The Iranian constitution details the powers of the supreme leader and makes it clear that he plays the key role on foreign and domestic policies. However, his powers are not unlimited. There is a clear division of powers in the Iranian system of government, proper checks and balances, mitigating the influence and concentration of power into the hands of one person or institution.
“Iranian elections remain as relevant as ever,” Hossein Mousavian, Asharq Al-Awsat, June 11, 2013.
The Iranian presidential election is set for June 14, and the candidate selected will take office in August. The world is eager to know the new president’s nuclear policy.
The ongoing Iranian nuclear issue dates back to early 2003, when Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), visited the nuclear facilities at Natanz and officially announced that Iran was among 10 nations that had attained enrichment technology and capability. After that, during the tenures of Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran and the world embarked on two approaches to nuclear diplomacy with varying costs and benefits.
“Iran’s Next President and The Third Nuclear Strategy,” Hossein Mousavian, Al-Monitor, June 10, 2013.
Despite the U.S. plan to withdraw from Afghanistan in late 2014, Washington is likely to maintain a presence of around 10,000 civilian and military personnel. The need to protect the security of those remaining forces requires the United States to engage Afghanistan’s neighbors—including Iran—during the transition.
“Engage with Iran in Afghanistan,” Hossein Mousavian, the National Interest, May 30, 2013.
For Iranians, the election is about the economy first, foreign policy second. The economic challenges include inflation, unemployment and devaluation of the national currency. Inflation is disproportionately hurting the lower and middle classes. While Iran’s Central Bank reports that the inflation rate for 2012 has been 27.4%, Steve Hanke, professor of Applied Economics at The Johns Hopkins University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington estimates that Iran experienced an inflation rate of 110% for the same period. This is quadruple the rate reported by the Central Bank.
“Next Iranian President Faces Economic, Foreign Policy Tests,” Hossein Mousavian, Al-Monitor, May 28, 2013.
The west is eagerly awaiting the results of the upcoming June presidential elections in Iran to determine whom they will be working with in Tehran for the foreseeable future. Certainly the nuclear issue will remain a high priority for world powers and Iran. Over a decade of negotiations with Tehran, world powers have challenged Iran’s legitimate rights for enrichment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), yielding no outcome. The world powers have continued hitting the hammer on the same nail and it is time for a renewed look at the status quo.
“3 factors set to rescue Iran nuclear talks,” Hossein Mousavian, Asharq Al-Awsat, May 19, 2013.
Dopo un decennio di stallo sulla questione nucleare, per trovare una soluzione è necessario avere ben chiare le cause di fondo dell’attuale crisi e l’eredità della storia. Prima della rivoluzione islamica del 1979, i paesi occidentali – e in particolare gli Stati Uniti – mantenevano ottimi rapporti con l’Iran e facevano a gara per aggiudicarsi i redditizi progetti di nuclearizzazione del paese, gettando così le basi per lo sviluppo della sua potenza atomica. In quel periodo, l’Occidente sosteneva che la tecnologia nucleare era di fondamentale importanza per Teheran. Nel 1976, il presidente Gerald Ford firmò una direttiva che consentiva all’Iran di acquisire la tecnologia necessaria a sviluppare un ciclo nucleare completo. Nel documento si legge: “L’introduzione dell’energia nucleare provvederà al crescente fabbisogno energetico dell’economia iraniana e renderà le riserve petrolifere del paese disponibili per l’esportazione o la trasformazione in prodotti petrolchimici”.
“La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato,” Hossein Mousavian, Aspenia, issue no. 60, pgs. 62-70. Published by the Aspen Institute, March 2013, (Italian).
Over a decade of negotiations between Iran and various world powers over Tehran’s nuclear programme have yielded little or no progress. Although all parties seek a peaceful resolution to this quagmire through diplomacy, all the major demands of the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, France and the UK – plus Germany) go beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Safeguard Agreement, the only viable and legitimate international framework for non-proliferation. In 2011, I proposed a peaceful solution based on the 2005 fatwa (religious decree) of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei banning the acquisition, production and use of nuclear weapons, and in 2012 Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi declared Iran’s willingness to transform the fatwa ‘into a legally binding, official document in the UN’, to secularise what many in the West see as a purely religious decree.1 Such a step would provide a sustainable legal and political umbrella for Iran to accept required measures; facilitate transparency and confidence-building measures; and help address doubts in the West about the commitment to the principles expressed in the fatwa in the context of Iran’s system of government, where politics and religion are intertwined.
“Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons,” Hossein Mousavian, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 147-162. Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 8, 2013.
Washington believed that covert action against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be more effective and less risky than an all-out war, which could force Tehran to retaliate across the region and divert its current peaceful nuclear programme toward weaponisation. In fact, Mark Fitzpatrick, former deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation said: “Industrial sabotage is a way to stop the programme, without military action, without fingerprints on the operation, and really, it is ideal, if it works.”
“Ten consequences of US covert war against Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Gulf News, May 11, 2013.
Sanctions, whether unilateral or multilateral, have been the United States’ core policy on Iran since the 1979 revolution. President Barack Obama entered office confirming that he intended to pursue a policy of engagement with Tehran. During his tenure, however, the United States has orchestrated its harshest sanctions to date against Iran.
“Twelve Major Consequences of Sanctions on Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al-Monitor, May 3, 2013.
Statements by the US officials threatening to attack Iran militarily are ineffectual if not counterproductive. On March 3 at the annual AIPAC conference, Vice President Joe Biden threatened military intervention and declared, “We mean it. And let me repeat it: We … mean it.” Biden’s approach was in line with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s message to the same conference asserting that only credible military threat will stop Iran from pursuing its nuclear program.
