“Opposition Group: Iran Testing U.S. with U.N. Nominee,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Paul D. Shinkman, US News, April 18, 2014.
Tag: US-Iran
Future of US-Iran Relations
Abstract: The election of Hassan Rouhani has been the start of a new path for Iran’s foreign policy, including its relationship with Washington. This paper discusses three schools of thought prevalent in Iran’s regime towards the US, ranging from those who believe America is addicted to hegemony, to those who believe there is inherent antagonism between Iran’s Islamic system and the West to those who represent a more moderate stance, including current President Hassan Rouhani. The paper concludes that if relations between Iran and the US improve, there will likely be pressure from the US on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its other allies in the region to minimize tension with Iran, particularly in order to solve conflicts in the region from Lebanon to Afghanistan without losing Saudi or Iran as allies.
“Future of US-Iran Relations,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Dossier: Iran-US Rapprochement: Iran’s Future Role, Published by Al Jazeera, April 2014.
Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran
The world powers are seeking a consensus that allows Iran to retain only a small and indigenousuranium enrichment program.Therefore they want to impose significant physical limits on the heavy water facilities, the number and type of centrifuges, the level of enrichment, the amount of stockpiled enriched uranium and the number of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment facilities — as well as install enhanced monitoring and verification measures.
However, these are demands that go beyond existing international nonproliferation commitments, and Iran is unlikely to accept.
The world powers’ limiting strategy poses a risk of pushing Iran to abandon its agreement with the P5+1, expel the IAEA inspectors, disable the IAEA’s monitoring equipment and ultimately build bombs. The bottom line is, the possibility of military confrontation with Iran is real if negotiators cannot agree on a final deal. Such confrontation could unleash terrible regional and international consequences. The world powers and Iran consider the following four scenarios in order to secure a final deal.
First, making Iran’s fatwa, or edict, operational. Iran is committed to a religious decree issued by the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei that bans the production, stockpiling and use of all weapons of mass destruction. Respecting its rights to peaceful nuclear technology means that Iran would have no reason to leave the NPT. This eliminates fears of an abrupt shutdown of monitoring the country’s nuclear program, because Iran would not withdraw from the NPT. In such eventuality, Iran and the world powers would forgo the limiting issues and discuss only transparency measures in the final deal.
Second, cooperating on a broad range of issues, including Iran’s enormous energy demands and potential. Such engagement and cooperation would remove all anxieties, not least Iran’s security concerns and the world powers’ fear that the Iranian nuclear program will be diverted toward weaponization.
Third, setting a realistic scope on limits to Iran’s nuclear program. Instead of making impossible demands, such as the closure of Iran’s enrichment site in Fordow or heavy water facilities in Arak, Iran and the P5+1 should agree on realistic limits guaranteeing nonproliferation for a specific confidence-building period. This would enable the IAEA enough time to address all technical ambiguities on the Iranian nuclear program.
Finally, considering a comprehensive vision for a nuclear-free Persian Gulf and Middle East. To actualize such a broad agenda, the world powers should first seek an agreement with Iran acceptable to other regional countries and then use the final deal with Iran as a model for the entire region.
Toward that end, the International Panel for Fissile Material, a team of independent nuclear experts from 15 countries, has proposed sensible measures: a ban on the separation or use of plutonium and uranium-233, restrictions on the use of high enriched uranium as a reactor fuel, limitations on uranium enrichment to less than 6 percent and agreement to a just-in-time system of uranium production rather than stockpiling enriched uranium. Both sides should agree to Iran’s adopting these courses of action.
“Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2014.
Fmr. Negotiator: Iran ‘Will Never’ Dismantle Nuke Program
“Fmr. Negotiator: Iran ‘Will Never’ Dismantle Nuke Program,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Adam Kredo, The Washington Free Beacon, February 3, 2014.
Ex-envoy: No ‘dismantling’ to occur on Iran’s N. activities
“Ex-envoy: No ‘dismantling’ to occur on Iran’s N. activities,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, ISNA, February 1, 2014.
Outlines of a Compromise
The world powers and Iran can agree on six principles:
• No nuclear weapon in the Middle East.
• A ban on production of plutonium and reprocessing in the Middle East.
• Stopping the production of highly enriched uranium, with no enrichment beyond five percent in the Middle East.
• No stockpiling beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use.
• Establishment of a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel.
• Regional confidence-building and verification measures by creating a regional authority in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region.
This would be the best path to reach the “comprehensive package” deal on the Iranian nuclear dilemma. The next six months of diplomacy will be decisive and the world powers and Iran should be open to pursuing an agenda of long-term co-operation. Iran’s nuclear deal has the potential to begin controlling fissile material in the Middle East and take meaningful steps toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.
“Outlines of a compromise,” Hossein Mousavian, The Security Times, January 31, 2014.
Negotiating Team Did Not Cross Red Lines
Excerpts of an exclusive interview with Hossein Mousavian, a former senior member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team.
More than ten years have passed since the beginning of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West. This dossier, which had once become the most controversial file in the IAEA because of certain technical and legal questions, was gradually transformed into a political affair following its referral from the IAEA Board of Governors to the UN Security Council and this prepared the ground for the presence of new players. On November 24th 2013, a document was finally signed between Iran and the P5+1 as a Joint Plan of Action, giving the two sides six months to maneuver in the first step. During this decade of negotiations, the Iranian nuclear dossier has experienced the presence of numerous experts and diplomats with various political views. Iranian Diplomacy recently spoke with Hossein Mousavian, a former senior member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, about the recent Geneva agreement and the future of the nuclear talks and Iran’s relations with the West, the US, and with countries of the Persian Gulf region. Mr. Mousavian, who is Princeton University, was Iran’s Ambassador to Germany from 1990-1997 and headed the Foreign Relations Committee of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran during the eight years of Mohammad Khatami’s presidency.
What is your assessment of the signing of the Joint Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 after many years of ups and downs in negotiations?
In a realistic view of this agreement, I must say that this agreement is neither desirable and ideal for the Iranian negotiating team nor desirable and ideal for the P5+1 negotiators. Neither of the parties has reached its maximum demands by signing this agreement. But considering the conditions or the situation of the nuclear dossier, I believe that neither the Iranian side nor the other party was able to achieve more than they did. The most important challenge and difference of opinion which exists in this agreement is, in fact, the response to the question of whether Iran’s enrichment program has been recognized or not? John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, stated in an interview that we have not recognized this right but the Iranian party reiterates that this right has been recognized. The critics of this agreement in Iran and the US maneuver over this issue. I believe that in order to understand the issue of uranium enrichment in Iran, we must study 40 years of US policy with regard to enrichment. Following the adoption of the NPT in the late 1960s and its implementation in the early 1970s, the US has never, up until now, officially recognized enrichment in any country.
The second issue is that the US believes that if Iran’s enrichment is recognized, then there will be an international competition over this issue at the global level which would spread the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the US has pursued a dual policy, meaning that it has explicitly and practically accepted enrichment in countries which it trusts like Germany and Japan. Unfortunately this issue has not been well-comprehended inside the country. The fact is that the non-recognition of the right to enrichment by the US is not only implemented for Iran but that it is rather a general and 40-year long policy of the US administration.
“Negotiating Team Did Not Cross Red Lines,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Sara Massoumi, Iranian Diplomacy, January 30, 2014.
Empire – Iran and the US: Diplomatic Enrichment
“Empire – Iran and the US: Diplomatic Enrichment,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Marwan Bishara, Al-Jazeera English, January 1, 2014.
Irán y EE.UU. pueden cooperar para evitar la desintegración de Siria
“Irán y EE.UU. pueden cooperar para evitar la desintegración de Siria,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Marina Meseguer Torres, January 5, 2014. (Spanish)
Diplomat Back in Iran After Exile in the US
One of Iran’s most prominent former diplomats, an ally of President Hassan Rouhani, has returned to the country, ending his unofficial exile in the United States, state news media reported on Tuesday.
The former diplomat, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who for many years was the spokesman of Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, left Tehran for Princeton University in 2009 after hard-liners accused him of espionage during earlier rounds of nuclear talks with European powers.
“I have returned to Iran to stay,” he was quoted as saying by the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, during a commemorative event for the death of the mother of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.
At Princeton, where Mr. Mousavian was a research scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security, he also acted as an unofficial Iranian government representative, answering queries or commenting for international news media about the nuclear program and the prospects for improved relations between Iran and the United States. It is unclear whether he also met with representatives of the United States government.
“Diplomat Back in Iran After Exile in the US,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Thomas Erdbrink, New York Times, December 31, 2013.
