“The Iranian Nuclear Dossier and International Law,” Presentation at the International Law Weekend, October 24, 2014.
Tag: WMD Free Zone
Iran: Assessing New, Emerging Geopolitics in the Middle East
The Middle East has experienced profound changes since the Afghanistan War in 2001, which have brought about the emergence of new actors and new challenges for the region. For the ambassador and researcher at Princeton University, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the international threat represented by the expansion of terrorism in Iraq and Syria has opened a new path of hope in the negotiations on the Teheran nuclear programme, given that it is a sufficient incentive both to forge new alliances and for Iran to reach a security and cooperation agreement with the USA and its allies for stability in the region.
“Iran: Assessing New, Emerging Geopolitics in the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, European Institute of the Mediterranean: IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014. Published by IEMed, November 2014.
The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East
After a decade of failed nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), they have finally fleshed out a temporary agreement that will hopefully restore trust in the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program among all parties. To do so, the temporary agreement must become the basis for renewed discussions on a final deal and the contours of a regional nuclear order in the Middle East. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear nonproliferation, a nuclear weapons−free zone (NWFZ), and a zone free of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.
This article examines the consequences of the breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout. Iran’s main demand includes respecting its rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions, as negotiated in the November 2013 interim agreement between it and the P5+1. Furthermore, a permanent settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities at the regional level, which will enhance nonproliferation efforts. These milestones, which are described in this article, will pave the way toward strengthening the call for concerted efforts to realize a WMDFZ in the Middle East and will help preserve the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in the future.
“The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 529-544. Published by Global Governance, October 2014.
7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity
Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are aiming to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program by Nov. 24. Iranian and US officials have confirmed that progress was made in the extremely complicated nuclear talks in mid-October in Vienna.
The progress achieved to date is unprecedented. US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman said Oct. 23, “We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable. We have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a possible text.” If a deal is not reached, it will mean no limits at all on Iran’s enrichment program and missing the best opportunity in a decade to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.
The following are seven reasons not to be too overly concerned about Iran’s breakout capability.
“7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 4, 2014.
After The Iran Nuclear Deal
Overcoming a decade of failed nuclear negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), in Geneva on November 24, 2013. The agreement put into motion talks to reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation. It could be a significant step toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East.
According to the interim agreement, Tehran “reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.” The comprehensive solution will build on interim steps and aims to resolve the decades-long nuclear dispute between Iran and world powers. It also paves the way for Iran “to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in conformity with its obligations therein.” To ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, the comprehensive agreement seeks to define a mutually agreed enrichment program with stringent transparency and verification mechanisms in place. The implementation of the agreement will be based on a mutually reciprocal, step-by-step process, to result ultimately in the comprehensive lifting of all unilateral, multilateral and UN Security Council sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.
If diplomacy fails and the interim deal reached in November 2013 does not produce a permanent solution, it will ultimately lead to heightened tensions, a possible all-out war, and force Iran to withdraw from the NPT. Now that against all odds, the United States and European Union have made a deal with Iran, skeptics and opponents have started mobilizing again—in both Tehran as well as in many other capitals, including Washington. In Iran, internal opposition to the deal is driven by concerns related to the hostile policies followed during Obama’s first term and by Israel’s continued challenge of Iran’s right to enrich its nuclear stockpile for energy use. In the United States, internal opposition to the deal and concern about Iranian behavior have been reinforced by two of its closest allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The deep uneasiness in those countries is tangible and immediate, for both see Iran as a mortal enemy, bent on Israel’s destruction and regional hegemony.
Finalizing a deal will require compromise by all parties. One of the key challenges will be the likely American insistence that Tehran make concessions far beyond the NPT requirements. Such demands to curb Iran’s nuclear program include dismantling a significant portion of existing centrifuges and low-enriched uranium stockpiles; closure of Fordo, Iran’s second enrichment site near the city of Qom; dismantling of the Arak heavy water research reactor; and intrusive inspections and monitoring that go beyond the NPT and the Additional Protocol. As an NPT member state, Iran would not accept targeted discrimination.
“After The Iran Nuclear Deal,” Cairo Review, Hossein Mousavian. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 6 2014.
Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy
An early version of this article appeared online June 9 because of the high interest in the ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The version below, which also appears in the print edition of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, was updated to reflect minor editorial changes to the previously posted version.
Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014. The goal is to agree on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and thus enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.
A key challenge is to agree how to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for nuclear weapons.
This article proposes a compromise based on a two-stage approach that involves Iran maintaining a capacity for enriching a small amount of uranium annually for research reactor fuel in the short term and developing a potential enrichment capacity in the longer term that would be appropriate to fuel power reactors. Iranian supply needs for its power reactors will develop in 2021 if Tehran decides to fuel the existing Bushehr power reactor domestically, in whole or in part, rather than renewing its fuel supply contract with Russia or buying fuel from another foreign supplier.
The proposed compromise also reflects Tehran’s plan to shift from its current low-power, first-generation centrifuges to high-capacity machines that are still under development.
This article therefore suggests that, during the next five years, Iran should modernize its enrichment facilities and in doing so, keep its operating capacity at about the current level rather than begin to operate the many thousands of first-generation machines that it already has installed and continue setting up more. During this period, Iran could phase out its first-generation machines in favor of the second-generation centrifuges it already has installed but has not yet operated. At the same time, it could develop, produce, and store components for a future generation of centrifuges that would be suitable for commercial-scale deployment. These later-generation centrifuges would not need to be assembled, except for test machines, until at least 2019.
To maintain the confidence of the international community that there will be no diversion of centrifuge components to a secret enrichment plant, the current transparency measures that Iran has undertaken for its centrifuge program would continue. These transparency measures should become the standard for transparency for centrifuge production worldwide.
Finally, the article suggests that the five-year period created by this proposal be used as an opportunity by Iran, the P5+1, and other interested states to explore in a second stage of the negotiations a multinational uranium-enrichment arrangement that would see Iran deploy its advanced centrifuges in a new regional, multinational facility rather than a national enrichment plant. By committing to working on such multinational arrangements for the Middle East and, ultimately, around the world, Iran and the P5+1 could chart a path to greatly reduce the proliferation risks that stem from national control of enrichment plants, regardless of location.
Latest Version:
“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, July/August, 2014.
Older Version:
“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, June 9, 2014.
Huffington Post: Latest Nuclear Talks
“Latest Nuclear Talks,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, Huffington Post, May 23, 2014. (From minute 11:20 onward)
Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward
Since reaching an interim nuclear deal last November, Iran and the world powers have been attempting to finalize a comprehensive nuclear deal by late July.
The Iranian stance on the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was clearly expressed through a fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Addressing more than 120 heads of state and officials at the 16th Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran on August 30, 2012, he stated: “The Islamic Republic—logically, religiously and theoretically—considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.” Ayatollah Khamenei added that Iran “proposed the idea of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, and we are committed to it.”
Iran has already declared its willingness to secularize that fatwa. Such a move would facilitate and expedite a final nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers. However, the fatwa, with its strong roots in Islamic belief, could also play a constructive role far beyond resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.
“Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward,” Hossein Mousavian Asharq Al-Awsat, May 10, 2014.
Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the sole internationally recognized treaty which has been dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty was recognized in 1970 as an international law. At that time, five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, the UK, Russia, China, and France) were nuclear-powered states. Following the conclusion of the NPT, three more countries, namely, India, Pakistan and North Korea, in addition to Israel developed nuclear weapons as well. These are also the sole countries that have so far refrained from accession to the NPT. At present, 189 countries are member states of this treaty and committed to creating a world free from nuclear weapons. The NPT is based on three major principles: 1. Nuclear disarmament, according to which big powers have been obligated to gradually destroy their arsenals of nuclear weapons; 2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and 3.Commitment of countries to promote peaceful nuclear activities.
Member states of the NPT have committed to hold an NPT review conference every five years in order to review performance of the parties to the treaty with regard to their treaty obligations. As a result, a preparatory committee was set up in New York, which meets every year to discuss the implementation of the treaty and take necessary decisions in this regard. At the moment, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT is underway at the United Nations Office in New York (and will continue until May 9, 2014). An expert delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran is also present at the session.
During the NPT review conference in 2010, an action plan known as the NPT Action Plan was adopted by the participants. The action plan consisted of 64 actions, including 22 actions on the nuclear disarmament and 23 actions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The rest of the plan was focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
A review of reports prepared by specialized international institutions will show that out of the aforesaid 64 actions stipulated in the NPT Action Plan, about 28 actions have been relatively implemented. The implementation of 21 actions has been very poor while the degree of progress on 15 other actions has remained practically at zero. The main point, however, is that most of those 28 actions that have been relatively implemented are related to promoting cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the contrary, those 15 actions, which have not been implemented yet, are all related to nuclear disarmament.
Let’s not forget that the first and foremost goal of the NPT is to create a world free from nuclear weapons. Now, more than 40 years after the treaty entered into force and despite the fact that 15 actions specified by the treaty and agreed upon by international community are related to nuclear disarmament, big powers have still retained more than 20,000 articles of nuclear weapons of which 90 percent is in the possession of the United States and Russia. As a result, the big powers have not only refused to fulfill their obligations with regard to the promotion of nuclear disarmament, but have also modernized their stockpiles of nuclear weapons during the past decades. Without a doubt, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the biggest violators of the NPT while, at the same time, having the highest responsibility for the full implementation of the contents of the treaty.
During the past decade, big global powers have focused all the resources of international community on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program and have imposed the most brutal sanctions against the country in spite of the fact that Iran is a party to the NPT, has no nuclear weapons and, according to frequent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there has been no diversion in its nuclear energy program toward production of nuclear weapons. However, the same powers have been largely indifferent toward possession of nuclear weapons by countries like India, Pakistan and Israel, have taken no steps against them, and have even established strategic relations with them! At the same time, those big powers have never been taken to task for the violation of their obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament.
“Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, May 7, 2014.
Fmr. Negotiator: Iran ‘Will Never’ Dismantle Nuke Program
“Fmr. Negotiator: Iran ‘Will Never’ Dismantle Nuke Program,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Adam Kredo, The Washington Free Beacon, February 3, 2014.
