Articles, Publications

Why geopolitical shifts dictate nuclear deal with Iran

Although a week of high-level talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna made good progress, negotiators failed to reach an agreement and instead set a new deadline of March 1, 2015, for a framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and a July 1 deadline for the final agreement, including annexes.

As a result of the tectonic developments in the Middle East in recent years, the geopolitics of the region have shifted significantly. Amid 35 years of all-out sanctions and pressure on Iran, the outcomes of the Middle East’s ebbs and flows include Iran’s emergence as the most stable country in the area and as a regional power, Arab countries either in turmoil or vulnerable to unrest and destabilization and the unprecedented rise of violent extremist groups. These developments could serve as the impetus for an Iranian-Western rapprochement, despite the inconclusive talks in Vienna.

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“Why geopolitical shifts dictate nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 27, 2014.

Articles, Publications

How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal

The ninth round of talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group of world powers ended on Tuesday without a breakthrough to seal a deal over Iran’s nuclear programme ahead of a 24 November deadline.

“It would be wrong to speak about any kind of major progress” at the Oman talks, but “there was no setback, no disruption and no deadlock,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency.

Moreover, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, the West was facing a “make-or-break moment” to reach a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.

While the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive package is low, it is still possible for the sides to agree on the general outlines of a nuclear accord before the deadline.

At the moment the key sticking points to a deal are twofold: the need to resolve issues of uranium enrichment capacity, and the timing and pace of the removal of sanctions.

With major progress already achieved in previous rounds of talks, other questions such as limits on enrichment levels, size of uranium stockpiles, and allowing inspections at Iran’s Fordo nuclear plant can be resolved if the two inter-related issues can be worked out.

Three-phase approach

There are ways this can be done. The principle should be that transparency and confidence-building measures by Iran and sanctions relief by the world powers go hand-in-hand and can be adjusted in a reciprocal fashion. This could be achieved through a phased approach:

Phase one

For immediate implementation after a deal is signed. In this phase, Iran should:

  1. Agree to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which includes snap visits by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors – signed but suspended by Iran in 2007
  2. Agree to provisional implementation of the modified Subsidiary Arrangement (Code 3.1) to the IAEA’s Safeguards Agreement – requiring signatory states to report any decisions to build new nuclear facilities but suspended by Iran since 2007
  3. Continue to cap uranium enrichment at 5% as agreed in November 2013
  4. Begin converting the enrichment site at Fordo to an R&D site
  5. Begin technical conversions at the heavy water facility at Arak to limit the production of plutonium, (material which can be used in a nuclear weapon)
  6. Begin addressing the Possible Military Dimension issues (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear programme with the IAEA
  7. Continue not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel at the Arak plant
  8. Begin limiting the current stockpiles of uranium to the level of practical needs
  9. Cap the enrichment capacity at the current operational level of about 9,400 centrifuges and not activate the other 12,000 already installed but not operational

These measures would guarantee the maximum level of Iran’s transparency and no so-called “breakout” capability – ie rush to make a bomb.

In return, the world powers should suspend all unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

Phase two

For implementation over a possible six-month period. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Complete a technical redesign of Arak heavy water facilities which would lower the current capacity of 10kg plutonium production to 1kg per year
  2. Complete conversion of Fordo as an R&D site
  3. Resolve PMD issues with the IAEA
  4. Approve Additional Protocol in the cabinet and submit to Parliament.

In return, the world powers should lift all sanctions imposed by European Union and the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions, while the US unilateral sanctions remain suspended.

Phase three

Phase three, as the final phase, should be completed before the end of President Barack Obama’s term in office. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Ratify the Additional Protocol by Parliament
  2. Approve at Cabinet level the Safeguard Agreement Code 3.1
  3. Commit to cap the level of the enrichment at 5% for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  4. Commit not to reprocess spent fuel at Arak for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  5. Commit to cap the stockpile of uranium at a level that is needed for domestic practical needs a longer period to be agreed by negotiations

‘Maximum transparency’

While Iran does not need to reprocess and enrich beyond 5% for many years, a longer period on these three phases would meet the world powers’ demand for longer duration of confidence-building measures on no “breakout”.

In return, the US should lift all unilateral sanctions suspended in phase one and the UNSC should lift the proliferation sanctions and normalise the Iranian nuclear dossier at the United Nations and the IAEA.

The P5+1 needs assurances of maximum transparency on the Iranian nuclear programme and confidence there will be no “breakout”.

Iran’s two main objectives are respecting its rights for peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and lifting the unilateral and multilateral related sanctions.

This package includes the two key objectives of the world powers and Iran with a realistic timetable and proportionate reciprocations.

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“How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal,” Hossein Mousavian, BBC, November 16, 2014.

 

Essays, Publications

The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East

After a decade of failed nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), they have finally fleshed out a temporary agreement that will hopefully restore trust in the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program among all parties. To do so, the temporary agreement must become the basis for renewed discussions on a final deal and the contours of a regional nuclear order in the Middle East. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear nonproliferation, a nuclear weapons−free zone (NWFZ), and a zone free of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.

This article examines the consequences of the breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout. Iran’s main demand includes respecting its rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions, as negotiated in the November 2013 interim agreement between it and the P5+1. Furthermore, a permanent settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities at the regional level, which will enhance nonproliferation efforts. These milestones, which are described in this article, will pave the way toward strengthening the call for concerted efforts to realize a WMDFZ in the Middle East and will help preserve the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in the future.

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“The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 529-544. Published by Global Governance, October 2014.