Essays, Publications

America’s Middle East Challenge

The Middle East is in dire need of cooperation on issues of long-term interest to the stability and well-being of the whole region. The Arab Spring has resulted in political instability in many countries, while extremist and terrorist groups have wreaked havoc across the region. It is imperative for Middle Eastern countries to work collaboratively in order to tackle these region-wide challenges.

The United States faces lack of trust from Iran and suspicion from its Arab allies. America’s oil-centered involvement in the Middle East is becoming less strategically important as the United States moves toward becoming the leading exporter of oil and gas. As a result, the Arabs are losing their oil leverage with Washington and are resorting to suicidal strategies to destabilize the region, by funding various extremist groups, in hopes that it would compel America to stay involved.

America’s increased involvement in the Middle East is inevitable as a result of the expansion of ISIS and other terrorist groups. This heightened involvement could result in positive outcomes if it is calculated carefully. The United States should come to the realization that its military might is not capable of bringing about peace in the Middle East. As Chas W. Freeman Jr. argued in his book
America’s Misadventures in the Middle East, “How do we propose to manage the contradiction between our desire to assure the stability of the Persian Gulf and the fact that our presence in it is inherently destabilizing?” However, U.S. military superiority could be applied positively and used to support regional governments to fight terrorism in the region. Washington’s efforts toward a regional cooperation system in the Persian Gulf (akin to that of the European Union) would fill the vacuum caused by an eventual U.S. departure and assuage Arab fears of a resurgent Iran. President Rouhani, in his 2014 address to the UN General Assembly, pointed out, “The right solution to this quandary comes from within the region and regionally provided solutions with international support and not from outside the region.”

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“America’s Middle East Challenge,” Cairo Review, Hossein Mousavian with Mehrdad Saberi. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, April 6 2014.

Articles, Publications

Seventeen points to know about Netanyahu

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s histrionics in the US Congress on March 3 was an implicit effort to overturn US foreign policy and goad Washington into a disastrous war with Iran. Riddled with misinformation and outright conspiracies about Iran’s nuclear programme and Iranian foreign policy, his attempt at undermining the Obama administration has thus far only served to reveal to the world how little he cares for the best interests of the US in the Middle East. “I was near tears during Netanyahu’s speech to Congress — saddened by the insult to the intelligence of the United States as part of the P5 +1 nations,” House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi said after the speech.

The New York Times said of Netanyahu on March 5: “Netanyahu has always been an abrasive and unhelpful figure. In the George H.W. Bush presidency, James Baker was so fed up with Bibi that he banned him from the State Department building.” After Netanyahu’s address to Congress, President Barack Obama also stated that “there was nothing new” presented and that the Israeli PM “didn’t offer any viable alternative” to a peaceful diplomatic settlement with Iran.

The truth is there are many benefits to a US-Iran rapprochement. As US Secretary of State John Kerry has said, Iran and the US have ‘mutual interest’ in fighting Daesh a group that is clearly the biggest threat to international peace and security today. Iran is in fact now a leading force in helping Iraq defend its territorial integrity against the onslaught by the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” terrorist group. A nuclear deal will help the US and the world powers start exploring other possibilities for cooperation with Iran such as in preventing Iraq and Syria from completely falling apart, and even in efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. And these would only be for starters. The US and the world powers should not let Netanyahu to kill this chance.

Here are 17 points to understand about Netanyahu.

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“Seventeen points to know about Netanyahu,” Hossein Mousavian, Gulf News, March 16, 2015.

Essays, Publications

The Iran nuclear dilemma: the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT’s main objectives

Note: “The Iran nuclear dilemma: the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT’s main objectives,” by Hossein Mousavian was published in Harald Müller & Daniel Müller (Eds.). WMD Arms Control in the Middle East: Prospects, Obstacles and Options (pp. 35—42). Published by Ashgate Publishing (02/2015).

The Middle East is a hot spot of proliferation. It contains one state assumed to possess nuclear weapons, several states that tried and failed to develop a military nuclear capability, one state under suspicion of trying to do so, and it is the world region that witnessed the most frequent and severe employment of chemical weapons since the end of World War I. Notwithstanding, not a single arms control regime concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) covers the region as a whole. Instead we have seen several proliferation-related military operations which have rather contributed to destabilization than served non-proliferation. This volume, written under the auspices of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament determines the current state of diplomatic efforts to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East. In doing so, it provides insights into central actors’ conflicting political positions, thereby explaining the stalemate of efforts to negotiate a WMD-free zone. Chapters written by renowned experts from academia and policy-oriented think tanks, as well as by next-generation Middle East and arms control experts, introduce the subject to the reader, give background information about arms control initiatives, provide technical expertise, and endeavour to make proposals for arms control measures in support of the creation of a Middle East WMD-free zone.

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“The Iran nuclear dilemma: the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT’s main objectives,” Hossein Mousavian in Harald Müller & Daniel Müller (Eds.). WMD Arms Control in the Middle East: Prospects, Obstacles and Options (pp. 35—42). Published by Ashgate Publishing (02/2015).

Articles, Publications

Iran ready for a nuclear deal: Column

In January, Iran and major powers ended five days of nuclear talks in Geneva and Paris, including lengthy meetings between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. Negotiators made “limited progress” at nuclear talks, agreed to step up efforts and meet in February.

Every keen observer of the Iranian scene is fully aware that this progress has enjoyed the blessing — and explicit open support— of the Supreme Leader . Tehran has already made good on its resolve to reach a comprehensive, lasting deal.

The onus is now on the other sides on the two sticky points: Iran’s enrichment capacity and the timetable for lifting sanctions. Given that the contract with Russia to provide fuel for the Bushehr power plant expires in 2021, a 5-7 year limit on the current operational centrifuges would enable Iran to produce the needed fuel domestically on time. Will President Obama exhibit the necessary audacity and decide on the Iran’s practical enrichment capacity and lifting of the UN, multilateral and unilateral sanctions before his departure?

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“Iran ready for a nuclear deal: Column,” Hossein Mousavian, USA Today, February 6, 2015.

Lectures

IISS Manama: Regional challenges and their immediate and long-term implications

Comments at the 5th Plenary Session of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue

I think the Muslim powers – like Turkey, like Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, like Iraq, like Iran – can begin to establish a collective regional Islamic package and measure to fight extremism in general. Whether we have Shia extremism or Sunni extremism, whether this is Daesh or whatever it is, this would create a first‑step trust between the regional powers. I really do not support the US interfering in Muslim countries, fighting the Muslim terrorists, or those who call themselves Muslim, because the US is not popular in the Arab world; the image of the US is not good, and this would really give more fuel to the crisis because they would feel this is America, this is Zionism invading Afghanistan, invading Iraq, and they would be able to recruit more. If we have Muslim countries’ forces collectively cooperate to fight these people who are claiming they are Muslim, we would need the US, we would need P5+1’s support and the United Nations support, not military interference.

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Comments at the 4th Plenary Session of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue

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Comments at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue

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Media Exposure: “Analyst urges PGCC member states to engage with Iran,” IRNA, December 7, 2014. Read More

“Regional challenges and their immediate and long-term implications,” Presentation at the 10th IISS Regional Security Summit: The Manama Dialogue, December 5, 2014.

Articles, Publications

How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal

The ninth round of talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group of world powers ended on Tuesday without a breakthrough to seal a deal over Iran’s nuclear programme ahead of a 24 November deadline.

“It would be wrong to speak about any kind of major progress” at the Oman talks, but “there was no setback, no disruption and no deadlock,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency.

Moreover, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, the West was facing a “make-or-break moment” to reach a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.

While the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive package is low, it is still possible for the sides to agree on the general outlines of a nuclear accord before the deadline.

At the moment the key sticking points to a deal are twofold: the need to resolve issues of uranium enrichment capacity, and the timing and pace of the removal of sanctions.

With major progress already achieved in previous rounds of talks, other questions such as limits on enrichment levels, size of uranium stockpiles, and allowing inspections at Iran’s Fordo nuclear plant can be resolved if the two inter-related issues can be worked out.

Three-phase approach

There are ways this can be done. The principle should be that transparency and confidence-building measures by Iran and sanctions relief by the world powers go hand-in-hand and can be adjusted in a reciprocal fashion. This could be achieved through a phased approach:

Phase one

For immediate implementation after a deal is signed. In this phase, Iran should:

  1. Agree to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which includes snap visits by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors – signed but suspended by Iran in 2007
  2. Agree to provisional implementation of the modified Subsidiary Arrangement (Code 3.1) to the IAEA’s Safeguards Agreement – requiring signatory states to report any decisions to build new nuclear facilities but suspended by Iran since 2007
  3. Continue to cap uranium enrichment at 5% as agreed in November 2013
  4. Begin converting the enrichment site at Fordo to an R&D site
  5. Begin technical conversions at the heavy water facility at Arak to limit the production of plutonium, (material which can be used in a nuclear weapon)
  6. Begin addressing the Possible Military Dimension issues (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear programme with the IAEA
  7. Continue not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel at the Arak plant
  8. Begin limiting the current stockpiles of uranium to the level of practical needs
  9. Cap the enrichment capacity at the current operational level of about 9,400 centrifuges and not activate the other 12,000 already installed but not operational

These measures would guarantee the maximum level of Iran’s transparency and no so-called “breakout” capability – ie rush to make a bomb.

In return, the world powers should suspend all unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

Phase two

For implementation over a possible six-month period. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Complete a technical redesign of Arak heavy water facilities which would lower the current capacity of 10kg plutonium production to 1kg per year
  2. Complete conversion of Fordo as an R&D site
  3. Resolve PMD issues with the IAEA
  4. Approve Additional Protocol in the cabinet and submit to Parliament.

In return, the world powers should lift all sanctions imposed by European Union and the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions, while the US unilateral sanctions remain suspended.

Phase three

Phase three, as the final phase, should be completed before the end of President Barack Obama’s term in office. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Ratify the Additional Protocol by Parliament
  2. Approve at Cabinet level the Safeguard Agreement Code 3.1
  3. Commit to cap the level of the enrichment at 5% for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  4. Commit not to reprocess spent fuel at Arak for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  5. Commit to cap the stockpile of uranium at a level that is needed for domestic practical needs a longer period to be agreed by negotiations

‘Maximum transparency’

While Iran does not need to reprocess and enrich beyond 5% for many years, a longer period on these three phases would meet the world powers’ demand for longer duration of confidence-building measures on no “breakout”.

In return, the US should lift all unilateral sanctions suspended in phase one and the UNSC should lift the proliferation sanctions and normalise the Iranian nuclear dossier at the United Nations and the IAEA.

The P5+1 needs assurances of maximum transparency on the Iranian nuclear programme and confidence there will be no “breakout”.

Iran’s two main objectives are respecting its rights for peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and lifting the unilateral and multilateral related sanctions.

This package includes the two key objectives of the world powers and Iran with a realistic timetable and proportionate reciprocations.

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“How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal,” Hossein Mousavian, BBC, November 16, 2014.