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Essays, Publications

Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ)

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Over a decade of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany) have failed. The window for a diplomatic resolution will be most opportune during the second term of President Obama and the election of moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. They have both voiced their readiness for a diplomatic resolution to the current standoff. There is, however, a risk that if the current US/Western policy of pressure politics continues, we will inch toward a military confrontation. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The proposed paper will examine the prospects for a breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout capability. For the Iranians, their main demand includes recognition of their rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions. Any negotiated settlement on the Iranian nuclear file will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities, which will enhance non-proliferation efforts. These milestones will pave the way to strengthen the call for concerted efforts to realize the WMDFZ in the Middle East.

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“Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ),” Hossein Mousavian, European University Institute, Policy Paper, No.22. Published by Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Program, December 2013.

Essays, Publications

Solving the Nuclear Conflict with Iran

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Key Points:

  • The breakthrough in the negotiations with regard to the Iranian nuclear program was reached because the parameters of the negotiations have changed. This enabled rapprochement between Iran and the United States. The willingness of the P5+1 to accept limited enrichment and provide sanctions relief was key to securing Iranian consent.
  • A sustainable solution to the nuclear conflict with Iran can be agreed upon only on the basis of the NPT and necessitates an end to the discrimination of Iran compared to other member states. Measures that go beyond the provisions of the NPT can be complied with for a specified period of time as a confidence building measure.
  • A final deal can be reached if US-Iran relations are further improved to guarantee domestic US support for an agreement.

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“Solving the Nuclear Conflict with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Korber Policy Brief, No.2. Published by Korber Foundation, December 2013. 

Essays, Publications

Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?

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This paper presents a comprehensive explanation as to why Iran is not after a nuclear bomb and provides twenty-five reasons to strengthen this position. Examples range from a chronology of Israeli accusations that claim Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; elaborating on the findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors of Iranian nuclear facilities; the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s viewpoint on nuclear weapons; the findings of US and other Western intelligence agency’s regarding the Iran’s nuclear capability; and instances of missed opportunity that have evaded a resolution of the nuclear dossier. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on a framework for diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff and its contribution to the realization of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

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“Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?” Hossein Mousavian, International Studies Journal (ISJ), Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 129-142. Published by the International Studies Journal, November 2013.

Essays, Publications

Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction

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We suggest possible initiatives for fissile material control that could serve as initial steps toward an eventual Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. These initiatives include actions that Israel, the only regional state with nuclear weapons, could take towards nuclear disarmament; and measures of collective restraint regarding fissile material production and use to be taken by all states of the region to foster confidence that their civilian nuclear activities are indeed peaceful in intent and not being pursued as a cover to develop nuclear-weapon options.

For Israel, these initial steps include ending production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, declaring its stockpiles of these materials, and placing increasing portions under international safeguards as steps toward their elimination. The eventual nuclear disarmament of Israel would be a necessary condition for any Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone and for a broader weapon of mass destruction free zone.

The regional measures that we propose would serve to bring a Middle East nuclear- weapon-free zone closer and make the zone more robust when it is in force. These measures include no separation of plutonium, no use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel, and no national enrichment plants. It would greatly strengthen the global nonproliferation regime if these measures were adopted worldwide, including by the nuclear weapon states.

All these measures are worth pursuing in their own rights and states should take initiatives to make progress on them wherever possible. Progress should not be held up by the imposition of linkages, time ordering or sequencing between steps.

Although we do not discuss chemical and biological weapons in this paper, it is critical that all countries in the region ratify and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This has become especially important after the use of chemical weapons in the civil war in Syria in 2013 and Syria’s subsequent decision to accede to the CWC, declare its stockpile and verifiably destroy its chemical weapons. Egypt and Israel should follow suit on the CWC. All three states also should ratify the BWC.

Finally, we propose that discussions be launched on the design of regional verification arrangements strong enough so that all countries in the region can have confidence in the absence of secret nuclear weapon programs. Similar verification arrangements also should be developed to increase confidence in the region that countries are complying with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

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Read Princeton University Press Release

“Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson and Zia Mian, Research Report No. 11 International Panel on Fissile Materials. Published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013.

Essays, Publications

Five Options for Iran’s New President

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[Author’s note: The views in this paper were presented prior to the Iranian presidential election at the NPT Prepcom on April 25 and publicly at Global Zero event at University of California-Irvine on May 23, 2013 respectively. This paper does not reflect in anyway the official position of the Iranian government.]

Nuclear negotiations lasting more than a decade between Iran and world powers have failed. The talks have been unable to reconcile the concerns voiced by the United States and other parties that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon with Iran’s insistence that its program is strictly peaceful and only intended for civilian energy production.

Publicly, the U.S. and other Western officials blame the failure of nuclear talks on Iran. The key question, however, is whether talks have failed because of the perceived Iranian intention to build a nuclear bomb, or due to the West’s unwillingness to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium under international safeguards. Former U.S. officials Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, authors of Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, recently addressed this issue, which rarely is part of Iran policy debates in the United States: “Washington’s unwillingness [to recognize the rights of Iran for enrichment] is grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of American strategic culture: difficulty coming to terms with independent power centers (whether globally or in vital regions like the Middle East); hostility to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate their foreign policies to U.S. preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat and Mubarak); and an unreflective but deeply rooted sense that U.S.-backed norms, rules, and transnational decision-making processes are meant to constrain others, not America itself.”

Iran, as a sovereign state and a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is entitled to uranium enrichment. I believe that if Washington recognized Iran’s right to enrich, a nuclear deal could be reached immediately. Without this recognition, no substantial agreement will be possible.

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“Five Options for Iran’s New President,” Hossein Mousavian, Cairo Review, pgs. 68-79. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 2013.

 

Essays, Publications

La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato (Italian)

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Dopo un decennio di stallo sulla questione nucleare, per trovare una soluzione è necessario avere ben chiare le cause di fondo dell’attuale crisi e l’eredità della storia. Prima della rivoluzione islamica del 1979, i paesi occidentali – e in particolare gli Stati Uniti – mantenevano ottimi rapporti con l’Iran e facevano a gara per aggiudicarsi i redditizi progetti di nuclearizzazione del paese, gettando così le basi per lo sviluppo della sua potenza atomica. In quel periodo, l’Occidente sosteneva che la tecnologia nucleare era di fondamentale importanza per Teheran. Nel 1976, il presidente Gerald Ford firmò una direttiva che consentiva all’Iran di acquisire la tecnologia necessaria a sviluppare un ciclo nucleare completo. Nel documento si legge: “L’introduzione dell’energia nucleare provvederà al crescente fabbisogno energetico dell’economia iraniana e renderà le riserve petrolifere del paese disponibili per l’esportazione o la trasformazione in prodotti petrolchimici”.

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“La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato,” Hossein Mousavian, Aspenia, issue no. 60, pgs. 62-70. Published by the Aspen Institute, March 2013, (Italian).

Essays, Publications

Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons

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Over a decade of negotiations between Iran and various world powers over Tehran’s nuclear programme have yielded little or no progress. Although all parties seek a peaceful resolution to this quagmire through diplomacy, all the major demands of the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, France and the UK – plus Germany) go beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Safeguard Agreement, the only viable and legitimate international framework for non-proliferation. In 2011, I proposed a peaceful solution based on the 2005 fatwa (religious decree) of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei banning the acquisition, production and use of nuclear weapons, and in 2012 Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi declared Iran’s willingness to transform the fatwa ‘into a legally binding, official document in the UN’, to secularise what many in the West see as a purely religious decree.1 Such a step would provide a sustainable legal and political umbrella for Iran to accept required measures; facilitate transparency and confidence-building measures; and help address doubts in the West about the commitment to the principles expressed in the fatwa in the context of Iran’s system of government, where politics and religion are intertwined.

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“Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons,” Hossein Mousavian, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 147-162. Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 8, 2013.

 

Essays, Publications

An Opportunity for a U.S.–Iran Paradigm Shift

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America as a superpower has had a longstanding interest in the Middle East, and thus is no stranger to the region. Unfortunately, the continuing U.S. domination in the Middle East with its flawed policies is creating strategic imbalances in the region and fueling intra-/regional tensions with serious implications for the overall peace and security of the region. The flawed U.S. polices in the Middle East are already leading to its total alienation from the region’s people. A recent poll the first of its kind in the region, conducted in twelve Arab countries covering 84 percent of the population of the Arab world shows 93.75 percent of the people look at the Unites States and Israel as the major threat to their interests.1 Growing anti-/Americanism in the Arab world is no secret.

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Hossein Mousavian, “An Opportunity for a U.S.–Iran Paradigm Shift.” The Washington Quarterly 36, no. 1 (pgs. 129-144). Published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington (12/2012).

Essays, Publications

Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass Destruction

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The United States has launched, in effect, an economic, political, cyber and covert war with Iran. American–Iranian relations could reach a turning point within a year. Without substantial progress on the diplomatic front, the chance for a unilateral Israeli or a joint US–Israeli military campaign aimed at destroying the Iranian nuclear programme could become a probability. Any attempt to reorient the current diplomatic trajectory will require a better understanding of the dispute between Tehran and Washington over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

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Hossein Mousavian, “Iran, the US and Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Survival 54, no. 5 (pgs. 183-202). Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (10/2012).