After a decade, we are nearing an endgame on Iran’s nuclear file. The initial positive atmosphere during Tehran’s talks with the P5+1 (the five members of the UN security council plus Germany) in Istanbul in April had been lost by the next round of talks in Baghdad, in May.
“Respect is Crucial in Nuclear Talks with Iran,” co-written with Mohammad Ali Shabani, Guardian, June 15, 2012.
The countries that make up the P5+1 (United States, Russia, France, Britain, China and Germany) consider Iran a major threat to non-proliferation and international peace and security. At the same time, these countries, which collectively possess more than 98% of the world’s nuclear weapons, admit that Iran neither possesses a single nuclear bomb nor has made the decision to make one.
“US Should Ease Sanctions, Recognize Iran Enrichment Rights,” Al Monitor, June 14, 2012.
In early 2005 Dr Hassan Rowhani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, told me of the Iranian supreme leader’s position on nuclear enrichment. Ali Khamenei had told him: “I would never abandon the rights of the country as long as I am alive. I would resign if for any reason Iran is deprived of its rights to enrichment, otherwise this may happen after my death.”
“There is an Alternative to the Iran Impasse,” Financial Times, May 22, 2012.
Unfortunately, the newly built trust between Iran and the 5+1 powers is in danger of collapse because of the unreasonable insistence by hawkish politicians and pundits in the West who echo Tel Aviv’s demands that Iran halt all enrichment activities and shut down the underground Fordo facility, even though the I.A.E.A. inspects it regularly.
“Critical Threshold in the Iran Crisis,” co-written with Kaveh Afrasiabi, New York Times, May 12, 2012.
The Obama administration has done more to undermine Iran over the past three years than any U.S. presidency in the 33 years since the Iranian revolution. Under the shadow of a policy of “engagement,” the United States and Israel have led a campaign of economic, cyber, and covert war against Iran. Yet this coercive approach, conducted along with sporadic negotiations on nuclear issues between Iran and the P5+1 group of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States has failed to resolve the future of Iran’s nuclear program.
“Backed Into a Corner,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2012.
Going in, the P5+1 members need to know that war or coercion are not
the only two options. A third, offered by President Obama, seeks to
engage Tehran regarding its nuclear program. This could work – since
2003, Iran has been looking for a viable and durable solution to the
diplomatic standoff.
“Real Solutions to Nuclear Deadlock with Iran,” Boston Globe, March 31, 2012.
The past six U.S. presidents have employed a policy of sanctions, containment and deterrence against Iran. Earlier in his tenure, President Barack Obama tried to change course by offering instead to engage, stressing “diplomacy without preconditions.” Two years later, however, the talk in Washington is of an inevitable coming war.
“How the U.S.-Iran Standoff Looks From Iran,” Bloomberg View, February 16, 2012.
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, two major schools of thought have influenced Iran’s foreign policy toward the United States. The first maintains that Iran and the United States can reach a compromise based on mutual respect, noninterference in domestic affairs, and the advancement of shared interests.
“How to Engage Iran,” Foreign Affairs, February 9, 2012.
In his first year in office, President Barack Obama made unprecedented diplomatic gestures towards Iran, raising hopes that the animosities that have plagued US-Iran relations for the past three decades might be overcome and rapprochement achieved.
“Rules for Successful Engagement with Iran”, Hossein Mousavian, Atlantic Council, August 30, 2011.
