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Essays, Publications

Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy

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An early version of this article appeared online June 9 because of the high interest in the ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The version below, which also appears in the print edition of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, was updated to reflect minor editorial changes to the previously posted version. 

Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014. The goal is to agree on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and thus enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.

A key challenge is to agree how to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for nuclear weapons.

This article proposes a compromise based on a two-stage approach that involves Iran maintaining a capacity for enriching a small amount of uranium annually for research reactor fuel in the short term and developing a potential enrichment capacity in the longer term that would be appropriate to fuel power reactors. Iranian supply needs for its power reactors will develop in 2021 if Tehran decides to fuel the existing Bushehr power reactor domestically, in whole or in part, rather than renewing its fuel supply contract with Russia or buying fuel from another foreign supplier.

The proposed compromise also reflects Tehran’s plan to shift from its current low-power, first-generation centrifuges to high-capacity machines that are still under development.

This article therefore suggests that, during the next five years, Iran should modernize its enrichment facilities and in doing so, keep its operating capacity at about the current level rather than begin to operate the many thousands of first-generation machines that it already has installed and continue setting up more. During this period, Iran could phase out its first-generation machines in favor of the second-generation centrifuges it already has installed but has not yet operated. At the same time, it could develop, produce, and store components for a future generation of centrifuges that would be suitable for commercial-scale deployment. These later-generation centrifuges would not need to be assembled, except for test machines, until at least 2019.

To maintain the confidence of the international community that there will be no diversion of centrifuge components to a secret enrichment plant, the current transparency measures that Iran has undertaken for its centrifuge program would continue. These transparency measures should become the standard for transparency for centrifuge production worldwide.

Finally, the article suggests that the five-year period created by this proposal be used as an opportunity by Iran, the P5+1, and other interested states to explore in a second stage of the negotiations a multinational uranium-enrichment arrangement that would see Iran deploy its advanced centrifuges in a new regional, multinational facility rather than a national enrichment plant. By committing to working on such multinational arrangements for the Middle East and, ultimately, around the world, Iran and the P5+1 could chart a path to greatly reduce the proliferation risks that stem from national control of enrichment plants, regardless of location.

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Latest Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, July/August, 2014.

Older Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, June 9, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless.

Part (1): Four major, interrelated elements shape Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the US

Page: 161

First, he wholeheartedly believes that regardless of all the ups and downs, pushes and pulls between Iran and the US, Washington’s ultimate intention is to topple Iran’s Islamic system and subordinate them within a Pax Americana, as it did during the Shah’s era after the 1953 coup. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains that the US, no matter which school of thought and party is in power or which president has taken office, intends to “wipe out the Islamic Republic”with all possible means at its disposal. The conclusion he draws from US rhetoric, policies, and behavior is that the US will not relent from its desire for regime change unless the current government surrenders its principles, religious beliefs, political structure, and independence. The United States’ tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and provision of material support, its covert operations, support for belligerent groups and the Islamic Republic’s opposition (including a budgetary provision), its denial of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment under the NPT, and its intrusive and paralyzing economic sanctions are all viewed by Ayatollah Khamenei as indisputable attempts to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. He maintains that the US’s primary objective is to undermine the Islamic government by fostering internal disorder and, ultimately, regime change.

The second element that shapes Ayatollah Khamenei’s disposition towards the US is his firm belief that US foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically regarding Iran, is overwhelmingly dominated by the pro-Israel lobby. From his point of view, even the president of the United States does not have any authority over US foreign policy. He is surprised that year after year, the president or other high-level officials of the most powerful country on earth attend American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) gatherings and report what they have done to undermine the Iranian government and satisfy pro-Israel lobby demands. Although there is in general a consensus within the nezam about Israel’s influence on US Middle East policy, some argue that it is the Zionists who determine the US foreign policy, and not Americans.

The third element shaping the Supreme Leader’s perception of the US is his extreme mistrust of American politics. The documents confiscated by students after seizing the US Embassy seemed to justify such a stance by many high-echelon Iranian politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei. According to those documents, the embassy was involved in espionage and the fostering of covert links to members of the new government and army.

Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei’s sees the American government and the system it represents as addicted to arrogance and hegemony. He feels that if a country is not seen as a “great power,” then a lord–serf relationship is the only kind of relationship that the US is prepared to accept.

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“Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, June 1, 2014.

Articles, Publications

US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity

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The talks between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Iran are moving “very slowly and with difficulty,” Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said May 16 after the conclusion of the latest round of negotiations in Vienna. The next day, lead Iranian negotiator and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “Back from Vienna after tough discussions. Agreement is possible. But illusions need to go. Opportunity shouldn’t be missed again like in 2005.”

A comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers, ending three decades of estrangement, hostility and sanctions, has never been closer, but it would be a tragedy if the current round of talks ended up on the list of missed opportunities between the United States and Iran, as I recount in my new book co-authored with Shahir Shahidsaless, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.”

The current precarious state of affairs cannot be sustained. If no common ground is created between Iran and the United States and the other world powers on the nuclear issue, one of two scenarios with similar outcomes, is likely to occur. As pressures build over time, patience for long diplomatic processes will wane and military confrontation could take the place of diplomacy. Or, as the United States tightens sanctions even further, Iran’s retaliatory actions may lead to an inadvertent or deliberate confrontation. The already crisis-stricken Middle East and the potential for a wider military confrontation should give greater urgency for the opportunity not to be missed this time.

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“US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 26, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward

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Since reaching an interim nuclear deal last November, Iran and the world powers have been attempting to finalize a comprehensive nuclear deal by late July.

The Iranian stance on the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was clearly expressed through a fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Addressing more than 120 heads of state and officials at the 16th Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran on August 30, 2012, he stated: “The Islamic Republic—logically, religiously and theoretically—considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.” Ayatollah Khamenei added that Iran “proposed the idea of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, and we are committed to it.”

Iran has already declared its willingness to secularize that fatwa. Such a move would facilitate and expedite a final nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers. However, the fatwa, with its strong roots in Islamic belief, could also play a constructive role far beyond resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.

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“Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward,” Hossein Mousavian Asharq Al-Awsat, May 10, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty

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The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the sole internationally recognized treaty which has been dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty was recognized in 1970 as an international law. At that time, five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, the UK, Russia, China, and France) were nuclear-powered states. Following the conclusion of the NPT, three more countries, namely, India, Pakistan and North Korea, in addition to Israel developed nuclear weapons as well. These are also the sole countries that have so far refrained from accession to the NPT. At present, 189 countries are member states of this treaty and committed to creating a world free from nuclear weapons. The NPT is based on three major principles: 1. Nuclear disarmament, according to which big powers have been obligated to gradually destroy their arsenals of nuclear weapons; 2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and 3.Commitment of countries to promote peaceful nuclear activities.

Member states of the NPT have committed to hold an NPT review conference every five years in order to review performance of the parties to the treaty with regard to their treaty obligations. As a result, a preparatory committee was set up in New York, which meets every year to discuss the implementation of the treaty and take necessary decisions in this regard. At the moment, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT is underway at the United Nations Office in New York (and will continue until May 9, 2014). An expert delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran is also present at the session.

During the NPT review conference in 2010, an action plan known as the NPT Action Plan was adopted by the participants. The action plan consisted of 64 actions, including 22 actions on the nuclear disarmament and 23 actions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The rest of the plan was focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

A review of reports prepared by specialized international institutions will show that out of the aforesaid 64 actions stipulated in the NPT Action Plan, about 28 actions have been relatively implemented. The implementation of 21 actions has been very poor while the degree of progress on 15 other actions has remained practically at zero. The main point, however, is that most of those 28 actions that have been relatively implemented are related to promoting cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the contrary, those 15 actions, which have not been implemented yet, are all related to nuclear disarmament.

Let’s not forget that the first and foremost goal of the NPT is to create a world free from nuclear weapons. Now, more than 40 years after the treaty entered into force and despite the fact that 15 actions specified by the treaty and agreed upon by international community are related to nuclear disarmament, big powers have still retained more than 20,000 articles of nuclear weapons of which 90 percent is in the possession of the United States and Russia. As a result, the big powers have not only refused to fulfill their obligations with regard to the promotion of nuclear disarmament, but have also modernized their stockpiles of nuclear weapons during the past decades. Without a doubt, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the biggest violators of the NPT while, at the same time, having the highest responsibility for the full implementation of the contents of the treaty.

During the past decade, big global powers have focused all the resources of international community on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program and have imposed the most brutal sanctions against the country in spite of the fact that Iran is a party to the NPT, has no nuclear weapons and, according to frequent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there has been no diversion in its nuclear energy program toward production of nuclear weapons. However, the same powers have been largely indifferent toward possession of nuclear weapons by countries like India, Pakistan and Israel, have taken no steps against them, and have even established strategic relations with them! At the same time, those big powers have never been taken to task for the violation of their obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament.

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“Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, May 7, 2014.

Essays, Publications

Future of US-Iran Relations

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Abstract: The election of Hassan Rouhani has been the start of a new path for Iran’s foreign policy, including its relationship with Washington. This paper discusses three schools of thought prevalent in Iran’s regime towards the US, ranging from those who believe America is addicted to hegemony, to those who believe there is inherent antagonism between Iran’s Islamic system and the West to those who represent a more moderate stance, including current President Hassan Rouhani. The paper concludes that if relations between Iran and the US improve, there will likely be pressure from the US on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its other allies in the region to minimize tension with Iran, particularly in order to solve conflicts in the region from Lebanon to Afghanistan without losing Saudi or Iran as allies.

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“Future of US-Iran Relations,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Dossier: Iran-US Rapprochement: Iran’s Future Role, Published by Al Jazeera, April 2014.

Articles, Publications

Ukraine crisis could strengthen Russia-Iran-China ties

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Tensions between Russia and the West have simmered since Ukraine’s Russian-leaning president, Viktor Yanukovych, was ousted on Feb. 21. The crisis culminated when the Crimean Peninsula’s local government, with 60% of its inhabitants identifying themselves as ethnic Russians, called for a referendum on seceding the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. While observers view the current Ukraine standoff as the gravest post-Cold War between the West and Moscow, the impasse over Iran’s nuclear crisis is also considered the greatest challenge to Iran-West relations.

Iran will remain neutral in this conflict, despite that the crisis in Ukraine may result in a favorable outcome to its future including the standoff with the West over its nuclear program. A senior Iranian official said, “Iran would surely stay out of this dispute [over Ukraine].” However, the crisis in Ukraine could have possible impacts on Russia-Iran relations.

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could result in NATO forces moving closer to Ukraine’s western borders. However, Russia is concerned that its withdrawal from Crimea may result in the West’s crawling of military forces toward the borders of Russia, thus jeopardizing its security and weakening its strategic depth. In the last two decades, Russia and Iran have been carefully watching the United States and NATO expanding their reach eastward by erecting military bases around the borders of the two countries, with near-total disregard for Moscow’s and Tehran’s legitimate security interests. In recent years, under Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule, both states have been resisting Western hegemony, seeking to mend their wounded pride and prestige and attempting to extricate themselves from what they perceived as a lack of international respect and influence. In 2005, Putin said that the fall of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. To give up on Ukraine and allow it to slip out of Russia’s orbit would be a monumental blow to Putin’s efforts for restoring Russia’s position in the international arena.

Since 2006, the United States has successfully amassed consensus among world powers with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the outcome of which were UN sanction resolutions, followed by unilateral US and EU sanctions. Now, a persistent Ukrainian crisis may bring to bear a number of scenarios.

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“Ukraine crisis could strengthen Russia-Iran-China ties,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, March 17, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran

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The world powers are seeking a consensus that allows Iran to retain only a small and indigenousuranium enrichment program.Therefore they want to impose significant physical limits on the heavy water facilities, the number and type of centrifuges, the level of enrichment, the amount of stockpiled enriched uranium and the number of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment facilities — as well as install enhanced monitoring and verification measures.

However, these are demands that go beyond existing international nonproliferation commitments, and Iran is unlikely to accept.

The world powers’ limiting strategy poses a risk of pushing Iran to abandon its agreement with the P5+1, expel the IAEA inspectors, disable the IAEA’s monitoring equipment and ultimately build bombs. The bottom line is, the possibility of military confrontation with Iran is real if negotiators cannot agree on a final deal. Such confrontation could unleash terrible regional and international consequences. The world powers and Iran consider the following four scenarios in order to secure a final deal.

First, making Iran’s fatwa, or edict, operational. Iran is committed to a religious decree issued by the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei that bans the production, stockpiling and use of all weapons of mass destruction. Respecting its rights to peaceful nuclear technology means that Iran would have no reason to leave the NPT. This eliminates fears of an abrupt shutdown of monitoring the country’s nuclear program, because Iran would not withdraw from the NPT. In such eventuality, Iran and the world powers would forgo the limiting issues and discuss only transparency measures in the final deal.

Second, cooperating on a broad range of issues, including Iran’s enormous energy demands and potential. Such engagement and cooperation would remove all anxieties, not least Iran’s security concerns and the world powers’ fear that the Iranian nuclear program will be diverted toward weaponization.

Third, setting a realistic scope on limits to Iran’s nuclear program. Instead of making impossible demands, such as the closure of Iran’s enrichment site in Fordow or heavy water facilities in Arak, Iran and the P5+1 should agree on realistic limits guaranteeing nonproliferation for a specific confidence-building period. This would enable the IAEA enough time to address all technical ambiguities on the Iranian nuclear program.

Finally, considering a comprehensive vision for a nuclear-free Persian Gulf and Middle East. To actualize such a broad agenda, the world powers should first seek an agreement with Iran acceptable to other regional countries and then use the final deal with Iran as a model for the entire region.

Toward that end, the International Panel for Fissile Material, a team of independent nuclear experts from 15 countries, has proposed sensible measures: a ban on the separation or use of plutonium and uranium-233, restrictions on the use of high enriched uranium as a reactor fuel, limitations on uranium enrichment to less than 6 percent and agreement to a just-in-time system of uranium production rather than stockpiling enriched uranium. Both sides should agree to Iran’s adopting these courses of action.

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“Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2014.

 

Articles, Publications

Diplomacy, not sanctions, key to deal with Iran

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As the American Israel Public Affairs Committee holds its annual policy conference, it would do well to remember that the Obama administration’s diplomacy, not sanctions, has yielded better results, according to a former senior Iranian diplomat.

History shows that coercive US policies toward Iran over the past 35 years have not helped the United States neutralize perceived Iranian threats from any angle. On the contrary, those policies have contributed to creating new dimensions of security concerns and the elevation of those American security concerns that prevously existed.

Despite over three decades of this approach toward Iran, today, the country enjoys an unmatched stability and power in the region while Israel is more isolated than ever. Contrary to the escalation of hostilities, on occasions when the United States has adopted conciliatory tones toward Iran, there has been great success in protecting peace and stability in the region.

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“Diplomacy, not sanctions, key to deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, March 3, 2014.