Tag: Nuclear Weapons

Essays, Publications

Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction

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We suggest possible initiatives for fissile material control that could serve as initial steps toward an eventual Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. These initiatives include actions that Israel, the only regional state with nuclear weapons, could take towards nuclear disarmament; and measures of collective restraint regarding fissile material production and use to be taken by all states of the region to foster confidence that their civilian nuclear activities are indeed peaceful in intent and not being pursued as a cover to develop nuclear-weapon options.

For Israel, these initial steps include ending production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, declaring its stockpiles of these materials, and placing increasing portions under international safeguards as steps toward their elimination. The eventual nuclear disarmament of Israel would be a necessary condition for any Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone and for a broader weapon of mass destruction free zone.

The regional measures that we propose would serve to bring a Middle East nuclear- weapon-free zone closer and make the zone more robust when it is in force. These measures include no separation of plutonium, no use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel, and no national enrichment plants. It would greatly strengthen the global nonproliferation regime if these measures were adopted worldwide, including by the nuclear weapon states.

All these measures are worth pursuing in their own rights and states should take initiatives to make progress on them wherever possible. Progress should not be held up by the imposition of linkages, time ordering or sequencing between steps.

Although we do not discuss chemical and biological weapons in this paper, it is critical that all countries in the region ratify and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This has become especially important after the use of chemical weapons in the civil war in Syria in 2013 and Syria’s subsequent decision to accede to the CWC, declare its stockpile and verifiably destroy its chemical weapons. Egypt and Israel should follow suit on the CWC. All three states also should ratify the BWC.

Finally, we propose that discussions be launched on the design of regional verification arrangements strong enough so that all countries in the region can have confidence in the absence of secret nuclear weapon programs. Similar verification arrangements also should be developed to increase confidence in the region that countries are complying with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

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“Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson and Zia Mian, Research Report No. 11 International Panel on Fissile Materials. Published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013.

Essays, Publications

Five Options for Iran’s New President

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[Author’s note: The views in this paper were presented prior to the Iranian presidential election at the NPT Prepcom on April 25 and publicly at Global Zero event at University of California-Irvine on May 23, 2013 respectively. This paper does not reflect in anyway the official position of the Iranian government.]

Nuclear negotiations lasting more than a decade between Iran and world powers have failed. The talks have been unable to reconcile the concerns voiced by the United States and other parties that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon with Iran’s insistence that its program is strictly peaceful and only intended for civilian energy production.

Publicly, the U.S. and other Western officials blame the failure of nuclear talks on Iran. The key question, however, is whether talks have failed because of the perceived Iranian intention to build a nuclear bomb, or due to the West’s unwillingness to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium under international safeguards. Former U.S. officials Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, authors of Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, recently addressed this issue, which rarely is part of Iran policy debates in the United States: “Washington’s unwillingness [to recognize the rights of Iran for enrichment] is grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of American strategic culture: difficulty coming to terms with independent power centers (whether globally or in vital regions like the Middle East); hostility to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate their foreign policies to U.S. preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat and Mubarak); and an unreflective but deeply rooted sense that U.S.-backed norms, rules, and transnational decision-making processes are meant to constrain others, not America itself.”

Iran, as a sovereign state and a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is entitled to uranium enrichment. I believe that if Washington recognized Iran’s right to enrich, a nuclear deal could be reached immediately. Without this recognition, no substantial agreement will be possible.

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“Five Options for Iran’s New President,” Hossein Mousavian, Cairo Review, pgs. 68-79. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 2013.

 

Articles, Publications

Iran’s Next President and The Third Nuclear Strategy

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The Iranian presidential election is set for June 14, and the candidate selected will take office in August. The world is eager to know the new president’s nuclear policy.

The ongoing Iranian nuclear issue dates back to early 2003, when Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), visited the nuclear facilities at Natanz and officially announced that Iran was among 10 nations that had attained enrichment technology and capability. After that, during the tenures of Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran and the world embarked on two approaches to nuclear diplomacy with varying costs and benefits.

“Iran’s Next President and The Third Nuclear Strategy,” Hossein Mousavian, Al-Monitor, June 10, 2013.

Essays, Publications

Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons

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Over a decade of negotiations between Iran and various world powers over Tehran’s nuclear programme have yielded little or no progress. Although all parties seek a peaceful resolution to this quagmire through diplomacy, all the major demands of the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, France and the UK – plus Germany) go beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Safeguard Agreement, the only viable and legitimate international framework for non-proliferation. In 2011, I proposed a peaceful solution based on the 2005 fatwa (religious decree) of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei banning the acquisition, production and use of nuclear weapons, and in 2012 Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi declared Iran’s willingness to transform the fatwa ‘into a legally binding, official document in the UN’, to secularise what many in the West see as a purely religious decree.1 Such a step would provide a sustainable legal and political umbrella for Iran to accept required measures; facilitate transparency and confidence-building measures; and help address doubts in the West about the commitment to the principles expressed in the fatwa in the context of Iran’s system of government, where politics and religion are intertwined.

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“Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons,” Hossein Mousavian, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 147-162. Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 8, 2013.

 

Articles, Publications

US Military Threats Toward Iran Do Not Work

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Statements by the US officials threatening to attack Iran militarily are ineffectual if not counterproductive. On March 3 at the annual AIPAC conference, Vice President Joe Biden threatened military intervention and declared, “We mean it. And let me repeat it: We … mean it.” Biden’s approach was in line with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s message to the same conference asserting that only credible military threat will stop Iran from pursuing its nuclear program.

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“US Military Threats Toward Iran Do Not Work,” Hossein Mousavian and Shahir Shahidsaless, April 18, 2013.
Articles, Publications

Embrace the Fatwa

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As the Western media reported it, the future of U.S.-Iranian nuclear negotiations suffered a major setback on Feb. 7 when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seemed to reject Vice President Joseph Biden’s offer of direct talks. “Some naive people like the idea of negotiating with America, however, negotiations will not solve the problem,” the supreme leader said in a statement posted on his website. “You are pointing a gun at Iran saying you want to talk. The Iranian nation will not be frightened by the threats.”

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“Embrace the Fatwa”, Hossein Mousavian, Foreign Policy, February 7, 2013.

Essays, Publications

Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass Destruction

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The United States has launched, in effect, an economic, political, cyber and covert war with Iran. American–Iranian relations could reach a turning point within a year. Without substantial progress on the diplomatic front, the chance for a unilateral Israeli or a joint US–Israeli military campaign aimed at destroying the Iranian nuclear programme could become a probability. Any attempt to reorient the current diplomatic trajectory will require a better understanding of the dispute between Tehran and Washington over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

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Hossein Mousavian, “Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Survival 54, no. 5 (pgs. 183-202). Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (10/2012).

Articles, Publications

Ten Reasons Iran Doesn’t Want the Bomb

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Since the beginning of Iran’s nuclear crisis, the West has been convinced that one approach offers the best hope of altering Tehran’s nuclear policy and halting its enrichment activities: comprehensive international sanctions and a credible threat of military strike. During the same period, I have repeatedly warned my friends in the West that such punitive pressures, no matter how severe, will not change the Iranian leadership’s mindset, and that a military option would be catastrophic for Iran, the region and beyond.

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“Ten Reasons Iran Doesn’t Want the Bomb,” National Interest, December 4, 2012.

Articles, Publications

Red line on Iran: No, here are Netanyahu’s real objectives

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Although US officials do not believe Iran has decided to build a nuclear bomb, Israel has gone into overdrive to convince the world that Iran is on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon and must have all its uranium enrichment activities stopped by all means possible, including the military option. Under Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, these efforts thus far have not garnered much support.

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“Red line on Iran: No, here are Netanyahu’s real objectives,” Boston Globe, October 9, 2012