


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# Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Hossein Mousavian**

The United States has launched, in effect, an economic, political, cyber and covert war with Iran. American–Iranian relations could reach a turning point within a year. Without substantial progress on the diplomatic front, the chance for a unilateral Israeli or a joint US–Israeli military campaign aimed at destroying the Iranian nuclear programme could become a probability. Any attempt to reorient the current diplomatic trajectory will require a better understanding of the dispute between Tehran and Washington over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As the Head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council for eight years (1997–2005), I am fully convinced that the strengthening and universalisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the establishment of a zone free from WMD in the Middle East (and indeed the elimination of such weapons altogether) are compatible with Iran’s security doctrine. This position has important strategic and religious underpinnings.

From a strategic point of view, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council believes that nuclear weapons neither provide domestic stability nor external security but, to the contrary, would undermine Iranian security. This assessment has remained consistent even during the presidency of

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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.<sup>1</sup> Iran has been able to protect its regional interests in its immediate neighbourhood without nuclear weapons. Conversely, it would never be able to win the confidence of its neighbours by possessing nuclear bombs.

Since the 1979 revolution, despite some rhetoric from radicals, the majority of Iran's prominent politicians have believed that acquisition of a nuclear bomb would present a long-term threat to Iran's national interests, both regionally and internationally. Iran wants to be a modern nation, fully capable in advanced technologies. This ambition can be fulfilled only through normal relations with the international community. Acquisition of nuclear bombs would be counterproductive.

Furthermore, an Iranian nuclear-weapons programme would spur the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), headed by Saudi Arabia, and other regional powers such as Turkey and Egypt, to acquire their own bombs, thus propelling the region into a costly, dangerous and ultimately unnecessary nuclear arms race.

Iran's political leaders have repeatedly described Israel's nuclear arsenal as 'irrelevant' and 'useless'. In light of Iran's preoccupation with its border security and with stability in its vicinity, above all in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea region (Iran's main energy hubs), Israel does not rank at the top of Iran's list of national security threats. The main security threat for Iran is not Israel or other neighbours, but rather the US desire for regime change, though even this will not compel Tehran to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The past 33 years have shown that Iran has not only endured such pressures from Washington, but has risen to become even stronger and more formidable in the region, without a need for a nuclear bomb.

From a religious point of view, the development, production, stock-piling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has said:

The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the

possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.<sup>2</sup>

Khamenei's first public fatwa (religious edict), issued in mid-2000, said that 'the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons'.<sup>3</sup> Iranian officials were informed privately about the Ayatollah's religious position on nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s, when he stated it in response to an internal official letter about weapons of mass destruction.

During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein, repeatedly used chemical weapons against Iran – weapons that were built using materials and technologies that in some cases were supplied by or with help from the United States and other Western countries. Under the moral guidance of the late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, however, Iran did not respond in kind, despite some 60,000 Iranian casualties. (The United Nations has confirmed that Iran did not use chemical weapons in retaliation for Iraq's use.<sup>4</sup>) As I have argued elsewhere, the fact that Iran has refrained from using chemical weapons, even in retaliation for Iraq's own use of such weapons against Iranian soldiers and civilians, is the most credible evidence of the seriousness of Khamenei's fatwa against weapons of mass destruction.<sup>5</sup>

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*Iran did not  
respond in  
kind*

Because of both its religious beliefs and its own national security assessments, Iran has joined all the major international conventions on weapons of mass destruction, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Nevertheless, the issue of weapons of mass destruction has remained one of the major disputes between Iran and the West (particularly the United States) since 1979. Almost all US administrations have accused Iran of harbouring WMD ambitions.<sup>6</sup>

For their part, most Iranians see the US pattern of behaviour during the last three decades as clearly showing that Washington's true intention, allied with Israel, is to use allegations that Iran is pursuing atomic and other

weapons of mass destruction as an excuse to overthrow yet another Middle Eastern government and make the region safe for US–Israeli domination.<sup>7</sup>

Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, also believes the United States is using the issue of Iran's nuclear programme as a pretext for regime change. 'Under the guise of trying to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction', he stated earlier this year, 'they [the Americans] are attempting something else entirely and setting different goals – regime change'.<sup>8</sup> Russia has also concluded that Western pressure for regime change in Syria is really about Iran: speaking after Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on Syria in July, Russia's UN envoy, Vitaly Churkin, said the conflict was 'geopolitical' and 'all about Iran'.<sup>9</sup>

### The nuclear dispute

Ever since Iran's uranium-enrichment programme was revealed in 2003, the United States and its European allies have been unwilling to accept Iran's right to enrich uranium as a non-weapons-holding member of the NPT.<sup>10</sup>

Enrichment of uranium in Iran was America's red line during the George W. Bush administration.<sup>11</sup> The Obama administration has rhetorically distanced itself from the Bush position, but in practice has stuck to it during nuclear talks with Iran. Moreover, Israel and its supporters on Capitol Hill have pressed Obama not to accept Iran's right to enrichment.<sup>12</sup>

In December 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the BBC that a diplomatic solution to the nuclear dispute would include Iran's exercising its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes once it had 'restored the confidence of the international community' that its programme had no military objective.<sup>13</sup> A few days later, an influential group of US senators wrote to President Barack Obama demanding that the United States 'make clear that, given the government of Iran's patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future'. The letter also warned that the group would strongly oppose any diplomatic outcome in which Iran was permitted to continue enriching uranium.<sup>14</sup>

In April 2012, a senior White House official told the *Los Angeles Times* that, if Iran complies with the demands of the United States and other world

powers for strict UN monitoring and safeguards, 'there can be a discussion' about allowing low-level domestic enrichment'.<sup>15</sup> But the Obama administration has left its position on this matter vague because of pressures from Israel and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which have influence over the US Congress. Although Obama has done more to strengthen international sanctions against Iran over the past three years than any other US president,<sup>16</sup> Israel feels that, as Trita Parsi put it, he 'has made America's red lines flexible and unreliable'.<sup>17</sup> France, too, opposes any enrichment in Iran.

Despite these misgivings, Reuters has reported that 'the US, European and even Israeli intelligence agencies generally agree on three things about Iran's nuclear programme: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead even if it decides to develop one'.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, they believe that Iran intends to at least acquire the capacity to build nuclear weapons in a relatively short time should it deem them necessary and, as a result, are not confident that Iran will confine its nuclear activities to non-military purposes.<sup>19</sup>

### **The US debate**

While the position of the Obama administration on Iranian enrichment might be vague, at least three distinct schools of thought have emerged within the United States over how to deal with Iran's nuclear programme. The first school holds that Iran has no right to carry out enrichment because it has consistently mounted secret nuclear programmes without reporting them to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has been referred by the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council as a result, and has been the subject of six Security Council resolutions calling for it to suspend all enrichment-related activities (levying sanctions until it does).<sup>20</sup> Emphasising that the right to enrich is only for peaceful purposes, members of this school say that they have reasonable grounds to suspect, based on Iran's clandestine activities and the weak economic justification for Iran's enrichment programme, that it is not for peaceful purposes.

A second school of thought holds that a nuclear Iran is preferable to a war with Iran, and that Iran can be deterred and contained. Its members

argue an Israeli or American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would make it more, not less, likely that Tehran would decide to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. Such an attack would also make it more, not less, difficult to contain Iranian influence.<sup>21</sup>

The third school of thought is quietly supported by a majority of diplomats within the US State Department,<sup>22</sup> and publicly promoted by two prominent former US diplomats, William Luers and Thomas Pickering.<sup>23</sup> Their position is that the United States should agree to let Iran continue enriching uranium up to 5% U-235, which is the upper end of the range for most civilian uses, if Iran's government agrees to unrestricted IAEA inspections and numerous safeguards that the Security Council has long demanded.<sup>24</sup> They argue that, once the IAEA has full access to Iran's nuclear programme, there could be a progressive reduction of the Security Council sanctions that are now in effect. Furthermore, they argue that, if Iran agrees to cease making threats against Israel, the United States should agree to actively support efforts toward achieving a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.<sup>25</sup>

Kenneth N. Waltz, one of America's most prominent strategists, recently argued in an article for *Foreign Affairs* that an Iranian bomb would not be a threat because, 'by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less'. 'Israel's regional nuclear monopoly', he says,

has long fueled instability in the Middle East ... It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most of the current crisis ... If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small.

He goes on to note that 'history shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers ... India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going

nuclear.<sup>26</sup> I am not sure whether this theory can be considered a fourth school of thought in the United States, though it certainly carries weight.

### **Iran's position on enrichment**

Iran maintains that uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes is the right of all parties to the NPT. Indeed, Article IV of the NPT states that 'nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty'.<sup>27</sup> The NPT Conferences in 2000 and 2010 confirmed that the right to peaceful use constitutes one of the pillars of the treaty.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, paragraph 69 of the final document of the first United Nations General Assembly special session on Disarmament in 1978, which was adopted by consensus, states that

each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international cooperation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.<sup>29</sup>

Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands – all countries which, like Iran, are 'non-nuclear-weapon' parties to the NPT – have uranium-enrichment facilities, as do the five 'nuclear-weapon' parties to the NPT: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>30</sup>

Iran maintains that it is not in breach of the NPT by engaging in uranium enrichment, because this activity is carried out under IAEA supervision. The IAEA has verified that no material is being diverted for military purposes from the 15 nuclear facilities Iran has declared under its Safeguards Agreement.<sup>31</sup> Consequently, Iran is safely within the scope of Article IV of the NPT, as interpreted by the United States at the time of the treaty's drafting in 1968. At that time, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, William C. Foster, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:



It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.<sup>32</sup>

Meanwhile, the US Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, confirmed to the US Senate Armed Services Committee that Iran neither has nuclear weapons nor has decided to build them.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, according to the US intelligence services, the Israeli intelligence services 'largely agree' with their assessment of Iran's nuclear activities.<sup>34</sup> Israel's Chief of Staff, General Benny Gantz, has stated that, in his view, Iran has not decided to develop nuclear weapons and probably will not decide to do so.<sup>35</sup>

Iran sees the United States as having double standards with regard to other countries' nuclear activities. On the one hand, Washington and its allies claim they want to see a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, and apply economic sanctions and threaten military action against Iran, which hasn't got a single nuclear weapon, is a member of the NPT and has opened its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. On the other hand, the United States maintains strategic relations with Israel, India and Pakistan, despite the fact that they reject the NPT, are believed to possess several hundred nuclear weapons between them, and keep their nuclear facilities almost entirely closed to the IAEA. Far from imposing sanctions on these countries, the United States gives over \$3 billion a year in military aid to Israel and \$3bn to Pakistan,<sup>36</sup> and has established strategic nuclear cooperation with India.<sup>37</sup>

Furthermore, the sanctions and pressures orchestrated by Washington and its allies against Iran are stronger than those imposed on North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT and tested a nuclear bomb, even though Iran has remained committed to the NPT and does not possess nuclear

weapons.<sup>38</sup> South Korea and Egypt were found, like Iran, to be non-compliant with their NPT safeguards by the IAEA in 2004–05, but only Iran's case was referred to the Security Council and sanctioned; South Korea's and Egypt's cases were resolved within the IAEA due to their good relations with the United States.<sup>39</sup>

### The latest nuclear proposals

In talks held in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow in spring and summer 2012, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of Security Council plus Germany) requested that Iran stop the production of 20% enriched uranium, shut down its underground nuclear-enrichment facility at Fordow and ship its 20% enriched-uranium stockpile out of the country. In exchange, the six powers would provide fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), cooperate on nuclear safety and provide spare parts for civilian airliners.<sup>40</sup>

I was not surprised to hear that Iran rejected the P5+1 offer. I had warned in an interview with Christian Amanpour that was broadcast live on CNN prior to the talks that 'the P5+1 ... ask Iran to give diamonds in return for peanuts ... Asking Iran to stop twenty percent [uranium enrichment] ... [and] to give access to the IAEA beyond [the] Additional Protocol – this is practically the diamonds the P5+1 want ... If they are going to propose Iran spare parts for airplanes [in exchange], these would be the peanuts.'<sup>41</sup>

Iran's own position in the negotiations was to request recognition of its right to enrich, and sanctions relief in exchange for its cooperation in removing all remaining concerns about a possible Iranian nuclear-weapons programme. Iran proposed to the P5+1 the following five-step plan:

- (1) acceptance of Iran's right to enrich uranium in exchange for the 'operationalisation' of the Supreme Leader's fatwa against nuclear weapons – possibly in the form of a UN document, in which Iran would promise not to pursue nuclear weapons;
- (2) relief from sanctions in exchange for Iran's cooperation with the IAEA;
- (3) nuclear cooperation between Iran and the P5+1 in the fields of civilian nuclear-energy production and nuclear safety;

- (4) confidence-building measures, possibly involving quantitative limits on Iran's production of 20% enriched uranium;
- (5) cooperation on non-nuclear issues, such as on interdicting narcotics smuggling and in resolving regional conflicts such as those within Syria and Bahrain.<sup>42</sup>

I believe that, in the recent high-level negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow during the first half of 2012, Iran was completely open with the IAEA and was willing to address all remaining issues, including the IAEA's concerns about 'possible military dimensions' to Iran's nuclear programme. Furthermore, Iran was ready to accept limits on the capacity and level of its enrichment programme, including a cap at 5% level for its enrichment.<sup>43</sup>

Prior to the talks, I proposed a four-step plan, first published in the *Boston Globe* on 31 March 2012.<sup>44</sup> During the first phase of this plan, to cool down the pressure for war, Iran would stop producing 20% enriched uranium, which can be processed into weapons-grade fuel relatively rapidly. In exchange, the P5+1 would provide 20%-enriched fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the United States and EU would suspend sanctions on Iran's oil exports and its central bank.

During phase two, Iran would implement, on an interim basis, the Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which requires it to immediately report any plans for new nuclear facilities to the agency, and the Additional Protocol, which would give the IAEA access to nuclear-programme-related sites where there is no nuclear material present. Iran would also address the IAEA's questions about the 'possible military dimensions' of its nuclear programme. In exchange, the P5+1 would recognise Iran's right to nuclear energy under the NPT, including enrichment (limited to civil, peaceful purposes), and suspend the Security Council's nuclear-related sanctions.

During the third phase, Iran would permit the IAEA to carry out full surveillance of its centrifuge production and would limit enrichment to existing sites. During a confidence-building period of some years, it would not stock-pile enriched uranium for which it had no immediate use. In exchange, the

P5+1 would suspend unilateral sanctions related to the nuclear issue, lift sanctions on the export of civilian goods (such as aviation) to Iran and cooperate with Iran on peaceful nuclear technology.

Finally, during phase four, Iran's parliament would make permanent its transparency commitments by ratifying the Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1, maximise its cooperation with the IAEA, and suspend the construction of further enrichment sites until the agency concerns about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme were removed. In exchange, the P5+1 would lift all UN and unilateral sanctions.

### **The war against Iran**

For the past several years, the United States and Israel have repeatedly threatened to attack Iran because of its nuclear programme.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, they are already at war with Iran economically and politically; have allegedly carried out cyber attacks within the country; and have been accused by the Iranian government of assassinating scientists linked to Iran's nuclear programme.<sup>46</sup>

Due to unilateral and multilateral sanctions led by the United States, the annual inflation rate in Iran is over 20%, although many economists believe it could be double that. In June 2012, the price of chicken was up 30%, grains up 55.8%, fruits up 66.6%, and vegetables up 99.5% over the previous year. Iran's Central Bank estimates unemployment among the young at 22.5%.<sup>47</sup> The value of Iran's currency, the rial, has fallen 40% against the dollar in since the beginning of 2012.<sup>48</sup>

The Obama administration has reportedly been waging cyber war against Iran as well. In 2010, the Stuxnet virus temporarily shut down a considerable portion of Iran's enrichment programme, and also infected some of Iran's power plants, oil rigs and water-supply systems, although apparently without causing serious damage. The United States is also suspected of being behind the Flame virus, a form of spyware able to record keystrokes, eavesdrop on conversations near an infected computer, and tap into screen images.<sup>49</sup>

In the past two years, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated, probably by the Israeli intelligence service, the Mossad, working with

the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), an organisation the United States designates as 'terrorist'.<sup>50</sup> In 2011, an explosion (probably organised by the Mossad and MEK) at the Bid Ganeh military base near Tehran killed 17 people, including one of the founders of Iran's ballistic-missile programme, General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam.<sup>51</sup> Terrorist attacks directed at Iran's Revolutionary Guard have been linked to Jundallah, a Sunni group with ties to US and Israeli intelligence.<sup>52</sup>

While for many the question is whether the failure of the talks will lead to an Israeli or American attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, I am worried about the consequences of the war the United States, Israel and their European allies have already mounted on Iran by other means.<sup>53</sup>

### **Beyond the nuclear issue**

The United States and Iran have been enemies ever since the 1979 revolution – long before Iran's nuclear programme began. There is therefore a need for a grand bargain between Washington and Tehran that goes beyond the nuclear issue.<sup>54</sup> I advocate a three-pillar approach:

- A peaceful resolution of the confrontation over Iran's nuclear programme. To resolve the Iranian nuclear impasse in a realistic and face-saving way, the P5+1 should offer a package that includes three major elements: (1) recognition of Iran's inalienable right to carry out enrichment; (2) removal of the sanctions; and (3) normalisation of Iran's nuclear file. In return, Iran should provide full transparency to IAEA inspection as well as confidence-building measures and assurances that it will remain a non-nuclear-weapon state.
- A comprehensive dialogue on the other issues between Iran and the United States.
- A new arrangement for regional security including a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Of these three pillars, perhaps none could pay more dividends for international peace and security than the third. (This has been the position of Iran for decades, which was the first country to propose a 'Nuclear Weapon

Free Zone in the Middle East'.) According to some analysts, with whom I am in full agreement, the process of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East could potentially facilitate a security arrangement and help find a just solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, it is the only way to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. However, while annual UN General Assembly resolutions on establishing such a zone in the Middle East have for years been adopted unanimously, practical progress toward this goal has not been forthcoming, mainly because the world powers have not been ready to take serious steps to bring about its realisation.

Israel is the only country which possesses nuclear weapons in the region, with an arsenal estimated at between 100 and 200 nuclear warheads.<sup>56</sup> Israel argues that its nuclear weapon is its final deterrent against the Arabs and the Iranians. But the United States, with more than 5,000 nuclear warheads, should be able to provide a security guarantee for Israel, as it does for about 30 other non-nuclear states.

Achieving a WMD-free zone or a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East requires confidence-building measures. Serious, practical steps are needed, such as:

- meetings between mid-level, regional governmental experts at which the political and security requirements for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be discussed and hopefully agreed. Perhaps the best way of bringing these about would be to have the United Nations arrange and hold such meetings, in which all Middle Eastern countries would regularly participate;
- measures to reach an agreement for non-intrusive verification of the zone's nuclear-free status;<sup>57</sup>
- agreements on membership of the zone, that is, those states that need to ratify the zone before it becomes enforceable;
- discussions of possible limitations on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology within the zone, such as limitations on uranium enrichment and plutonium separation;
- a regional, mutual monitoring and verification programme supplementing the Safeguard Agreements with the IAEA. Such a

programme could serve to build confidence within the Persian Gulf about the peacefulness of the nuclear programmes in the area;

- a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities building on the 1990 IAEA General Conference Resolution 533, which prohibits ‘all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation’.<sup>58</sup>

As a final step toward a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone, Israel would have to join the NPT and give up its nuclear bombs. Indeed, as the only state in the region with nuclear weapons, Israel could take some steps earlier that are strategically low risk but that would have a high symbolic impact, such as shutting down its Dimona nuclear reactor and the associated facilities.<sup>59</sup> Serious efforts like these to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would help Iran become more forthcoming in resolving questions about its own nuclear-energy programme.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> At a press conference in New York City in 2006, Ahmaedinejad said: ‘The time for nuclear bombs has ended. We know that. These nuclear arsenals will not benefit anyone ... If the nuclear bomb could have saved anyone, it would have prevented the collapse of the Soviet Union. If the nuclear bomb could have created security, it would have prevented, perhaps, September 11th. If the nuclear bomb could have done anything, it could have, perhaps, stopped the Palestinian intifada.’ For a transcript of his remarks, see ‘President Ahmadinejad’s News Conference’, *Washington Post*, 21 September 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/21/AR2006092100829.html>.
- <sup>2</sup> ‘Iran Will Never Seek Nuclear Weapons: Leader’, PressTV, 22 February 2012, [www.presstv.ir/detail/228014.html](http://www.presstv.ir/detail/228014.html).
- <sup>3</sup> See ‘Iran’s Statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting’, Mehr News Agency, 10 August 2005, available at [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/mehro80905.html](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/mehro80905.html).
- <sup>4</sup> See, inter alia, reports of several UN investigative missions contained in the following UN Security Council Documents: ‘Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons’, 26 March 1984, S/16433; ‘Letter Dated 17 April 1985 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council’, 24 April 1985, S/17127; ‘Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General to Investigate

- Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Conflict Between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq', 12 March 1986, S/17911; 'Note by the President of the Security Council', 21 March 1986, S/17932.
- 5 'Amanpour Interviews Former Iranian Nuclear Negotiation Insider About Weaponization Plans', CNN, 25 April 2012, <http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/25/amanpour-interviews-former-iranian-nuclear-negotiation-insider-about-weaponization-plans/>.
  - 6 Christopher L. Brown and Alyssa Smith, 'Middle East in Transition', Southern Center for International Studies, 2008, [http://www.southern-center.org/me\\_septo8\\_lesson1.pdf](http://www.southern-center.org/me_septo8_lesson1.pdf).
  - 7 See, for example, Sasan Fayazmanesh, 'The Saga of Iran's Alleged WMD', CounterPunch, 12 December 2003, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/12/12/the-saga-of-iran-s-alleged-wmd/>.
  - 8 'Putin: "The West Wants Regime Change in Iran"', RT.com, 25 February 2012, <http://rt.com/politics/putin-regime-iran-usa-175/>.
  - 9 'Russia: Western Pressure Over Syrian Conflict is "All About Iran"', *Telegraph*, 19 July 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/middleeast/syria/9413554/Russia-Western-pressure-over-Syrian-conflict-is-all-about-Iran.html>.
  - 10 Peter Jenkins, 'The Deal the West Could Strike With Iran', *Telegraph*, 23 January 2012, [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9033566/The-deal-the-West-could-strike-with-Iran.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9033566/The-deal-the-West-could-strike-with-Iran.html).
  - 11 See Gareth Porter, 'Neocons Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks With Iran', *Antiwar.com*, 29 March 2006, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/porter.php?articleid=8778>.
  - 12 See Tony Karon, 'Could U.S. Politics Hinder Obama's Iran Diplomacy?', *Time*, 10 December 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2036275,00.html>.
  - 13 Kim Ghattas, 'Clinton Urges Iran to Fully Engage in Nuclear Talks', BBC News, 3 December 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-us-canada-11917186>.
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