Lectures

IISS Manama: Regional challenges and their immediate and long-term implications

Comments at the 5th Plenary Session of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue

I think the Muslim powers – like Turkey, like Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, like Iraq, like Iran – can begin to establish a collective regional Islamic package and measure to fight extremism in general. Whether we have Shia extremism or Sunni extremism, whether this is Daesh or whatever it is, this would create a first‑step trust between the regional powers. I really do not support the US interfering in Muslim countries, fighting the Muslim terrorists, or those who call themselves Muslim, because the US is not popular in the Arab world; the image of the US is not good, and this would really give more fuel to the crisis because they would feel this is America, this is Zionism invading Afghanistan, invading Iraq, and they would be able to recruit more. If we have Muslim countries’ forces collectively cooperate to fight these people who are claiming they are Muslim, we would need the US, we would need P5+1’s support and the United Nations support, not military interference.

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Comments at the 4th Plenary Session of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue

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Comments at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue

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Media Exposure: “Analyst urges PGCC member states to engage with Iran,” IRNA, December 7, 2014. Read More

“Regional challenges and their immediate and long-term implications,” Presentation at the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue, December 5, 2014.

Articles, Publications

How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal

The ninth round of talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group of world powers ended on Tuesday without a breakthrough to seal a deal over Iran’s nuclear programme ahead of a 24 November deadline.

“It would be wrong to speak about any kind of major progress” at the Oman talks, but “there was no setback, no disruption and no deadlock,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency.

Moreover, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, the West was facing a “make-or-break moment” to reach a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.

While the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive package is low, it is still possible for the sides to agree on the general outlines of a nuclear accord before the deadline.

At the moment the key sticking points to a deal are twofold: the need to resolve issues of uranium enrichment capacity, and the timing and pace of the removal of sanctions.

With major progress already achieved in previous rounds of talks, other questions such as limits on enrichment levels, size of uranium stockpiles, and allowing inspections at Iran’s Fordo nuclear plant can be resolved if the two inter-related issues can be worked out.

Three-phase approach

There are ways this can be done. The principle should be that transparency and confidence-building measures by Iran and sanctions relief by the world powers go hand-in-hand and can be adjusted in a reciprocal fashion. This could be achieved through a phased approach:

Phase one

For immediate implementation after a deal is signed. In this phase, Iran should:

  1. Agree to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which includes snap visits by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors – signed but suspended by Iran in 2007
  2. Agree to provisional implementation of the modified Subsidiary Arrangement (Code 3.1) to the IAEA’s Safeguards Agreement – requiring signatory states to report any decisions to build new nuclear facilities but suspended by Iran since 2007
  3. Continue to cap uranium enrichment at 5% as agreed in November 2013
  4. Begin converting the enrichment site at Fordo to an R&D site
  5. Begin technical conversions at the heavy water facility at Arak to limit the production of plutonium, (material which can be used in a nuclear weapon)
  6. Begin addressing the Possible Military Dimension issues (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear programme with the IAEA
  7. Continue not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel at the Arak plant
  8. Begin limiting the current stockpiles of uranium to the level of practical needs
  9. Cap the enrichment capacity at the current operational level of about 9,400 centrifuges and not activate the other 12,000 already installed but not operational

These measures would guarantee the maximum level of Iran’s transparency and no so-called “breakout” capability – ie rush to make a bomb.

In return, the world powers should suspend all unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

Phase two

For implementation over a possible six-month period. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Complete a technical redesign of Arak heavy water facilities which would lower the current capacity of 10kg plutonium production to 1kg per year
  2. Complete conversion of Fordo as an R&D site
  3. Resolve PMD issues with the IAEA
  4. Approve Additional Protocol in the cabinet and submit to Parliament.

In return, the world powers should lift all sanctions imposed by European Union and the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions, while the US unilateral sanctions remain suspended.

Phase three

Phase three, as the final phase, should be completed before the end of President Barack Obama’s term in office. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Ratify the Additional Protocol by Parliament
  2. Approve at Cabinet level the Safeguard Agreement Code 3.1
  3. Commit to cap the level of the enrichment at 5% for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  4. Commit not to reprocess spent fuel at Arak for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  5. Commit to cap the stockpile of uranium at a level that is needed for domestic practical needs a longer period to be agreed by negotiations

‘Maximum transparency’

While Iran does not need to reprocess and enrich beyond 5% for many years, a longer period on these three phases would meet the world powers’ demand for longer duration of confidence-building measures on no “breakout”.

In return, the US should lift all unilateral sanctions suspended in phase one and the UNSC should lift the proliferation sanctions and normalise the Iranian nuclear dossier at the United Nations and the IAEA.

The P5+1 needs assurances of maximum transparency on the Iranian nuclear programme and confidence there will be no “breakout”.

Iran’s two main objectives are respecting its rights for peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and lifting the unilateral and multilateral related sanctions.

This package includes the two key objectives of the world powers and Iran with a realistic timetable and proportionate reciprocations.

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“How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal,” Hossein Mousavian, BBC, November 16, 2014.

 

Essays, Publications

Iran: Assessing New, Emerging Geopolitics in the Middle East

The Middle East has experienced profound changes since the Afghanistan War in 2001, which have brought about the emergence of new actors and new challenges for the region. For the ambassador and researcher at Princeton University, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the international threat represented by the expansion of terrorism in Iraq and Syria has opened a new path of hope in the negotiations on the Teheran nuclear programme, given that it is a sufficient incentive both to forge new alliances and for Iran to reach a security and cooperation agreement with the USA and its allies for stability in the region.

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“Iran: Assessing New, Emerging Geopolitics in the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, European Institute of the Mediterranean: IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014. Published by IEMed, November 2014.