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Interview, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, 26/06/2026

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, tells Euronews he believes Tehran will allow the IAEA access to its nuclear sites as part of negotiations with the US, despite some Iranian officials saying access could only be granted after a final deal has been struck.

https://www.euronews.com/video/2026/06/26/tehran-will-allow-nuclear-inspections-during-peace-talks-former-iranian-diplomat-says

An Al Arabiya Counterpoints Debate, June, 25, 2026

Participants:

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: Former Iranian Diplomat and Former Senior Nuclear Negotiator

George Papadopoulos: Former Foreign Policy Adviser to President Donald Trump

Chuck Freilich: Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser and Professor at Columbia University

Who Won the War?

Melinda Nucifora: President Trump declared victory only ten days after the outbreak of the war. Four months later, however, following a ceasefire and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, negotiations toward a permanent agreement are still underway. While both Washington and Tehran describe the talks as making progress, the principal issues remain unresolved, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and the future of the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. decision to suspend sanctions on Iran’s oil exports for sixty days has also generated considerable debate, including among Republican lawmakers, leading many to ask a fundamental question: What was the war ultimately meant to achieve? Professor Freilich, let me begin with you. Who, in your view, emerged as the real winner—the United States or Iran?

Chuck Freilich: Unfortunately, I believe Iran emerged as the winner. In my view, the war was both necessary and justified. However, it was conducted without clearly defined strategic objectives by either the United States or Israel. President Trump also ended the conflict prematurely, allowing Iran to claim that it had successfully withstood military pressure from both the world’s leading superpower and Israel. That perception has strengthened Iran’s confidence at the negotiating table. In many respects, the Memorandum of Understanding reflects Iranian preferences far more than American ones. Even as negotiations move toward a comprehensive agreement, Iran appears to retain the stronger bargaining position. A final agreement remains possible, but I consider it unlikely. The two sides remain fundamentally divided on the principal issues. The interim arrangement merely reopened the Strait of Hormuz and extended the ceasefire. Whether Iran will ultimately accept the concessions Washington seeks remains uncertain, leaving the region in a prolonged strategic limbo.

Melinda Nucifora: Mr. Papadopoulos, Professor Freilich argues that the war was strategically mismanaged and that the resulting memorandum represents an American concession. Do you agree?

George Papadopoulos: I disagree with almost every aspect of that assessment. President Trump was the first American president in nearly fifty years willing to confront a regime that, in my view, has threatened both U.S. interests and those of America’s allies. The joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign successfully transformed military achievements into political and economic gains. Militarily, Iran’s senior leadership was eliminated, creating significant political disruption. Politically, a number of important Muslim-majority countries—including Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan—ultimately endorsed the Memorandum of Understanding. Economically, Iran agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, allowing commercial shipping to resume. Energy markets responded positively, with oil prices falling dramatically from their wartime highs. Taken together, these developments do not represent American capitulation. Rather, they demonstrate that the United States and its allies achieved their principal objectives. My only criticism is that these actions should have been taken much earlier.

Melinda Nucifora: Mr. Mousavian, despite the enormous human and economic costs borne by all sides, do you believe Iran emerged victorious, or do you agree that the United States achieved its objectives?

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: I believe the central assumption behind the war was that a large-scale U.S.-Israeli military campaign—combined with the assassination of Iran’s senior political, military, and security leadership—would trigger internal unrest and ultimately lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic. That assumption was widely reflected in hundreds of opinion articles published in the American press. Senior U.S. officials, including President Trump and members of his administration, also spoke publicly about broader strategic objectives, including control over Iran’s energy resources and Kharg Island, the country’s principal oil export terminal.

Today, it is clear that this assumption failed. At the same time, I do not believe there was any real winner. Iran suffered enormous destruction and economic losses amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars. Israel also sustained unprecedented military and economic damage. America’s regional allies paid a significant price, and for the first time since the Second World War, U.S. military bases across the region came under direct attack. Everyone lost. If the objective was regime collapse, that objective clearly failed. More broadly, however, the war demonstrated that military confrontation imposed heavy costs on all parties without producing a decisive political outcome.

Competing Definitions of Victory

Melinda Nucifora: Professor Freilich, Mr. Mousavian argues that everyone lost because all sides paid an extraordinary price. Why do you still believe Iran emerged as the winner?

Chuck Freilich: I certainly acknowledge that all parties paid significant costs. Nevertheless, I believe Iran achieved the more favorable political outcome. President Trump deserves credit for being the first American president in decades willing to employ military force directly against Iran. However, achieving military action is not the same as achieving strategic success. One of the principal objectives was regime change. That did not occur. Instead, the Iranian political system emerged more confident than before. Another objective was the destruction of Iran’s nuclear program. Although the program suffered setbacks, it remained fundamentally intact. Iran also succeeded in linking negotiations over the nuclear issue with broader regional questions, particularly developments involving Lebanon. As a result, the United States pressured Israel to halt military operations against Hezbollah—an outcome unprecedented in recent decades. Among the major military objectives, only Iran’s ballistic missile production infrastructure experienced substantial damage. Even there, Iran retained significant capabilities. For these reasons, I remain unconvinced that the United States achieved the decisive strategic victory it originally sought.

The Nuclear Question

Melinda Nucifora: One of President Trump’s principal war objectives was to eliminate Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Yet the nuclear issue remains unresolved and continues to dominate the negotiations. President Trump has repeatedly argued that he can negotiate a better agreement than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement in which you, Mr. Mousavian, played an important role. Do you believe he is on track to achieve a better deal?

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: Before answering that question, I believe we should begin with two important facts. The first concerns the record of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since 2003, every safeguard report has reached the same essential conclusion: although the Agency has periodically raised technical questions, it has found no evidence that Iran diverted its nuclear program toward weaponization. Before the war, during the conflict, and afterward, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi repeatedly reaffirmed that the Agency had found no evidence that Iran had decided to build a nuclear weapon. The second fact concerns the assessments of the U.S. intelligence community. Since 2003—and particularly following the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate—successive American intelligence assessments have consistently concluded that there is no evidence Iran has made the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon. These are not Iranian claims. They are the conclusions of the world’s nuclear watchdog and America’s own intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, much as Iraq was invaded under the false assumption that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, Iran was attacked despite the absence of evidence that it was pursuing a nuclear weapon. The JCPOA remains the most comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated. Iran accepted transparency measures and operational limitations that exceeded the obligations of every other member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In many respects, the agreement represented what I have often described as an “NPT Plus” arrangement, imposing verification measures far beyond the treaty’s original requirements.

Melinda Nucifora: If there was no evidence that Iran intended to build a nuclear weapon, why did both the United States and Israel consider the nuclear program such a serious threat? Clearly, they believed the danger was real.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: That is precisely why I referred to American intelligence assessments rather than my own opinion. If only Iranian officials made this argument, critics could dismiss it as political rhetoric. But the conclusions I cited come from U.S. intelligence agencies and the IAEA. The JCPOA itself reflected that international consensus. It was negotiated not only between Iran and the United States, but also with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union. It was unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 2231. There is no serious dispute that from 2015 until the U.S. withdrawal in 2018, Iran fully complied with its obligations. During that period, the IAEA repeatedly verified Iran’s compliance with the agreement. Yet despite implementing the most intrusive verification regime in the history of nuclear non-proliferation, Iran was rewarded not with sanctions relief, but with America’s withdrawal from the agreement and the reimposition of the most comprehensive sanctions ever imposed on the country. That experience fundamentally shaped Iranian perceptions of American credibility and remains one of the central obstacles to rebuilding trust today.

Can There Be a Better Deal Than the JCPOA?

Melinda Nucifora: George, if the JCPOA was as comprehensive as Mr. Mousavian argues, how can President Trump realistically negotiate a better agreement?

George Papadopoulos: The issue extends well beyond the United States. President Trump has made it unequivocally clear that Iran will never obtain a nuclear weapon under his administration. Similar concerns have been expressed by the European Union, Russia, China, and many other governments. This is not simply a bilateral dispute; it is an international security issue. Before the war, the United States offered Iran significant economic incentives, including expanded agricultural trade, civilian aircraft sales, and broader economic cooperation, provided Tehran agreed to end uranium enrichment permanently and abandon any pathway toward a nuclear weapon. Iran rejected those proposals, insisting that uranium enrichment is an inalienable sovereign right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Military action followed. In my view, had the United States and Israel not intervened, Iran would eventually have acquired a nuclear weapons capability.

Melinda Nucifora: Yet even after the military campaign, the nuclear issue remains unresolved. What, then, has actually been achieved?

George Papadopoulos: A great deal has changed. For the first time in nearly half a century, Iran understands that the military option is not merely rhetorical—it is real. For decades, successive American administrations relied primarily on sanctions and diplomatic pressure while avoiding direct military confrontation. During that period, Iran expanded its regional influence, strengthened ties with other sanctioned states, supported armed groups across the Middle East, and continued activities that many governments regarded as destabilizing.The recent war fundamentally altered those calculations.

Iran’s navy and air force suffered severe damage. Much of its senior military leadership was eliminated. A new transitional leadership has emerged that appears more interested in sanctions relief, restoring oil exports, and reintegrating Iran into the international economy. For that reason, I believe Iran has entered negotiations more seriously than at any previous point during the past forty-seven years.

Competing Views of Nuclear Deterrence

Chuck Freilich: I believe the discussion risks overlooking the broader strategic picture. It is possible to cite individual sentences from lengthy IAEA reports or intelligence assessments, but the overwhelming judgment of Western intelligence services was that Iran had become a threshold nuclear state. Iran may not have assembled a nuclear weapon, but before the June conflict it had enriched uranium to 60 percent—only a short technical step from weapons-grade material—and had accumulated enough enriched uranium to produce multiple nuclear devices if it chose to do so. From Israel’s perspective, waiting until Iran actually crossed that final threshold would have been strategically irresponsible.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: An important point is often overlooked. Under the JCPOA, Iran enriched uranium only below five percent and maintained a stockpile of less than 300 kilograms. Throughout that period, Iran remained in full compliance with the agreement. Only after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed comprehensive sanctions did Iran gradually reduce its own commitments under the agreement, eventually increasing enrichment levels to 60 percent. If one seeks the origin of today’s nuclear crisis, it is necessary to ask why the United States abandoned an agreement that the IAEA repeatedly confirmed Iran was fully implementing. Even during the negotiations held in 2025 and 2026, Iran indicated its willingness to eliminate its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and return to lower enrichment levels within the framework of a negotiated agreement. That demonstrates that highly enriched uranium was intended as leverage in negotiations rather than evidence of a political decision to build a nuclear weapon.

Israel’s Nuclear Monopoly and the Question of Double Standards

Melinda Nucifora: Mr. Mousavian, your argument raises a broader question. If other countries are permitted to enrich uranium, and if Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, why should Iran be treated differently?

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: The debate cannot ignore one fundamental reality. Israel is the only country in the Middle East that possesses nuclear weapons. Iran, by contrast, remains a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has accepted IAEA safeguards, and has never been found to have diverted its declared nuclear activities toward weaponization. Yet Iran has been attacked by two nuclear-armed states while the only nuclear arsenal in the region remains outside the NPT and outside international inspections. This raises an obvious question: if the objective is genuinely nuclear non-proliferation, why does the international community continue to tolerate one standard for Israel and another for Iran? For more than five decades, Iran has consistently supported the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. Indeed, Iran first proposed such an initiative at the United Nations in the 1970s. Successive Iranian governments have continued to support that proposal, while Israel has opposed it. If the concern is truly preventing nuclear proliferation, then a regional framework that applies equally to every state would represent the most logical and sustainable solution.

Chuck Freilich: I believe that comparison is fundamentally misleading. There is an essential difference between Israel and Iran. Israel is a democracy that is generally regarded by Western governments as a responsible member of the international community. Whatever Israel’s actual capabilities may or may not be, it has never officially declared itself a nuclear power, nor has it threatened neighboring states with destruction. Iran, on the other hand, has repeatedly called for Israel’s elimination while simultaneously investing enormous resources in ballistic missile development, uranium enrichment, and support for armed groups across the region. The concern is therefore not simply nuclear capability. It is the combination of capability and declared intent. For Israeli policymakers, those factors cannot be separated.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: I have consistently opposed existential threats made by either side. For many years, I have advocated mutual recognition, an end to hostile rhetoric, and a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. Any threat to eliminate another country violates the principles of the United Nations Charter. At the same time, we should also recognize another reality. Many Israeli officials have openly discussed military action designed to destroy Iran’s strategic capabilities and, in some cases, even to bring about regime change. From the Iranian perspective, those statements constitute existential threats as well. If we seek genuine security, the objective should not be to determine whose threats are more serious. The objective should be to eliminate mutual existential threats altogether through diplomacy and reciprocal security guarantees. Regarding nuclear weapons, I believe we should begin with facts rather than assumptions. Iran remains an NPT member. Israel does not. Iran accepted and implemented the most comprehensive nuclear verification regime ever negotiated under the JCPOA. Between 2015 and 2018, the IAEA repeatedly confirmed Iran’s full compliance and verified the peaceful nature of its declared nuclear activities. The crisis began only after the United States withdrew from the agreement despite Iran’s verified compliance. For that reason, the issue before us is not merely Iran’s nuclear program. It is the broader question of whether international agreements remain credible when one party fully implements its obligations while another abandons the agreement.

Was the U.S. Withdrawal from the JCPOA the Turning Point?

Melinda Nucifora: That brings us to another important question. Was the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 the catalyst for the nuclear crisis we see today? George, let me begin with you.

George Papadopoulos: The American withdrawal certainly changed Iran’s behavior.  After leaving the agreement, Iran significantly expanded uranium enrichment and accumulated far larger quantities of enriched material than had been permitted under the JCPOA. But I believe the fundamental problem lay in the agreement itself. The Obama administration negotiated an arrangement that contained sunset provisions allowing many restrictions eventually to expire. In effect, the agreement postponed rather than permanently resolved the nuclear issue. President Trump concluded that this was a flawed agreement.

Rather than continuing to provide sanctions relief while Iran preserved an industrial-scale enrichment capability, his administration chose to withdraw and pursue a different strategy aimed at achieving a more comprehensive and durable settlement. Furthermore, comparisons between Iran and countries such as Germany or Japan overlook an essential distinction. Those countries are not financing armed groups across the Middle East, threatening neighboring states, or pursuing revolutionary foreign policies. Context matters. A country cannot be evaluated solely by its enrichment level; its broader strategic behavior must also be taken into account.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: Respectfully, I disagree. Many countries possess enrichment technology, including enrichment at very high levels, without being accused of seeking nuclear weapons. The decisive issue is not enrichment itself but whether there is evidence of diversion toward weaponization. The JCPOA successfully addressed precisely that concern through the most intrusive verification system ever negotiated. When the United States withdrew, Iran gradually reduced its commitments under the agreement. That sequence is critical. The expansion of Iran’s enrichment program did not precede the American withdrawal; it followed it. Therefore, if we wish to understand today’s crisis, we must acknowledge that abandoning a functioning agreement inevitably produced new incentives for both sides to escalate rather than cooperate.

Chuck Freilich: I opposed the American withdrawal from the JCPOA at the time because I believed it created unnecessary complications. Nevertheless, that debate now belongs to history. Even had the agreement remained in force, many of its most significant restrictions would have expired by 2030. Israel therefore viewed the agreement as delaying rather than eliminating the nuclear challenge. From Israel’s perspective, no civilian nuclear program requires uranium enrichment approaching weapons-grade levels. That remains the fundamental concern. The question today is no longer whether the JCPOA should have survived. The question is what kind of agreement can permanently prevent another nuclear crisis while providing sufficient confidence to all parties.

Beyond the Nuclear Issue: Can There Be a Grand Bargain?

Melinda Nucifora: Let us move beyond the nuclear issue. Recent negotiations have expanded to include Lebanon and broader regional security questions. In Israel, some officials have expressed concern that Washington may be making concessions at Israel’s expense. Others argue that the United States is simply pursuing its own strategic interests. Mr. Papadopoulos, has the United States abandoned Israel by insisting that Lebanon be included in the negotiations?

George Papadopoulos: Absolutely not. President Trump has demonstrated repeatedly that he is among the strongest supporters of Israel of any American president in modern history. His administration has consistently provided Israel with political, diplomatic, and military support unmatched by previous administrations. Including Lebanon in the negotiations should not be interpreted as a concession to Iran. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic objective. For decades, the relationship among the United States, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon has been trapped in a repetitive cycle of sanctions, proxy warfare, military escalation, and retaliation. That model has failed to produce either peace or stability. The current negotiations seek to establish a different framework. The objective is to reintegrate Iran into the international economy under strict safeguards, ensure that it does not acquire a nuclear weapon, reduce regional hostilities, and create conditions under which conflicts involving Lebanon and Israel can gradually be de-escalated. That represents a strategic shift rather than a retreat. In my view, it ultimately serves both American and Israeli interests.

Chuck Freilich: I would not describe American policy as either betrayal or abandonment. The United States is naturally pursuing what it believes to be its own national interests. Where I disagree is in the assumption that economic engagement alone will fundamentally alter Iran’s behavior. A similar expectation accompanied the JCPOA. Many believed that greater economic integration would gradually moderate Iranian regional policies. In my judgment, that expectation proved overly optimistic. The Iranian political system is driven by ideological and revolutionary considerations that frequently outweigh purely economic calculations. Economic incentives are undoubtedly welcome in Tehran, but they are unlikely by themselves to produce a fundamental transformation in Iranian strategic behavior. Regarding Lebanon, a temporary reduction in hostilities may be desirable. However, it does not resolve the underlying problem. Israel continues to face a security environment in which Hezbollah retains significant capabilities and, in Israel’s view, remains closely linked to Iranian regional strategy. No responsible Israeli government can ignore that reality.

A Comprehensive Peace or Endless Crisis?

Melinda Nucifora: Mr. Mousavian, should Iran pursue an agreement with the United States even if broader regional issues—particularly Lebanon—remain unresolved? Or does a durable peace require a more comprehensive settlement?

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: If the objective is a sustainable agreement rather than another temporary arrangement, a comprehensive framework is essential. The first requirement is a genuine grand bargain between Iran and the United States. After nearly half a century of hostility, both countries need a comprehensive agreement that addresses not only the nuclear issue but also sanctions, regional disputes, bilateral relations, and mutual security concerns. Such an agreement should establish normal diplomatic relations based on mutual respect, recognition of legitimate interests, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. However, bilateral normalization alone is not sufficient. The second requirement is a broader regional dialogue involving Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Regional stability cannot be achieved through permanent rivalry or military alliances directed against one another. Instead, the region requires a collective security framework based on cooperation in political, economic, energy, and security affairs. The third-dimension concerns Iran and Israel. President Trump is uniquely positioned to encourage direct efforts aimed at ending decades of mutual existential threats between the two countries. Lasting peace requires reciprocal commitments by both sides to abandon policies based on deterrence through permanent hostility. Finally, there is another issue that cannot be ignored. No lasting regional order will emerge without addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The international community has adopted numerous United Nations resolutions supporting a two-state solution. Until that issue is resolved, instability will continue to affect the wider Middle East regardless of any bilateral agreement between Washington and Tehran. A comprehensive peace therefore requires progress on all these interconnected fronts.

Strategic Competition Beyond the Middle East

George Papadopoulos: I actually agree with one important point raised by Mr. Mousavian. The United States and Iran do need a comprehensive agreement. For forty-seven years, successive American administrations have failed to develop a sustainable strategy toward Iran. During that same period, another major geopolitical challenge emerged: China’s growing influence. Today, Beijing has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in Iran, expanded long-term strategic cooperation, and actively encourages alternatives to the U.S.-led international financial system. From Washington’s perspective, Iran is no longer only a Middle Eastern issue. It has become part of the broader strategic competition between the United States and China. That reality makes a comprehensive agreement with Tehran even more important. President Trump understands that if Iran can eventually be reintegrated into a more stable international framework, it will strengthen America’s long-term global position while reducing opportunities for strategic competitors to expand their influence in the region. For that reason, the current negotiations should be understood not only as an effort to end one conflict, but also as part of a much larger geopolitical strategy.

Closing Reflections: Is a Historic Breakthrough Possible?

Melinda Nucifora: We are almost out of time, so I would like to ask each of you a final question. After nearly five decades of hostility, are we witnessing the beginning of a genuine strategic transformation, or is this simply another temporary pause before the next confrontation?

Chuck Freilich: I certainly support the idea of a comprehensive agreement in principle. Every responsible policymaker would prefer diplomacy to war. My concern is that the political conditions necessary for such an agreement simply do not yet exist. From Israel’s perspective, Iran remains an international actor whose regional policies continue to generate instability. As long as Tehran maintains what Israel perceives as existential threats and continues supporting armed groups hostile to Israel, it will be extremely difficult to establish lasting confidence. Israel has no territorial dispute with Iran. The two countries share no borders, compete over no natural resources, and have no historical conflict comparable to many others in the region. If mutual threats were abandoned and Iran fundamentally changed its regional posture, there would be no inherent reason why the two countries could not eventually establish a normal working relationship. The challenge is whether that transformation is politically realistic under present circumstances.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian: I believe the opportunity is real. The wars of 2025 and 2026 demonstrated the limits of military solutions. They also demonstrated that none of the principal actors achieved the political objectives they originally sought. That experience creates an opportunity to pursue a different path. For decades, I have argued that sustainable peace requires three interconnected frameworks. The first is a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the United States capable of ending decades of bilateral hostility and establishing normal diplomatic relations based on mutual respect, sovereign equality, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The second is a broader regional framework bringing together Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf to establish collective cooperation in security, economic development, energy, and regional stability.  The third concerns Iran and Israel. The United States is uniquely positioned to facilitate a process through which both countries gradually abandon mutual existential threats and replace confrontation with structured dialogue. At the same time, lasting regional peace cannot be achieved without addressing the Palestinian question. The implementation of a two-state solution, consistent with longstanding United Nations resolutions, remains an essential component of any durable Middle Eastern settlement. Peace in the region cannot be built through military superiority alone. It must rest upon mutual security, respect for international law, and comprehensive diplomacy.

George Papadopoulos: I believe this moment presents the best opportunity in nearly half a century to redefine relations between the United States and Iran. President Trump demonstrated that diplomacy is most effective when supported by credible deterrence. Military pressure alone could not produce a lasting settlement, but neither could diplomacy conducted without leverage. The Memorandum of Understanding created an opportunity to pursue a broader strategic agreement that serves American interests while allowing Iran to reintegrate into the international community under clearly defined responsibilities. Such an agreement would reduce regional instability, strengthen global energy security, and allow the United States to devote greater attention to long-term strategic competition elsewhere in the world. If successful, it would represent not simply the end of one conflict, but the beginning of a new strategic relationship.

Conclusion

The discussion illustrates how profoundly different strategic narratives continue to shape perceptions of the same events. For Chuck Freilich, the central issue remains Israel’s long-term security and the danger of allowing Iran to retain strategic capabilities that could eventually threaten regional stability. For George Papadopoulos, the war demonstrated that military pressure created the leverage necessary to open the door to a broader diplomatic settlement while advancing America’s wider geopolitical interests. For Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the principal lesson is different: the wars demonstrated the limits of coercion and confirmed that only comprehensive diplomacy addressing bilateral disputes, regional security, and mutual recognition can produce lasting peace.

Despite these differences, an unexpected point of convergence emerged during the discussion.

All three participants ultimately acknowledged that a broader diplomatic framework would be preferable to another cycle of military confrontation. Their disagreement concerned not the desirability of diplomacy, but the conditions under which it could succeed. Whether the Memorandum of Understanding ultimately becomes another temporary ceasefire or the foundation for a historic reconciliation remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that after forty-seven years of confrontation, the debate has begun to shift. The central question is no longer whether the United States and Iran should negotiate, but whether both sides—and the wider region—can finally move beyond crisis management toward a stable political order based on mutual respect, confidence-building, and regional cooperation. The answer to that question will shape not only the future of U.S.-Iran relations, but also the strategic landscape of the Middle East for years to come.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RJJOBZ4NCs

Al Arabiya English, June 24, 2026

President Donald Trump has repeatedly declared that the US has won the war and that a deal with Iran is either done or close to completion. As debate intensifies over the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, Counterpoints asks a critical question: who is really coming out on top?

Host Melinda Nucifora

Guests: Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Former Iranian Diplomat and Former Senior Nuclear Negotiator George Papadopoulos, Former Foreign Policy Adviser to Donald Trump Chuck Freilich, Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser

The central question: Why one standard for Israel and another for Iran?

The discussion opened with what the interviewer described as one of the biggest questions in Middle East politics:

Why is Israel allowed to possess nuclear weapons while Iran is denied even an advanced civilian nuclear capability?

Hossein Mousavian argued that this double standard has become one of the principal obstacles to regional stability.

His main point was:

• Israel possesses an undeclared nuclear arsenal.
• Israel is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
• Israel does not permit IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities.
• Yet Western governments rarely pressure Israel on its nuclear status.

By contrast,

• Iran remains an NPT member.
• Iran accepts IAEA inspections.
• Yet Iran has been subjected to sanctions, military threats, and repeated crises.

He argued that this asymmetry creates resentment across the Middle East.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RJJOBZ4NCs

Interview with Aljazeera, June 16, 2026

At the heart of this particular aspect of the dispute is a longstanding disagreement over the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program, according to Seyed Hossein Mousavian, an Iranian policymaker and former diplomat who served on Tehran’s nuclear negotiating team in talks with the European Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The hardest battle will be “to reconcile Iran’s insistence on maintaining a peaceful enrichment program under the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], with Washington’s demand for stringent restrictions that ensure the program cannot be diverted toward military purposes,” Mousavian told Al Jazeera.

Mousavian, however, does not view the phased release of frozen assets as leverage, but rather as a confidence-building measure.

“Iran has previously indicated flexibility on measures such as limits on enrichment levels, enhanced monitoring, and reducing or relocating portions of its enriched uranium stockpile, provided that its right to enrichment is formally recognized and that it receives tangible economic benefits,” he said.

The next 60 days may determine not only whether Washington and Tehran can agree on enrichment and sanctions relief, but whether a ceasefire designed to end a war can evolve into a broader agreement capable of preventing the next one. “Ironically, while the recent war has increased mistrust and political opposition on both sides, it may also have clarified the costs of conflict,” said Mousavian.

https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/16/optics-of-peace-first-details-later-the-us-iran-60-day-challenge

Robin Wright’s Interview with Mousavian-June 12, 2026

“Hormuz from now on is not going to go back to the situation of past decades,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former nuclear negotiator for Iran who is now a researcher at Princeton, told me. Hormuz will continue to be “a major element of deterrence of Iranian strategy.” Mousavian balked at the idea that Iran was taking the world hostage. He called it leverage. “Iran has been faced with the madman policies of Israel and the U.S.,” he said. “If you are mad, we are going to be more mad than you. This is what they are doing practically.”

https://www.newyorker.com/preview/article/6a2c3a3b88a3e5594c324707?status=draft&debug_config=copliot;t=1781284158550

Interview-Mousavian – TRT – May 11, 2026

US media outlet Axios reported that US and Tehran were on the verge of agreeing on a one-page memorandum of understanding, raising hopes for potential de-escalation. However, the US president dismissed Iran’s response to the proposal, calling it ‘totally unacceptable’. Among its key points, Tehran’s latest proposal included an end to the war on all fronts, the lifting of the US blockade on Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz, and guarantees against any further attacks on Iran. Washington’s swift rejection led to a spike in oil prices, while the traffic through Hormuz remains highly limited. Meanwhile, in an interview with CBS News, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the war with Iran is not ‘over’, as Tel Aviv is also stepping up its attacks on Lebanon.

Guests: Seyed Hossein Mousavian Visiting Research Collaborator at Princeton University

Fawaz Gerges Professor of International Relations at LSE

Daniel Levy President of the US/Middle East Project

Liam Collins Retired US Army Colonel

Q1: President Trump has said the war would end soon, but we are now in week 10. How do you assess the current situation, especially after he called Iran’s latest peace proposal “totally unacceptable”?

A: There are three major obstacles preventing an agreement between Iran and the United States. First, the U.S. is seeking an agreement that effectively signals Iran’s capitulation or submission, which Tehran firmly rejects.

Second, Iran insists that any nuclear agreement must be based on the NPT, to which both countries are parties. However, the United States is pushing for terms beyond the NPT framework, such as dismantling Iran’s nuclear facilities—similar to the Libya model—or requiring Iran to export its enriched uranium. From Iran’s perspective, these demands constitute clear violations of international law, as there is no legal basis for forcing an NPT member to dismantle its peaceful nuclear program.

Third, Iran seeks an agreement that would effectively end the war, whereas the United States appears to favor an arrangement that leaves the option open for future military action. This includes allowing Israel to continue its operations in Lebanon. These three issues remain the core barriers to any deal.

Q2: Reports suggest that the situation inside Iran is placing severe economic pressure on the population. How long can Iranians endure these conditions, and what does it mean for the system?

A: The economic pressures are real—high inflation, unemployment, and damage to industrial infrastructure have significantly affected daily life. However, if we look at the past 47 years, Iran has endured continuous sanctions, external pressures, cyber operations, and even an eight-year war following Saddam Hussein’s invasion. Despite these challenges, the country has shown a high level of resilience. That said, the longer the current situation continues, the more severe the economic and social consequences will become.

Q3: You have previously argued that the United States cannot be trusted in diplomacy. Given recent developments, why should Iran still believe negotiations can work?

A: Iran has consistently maintained that it cannot fully trust the United States, yet it has never abandoned diplomacy. The distrust stems from concrete experience. There was a comprehensive agreement—the JCPOA—endorsed by the United Nations Security Council through Resolution 2231, and verified by the IAEA, with Iran in full compliance. Nevertheless, the United States withdrew and imposed a “maximum pressure” policy.

This pattern has repeated itself. In 2025, negotiations were reportedly close to success, according to the Omani foreign minister, yet the United States resorted to military action. In 2026, again, diplomacy was advancing with significant progress, but was interrupted by renewed U.S. attacks. These episodes reinforce Iran’s perception that Washington is not committed to sustained diplomacy.

At the same time, many countries—including Oman, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—continue to encourage diplomatic engagement and actively push for a negotiated solution. However, as long as the three core issues I mentioned remain unresolved, reaching an agreement will remain difficult.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUeXM_n01Hg

Democracy Now, April 14,2026-Interview with Malley & Mousavian

Transcript

We’re joined now in the studio by two former negotiators for the U.S. and Iran in this Democracy Now! exclusive.

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian served as spokesperson for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005. He also served as Iran’s ambassador to Germany. He’s author of two books, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir and, most recently, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.

And we’re joined by Rob Malley. He was one of the negotiators on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He served as a senior Middle East official under Presidents Clinton, Obama and Biden. Under Biden, he served as the special envoy for Iran. He is now a lecturer at Yale University, former president of the International Crisis Group, co-author with Hussein Agha of a new book, Tomorrow Is Yesterday: Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel/Palestine.

AMY GOODMAN: Why don’t we start off, in this exclusive we have with the two of you at the table, American and Iranian negotiator, with your assessment of what’s taken place? It can be right through to this week, the failed negotiations, and before that, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. Why don’t we begin with you, Rob Malley?

ROBERT MALLEY: Well, first, I think — thanks for having me.

You know, we can’t ignore the fact that this war was unlawful, unjustified, unnecessary. And I think even if we’re now going to talk about negotiations, even if the negotiations are to succeed, none of that could let us forget or excuse how we got here. So, I do want to insist on that, because, you know, if negotiations succeed, it’s going to be too quick for the administration to say, “You see? We were right.”

But I think the real question now is whether the U.S. and Iran are engaging in these negotiations, trying to find a solution that will meet both their sides’ core needs, or whether, in this case, the U.S. takes the attitude that “we won the war because we’re stronger, and if you’re not accepting the war, then you’re going to — we’re going to inflict more pain.” That won’t work. And it won’t work because Iran believes, and with some justification, that it has inflicted pain on the U.S. and that every day that goes by, it’s going to inflict more. So, they’re not in a position right now where Iran is sort of begging for a deal because it wants to avoid an escalation. They believe, again, rightly or wrongly, that they could sustain the pain longer than the U.S. can.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, as you talk about what Iran believes, let’s go to the Iranian ambassador, Hossein Mousavian. Your assessment of what has taken place? Now it seems to be coming down to the nuclear negotiations, around, well, Iran saying they’ll do a moratorium for five years and the United States demanding 20. But, overall, the picture?

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: I think Iranians are now coming to the negotiating table with more mistrust than ever, because once the deal was agreed in 2015, Iran was in full compliance, and the U.S. withdrew. Then there was a nuclear negotiation between Iran and the U.S. in 2025. The negotiations, as the foreign minister of Oman said, had significant progress; a deal was within reach. The U.S. withdrew and attacked Iran. We had negotiations in 2026. Again, as the Omani foreign minister said, negotiations had significant progress, and a deal was within reach. Again, the U.S. attacked. Then we had the latest round in Islamabad. It was a one-day negotiation—the highest level after the revolution, after 48 years. The U.S. side said there was progress; only the nuclear issue was not agreed. We agreed on everything, as President Trump said. The Iranian foreign minister also said we were very close to a final deal. And then immediately the U.S. imposed a blockade, a maritime blockade. That is why they really do not know whether the U.S. is genuinely committed to diplomacy or not.

If we are talking now about the nuclear issue, first of all, every assessment of all U.S. intelligence establishments since 2007 has consistently stated no evidence of weaponization and no evidence of an Iranian decision to build nuclear weapons—even in 2025 and 2026. This is the U.S. security assessment: no decision to go nuclear and no evidence of weaponization. Every IAEA report since 2003 has also said there is no evidence of weaponization. Therefore, there was no imminent threat. And I believe it was an illegal war, no doubt. The overwhelming majority of the international community has also insisted the war was illegal. Now we are coming to the negotiations.

The biggest issue you have heard during the last two years is Iran’s 450 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium. They say Iran could make 10 nuclear bombs if it decides to do so. And even you hear from American officials that they are insisting on this stockpile. But I don’t know whether people know that in the 2025 negotiations, Iran said it was ready to dilute all 60% material down to below 5%. In the 2026 negotiations, Iran officially told the Americans it was ready to dilute. This was confirmed by the Omani foreign minister in his interview with Face the Nation, stating that Iran was and is ready to dilute its entire stockpile to below 5%. Iran accepted to suspend enrichment for some years. Iran accepted to have zero stockpile. Therefore, there is no worry—and there was no worry—about high-level enriched uranium stockpiles.

The other issue is the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. They have ambiguities and technical questions about Iran’s nuclear program. Iran was in full compliance with the JCPOA. The JCPOA was the most comprehensive agreement in the history of nonproliferation, with Iranian commitments going far beyond the NPT. But Iran accepted it. And then, in the 2025 talks and again in the 2026 nuclear talks in Islamabad, Iranians said: “We are ready to go to the highest level of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA to address every technical ambiguity.” Therefore, when Iran was ready to dilute its entire stockpile, when Iran was ready to reach the maximum level of cooperation with the IAEA to remove concerns about possible military dimensions, and when Iran was also ready to suspend enrichment for some years and accept zero stockpile, then why the blockade?

I really do not understand whether the issue is nuclear or not, because we have heard from American officials who have publicly said the aim was controlling Iranian oil reserves. And we have also heard from American officials that the aim was regime change. If the aim is controlling Iranian oil reserves like Venezuela, or if the aim is regime change while using the nuclear issue as a pretext, then we are not going to have any deal.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Ambassador, I wanted to ask you precisely about this issue of how the Trump administration often tries to confuse in the American public the difference between enrichment of uranium for peaceful purposes versus — which Iran, like all signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have a right to do — and the actual development of bombs, of a nuclear bomb, and also the fact that the former Ayatollah Khamenei specifically had a fatwa against Iran developing a nuclear bomb. Could you explain that position of the leader who was killed by the United States?

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: Actually, what Iranians are saying concerns their legitimate legal rights under the NPT. Argentina has enrichment. Brazil has enrichment. Germany has enrichment. Japan has enrichment. And none of them has nuclear weapons, while all are members of the NPT. Iran does not accept any deal that would make it the only NPT member discriminated against with respect to its legitimate legal rights under the treaty. Therefore, respecting Iran’s rights, like those of any other NPT member, to enrichment is one issue; the exercise of those rights is another.

Iran was ready, as a confidence-building measure, not to exercise those rights for a specific period. What the U.S. is demanding—zero enrichment—is, in Iran’s view, a clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of course, Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that all weapons of mass destruction are religiously forbidden (haram). Iran is a member of the NPT, and the important point is that despite being one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world, Iran has never diverted its nuclear program toward weaponization, as confirmed by all U.S. intelligence assessments and the IAEA.

Therefore, we need to distinguish between respecting Iran’s rights, like those of other NPT members, to peaceful nuclear technology—which is one issue—and confidence-building measures, such as temporary suspension of enrichment, transparency steps, or zero stockpile arrangements, which are another. I think we need to keep a clear distinction between these two.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And I’d like to ask Rob Malley — the negotiators for the Trump administration in the latest round have continued to include Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, two people who would have, some would say, virtually no knowledge of the complexity of negotiations over nuclear enrichment and the development of nuclear bombs. Your assessment of their role in all of this, and also why, in all of this talk about Iran coming under some kind of international control, there is no mention of the fact that there’s one power that does have nuclear weapons in the Middle East — Israel — and it is not a party to the NPT?

ROBERT MALLEY: So, first, allow me to — you won’t be surprised that I have a little bit of a different appreciation from Hossein in terms of Iran’s nuclear program. I think there is some evidence, certainly at some point, that they did have a military program. And my view is that they’ve always — their view was “We’re going to hedge. We’re going to have a nuclear program, so that if we do want to develop a weapon, we can.” I think that’s — you know, one could understand why they did. But I think it’s pretty clear that they did have that. So, I don’t think that there was anything — that there was anything — and that’s why, by the way, President Obama negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was a way to contain — and, I think, successfully — Iran’s nuclear program, to make sure that if they were tempted to try to dash for a bomb, they couldn’t do it in a quick way, and it would be immediately verified. I think one of the dramatically tragic mistakes of the first Trump administration was to tear that deal up. So, I don’t think one has to be naive about what Iran was doing, and still see that in what Trump was doing was — produced exactly the wrong effects.

Now, in terms of the current negotiations, no, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff are not nuclear experts — by the way, nor am I. That’s not the issue. The issue is whether they’re surrounded by nuclear experts. And everything — all the reports that I’ve received is that when they negotiated with the Iranians in the past — I don’t know what happened in Islamabad, but in the past, they didn’t have nuclear experts. And so, there was — and I think this has been well documented, that they misunderstood Iranian positions. They couldn’t appreciate what they were actually trying to convey.

And part of it, I think, is because of the oddity of this administration, where so many of the decisions seem to rely and reside in one person, not the most reliable of all people. It’s the president of the United States. And he is very mercurial, and he’s very unpredictable, and he changes his mind, and he changes his objectives. We don’t really know what his objectives are in this conflict.

And so, I think what Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner did is they relayed what they heard from the Iranians. They didn’t really fully understand them. And then, depending on the president’s mood, he varied on whether he was in the mood to accept a negotiated deal or was more eager for confrontation. And my assessment is that, in this case, a bit emboldened by Venezuela — and we just saw the clip of where things are with that country — he felt he could not fail at a military endeavor. He was going to win. He was going to bring Iran to knees and then be able to dictate the terms of a settlement. That’s not what happened.

AMY GOODMAN: When the U.S. attacked and Israel attacked Iran, I thought it was very interesting that the Omani foreign minister, who was negotiating, who was mediating, actually took a plane to Washington, because he didn’t feel that Kushner and Witkoff were conveying what Iran was agreeing to. And he went on all the U.S. media he could, so that he could get President Trump’s attention, particularly on Fox. But I want to go to what he said on Face the Nation. This is Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi. He said Iran had agreed to abandon its nuclear enrichment and stockpiling program.

BADR BIN HAMAD ALBUSAIDI: If the ultimate objective is to ensure forever that Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb, I think we have cracked that problem through these negotiations by agreeing a very important breakthrough that has never been achieved anytime before. And I think if we can capture that and build on it, I think a deal is within our reach.

AMY GOODMAN: So, that was the Omani foreign minister. He actually kept repeating in all these interviews — he had a phrase — “This is better than Obama.” You know, someone had trained — it’s like they had said to him, “This is what Trump needs to hear,” because that’s Trump’s main motivating factor, “better than Obama.” You are, Rob Malley, one of the lead negotiators for the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. If you can explain why you — if you think this was better than what you achieved, and why, anyway, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked the very next day? And what happened that very next day, the Iranian girls’ school in Minab was taken out, it looks like with a U.S. missile, and 175 people, about, died, overwhelmingly primary school girls.

ROBERT MALLEY: So, I mean, I said it at the same time, either before or after the Omani foreign minister, because based on the reports, and Hossein just said that, Iran was agreeing to suspend enrichment for a period of years. That is beyond anything that either President Obama achieved or President Biden was — could have achieved. I mean, at that time, Iran was not talking about suspending; it was accepting limits. I think those limits were sufficient to contain Iran’s nuclear program. But if what President Trump wanted was to be able to say at the end of these negotiations, “I beat President Obama,” I would have granted him that, if it could have spared us a war, because it was — you know, it was a truism. Suspension is better than the limited enrichment that Iran had.

Now, again, I want to emphasize that marginal gain between suspension of enrichment or very low enrichment does not justify in any way, does not excuse, an illegal war that has caused the deaths that you mentioned, far more than that, destruction and now disruptions of the world economy, that then hurt the poorest nations first and foremost. And that’s, of course, also because of Iran’s reaction, but the trigger was the war that was launched by the United States and Israel.

So, if that was his goal — but I think it goes back to the point that I was making earlier. I think the war was launched by President Trump because he felt he could and he felt that he was on a roll, was on a roll after Venezuela, after the attack on Iran a year ago, that he could be the president who finally deals with this issue. He’s changed, in his view, the regime in Venezuela. He thought he could change the regime in Iran, and then, next, Cuba, and that he would go down in history as this person. The details didn’t matter. And I think he really felt unstoppable. And he felt that the experts who were warning him didn’t know what they were talking about; he knew better.

AMY GOODMAN: In his gut.

ROBERT MALLEY: In his gut, whatever gut he has, yes.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: I’d like to ask Ambassador Mousavian: Where do we go from here? Especially now that — after Trump announced this blockade of Iranian ports, and yet he’s getting no support from the European Union on this. And, of course, China has made it very clear that they are going to continue to expect to be able to get through, have their ships go through the Strait of Hormuz and to trade with Iran. What is the — what are the options for the United States? And also, can Iran survive a long-term blockade, economic blockade, by the United States?

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: The naval blockade, based on United Nations Resolution 1974, is an act of war and an act of aggression. Therefore, internationally and legally, what the U.S. is doing constitutes a clear act of aggression or war, because it is causing suffering for a 90 million-strong nation, with the fear of famine and hunger affecting the population. This is not just about a state.

Nevertheless, regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the reality is that this strait remained open and free for navigation for 47 to 48 years. There was never any problem. Even after the first U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in 2025, Iran did not impose any restrictions on navigation. But when the U.S. and Israel attacked for the second time in 2026, Iranians felt this was an existential threat. That was the key difference. That is why they considered using all the tools available to them, one of which was the Strait of Hormuz. Nevertheless, they did not close the strait; they imposed limited restrictions. Internationally, this strait should remain open to free navigation, and there should be no restrictions. Legally and internationally, Iran cannot close it. However, there are also international rules that during wartime, a country that is attacked may impose limited and calculated restrictions on navigation, but not broad restrictions, and it cannot close the strait.

For the future, if the U.S. is looking for a nuclear deal—as we have already discussed—and as Rob said, they have already achieved what they wanted, more than in the Obama period and more than under the JCPOA, they can still achieve one additional major breakthrough on the nuclear issue. President Trump could propose that Iran move toward a multilateral enrichment mechanism in the Persian Gulf. I, together with nuclear scientists at Princeton University, have published multiple articles on this. The latest was 10 days before the 2025 war. We argued that rather than national enrichment—since Saudi Arabia is also seeking enrichment, and if Saudi Arabia obtains it, Egypt will seek it, and if Egypt obtains it, Turkey will follow—this trend could spread across the region and undermine nonproliferation. Instead, a multilateral enrichment arrangement in the region would be the best solution, fully under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S., Russia, China, and other powers could also participate. This would be an international arrangement, similar to Urenco in Europe, where Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the Netherlands share enrichment. Therefore, beyond what nuclear negotiators have already achieved under President Trump—which is more than the JCPOA under President Obama—they could reach an additional major agreement: a regional arrangement that would help make the entire Persian Gulf free of nuclear weapons.

Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has not closed it. Iran says that if there is a deal—if the U.S. agrees not to attack Iran or to end the war—it will reopen it fully. Therefore, the U.S. could say, “OK, we will continue negotiations, and we are committed not to attack Iran again.” Because the U.S. has, directly or indirectly, been involved in conflicts with Iran multiple times: it indirectly cooperated with Saddam Hussein against Iran in the 1980s, including providing material and technical support for chemical weapons use; the second conflict was in 2025; the third in 2026; and now the blockade in 2026 is again being seen as an act of war. If the U.S. is truly serious about diplomacy, then diplomacy is possible, but it requires a commitment not to attack Iran again. In that case, Iran would open the Hormuz issue. That would be a good solution.

JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And I’d also like to ask Rob Malley the situation with Israel, which is not — which has been attacking Iran but is not part of the current negotiations. What do you feel has happened between Israel and the Trump administration? Is there a divergence occurring between the two?

ROBERT MALLEY: So, I think they have different objectives. I mean, first of all, we don’t know what President Trump’s objectives are, so it’s hard to say how they’re different or they’re similar to Israel’s. But I think Israel has been consistent in its actions. What it wants is to weaken its neighbors, whoever they are. I mean, it’s happened in Gaza, which they destroyed. The West Bank, you just saw — we just saw what they’re doing there. Lebanon, which we could talk about, which is — they’ve devastated the country. A million people now have fled the south. They’ve killed hundreds of people even since the recent ceasefire, which apparently didn’t apply to Lebanon. And they would like to weaken, fragment Iran as much as possible, because they have this view that this is their opportunity to extinguish any threat, real or pretextual, imminent or into the future.

That’s not really, I think, President Trump’s view. Again, it’s hard to define it. But what that means is, Israel would prefer to prolong this war as long as possible. I don’t think that that’s President Trump’s ambition. And I think the day President Trump says it’s it, I think he will — that Prime Minister Netanyahu will not be able to do anything but acquiesce. So, we have to wait for that moment to happen, for the president to tell the Israelis it’s over, it’s over both in Iran and in Lebanon. I’m not sure what he’ll say about Lebanon, but at least in Iran. I don’t think Prime Minister Netanyahu could afford to stand in his way.

AMY GOODMAN: And I wanted to ask you, finally, Ambassador Mousavian, about — we’ve talked to so many Iranian professors, dissidents, you know, the thousands of Iranians who were killed in the streets recently. And, I mean, we haven’t talked to them, but noting that. I wanted to ask you about the — my surprise at how many of those, even people who have been on death row in the Evin Prison, have condemned the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran. They say it will make the regime more right-wing, that this does not accomplish their ends. I’m wondering your thoughts on all of these people who are coming out now and saying they want to be in charge of their own country; they don’t want these outside forces, because they’re destroying Iran.

SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN: I think what Americans need to understand is that there is a clear distinction between Iranian dissatisfaction with the current governing system in Iran—I would say about 80% of Iranians are not happy with the system. They face problems of economic inflation, poverty, corruption, mismanagement, and general dysfunctionality of the system—there is no doubt about that. I am sure the majority of Iranians want major reforms. Their main concerns are economic issues, corruption, mismanagement, and systemic dysfunction.

Having said that, when they are attacked by the U.S., or especially by Israel, the whole nation tends to become united in defense of its integrity, independence, and identity—particularly when they hear statements from the U.S. president that he would eradicate Iranian civilization, or when Iranians are referred to as “animals” or “bastards.” Such language—humiliation, threats, bullying, and attacks—has a strong effect. I mean, Iran has suffered about 30,000 people killed or injured during the two wars, and hundreds of millions in damages. Over 100,000 non-military buildings have been destroyed. In such circumstances, it is normal that a nation becomes united to defend its country.

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AMY GOODMAN: I’m going to leave it there, but, of course, we will not leave the discussions about what’s happening there, as we continue to cover them every day on Democracy Now! Ambassador Hossein Mousavian served as spokesperson for Iran in its nuclear negotiations with the European Union from 2003 to 2005, also served as Iran’s ambassador to Germany. And Robert Malley served as the special envoy for Iran under President Biden, also served as one of the negotiators on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal under President Obama.

Coming up, the president versus the pope. We’ll speak with Father James Martin, a Jesuit priest. Stay with us.

AMY GOODMAN: “Rican Beach” by Alynda Segarra and Hurray for the Riff Raff, performing in our Democracy Now! studio. To see her performance at our 30th anniversary, along with Bruce Springsteen and Patti Smith and Michael Stipe, you can go to democracynow.org. I’m Amy Goodman, with Juan González.