“Ex-envoy: No ‘dismantling’ to occur on Iran’s N. activities,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, ISNA, February 1, 2014.
Tag: WMD Free Zone
Outlines of a Compromise
The world powers and Iran can agree on six principles:
• No nuclear weapon in the Middle East.
• A ban on production of plutonium and reprocessing in the Middle East.
• Stopping the production of highly enriched uranium, with no enrichment beyond five percent in the Middle East.
• No stockpiling beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use.
• Establishment of a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel.
• Regional confidence-building and verification measures by creating a regional authority in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region.
This would be the best path to reach the “comprehensive package” deal on the Iranian nuclear dilemma. The next six months of diplomacy will be decisive and the world powers and Iran should be open to pursuing an agenda of long-term co-operation. Iran’s nuclear deal has the potential to begin controlling fissile material in the Middle East and take meaningful steps toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
“Outlines of a compromise,” Hossein Mousavian, The Security Times, January 31, 2014.
The United States, Russia and the Middle East
“The United States, Russia and the Middle East,” presentation at the John Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, December 5, 2013. (Video)
Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ)
Over a decade of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany) have failed. The window for a diplomatic resolution will be most opportune during the second term of President Obama and the election of moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. They have both voiced their readiness for a diplomatic resolution to the current standoff. There is, however, a risk that if the current US/Western policy of pressure politics continues, we will inch toward a military confrontation. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The proposed paper will examine the prospects for a breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout capability. For the Iranians, their main demand includes recognition of their rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions. Any negotiated settlement on the Iranian nuclear file will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities, which will enhance non-proliferation efforts. These milestones will pave the way to strengthen the call for concerted efforts to realize the WMDFZ in the Middle East.
“Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ),” Hossein Mousavian, European University Institute, Policy Paper, No.22. Published by Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Program, December 2013.
Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?
This paper presents a comprehensive explanation as to why Iran is not after a nuclear bomb and provides twenty-five reasons to strengthen this position. Examples range from a chronology of Israeli accusations that claim Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; elaborating on the findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors of Iranian nuclear facilities; the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s viewpoint on nuclear weapons; the findings of US and other Western intelligence agency’s regarding the Iran’s nuclear capability; and instances of missed opportunity that have evaded a resolution of the nuclear dossier. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on a framework for diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff and its contribution to the realization of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.
“Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?” Hossein Mousavian, International Studies Journal (ISJ), Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 129-142. Published by the International Studies Journal, November 2013.
Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction
We suggest possible initiatives for fissile material control that could serve as initial steps toward an eventual Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. These initiatives include actions that Israel, the only regional state with nuclear weapons, could take towards nuclear disarmament; and measures of collective restraint regarding fissile material production and use to be taken by all states of the region to foster confidence that their civilian nuclear activities are indeed peaceful in intent and not being pursued as a cover to develop nuclear-weapon options.
For Israel, these initial steps include ending production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, declaring its stockpiles of these materials, and placing increasing portions under international safeguards as steps toward their elimination. The eventual nuclear disarmament of Israel would be a necessary condition for any Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone and for a broader weapon of mass destruction free zone.
The regional measures that we propose would serve to bring a Middle East nuclear- weapon-free zone closer and make the zone more robust when it is in force. These measures include no separation of plutonium, no use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel, and no national enrichment plants. It would greatly strengthen the global nonproliferation regime if these measures were adopted worldwide, including by the nuclear weapon states.
All these measures are worth pursuing in their own rights and states should take initiatives to make progress on them wherever possible. Progress should not be held up by the imposition of linkages, time ordering or sequencing between steps.
Although we do not discuss chemical and biological weapons in this paper, it is critical that all countries in the region ratify and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This has become especially important after the use of chemical weapons in the civil war in Syria in 2013 and Syria’s subsequent decision to accede to the CWC, declare its stockpile and verifiably destroy its chemical weapons. Egypt and Israel should follow suit on the CWC. All three states also should ratify the BWC.
Finally, we propose that discussions be launched on the design of regional verification arrangements strong enough so that all countries in the region can have confidence in the absence of secret nuclear weapon programs. Similar verification arrangements also should be developed to increase confidence in the region that countries are complying with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.
Read Princeton University Press Release
“Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson and Zia Mian, Research Report No. 11 International Panel on Fissile Materials. Published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013.
Five Options for Iran’s New President
[Author’s note: The views in this paper were presented prior to the Iranian presidential election at the NPT Prepcom on April 25 and publicly at Global Zero event at University of California-Irvine on May 23, 2013 respectively. This paper does not reflect in anyway the official position of the Iranian government.]
Nuclear negotiations lasting more than a decade between Iran and world powers have failed. The talks have been unable to reconcile the concerns voiced by the United States and other parties that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon with Iran’s insistence that its program is strictly peaceful and only intended for civilian energy production.
Publicly, the U.S. and other Western officials blame the failure of nuclear talks on Iran. The key question, however, is whether talks have failed because of the perceived Iranian intention to build a nuclear bomb, or due to the West’s unwillingness to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium under international safeguards. Former U.S. officials Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, authors of Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, recently addressed this issue, which rarely is part of Iran policy debates in the United States: “Washington’s unwillingness [to recognize the rights of Iran for enrichment] is grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of American strategic culture: difficulty coming to terms with independent power centers (whether globally or in vital regions like the Middle East); hostility to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate their foreign policies to U.S. preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat and Mubarak); and an unreflective but deeply rooted sense that U.S.-backed norms, rules, and transnational decision-making processes are meant to constrain others, not America itself.”
Iran, as a sovereign state and a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is entitled to uranium enrichment. I believe that if Washington recognized Iran’s right to enrich, a nuclear deal could be reached immediately. Without this recognition, no substantial agreement will be possible.
“Five Options for Iran’s New President,” Hossein Mousavian, Cairo Review, pgs. 68-79. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 2013.
Nuclear Options for Iran’s New President (Arabic)
ستكون هناك فرصة أكبر لتحقيق انفراجة دبلوماسية في الجمود بشأن البرنامج النووي الإيراني خلال الولاية الثانية للرئيس الأميركي باراك أوباما، الذي طالب القادة الإيرانيين، في خطاب حالة الاتحاد لعام 2013، بـ«الاعتراف بأن هذا هو الوقت المناسب للتوصل إلى حل دبلوماسي». وعلاوة على ذلك، يأتي فوز كبير المفاوضين النوويين الإيرانيين حسن روحاني بانتخابات الرئاسة الإيرانية الشهر الماضي ليقدم آفاقا جديدة للمفاوضات.
“Nuclear Options for Iran’s New President,” Hossein Mousavian, Asharq Al-Awsat, July 9, 2013. (Arabic)
3 factors set to rescue Iran nuclear talks
The west is eagerly awaiting the results of the upcoming June presidential elections in Iran to determine whom they will be working with in Tehran for the foreseeable future. Certainly the nuclear issue will remain a high priority for world powers and Iran. Over a decade of negotiations with Tehran, world powers have challenged Iran’s legitimate rights for enrichment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), yielding no outcome. The world powers have continued hitting the hammer on the same nail and it is time for a renewed look at the status quo.
“3 factors set to rescue Iran nuclear talks,” Hossein Mousavian, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 19, 2013.
La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato (Italian)
Dopo un decennio di stallo sulla questione nucleare, per trovare una soluzione è necessario avere ben chiare le cause di fondo dell’attuale crisi e l’eredità della storia. Prima della rivoluzione islamica del 1979, i paesi occidentali – e in particolare gli Stati Uniti – mantenevano ottimi rapporti con l’Iran e facevano a gara per aggiudicarsi i redditizi progetti di nuclearizzazione del paese, gettando così le basi per lo sviluppo della sua potenza atomica. In quel periodo, l’Occidente sosteneva che la tecnologia nucleare era di fondamentale importanza per Teheran. Nel 1976, il presidente Gerald Ford firmò una direttiva che consentiva all’Iran di acquisire la tecnologia necessaria a sviluppare un ciclo nucleare completo. Nel documento si legge: “L’introduzione dell’energia nucleare provvederà al crescente fabbisogno energetico dell’economia iraniana e renderà le riserve petrolifere del paese disponibili per l’esportazione o la trasformazione in prodotti petrolchimici”.
“La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato,” Hossein Mousavian, Aspenia, issue no. 60, pgs. 62-70. Published by the Aspen Institute, March 2013, (Italian).
