Essays, Publications

Solving the Nuclear Conflict with Iran

Key Points:

  • The breakthrough in the negotiations with regard to the Iranian nuclear program was reached because the parameters of the negotiations have changed. This enabled rapprochement between Iran and the United States. The willingness of the P5+1 to accept limited enrichment and provide sanctions relief was key to securing Iranian consent.
  • A sustainable solution to the nuclear conflict with Iran can be agreed upon only on the basis of the NPT and necessitates an end to the discrimination of Iran compared to other member states. Measures that go beyond the provisions of the NPT can be complied with for a specified period of time as a confidence building measure.
  • A final deal can be reached if US-Iran relations are further improved to guarantee domestic US support for an agreement.

Read Policy Brief

“Solving the Nuclear Conflict with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Korber Policy Brief, No.2. Published by Korber Foundation, December 2013. 

Articles, Publications

Una nueva era nuclear en el golfo Pérsico (Spanish)

El enriquecimiento de uranio ha sido el foco de la disputa sobre el programa nuclear iraní entre este país y las potencias mundiales, especialmente Estados Unidos, desde el año 2003. Irán viene argumentando que el enriquecimiento es su “derecho inalienable” en virtud del Tratado de No Proliferación (TNP) y que detener ese proceso es una “línea roja” que no se puede cruzar. Estados Unidos se ha opuesto a la posición de Irán.

El 24 de noviembre, después de cuatro días de conversaciones maratonianas, Irán y el Grupo 5+1 (los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU más Alemania), firmaron finalmente el acuerdo provisional de Ginebra; debe interpretarse como el preámbulo para una solución integral y a largo plazo. Poco después, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores iraní, Mohamed Javad Zarif, aseguró en una conferencia de prensa, que hay en el acuerdo, en dos ocasiones, “una muy clara referencia sobre el hecho de que el programa de enriquecimiento iraní continuará y será parte de cualquier acuerdo, ahora y en el futuro”. Zarif estaba aludiendo a un texto en el Plan de Acción Conjunto que establece que el acuerdo final implicará “un programa de enriquecimiento definido de mutuo acuerdo, con límites prácticos y medidas de transparencia para garantizar el carácter pacífico del programa”.

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“Una nueva era nuclear en el golfo Pérsico,” Hossein Mousavian, El Pais, December 11, 2013. (Spanish)

Articles, Publications

Iran and the nuclear agreement: Trust but verify

The Joint Plan of Action signed in Geneva represents a serious step toward defusing the longstanding dispute between Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear program. Both sides negotiated seriously and in good faith, overcoming substantial problems while achieving an important agreement.

For the interim agreement to work, however, both sides need to commit unequivocally to fully meeting the obligations on time. There is no room for delays, obfuscation, excuses.

This is not simply a matter of building trust or goodwill. Yes, an interim agreement has been reached, but with 30-plus years of deep distrust and enmity between Iran and the West as the backdrop. There is no sugarcoating the distrust or sense of victimization that pervades this agreement, and the feeling on both sides that the other will not fulfill its obligations or, more bluntly, will cheat.

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“Iran and the nuclear agreement: Trust but verify,” Daniel Kurtzer, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Thomas Pickering, Al-Monitor, December 6, 2013.

Articles, Publications

Iran nuclear deal may be start of new era in Persian Gulf

The Geneva pact was a historic success because both Iran and the United States demonstrated that they have learned pivotal lessons from the past. The nonconciliatory, Cold War stance that they adopted toward each other during the last 34 years benefit the national interests and security of neither state. It is significantly momentous that Iran and the United States, after more than three decades, were able to conduct meaningful negotiations at the highest diplomatic level and bring a complex dispute to a mutually agreeable conclusion aimed at reaching a permanent solution “in less than one year.”

Rather than distancing themselves from the United States by exacerbating their differences with Iran while the United States and Iran are striving to settle theirs, the countries in the region should embrace the move toward a new Middle East. The countries in the region could instead positively respond to Iran’s efforts at rapprochement with the United States, which are paramount in the Rouhani government’s near-term agenda. Detente between Iran and the United States may leave no choice but for this to occur.

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“Iran nuclear deal may be start of new era in Persian Gulf,” Hossein Mousavian and Shahir Shahidsaless, Al-Monitor, December 1, 2013.

Articles, Publications

The committee to save Syria

All parties should support U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s efforts. Geneva 2 talks could be productive if all concerned stakeholders, including Iran, Assad and opposition leaders, are included. The group should call for a genuine cease-fire backed by regional and international powers. Participants must agree on several further principles and goals. First, there must be concerted effort to prevent Syria’s disintegration through measures that mitigate sectarian vengeance. Key government, military and security structures must be retained, while terrorist and extremist elements must be marginalized. All parties to the talks should back robust humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilians. The parties should also consider the establishment of a regional cooperation mechanism to address current and future security challenges. The Syrian conflict has polarized the country; to foster national unity, therefore, there is a need for a forum for national dialogue. Finally, parties to the talks should support a new democracy by holding free and fair elections for the presidency, parliament and a committee to draw a new constitution — administered and supervised by the United Nations.

Geneva 2 offers the prospect of a political solution to the Syrian conflict. But if the talks fail, the Syrian conflict can escalate and spill over across the region. Parties to the talks have a responsibility not to allow that to happen.

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“The committee to save Syria,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera America, November 25, 2013.

Articles, Publications

Beyond Iran’s nuclear deal

In recent years, Western countries have made several foreign policy miscalculations arising from over reliance on simplistic information and rationales, leading to misunderstanding of the other side’s culture and intentions, while also misjudging the readiness of their own citizens to pay with their lives and treasure.

This results in policies that are mismatched with a nation’s ability to respond correctly to the changing environment and circumstances — requiring the active misleading of the public with false and manipulated information.

In the current nuclear crisis with Iran, the West was in danger of repeating some of the same mistakes.

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Read Japanese version

“Beyond Iran’s nuclear deal,” Hossein Mousavian, Kyodo News, November 26, 2013.

Articles, Publications

It was not sanctions that brought Iran to the table

As Iran meets world powers in Geneva today for this month’s second round of talks on its nuclear programme, there is much self-congratulation about the supposed effectiveness of the sanctions after decades of intransigence.

But the idea that it is sanctions that have brought Tehran to the table is wrong. The real cause is the desire of new President Hassan Rouhani to reach a rapprochement with the US, the EU, its neighbours and other world powers, alongside the fact that the US red line has changed from “no enrichment of uranium” to “no nuclear bomb”.

“It was not sanctions that brought Iran to the table,” Hossein Mousavian, Financial Times, November 19, 2013.

Essays, Publications

Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?

This paper presents a comprehensive explanation as to why Iran is not after a nuclear bomb and provides twenty-five reasons to strengthen this position. Examples range from a chronology of Israeli accusations that claim Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; elaborating on the findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors of Iranian nuclear facilities; the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s viewpoint on nuclear weapons; the findings of US and other Western intelligence agency’s regarding the Iran’s nuclear capability; and instances of missed opportunity that have evaded a resolution of the nuclear dossier. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on a framework for diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff and its contribution to the realization of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

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“Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?” Hossein Mousavian, International Studies Journal (ISJ), Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 129-142. Published by the International Studies Journal, November 2013.

Articles, Publications

7 Reasons Iran nuclear deal a win-win for all parties

The negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program held in Geneva, Nov. 7–9, made unprecedented progress toward an agreement. US Secretary of State John Kerry announced at the conclusion of the talks, “We came to Geneva to narrow the differences, and I can tell you without any reservations, we made significant progress. It takes time to build confidence between countries that have really been at odds with each other for a long time now.”

The French position, however, surprised everyone. Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius warned that a rush to an agreement would be a “fool’s game.” Informed sources told Al-Monitor that Britain, China, Germany, Russia, and the United States and Iran had been amenable to signing a draft agreement but that Paris then moved to block the deal. There are 7 reasons to help France, the US Congress, Israel and some of the Arab states rethink their position, which is blocking a win-win deal.

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“7 Reasons Iran nuclear deal a win-win for all parties,” Hossein Mousavian, Al-Monitor, November 9, 2013.

Essays, Publications

Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction

We suggest possible initiatives for fissile material control that could serve as initial steps toward an eventual Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. These initiatives include actions that Israel, the only regional state with nuclear weapons, could take towards nuclear disarmament; and measures of collective restraint regarding fissile material production and use to be taken by all states of the region to foster confidence that their civilian nuclear activities are indeed peaceful in intent and not being pursued as a cover to develop nuclear-weapon options.

For Israel, these initial steps include ending production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, declaring its stockpiles of these materials, and placing increasing portions under international safeguards as steps toward their elimination. The eventual nuclear disarmament of Israel would be a necessary condition for any Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone and for a broader weapon of mass destruction free zone.

The regional measures that we propose would serve to bring a Middle East nuclear- weapon-free zone closer and make the zone more robust when it is in force. These measures include no separation of plutonium, no use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel, and no national enrichment plants. It would greatly strengthen the global nonproliferation regime if these measures were adopted worldwide, including by the nuclear weapon states.

All these measures are worth pursuing in their own rights and states should take initiatives to make progress on them wherever possible. Progress should not be held up by the imposition of linkages, time ordering or sequencing between steps.

Although we do not discuss chemical and biological weapons in this paper, it is critical that all countries in the region ratify and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This has become especially important after the use of chemical weapons in the civil war in Syria in 2013 and Syria’s subsequent decision to accede to the CWC, declare its stockpile and verifiably destroy its chemical weapons. Egypt and Israel should follow suit on the CWC. All three states also should ratify the BWC.

Finally, we propose that discussions be launched on the design of regional verification arrangements strong enough so that all countries in the region can have confidence in the absence of secret nuclear weapon programs. Similar verification arrangements also should be developed to increase confidence in the region that countries are complying with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

Read Report

Read Princeton University Press Release

“Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson and Zia Mian, Research Report No. 11 International Panel on Fissile Materials. Published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013.