“Nuclear deal and Iran’s future as regional power,” The Chautauqua Institute, August 21, 2015.
Coverage: “Kiyaei, Mousavian discuss nuclear deal and Iran’s future as regional power,” Sam Flynn, The Chautauquan Daily, August 22, 2015.
“Nuclear deal and Iran’s future as regional power,” The Chautauqua Institute, August 21, 2015.
Coverage: “Kiyaei, Mousavian discuss nuclear deal and Iran’s future as regional power,” Sam Flynn, The Chautauquan Daily, August 22, 2015.
The National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations hosted a discussion on the newly-announced framework agreement between the P5+1 and Iran on that country’s nuclear program. The framework pushes Iran’s nuclear “breakout time” to at least a year and allows international inspectors access to Iranian programs deemed suspicious. ”Breakout time” refers to the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon.
The panelists talked about the specifics of the agreement. The also assessed the agreement’s implications for Iran’s regional neighbors and their relationship with the U.S., impact on the energy sector, and potential to be finalized by the June 2015 deadline. Speakers include Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former nuclear negotiator for Iran.
“Iran Nuclear Framework Agreement,” National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, April 8, 2015. (Video)
“P5+1 & Iran: Report on the Ongoing Nuclear Talks,” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, April 2, 2015. (Audio & Video)
“Slow economy could prompt Iran to take nuclear deal,” interview with Hossein Mousavian, Steven Mufson, Washington Post, March 29, 2015.
“Hope and fear prevent a deal with Iran,” interview with Hossein Mousavian, Netherlands News Broadcasting, Wouter Zwart, NOS, March 23, 2015. (Dutch) (Video)
“Full Interview with Amb. Seyed Hossein Mousavian About GOP Iran Letter,” interview with Hossein Mousavian, Ari Rabin-Havt, Sirius XM Radio, March 11, 2015. (Audio)
Note: “The Iran nuclear dilemma: the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT’s main objectives,” by Hossein Mousavian was published in Harald Müller & Daniel Müller (Eds.). WMD Arms Control in the Middle East: Prospects, Obstacles and Options (pp. 35—42). Published by Ashgate Publishing (02/2015).
The Middle East is a hot spot of proliferation. It contains one state assumed to possess nuclear weapons, several states that tried and failed to develop a military nuclear capability, one state under suspicion of trying to do so, and it is the world region that witnessed the most frequent and severe employment of chemical weapons since the end of World War I. Notwithstanding, not a single arms control regime concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) covers the region as a whole. Instead we have seen several proliferation-related military operations which have rather contributed to destabilization than served non-proliferation. This volume, written under the auspices of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament determines the current state of diplomatic efforts to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East. In doing so, it provides insights into central actors’ conflicting political positions, thereby explaining the stalemate of efforts to negotiate a WMD-free zone. Chapters written by renowned experts from academia and policy-oriented think tanks, as well as by next-generation Middle East and arms control experts, introduce the subject to the reader, give background information about arms control initiatives, provide technical expertise, and endeavour to make proposals for arms control measures in support of the creation of a Middle East WMD-free zone.
“The Iran nuclear dilemma: the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT’s main objectives,” Hossein Mousavian in Harald Müller & Daniel Müller (Eds.). WMD Arms Control in the Middle East: Prospects, Obstacles and Options (pp. 35—42). Published by Ashgate Publishing (02/2015).
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, arrived in Geneva Feb. 21 to hold bilateral meetings with US Secretary of State John Kerry and US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz. Hossein Fereydoun, President Hassan Rouhani’s senior adviser, is also accompanying the Iranian negotiation team to facilitate consultations and coordination. This is the highest level of talks between Iran and the United States since the 1979 revolution. The nuclear talks between Iran and the world powers are at a most critical moment — and in their final phase — and the chance for a final deal is likely more than 50%.
Recently, Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state and national security adviser whose knowledge of national security matters is often viewed as paramount in certain Washington circles, has attempted to cast unwarranted criticism on efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear dispute. “The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it,” Kissinger said of the ongoing diplomatic efforts. “And if the other countries in the region conclude that America has approved the development of an enrichment capability within one year of a nuclear weapon, and if they then insist on building the same capability, we will live in a proliferated world in which everybody — even if that agreement is maintained — will be very close to the trigger point.”
Kissinger’s assessment reflects a beleaguered understanding of the current status of the nuclear negotiations and the history of Iran’s nuclear program, as well as the realities of the current international system in regard to nuclear proliferation.
The key to understanding the nuclear proliferation issue is to have a firm grasp of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that has as its goal reducing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, as well as nuclear weapons disarmament on behalf of the nuclear weapons powers.
Over the years, many nations signatory to the treaty, on both sides of the nuclear weapons divide, have been in technical violation of their obligations under the NPT. There have been at least five states — Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, South Korea and Taiwan — that have engaged in clandestine nuclear programs without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The nuclear weapons states, too, have oftentimes been negligent in their obligation to dismantle their nuclear weapons and in many cases have actually upgraded their warheads and increased their number. In the case of Iran, there has also arguably been a significant double standard.
“Would Iran deal set new nuclear proliferation standard?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, February 22, 2015.
“US and Seven Wrong Strategies in Diplomacy with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, January 31, 2015.
“No alternative but to cooperate,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Energlobe, December 17, 2014.