strait of Hormuz has evolved from a regional maritime chokepoint into the central geopolitical fault line of the global economy. During the past several weeks, tensions between the United States, Israel, and Iran escalated sharply following military exchanges near the Strait, US naval operations connected to “Project Freedom”, attacks on commercial shipping, and reciprocal accusations of ceasefire violations. Commercial traffic through the Strait has been severely disrupted, oil prices have surged, and global shipping insurers have warned of systemic economic risks extending far beyond the Middle East.

Today, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz has become more consequential than the Iranian nuclear dispute itself. The nuclear issue had already been addressed diplomatically through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a binding international framework. The unilateral US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, followed by unlawful and unnecessary military attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, fundamentally undermined the agreement and transformed the Iranian nuclear issue from a multilateral diplomatic matter into a broader geopolitical confrontation between Iran and a coalition composed of the United States, Israel, and several US-aligned Arab governments in the Persian Gulf.

Iran Has Suffered Massive Damage

Unlike the nuclear issue, however, instability in the Strait of Hormuz directly affects the entire global economy, including energy markets, supply chains, inflation, food security, and maritime commerce. Iran frames the Strait of Hormuz within the doctrine of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. From Tehran’s perspective, repeated military attacks by Iraq under Saddam Hussein during the 1980s, the extensive economic sanctions regime imposed by the United States, cyber operations, targeted assassinations, and the more recent Israeli and American military strikes in 2025 and 2026, have cumulatively imposed trillions of dollars in damage on Iran’s infrastructure, economy, and national security. Iranian government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said an early estimate indicates that Iran has suffered about $270 billion in damages since the start of the US-Israel war on February 28, 2026.

The United States and several European governments have argued that Iran cannot lawfully impose transit tolls or fees on vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz because such a precedent could encourage other littoral states to impose similar charges in international straits. “Not only is this illegal, it’s unacceptable. It’s dangerous for the world, and it’s important that the world have a plan to confront it,” said the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Legally, the concern reflects the transit passage regime under Articles 37-44 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which protects freedom of navigation through international straits.

An Inaccurate Argument

However, the comparison between Iran and other coastal states is fundamentally flawed. No other littoral state governing a strategic strait has experienced three major illegal military confrontations – Saddam Hussein’s invasion, prolonged US coercive policies, and direct Israeli-American military operations against its territory – while also bearing the primary burden of maintaining regional maritime security and environmental protection.

While Iran has never ratified the convention, however, under international law, Iran may not be legally entitled to impose unilateral tolls merely for innocent or transit passage. Nevertheless, several alternative legal and institutional mechanisms could provide a lawful framework for cost-sharing and compensation.

First, UNCLOS permits coastal states to recover costs for specific services rendered, including pilotage support, environmental protection, emergency rescue operations, anti-pollution measures, maritime traffic management, demining, and navigational safety systems. Iran could, therefore, lawfully establish specialised maritime service regimes tied to concrete operational services rather than simple passage itself.

Second, Article 43 of UNCLOS explicitly encourages burden-sharing agreements between user states and coastal states in international straits. This provision has remained largely underdeveloped globally. Iran could, therefore, advocate the establishment of a multilateral “Hormuz Maritime Security and Environmental Protection Fund” under United Nations or International Maritime Organization supervision. Such a mechanism would allow energy-importing states, shipping companies, insurers, and Persian Gulf energy exporters to contribute financially toward maintaining safe navigation, environmental protection, anti-piracy operations, and post-conflict reconstruction in the region. This approach would transform the debate from “illegal tolls” into lawful cooperative burden-sharing.

Third, Iran could invoke emerging principles within international environmental law and the law of state responsibility. The recent military confrontations in the Persian Gulf have significantly increased risks of environmental catastrophe, including oil spills, destruction of marine ecosystems, and contamination of fisheries and coastal infrastructure. Under the “polluter pays” principle and broader doctrines of state responsibility, states contributing to militarisation and conflict in the Strait may bear obligations toward remediation and reconstruction. Iran may, therefore, argue that states participating in military escalation should contribute financially to environmental protection and maritime stabilisation efforts in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Question Of Compensation

Fourth, there is a historical imbalance in international compensation mechanisms that remains unresolved. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations Compensation Commission established an international mechanism to process claims and compensation. Iran, despite suffering enormous destruction during Iraq’s invasion of Iran initiated by Saddam Hussein in 1980, never received a comparable compensation framework. The absence of such mechanisms has contributed to long-term regional instability and mistrust between Iran and the Arab neighbouring countries, which supported Saddam’s invasion of Iran.

An Imbalanced Framework

A future Hormuz framework could, therefore, integrate both maritime security financing and broader reconstruction arrangements connected to decades of regional conflict. The strategic reality is that the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be treated merely as a narrow legal issue of navigational rights. It has become a test case for whether international law can adapt to asymmetrical burdens imposed on regional states in periods of prolonged geopolitical confrontation. The existing framework places the overwhelming responsibility for securing one of the world’s most vital energy corridors on the coastal states of Iran and Oman in the Hormuz Strait, while the economic benefits are distributed globally. Such an imbalance is politically unsustainable under conditions of war, sanctions, and repeated military escalation.

Ultimately, the future of the Strait of Hormuz depends not on military coercion but on diplomatic innovation. A durable solution requires de-escalation between Iran, the United States, and the international community, restoration of lawful diplomacy, and creation of a multilateral framework balancing freedom of navigation with equitable burden-sharing, environmental protection, and regional reconstruction. Without such a framework, the Strait risks becoming a permanent epicentre of global economic instability. With it, however, Hormuz could evolve from a symbol of confrontation into a platform for cooperative security and international legal innovation.

https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/us-iran-war-coercion-cant-calm-hormuz-innovation-might-11510523

Interviews, Media

War on Iran has triggered a fundamental crisis of trust in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

Interview-Mousavian – TRT – May 11, 2026

US media outlet Axios reported that US and Tehran were on the verge of agreeing on a one-page memorandum of understanding, raising hopes for potential de-escalation. However, the US president dismissed Iran’s response to the proposal, calling it ‘totally unacceptable’. Among its key points, Tehran’s latest proposal included an end to the war on all fronts, the lifting of the US blockade on Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz, and guarantees against any further attacks on Iran. Washington’s swift rejection led to a spike in oil prices, while the traffic through Hormuz remains highly limited. Meanwhile, in an interview with CBS News, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war with Iran is not ‘over’, as Tel Aviv is also stepping up its attacks on Lebanon.

Guests: Seyed Hossein Mousavian Visiting Research Collaborator at Princeton University

Fawaz Gerges Professor of International Relations at LSE

Daniel Levy President of the US/Middle East Project

Liam Collins Retired US Army Colonel

Q1: President Trump has said the war would end soon, but we are now in week 10. How do you assess the current situation, especially after he called Iran’s latest peace proposal “totally unacceptable”?

A: There are three major obstacles preventing an agreement between Iran and the United States. First, the U.S. is seeking an agreement that effectively signals Iran’s capitulation or submission, which Tehran firmly rejects.

Second, Iran insists that any nuclear agreement must be based on the NPT, to which both countries are parties. However, the United States is pushing for terms beyond the NPT framework, such as dismantling Iran’s nuclear facilities—similar to the Libya model—or requiring Iran to export its enriched uranium. From Iran’s perspective, these demands constitute clear violations of international law, as there is no legal basis for forcing an NPT member to dismantle its peaceful nuclear program.

Third, Iran seeks an agreement that would effectively end the war, whereas the United States appears to favor an arrangement that leaves the option open for future military action. This includes allowing Israel to continue its operations in Lebanon. These three issues remain the core barriers to any deal.

Q2: Reports suggest that the situation inside Iran is placing severe economic pressure on the population. How long can Iranians endure these conditions, and what does it mean for the system?

A: The economic pressures are real—high inflation, unemployment, and damage to industrial infrastructure have significantly affected daily life. However, if we look at the past 47 years, Iran has endured continuous sanctions, external pressures, cyber operations, and even an eight-year war following Saddam Hussein’s invasion. Despite these challenges, the country has shown a high level of resilience. That said, the longer the current situation continues, the more severe the economic and social consequences will become.

Q3: You have previously argued that the United States cannot be trusted in diplomacy. Given recent developments, why should Iran still believe negotiations can work?

A: Iran has consistently maintained that it cannot fully trust the United States, yet it has never abandoned diplomacy. The distrust stems from concrete experience. There was a comprehensive agreement—the JCPOA—endorsed by the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 2231, and verified by the IAEA, with Iran in full compliance. Nevertheless, the United States withdrew and imposed a “maximum pressure” policy.

This pattern has repeated itself. In 2025, negotiations were reportedly close to success, according to the Omani foreign minister, yet the United States resorted to military action. In 2026, again, diplomacy was advancing with significant progress, but was interrupted by renewed U.S. attacks. These episodes reinforce Iran’s perception that Washington is not committed to sustained diplomacy.

At the same time, many countries—including Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—continue to encourage diplomatic engagement and actively push for a negotiated solution. However, as long as the three core issues I mentioned remain unresolved, reaching an agreement will remain difficult.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUeXM_n01Hg

Interviews, Media

Exclusive: Former American & Iranian Negotiators on Ceasefire Talks & How War Could End

Democracy Now, April 14,2026-Interview with Malley & Mousavian

Transcript

We’re joined now in the studio by two former negotiators for the U.S. and Iran in this Democracy Now! exclusive.

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian served as spokesperson for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005. He also served as Iran’s ambassador to Germany. He’s author of two books, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir and, most recently, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.

And we’re joined by Rob Malley. He was one of the negotiators on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He served as a senior Middle East official under Presidents Clinton, Obama and Biden. Under Biden, he served as the special envoy for Iran. He is now a lecturer at Yale University, former president of the International Crisis Group, co-author with Hussein Agha of a new book, Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine.

AMY GOODMAN: Why don’t we start off, in this exclusive we have with the two of you at the table, American and Iranian negotiator, with your assessment of what’s taken place? It can be right through to this week, the failed negotiations, and before that, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. Why don’t we begin with you, Rob Malley?

ROBERT MALLEY: Well, first, I think — thanks for having me.

You know, we can’t ignore the fact that this war was unlawful, unjustified, unnecessary. And I think even if we’re now going to talk about negotiations, even if the negotiations are to succeed, none of that could let us forget or excuse how we got here. So, I do want to insist on that, because, you know, if negotiations succeed, it’s going to be too quick for the administration to say, “You see? We were right.”

But I think the real question now is whether the U.S. and Iran are engaging in these negotiations, trying to find a solution that will meet both their sides’ core needs, or whether, in this case, the U.S. takes the attitude that “we won the war because we’re stronger, and if you’re not accepting the war, then you’re going to — we’re going to inflict more pain.” That won’t work. And it won’t work because Iran believes, and with some justification, that it has inflicted pain on the U.S. and that every day that goes by, it’s going to inflict more. So, they’re not in a position right now where Iran is sort of begging for a deal because it wants to avoid an escalation. They believe, again, rightly or wrongly, that they could sustain the pain longer than the U.S. can.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, as you talk about what Iran believes, let’s go to the Iranian ambassador, Hossein Mousavian. Your assessment of what has taken place? Now it seems to be coming down to the nuclear negotiations, around, well, Iran saying they’ll do a moratorium for five years and the United States demanding 20. But, overall, the picture?

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: I think Iranians are now coming to the negotiating table with more mistrust than ever, because once the deal was agreed in 2015, Iran was in full compliance, and the U.S. withdrew. Then there was a nuclear negotiation between Iran and the U.S. in 2025. The negotiations, as the foreign minister of Oman said, had significant progress; a deal was within reach. The U.S. withdrew and attacked Iran. We had negotiations in 2026. Again, as the Omani foreign minister said, negotiations had significant progress, and a deal was within reach. Again, the U.S. attacked. Then we had the latest round in Islamabad. It was a one-day negotiation—the highest level after the revolution, after 48 years. The U.S. side said there was progress; only the nuclear issue was not agreed. We agreed on everything, as President Trump said. The Iranian foreign minister also said we were very close to a final deal. And then immediately the U.S. imposed a blockade, a maritime blockade. That is why they really do not know whether the U.S. is genuinely committed to diplomacy or not.

If we are talking now about the nuclear issue, first of all, every assessment of all U.S. intelligence establishments since 2007 has consistently stated no evidence of weaponization and no evidence of an Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons—even in 2025 and 2026. This is the U.S. security assessment: no decision to go nuclear and no evidence of weaponization. Every IAEA report since 2003 has also said there is no evidence of weaponization. Therefore, there was no imminent threat. And I believe it was an illegal war, no doubt. The overwhelming majority of the international community has also insisted the war was illegal. Now we are coming to the negotiations.

The biggest issue you have heard during the last two years is Iran’s 450 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. They say Iran could make 10 nuclear bombs if it decides to do so. And even you hear from American officials that they are insisting on this stockpile. But I don’t know whether people know that in the 2025 negotiations, Iran said it was ready to dilute all 60% material down to below 5%. In the 2026 negotiations, Iran officially told the Americans it was ready to dilute. This was confirmed by the Omani foreign minister in his interview with Face the Nation, stating that Iran was and is ready to dilute its entire stockpile to below 5%. Iran accepted to suspend enrichment for some years. Iran accepted to have zero stockpile. Therefore, there is no worry—and there was no worry—about high-level enriched uranium stockpiles.

The other issue is the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. They have ambiguities and technical questions about Iran’s nuclear program. Iran was in full compliance with the JCPOA. The JCPOA was the most comprehensive agreement in the history of nonproliferation, with Iranian commitments going far beyond the NPT. But Iran accepted it. And then, in the 2025 talks and again in the 2026 nuclear talks in Islamabad, Iranians said: “We are ready to go to the highest level of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA to address every technical ambiguity.” Therefore, when Iran was ready to dilute its entire stockpile, when Iran was ready to reach the maximum level of cooperation with the IAEA to remove concerns about possible military dimensions, and when Iran was also ready to suspend enrichment for some years and accept zero stockpile, then why the blockade?

I really do not understand whether the issue is nuclear or not, because we have heard from American officials who have publicly said the aim was controlling Iranian oil reserves. And we have also heard from American officials that the aim was regime change. If the aim is controlling Iranian oil reserves like Venezuela, or if the aim is regime change while using the nuclear issue as a pretext, then we are not going to have any deal.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Ambassador, I wanted to ask you precisely about this issue of how the Trump administration often tries to confuse in the American public the difference between enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes versus — which Iran, like all signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have a right to do — and the actual development of bombs, of a nuclear bomb, and also the fact that the former Ayatollah Khamenei specifically had a fatwa against Iran developing a nuclear bomb. Could you explain that position of the leader who was killed by the United States?

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: Actually, what Iranians are saying concerns their legitimate legal rights under the NPT. Argentina has enrichment. Brazil has enrichment. Germany has enrichment. Japan has enrichment. And none of them has nuclear weapons, while all are members of the NPT. Iran does not accept any deal that would make it the only NPT member discriminated against with respect to its legitimate legal rights under the treaty. Therefore, respecting Iran’s rights, like those of any other NPT member, to enrichment is one issue; the exercise of those rights is another.

Iran was ready, as a confidence-building measure, not to exercise those rights for a specific period. What the U.S. is demanding—zero enrichment—is, in Iran’s view, a clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of course, Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that all weapons of mass destruction are religiously forbidden (haram). Iran is a member of the NPT, and the important point is that despite being one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world, Iran has never diverted its nuclear program toward weaponization, as confirmed by all U.S. intelligence assessments and the IAEA.

Therefore, we need to distinguish between respecting Iran’s rights, like those of other NPT members, to peaceful nuclear technology—which is one issue—and confidence-building measures, such as temporary suspension of enrichment, transparency steps, or zero stockpile arrangements, which are another. I think we need to keep a clear distinction between these two.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And I’d like to ask Rob Malley — the negotiators for the Trump administration in the latest round have continued to include Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, two people who would have, some would say, virtually no knowledge of the complexity of negotiations over nuclear enrichment and the development of nuclear bombs. Your assessment of their role in all of this, and also why, in all of this talk about Iran coming under some kind of international control, there is no mention of the fact that there’s one power that does have nuclear weapons in the Middle East — Israel — and it is not a party to the NPT?

ROBERT MALLEY: So, first, allow me to — you won’t be surprised that I have a little bit of a different appreciation from Hossein in terms of Iran’s nuclear program. I think there is some evidence, certainly at some point, that they did have a military program. And my view is that they’ve always — their view was “We’re going to hedge. We’re going to have a nuclear program, so that if we do want to develop a weapon, we can.” I think that’s — you know, one could understand why they did. But I think it’s pretty clear that they did have that. So, I don’t think that there was anything — that there was anything — and that’s why, by the way, President Obama negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was a way to contain — and, I think, successfully — Iran’s nuclear program, to make sure that if they were tempted to try to dash for a bomb, they couldn’t do it in a quick way, and it would be immediately verified. I think one of the dramatically tragic mistakes of the first Trump administration was to tear that deal up. So, I don’t think one has to be naive about what Iran was doing, and still see that in what Trump was doing was — produced exactly the wrong effects.

Now, in terms of the current negotiations, no, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff are not nuclear experts — by the way, nor am I. That’s not the issue. The issue is whether they’re surrounded by nuclear experts. And everything — all the reports that I’ve received is that when they negotiated with the Iranians in the past — I don’t know what happened in Islamabad, but in the past, they didn’t have nuclear experts. And so, there was — and I think this has been well documented, that they misunderstood Iranian positions. They couldn’t appreciate what they were actually trying to convey.

And part of it, I think, is because of the oddity of this administration, where so many of the decisions seem to rely and reside in one person, not the most reliable of all people. It’s the president of the United States. And he is very mercurial, and he’s very unpredictable, and he changes his mind, and he changes his objectives. We don’t really know what his objectives are in this conflict.

And so, I think what Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner did is they relayed what they heard from the Iranians. They didn’t really fully understand them. And then, depending on the president’s mood, he varied on whether he was in the mood to accept a negotiated deal or was more eager for confrontation. And my assessment is that, in this case, a bit emboldened by Venezuela — and we just saw the clip of where things are with that country — he felt he could not fail at a military endeavor. He was going to win. He was going to bring Iran to knees and then be able to dictate the terms of a settlement. That’s not what happened.

AMY GOODMAN: When the U.S. attacked and Israel attacked Iran, I thought it was very interesting that the Omani foreign minister, who was negotiating, who was mediating, actually took a plane to Washington, because he didn’t feel that Kushner and Witkoff were conveying what Iran was agreeing to. And he went on all the U.S. media he could, so that he could get President Trump’s attention, particularly on Fox. But I want to go to what he said on Face the Nation. This is Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi. He said Iran had agreed to abandon its nuclear enrichment and stockpiling program.

BADR BIN HAMAD ALBUSAIDI: If the ultimate objective is to ensure forever that Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb, I think we have cracked that problem through these negotiations by agreeing a very important breakthrough that has never been achieved anytime before. And I think if we can capture that and build on it, I think a deal is within our reach.

AMY GOODMAN: So, that was the Omani foreign minister. He actually kept repeating in all these interviews — he had a phrase — “This is better than Obama.” You know, someone had trained — it’s like they had said to him, “This is what Trump needs to hear,” because that’s Trump’s main motivating factor, “better than Obama.” You are, Rob Malley, one of the lead negotiators for the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. If you can explain why you — if you think this was better than what you achieved, and why, anyway, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked the very next day? And what happened that very next day, the Iranian girls’ school in Minab was taken out, it looks like with a U.S. missile, and 175 people, about, died, overwhelmingly primary school girls.

ROBERT MALLEY: So, I mean, I said it at the same time, either before or after the Omani foreign minister, because based on the reports, and Hossein just said that, Iran was agreeing to suspend enrichment for a period of years. That is beyond anything that either President Obama achieved or President Biden was — could have achieved. I mean, at that time, Iran was not talking about suspending; it was accepting limits. I think those limits were sufficient to contain Iran’s nuclear program. But if what President Trump wanted was to be able to say at the end of these negotiations, “I beat President Obama,” I would have granted him that, if it could have spared us a war, because it was — you know, it was a truism. Suspension is better than the limited enrichment that Iran had.

Now, again, I want to emphasize that marginal gain between suspension of enrichment or very low enrichment does not justify in any way, does not excuse, an illegal war that has caused the deaths that you mentioned, far more than that, destruction and now disruptions of the world economy, that then hurt the poorest nations first and foremost. And that’s, of course, also because of Iran’s reaction, but the trigger was the war that was launched by the United States and Israel.

So, if that was his goal — but I think it goes back to the point that I was making earlier. I think the war was launched by President Trump because he felt he could and he felt that he was on a roll, was on a roll after Venezuela, after the attack on Iran a year ago, that he could be the president who finally deals with this issue. He’s changed, in his view, the regime in Venezuela. He thought he could change the regime in Iran, and then, next, Cuba, and that he would go down in history as this person. The details didn’t matter. And I think he really felt unstoppable. And he felt that the experts who were warning him didn’t know what they were talking about; he knew better.

AMY GOODMAN: In his gut.

ROBERT MALLEY: In his gut, whatever gut he has, yes.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: I’d like to ask Ambassador Mousavian: Where do we go from here? Especially now that — after Trump announced this blockade of Iranian ports, and yet he’s getting no support from the European Union on this. And, of course, China has made it very clear that they are going to continue to expect to be able to get through, have their ships go through the Strait of Hormuz and to trade with Iran. What is the — what are the options for the United States? And also, can Iran survive a long-term blockade, economic blockade, by the United States?

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: The naval blockade, based on United Nations Resolution 1974, is an act of war and an act of aggression. Therefore, internationally and legally, what the U.S. is doing constitutes a clear act of aggression or war, because it is causing suffering for a 90 million-strong nation, with the fear of famine and hunger affecting the population. This is not just about a state.

Nevertheless, regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the reality is that this strait remained open and free for navigation for 47 to 48 years. There was never any problem. Even after the first U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in 2025, Iran did not impose any restrictions on navigation. But when the U.S. and Israel attacked for the second time in 2026, Iranians felt this was an existential threat. That was the key difference. That is why they considered using all the tools available to them, one of which was the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, they did not close the strait; they imposed limited restrictions. Internationally, this strait should remain open to free navigation, and there should be no restrictions. Legally and internationally, Iran cannot close it. However, there are also international rules that during wartime, a country that is attacked may impose limited and calculated restrictions on navigation, but not broad restrictions, and it cannot close the strait.

For the future, if the U.S. is looking for a nuclear deal—as we have already discussed—and as Rob said, they have already achieved what they wanted, more than in the Obama period and more than under the JCPOA, they can still achieve one additional major breakthrough on the nuclear issue. President Trump could propose that Iran move toward a multilateral enrichment mechanism in the Persian Gulf. I, together with nuclear scientists at Princeton University, have published multiple articles on this. The latest was 10 days before the 2025 war. We argued that rather than national enrichment—since Saudi Arabia is also seeking enrichment, and if Saudi Arabia obtains it, Egypt will seek it, and if Egypt obtains it, Turkey will follow—this trend could spread across the region and undermine nonproliferation. Instead, a multilateral enrichment arrangement in the region would be the best solution, fully under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S., Russia, China, and other powers could also participate. This would be an international arrangement, similar to Urenco in Europe, where Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the Netherlands share enrichment. Therefore, beyond what nuclear negotiators have already achieved under President Trump—which is more than the JCPOA under President Obama—they could reach an additional major agreement: a regional arrangement that would help make the entire Persian Gulf free of nuclear weapons.

Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has not closed it. Iran says that if there is a deal—if the U.S. agrees not to attack Iran or to end the war—it will reopen it fully. Therefore, the U.S. could say, “OK, we will continue negotiations, and we are committed not to attack Iran again.” Because the U.S. has, directly or indirectly, been involved in conflicts with Iran multiple times: it indirectly cooperated with Saddam Hussein against Iran in the 1980s, including providing material and technical support for chemical weapons use; the second conflict was in 2025; the third in 2026; and now the blockade in 2026 is again being seen as an act of war. If the U.S. is truly serious about diplomacy, then diplomacy is possible, but it requires a commitment not to attack Iran again. In that case, Iran would open the Hormuz issue. That would be a good solution.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And I’d also like to ask Rob Malley the situation with Israel, which is not — which has been attacking Iran but is not part of the current negotiations. What do you feel has happened between Israel and the Trump administration? Is there a divergence occurring between the two?

ROBERT MALLEY: So, I think they have different objectives. I mean, first of all, we don’t know what President Trump’s objectives are, so it’s hard to say how they’re different or they’re similar to Israel’s. But I think Israel has been consistent in its actions. What it wants is to weaken its neighbors, whoever they are. I mean, it’s happened in Gaza, which they destroyed. The West Bank, you just saw — we just saw what they’re doing there. Lebanon, which we could talk about, which is — they’ve devastated the country. A million people now have fled the south. They’ve killed hundreds of people even since the recent ceasefire, which apparently didn’t apply to Lebanon. And they would like to weaken, fragment Iran as much as possible, because they have this view that this is their opportunity to extinguish any threat, real or pretextual, imminent or into the future.

That’s not really, I think, President Trump’s view. Again, it’s hard to define it. But what that means is, Israel would prefer to prolong this war as long as possible. I don’t think that that’s President Trump’s ambition. And I think the day President Trump says it’s it, I think he will — that Prime Minister Netanyahu will not be able to do anything but acquiesce. So, we have to wait for that moment to happen, for the president to tell the Israelis it’s over, it’s over both in Iran and in Lebanon. I’m not sure what he’ll say about Lebanon, but at least in Iran. I don’t think Prime Minister Netanyahu could afford to stand in his way.

AMY GOODMAN: And I wanted to ask you, finally, Ambassador Mousavian, about — we’ve talked to so many Iranian professors, dissidents, you know, the thousands of Iranians who were killed in the streets recently. And, I mean, we haven’t talked to them, but noting that. I wanted to ask you about the — my surprise at how many of those, even people who have been on death row in the Evin Prison, have condemned the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. They say it will make the regime more right-wing, that this does not accomplish their ends. I’m wondering your thoughts on all of these people who are coming out now and saying they want to be in charge of their own country; they don’t want these outside forces, because they’re destroying Iran.

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: I think what Americans need to understand is that there is a clear distinction between Iranian dissatisfaction with the current governing system in Iran—I would say about 80% of Iranians are not happy with the system. They face problems of economic inflation, poverty, corruption, mismanagement, and general dysfunctionality of the system—there is no doubt about that. I am sure the majority of Iranians want major reforms. Their main concerns are economic issues, corruption, mismanagement, and systemic dysfunction.

Having said that, when they are attacked by the U.S., or especially by Israel, the whole nation tends to become united in defense of its integrity, independence, and identity—particularly when they hear statements from the U.S. president that he would eradicate Iranian civilization, or when Iranians are referred to as “animals” or “bastards.” Such language—humiliation, threats, bullying, and attacks—has a strong effect. I mean, Iran has suffered about 30,000 people killed or injured during the two wars, and hundreds of millions in damages. Over 100,000 non-military buildings have been destroyed. In such circumstances, it is normal that a nation becomes united to defend its country.


AMY GOODMAN: I’m going to leave it there, but, of course, we will not leave the discussions about what’s happening there, as we continue to cover them every day on Democracy Now! Ambassador Hossein Mousavian served as spokesperson for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005, also served as Iran’s ambassador to Germany. And Robert Malley served as the special envoy for Iran under President Biden, also served as one of the negotiators on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal under President Obama.

Coming up, the president versus the pope. We’ll speak with Father James Martin, a Jesuit priest. Stay with us.

AMY GOODMAN: “Rican Beach” by Alynda Segarra and Hurray for the Riff Raff, performing in our Democracy Now! studio. To see her performance at our 30th anniversary, along with Bruce Springsteen and Patti Smith and Michael Stipe, you can go to democracynow.org. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.

Articles, Media

Taking a sledgehammer to the nuclear nonproliferation regime

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

By Frank von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian | Analysis | April 18, 2026

The current crisis over Iran’s nuclear program has reached an extraordinary level, climaxing shockingly with President Trump’s April 7 threat to destroy Iran’s “civilization” if it did not comply with his demands—a barely veiled threat of a massive nuclear attack on Iran’s cities. Any country faced with such a threat would want its own nuclear deterrent.

More broadly, the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—the expression of a global near consensus that the world would be better off without nuclear weapons and that, in the interim, the fewer fingers on nuclear triggers the better—is fraying.

In the NPT, the “P5” (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States; the Soviet Union, succeeded by Russia; the United Kingdom; France; and China— committed to eliminate their nuclear arsenals if the non-weapon states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor their use of nuclear material to make sure that none was diverted to weapons use.

Surprisingly few countries have acquired nuclear weapons. In 1995, the negotiators of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty judged 44 countries to be technologically capable of making nuclear weapons. But, in the 56 years since the NPT came into force, only three countries—Israel, India, and Pakistan—decided to acquire nuclear weapons outside the NPT and only one, North Korea, defected after it joined the NPT.

The nonweapon states initially agreed to membership in the NPT for 25 years. In 1995, when the 25 years were up, the Cold War had just ended and US and Russian nuclear warheads were being dismantled at a combined rate of 3,000 per year. Nuclear disarmament seemed in sight, and the NPT was made permanent. Unfortunately, during the past decade, the shrinkage of the global warhead stockpile stopped, with about 10,000 warheads still in existence, and it has begun to grow again as China builds up.

The 190 parties to the NPT that are to meet at the UN during May to review the state of compliance with the treaty have failed to reach consensus in the previous two reviews since 2010.

And then there is Iran.

The Iranian proliferation quandary. In 2011, the IAEA concluded that, prior to 2003, Iran had a nuclear weapon development program. In 2003, then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni published a religious edict that weapons of mass destruction are “haram” (religiously forbidden). The force of this edict has been debated, but the most recent Congressional Research Service report on Iran’s nuclear-weapon program states, “According to official U.S. assessments, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and has not resumed it.”

In 2018, President Trump capriciously withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by the Obama Administration, in which Iran had agreed to strong limits on different parts of its nuclear program for 15 years or longer. To force Iran to give him a “better deal” than it had given Obama, Trump reinstated crushing primary and secondary sanctions on Iran’s economy. Neither the UN Security Council nor the IAEA Board of Governors said anything, but UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres did:

“I am deeply concerned by today’s announcement that the United States will be withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and will begin reinstating US sanctions… I have consistently reiterated that the JCPOA represents a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy and has contributed to regional and international peace and security.”

Given the widespread opposition to the JCPOA in Congress, the Biden administration did not give a high priority to negotiating its revival. Since President Trump’s reelection, the situation has rapidly deteriorated.

On June 12, 2025, the IAEA’s Board of Governors found that “Iran has failed to co-operate fully with the Agency, as required by its Safeguards Agreement.” The focus of the board’s complaint was Iran’s inadequate explanations of the activities it had carried out during the period ending in 2003. Those were issues that the IAEA had declared closed after it summarized its conclusions in its December 2015 “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” just before the JCPOA came into force in January 2016.

The day after the IAEA Board’s statement, while the United States was negotiating with Iran, Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear sites. President Trump ordered US forces to join in and bomb Iran’s buried centrifuge halls with massive bunker busters.

Again, on February 27, in a pause in a second US negotiation with Iran, the foreign minister of Oman, who was mediating the talks, reported in a “Face the Nation” interview that the negotiators had made “substantial progress” toward a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program and that Iran was willing to end its production of highly enriched uranium and blend down its existing stock. The next day, Israel attacked and killed Iran’s supreme leader and much of its military leadership, and Trump again ordered US forces to join in the intense follow-on bombing of Iran.

The UN Security Council has not condemned these attacks on Iran but has condemned Iran for its retaliatory attacks on its US-allied Persian Gulf neighbors and for its closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The IAEA also has not condemned Israeli and US attacks on facilities it safeguarded, even though the result has been Iran’s decision to block IAEA access to Iran’s bombed sites (presumably out of fear that IAEA inspections could be used by the US and Israel for targeting intelligence).

US negotiations with Iran. The key sticking point in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program since it became public in 2003 has been uranium enrichment. Iran claims it has a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, uranium enrichment provides a route to nuclear weapons.

Our own view is that there is no economic justification for a small enrichment program like Iran’s. The four big suppliers: Russia; URENCO (a firm jointly owned by Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK); China; and France have more than enough capacity to supply the world’s nuclear power reactors at lower cost. Even the United States, with the world’s largest nuclear-power capacity—one quarter of the global total—has bought enrichment services from these suppliers since 2013 when it shut down the last of the three energy-inefficient enrichment plants it built to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons during the Cold War.

If countries insist on building uneconomic enrichment plants, we have advocated that those plants be under multinational control, as is the case with URENCO, which was founded in 1971 when there was still some concern that West Germany might seek nuclear weapons. Iran has expressed a willingness to put its enrichment program under multinational control but is unwilling to have it relocated to a neutral country as we recommended.

After President Trump took the United States out of the Iran nuclear deal that the Obama administration had negotiated and reimposed the sanctions that had been lifted as part of that agreement, Iran responded by enriching uranium, step-by-step, to higher levels than the 3.67 percent limit on uranium 235 it had agreed to. Ultimately, Iran was enriching some uranium to 60 percent, just short of weapon-grade (90 percent). By the time Israel and the US began bombing in June 2025, Iran had produced about half a ton of uranium enriched to that level. Using that as feed material, Iran could, with a single “cascade” of 175 of its most advanced centrifuges, produce enough weapon-grade uranium for about 10 bombs at a rate of one bomb equivalent per 25 days,

Since Iran shut down traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the apparent abandonment (or as Iran has claimed, failure) of a plan to sieze Irans highly enriched uranium, US-Iranian negotiations were launched in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad. Success or failure in reaching agreement on Iran’s nuclear program will have enormous implications for Middle East peace—and for nuclear proliferation around the world.

An inconsistent nonproliferation policy. Despite going to war over Iran’s uranium enrichment program, President Trump has inconsistently given both South Korea and Saudi Arabia his blessing to acquire uranium-enrichment and spent-fuel-reprocessing programs. “Reprocessing” is a chemical process used to separate plutonium, another nuclear-weapons material, from irradiated uranium fuel.

As explained above, there is today no economic justification for any new national enrichment program. There is currently a churn of customers for uranium enrichment as URENCO and France expand their capacities in response to the scrambling of US and European nuclear utilities to reduce their dependence on Russia’s enrichment capacity. But small national enrichment plants are still not financially competitive, and the big suppliers are diverse enough so that no country with a nuclear power plant needs to feel vulnerable to to being cut off from nuclear fuel for political reasons. Russia, for example, has been supplying low-enriched uranium fuel for Iran’s single commercial nuclear power reactor since France broke its enrichment contract with Iran after Iran’s 1979 revolution.

Recycled plutonium is not economically competitive with low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power generation on any scale. France and the UK proved that by trying to sell plutonium recycling services to other countries. The UK reprocessing company shut down in 2018 after escalating costs resulted in it losing all of its foreign customers. The only remaining significant reprocessing customer of France’s government-owned fuel-cycle company is France’s government-owned nuclear utility.

Nevertheless, without the required consultations with the relevant congressional oversight committees, President Trump has committed to both South Korea and Saudi Arabia that the United States will support their efforts to acquire both uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation facilities.

The reasons for concern are clear: At the end of May 2025, a poll of South Koreans found 76 percent supported acquiring a nuclear deterrent against North Korea. In the case of Saudi Arabia, its ruler, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, stated in a 2018 interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes that, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” President Trump has also agreed to support Saudi Arabia’s refusal to accede to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which 144 other countries, including Iran, have agreed to. The Additional Protocol requires countries to provide the IAEA access to their nuclear facilities while they are under construction to check the safeguard-ability of their designs before they go into operation and to make sure that the IAEA knows when they do start up.

President Trump made these agreements with the leaders of South Korea and Saudi Arabia in his usual transactional style. Rules, he apparently believes, need not be followed if a government is willing to pay enough.

President’s Trump’s disdain for the rules is endangering world order in many ways. We cannot leave defense of the nonproliferation regime for later, however. If we do, we may find ourselves in a nuclear-armed crowd.

https://thebulletin.org/2026/04/taking-a-sledgehammer-to-the-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/#post-heading

Articles, Media

بحران اساسی اعتماد به پیمان‌های بین‌المللی؛ پیامد تجاوز به ایران

نویسنده سید حسین موسویان-میدل ایست آی-چهارم می 2026

به گزارش ایسنا، «سید حسین موسویان» سفیر پیشین ایران در آلمان در گزارشی مطرح کرد که هم‌زمان با برگزاری کنفرانس بازبینی پیمان منع گسترش تسلیحات اتمی(ان‌پی‌تی) در نیویورک اعتبار این پیمان تحت فشار بی‌سابقه‌ای قرار گرفته است، چراکه این پیمان بین‌المللی که بر اساس یک «معامله بزرگ» میان محدودیت‌های هسته‌ای تضمین‌های امنیتی طراحی شده، اکنون با بحران عمیق‌تری روبه‌روست

به گفته موسویان، این بحران ناشی از عدم پایبندی فنی نیست، بلکه بحرانی ناشی از از دست رفتن اعتماد سیاسی است

او با اشاره به سابقه مذاکرات پیرامون حل‌وفصل مسئله برنامه هسته‌ای ایران، همکاری‌های ایران با آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی ذیل توافق جامع پادمانی و اجرای توافق ان‌پی‌تی در ایران که از زمان توافق هسته‌ای در سال ۲۰۱۵ تحت یکی از سختگیرانه‌ترین مقررات نظارت و راستی‌آزمایی آژانس قرار داشته است، نوشته هیچ گاه شواهدی برای اثبات ادعای وجود یک برنامه فعال تسلیحات اتمی در ایران در گزارش‌های فنی متعدد آژانس و ارزیابی‌های اطلاعاتی آمریکا وجود نداشت است

این سیاستمدار ایرانی با اشاره به خروج «دونالد ترامپ» رئیس‌جمهور آمریکا از توافق هسته‌ای در سال ۲۰۱۸ و حصول برخی پیشرفت‌ها در مذاکرات هسته‌ای با دولت دوم او در سال‌ ۲۰۲۵ و ۲۰۲۶ نوشته در نهایت، این  پیشرفت‌ها با تشدید تحریم‌ها تجاوزات آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی علیه ایران تحت‌الشاع قرار گرفت

شفافیت می‌تواند آسیب‌پذیری راهبردی را افزایش دهد

موسویان در گزارش خود که در وبگاه خبری میدل ایست آی منتشر شده است، نوشت: این تجربه به درس‌های راهبردی مشخصی مبدل شده است که اکنون نگاه هسته‌ای ایران را شکل می‌دهد. اول این که پایبندی به قوانین امنیت را تضمین نمی‌کند. عضویت در ان‌پی‌تی و اجرای پادمان‌های آژانس، نه‌تنها تضمین امنیتی به همراه نداشت، بلکه آسیب‌پذیری را تشدید کرد که در اقداماتی از جمله تحریم‌های جامع، حملات سایبری مانند ویروس استاکس‌نت، ترور و به شهادت رساندن دانشمندان هسته‌ای-از شهید «محسن فخری‌زاده» در ۲۰۲۰ تا ۱۴ دانشمند هسته‌ای  دیگر در عملیات موسوم به «شیر غران» رژیم صهیونیستی و نهایتا حملات نظامی به تاسیسات هسته‌ای ایران در نطنز، اصفهان و اراک

 دومین درس این است که شفافیت می‌تواند آسیب‌پذیری راهبردی را افزایش دهد. افزایش جزئیات و بازرسی‌های دقیق اطلاعات حساس درباره تاسیسات و کارکنان را در اختیار طرف‌هایی قرار می‌دهد که از آن در اقدامات قهری بهره‌برداری می‌کنند

سوم این که از دیدگاه ایران آژانس سیاسی شده است. مقامات ایرانی دیگر آژانس را یک نهاد منحصرا فنی نمی‌بینند بلکه معتقدند دیده‌بان هسته‌ای سازمان ملل تحت تاثیر فشارهای ژئوپولیتیکی غرب است و گزارش‌های آن را دارای «انگیزه سیاسی» می‌دانند که از بی‌طرفی فنی فاصله گرفته است

اعتماد ایران به آژانس تضعیف شده است

نگارنده معتقد است: بی‌اعتمادی فزاینده ایران به آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی طی دو دهه گذشته شکل گرفته است. «حیدر مصلحی» وزیر اطلاعات پیشین ایران در سال ۲۰۱۰ آژانس را به جاسوسی متهم کرد. پس از حملات متجاوزانه آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی به تاسیسات اتمی ایران در سال ۲۰۲۵ این  بدگمانی تشدید یافت و «محمود نبویان» نایب رییس کمیسیون امنیت ملی و سیاست خارجی مجلس شورای اسلامی مدعی شد که ریزتراشه‌های جاسوسی در کفش بازرسان آژانس هنگام تفتیش امنیتی در تاسیسات اتمی ایران کشف شده است

درس راهبردی چهارم برای ایران این بود که روند راستی‌آزمایی اقدامات قهری را تسهیل می‌کند؛ ‌گزارش‌های پادمانی و قطعنامه‌ها از دیدگاه ایران یک توجیه حقوقی و سیاسی برای اعمال تحریم‌ها، انزوای دیپلماتیک و دیگر اشکال اعمال فشار محسوب می‌شود

در همین راستا، «سرگئی لاوروف» وزیر امور خارجه ایران پس از حملات متجاوزانه به تاسیسات اتمی ایران آژانس را متهم کرد که بهانه‌هایی برای حملات هوایی به این تاسیسات فراهم آورده است

در نتیجه، اعتماد ایران به بی‌طرفی آژانس کاهش یافته و درخواست‌ها برای محدودسازی دسترسی‌های آژانس را در تهران افزایش داده است

درس پنجم ایران این بوده است که آمریکا و رژیم صهیونیستی نقش اصلی و تعیین‌کننده‌ای در پرونده هسته‌ای ایران داشته‌اند و نهادهای چندجانبه مانند شورای امنیت سازمان ملل و آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی نقشی ثانویه و تشریفاتی داشته‌اند. بی‌عملی این نهادها و ناتوانی آن‌ها از موضع‌گیری‌های هرچند جزئی مانند محکومیت آشکار ترورهای دانشمندان هسته‌ای یا حملات به تاسیسات اتمی ایران پرسش‌هایی را درباره بی‌طرفی و استقلال این نهادها برانگیخته و رویدادهایی مانند کنفرانس بازبینی ان‌پی‌تی را سازوکاری نه‌چندان اثرگذار و عمدتا روندی وقت‌گیر بدون در بر داشتن نتیجه‌ای هدفمند جلوه می‌دهد

بازدارندگی راهبردی تضمین نهایی بقاست، نه پایبندی به پیمان‌ها

در بخش پایانی این مطلب مطرح شده است: این تحولات اعتبار ان‌پی‌تی، ‌ آژانس و شورای امنیت را در نگاه بسیاری از کشورها، به‌ویژه ایران تضعیف کرده است. از دید تهران، سال‌ها پایبندی، بازرسی‌های دقیق و توافقات نه‌ منجر به امنیت شد و نه عادی‌سازی؛ ‌ بلکه تحریم، اجبار و خرابکاری و نهایتا حمله نظامی به همراه داشت. در همین حال، ‌ برخی از کشورهایی که سلاح اتمی ندارند توانمندی و ظرفیت پیشرفته غنی‌سازی اورانیوم را بدون درخواستی برای برچیدن آن حفظ کرده‌اند. از سوی دیگر نیز بازیگران غیرعضو در ان‌پی‌تی که سلاح اتمی دارند، ‌ عمدتا در برابر فشارهای مشابه مصون هستند

رژیم صهیونیستی که از عضویت در ان‌پی‌تی رویگردان بوده و به طور موثری مانع از اجرای قطعنامه‌های دیرینه سازمان ملل برای منطقه عاری از سلاح‌های کشتار جمعی در غرب آسیا شده است با فشار هدفمندی از سوی شورای امنیت، آژانس و قدرت‌های بزرگ در زمینه زرادخانه هسته‌ای خود مواجه نشده است. تضاد رویکردی که نسبت به برنامه هسته‌ای رژیم صهیونیستی وجود دارد در مقایسه با کره شمالی نشان می‌دهد که بازدارندگی راهبردی تضمین نهایی بقا است، نه پایبندی به پیمان‌ها

موسویان معتقد است که احیای مشروعیت نیازمند اقداماتی فراتر از تاییدهای تشریفاتی بوده و نیازمند بازسازی اعتماد نسبت به بی‌طرفی نهادهای بین‌المللی و بستن شکاف رو به گسترش میان اصول حقوقی و واقعیت‌های ژئوپولیتیکی است

https://www.isna.ir/news/1405021508638/

Articles, Media

War on Iran has triggered a fundamental crisis of trust in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty

By Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Middle East Eye, May 4, 2026

As diplomats convene in New York from 27 April to 22 May for the latest session of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, its credibility is under unprecedented strain.

Designed as a grand bargain between nuclear restraint and security assurances, the treaty now faces a deeper crisis – one not of technical compliance, but of political trust. Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the case of Iran.

For over two decades, Iran has been the most intensively monitored state under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of the IAEA’s entire budget, the highest portion is dedicated to monitoring, verification, and oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme – more than any other state.  

In the past two decades, successive IAEA reports, alongside publicly available US intelligence assessments, have not established conclusive evidence of an active nuclear weapons programme.

Since 2003, Tehran engaged in sustained negotiations with major powers, most notably reaching the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which it undertook significant nuclear restrictions and remained in compliance.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

However, the subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the agreement marked a critical rupture. In the years that followed, diplomatic efforts resumed, including US Iran talks in 2025 and 2026 as well as the Islamabad track, both of which reportedly achieved meaningful progress.

Yet these negotiations were ultimately overshadowed by renewed military action involving the US and Israel, alongside intensified sanctions and forms of economic and political blockade.

Strategic lessons

This experience has crystallised into a set of strategic lessons that now shape Iran’s nuclear outlook.

First, compliance does not guarantee security. Membership in the NPT and adherence to IAEA’s safeguards not only failed to provide security guarantees, but instead coincided with escalating vulnerabilities – manifested in comprehensive sanctions, sustained cyber operations such as the Stuxnet attack that damaged nuclear infrastructure, and ultimately military strikes – contributing, in Tehran’s view, to an existential threat reinforced by war and economic blockade.

Second, transparency can increase strategic exposure. Detailed disclosures and intrusive inspections reveal sensitive facilities and personnel, potentially increasing vulnerability by providing information that will be exploited in coercive actions, including cyber operations, sabotage incidents, targeted killings of nuclear scientists, and military strikes against key nuclear infrastructure, such as enrichment and heavy water facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak during US and Israeli operations.

At least 14 nuclear scientists are believed to be among those killed in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, launched on 13 June 2025. Prior to 2025, several other Iranian scientists were killed in assassinations spanning from 2010 to 2020, including Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (2020), Majid Shahriari (2010), and Masoud Ali Mohammadi (2010).

Third, the IAEA is perceived as politically influenced. Iranian officials increasingly view the IAEA not as a purely technical body, but as one shaped by geopolitical pressures, particularly from western states.

Senior bodies – including Iran’s foreign ministry and Atomic Energy Organization – publicly criticised the agency’s reporting as “politically motivated” and reflective of external influence, especially in the context of Board of Governors resolutions and post-conflict assessments. Such statements underscore a growing perception in Tehran that the IAEA has deviated from strict technical neutrality and operates, at least in part, within broader political dynamics.

Erosion of trust

Distrust of the IAEA inside Iran has grown steadily over the past two decades, particularly amid allegations that inspections were exploited for intelligence purposes. In 2010, Iran’s Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi accused the IAEA of sending “spies working for foreign intelligence gathering organisations among its inspectors”.

After the 2025 Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, such suspicions intensified. Senior Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian accused IAEA inspectors of espionage and alleged that surveillance microchips had been discovered concealed in inspectors’ shoes during security checks at nuclear sites.

Years of compliance and intrusive inspections did not produce security or normalisation; instead, they culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack

These accusations, whether accurate or not, further eroded Iranian confidence in the IAEA’s neutrality and strengthened calls in Tehran to restrict access to inspections.

Fourth, verification processes facilitate coercive measures. Safeguards reporting and resolutions are perceived as providing legal and political justification for sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and other forms of pressure. 

A few days after the 2025 Israeli-US strike on Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the IAEA of providing “pretexts” that enabled Israel to justify its recent air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

Fifth, US and Israeli primacy in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier. The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear negotiations since 2003 – culminating in the JCPOA and followed by subsequent developments, including the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement and escalating tensions that extended to military action by the US and Israel – leaves little doubt that these two actors have played the primary and decisive role in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier.

In practice, the direction, pace, and outcomes of the process have been driven largely by Washington and Tel Aviv, while multilateral institutions have occupied a secondary and largely ineffective position. Bodies such as the UN Security Council and the IAEA, along with the broader framework of the NPT, appear in this context to have functioned primarily in reactive or procedural capacities rather than as independent and influential actors.

From this perspective, their inability to adopt even minimal positions – such as issuing clear condemnations of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or military strikes targeting nuclear facilities – has been interpreted as evidence of diminished effectiveness and constrained autonomy.

This pattern raises critical questions regarding the capacity of the nonproliferation regime to function as an impartial and authoritative framework in the face of major geopolitical conflicts.

Viewed through this lens, the recurring review conferences of the NPT risk being perceived not as effective mechanisms of governance, but as largely procedural exercises that consume time and resources without delivering meaningful outcomes.

Credibility undermined

Taken together, these developments have severely undermined the credibility of the NPT, the IAEA, and the UNSC in the eyes of many states, particularly Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, years of compliance, intrusive inspections, and negotiated agreements did not produce security or normalisation; instead, they culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack.

At the same time, other non-nuclear-weapon states continue to maintain advanced enrichment capabilities without facing demands for their elimination, while nuclear-armed states outside the NPT framework remain largely immune from comparable pressure.

Most notably, Israel has remained the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East while refusing to join the NPT, effectively blocking implementation of long-standing UN resolutions calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

Yet neither the IAEA, nor the UNSC, nor the major world powers have exerted meaningful pressure on Israel regarding its nuclear arsenal. The contrast with North Korea has further reinforced the perception that strategic deterrence – not treaty compliance – provides the ultimate guarantee of survival. As a result, the foundational bargain of the NPT is increasingly being called into question.

If states conclude that adherence to nonproliferation obligations neither protects their security nor ensures equal treatment under international law, then confidence in the entire nonproliferation regime will continue to erode.

Restoring legitimacy will require far more than procedural reaffirmations; it demands rebuilding trust in the impartiality of international institutions and closing the widening gap between legal principles and geopolitical realities.

https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/war-iran-fundamental-crisis-trust-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty