Tag: US-Iran

Articles, Publications

US and Iran security cooperation could help save Iraq

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While the highest US officials, including Obama, call the rise of terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq a threat to US national security, this deep mutual security concern can form the pillar of cooperation between Iran and the United States. Together, they face terrorists who not only have claimed territory but also obtained hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from the central bank of Mosul.

Tehran and Washington’s common interests on managing the current crisis in Iraq include:

  1. Preventing an all-out sectarian war.
  2. Opposing the collapse of the post-Saddam Hussein political system in Iraq.
  3. Securing the safe passage of oil from the Persian Gulf region.
  4. Preventing the breakup of the state system in the Middle East.
  5. Avoiding further US military involvement in the Persian Gulf.
  6. Keeping oil resources out of the hands of terrorists.
  7. Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq.
  8. Forming a more inclusive government to avoid sectarian violence and shape unity against terrorists and insurgents.

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“US and Iran security cooperation could help save Iraq,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, July 10, 2014.

Interviews

Inside view of Iran, Iraq, & US relationship (Video)

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To understand the questions of the present, we have to look to the answers of the past. U.S. relations with Iran carry a long and complex narrative that is overflowing from decades before.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian served in Iran’s Foreign Ministry, was an advisor for their national security council, and worked with current Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. His extensive knowledge of the area and their foreign relations with the U.S. led to his latest work, Iran and the United States: An insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.

MSNBC sat down with the ambassador to discuss the path for a peaceful relationship between the superpowers.

Watch Part 1

Watch Part 2

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“Inside view of Iran, Iraq, & US relationship,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Krystal Ball, MSNBC, June 25, 2014. (Video)

Articles, Publications

How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, exclusively sent to Iran Review.Org by Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 could have opened a new chapter in Iran–US relations. Iran was among the first countries to denounce the 9/11 Twin Tower terror attacks in New York. Immediately following the condemnation, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of Iran actively began to work within the new paradigm that was created by the September 11 terrorist attack and the subsequent US declaration of a “war on terror.” We were also concerned with the extremist Salafis and the Taliban, whose ideologies we viewed as hostile towards Shia Iran and also dangerous to the broader region.

During a fall 2012 conference in Berlin, James Dobbins told me that Hamid Karzai was the United States’ favored candidate to lead the new Afghan government. “Iranians also supported us,” Dobbins said.

Dobbins highlighted the role of Javad Zarif in the success of the Bonn Conference and the establishment of the new Afghan government. According to a report by Michael Hirsh, in an interview Dobbins,“pointed out that Karzai was a Pashtun from the south, like the majority of the Afghan population.” Tajiks from the Northern Alliance, historically rivals to the Pashtuns, led by Yunus Qanooni, tenaciously demanded the majority share in the new government “since they were the people that had captured Kabul according to Dobbins.” Dobbins  says “that by 4.00 a.m., they had reached a very critical moment. Nobody was able to change Qanooni’s mind. Zarif finally and authoritatively whispered in Qanooni’s ear that, ‘This is the best deal you can get.’ And Qanooni said, ‘OK.’”

Even after the creation of a new Afghan government at the Bonn Conference, talks continued. But suddenly, there came a veritable bombshell. President Bush, only a few weeks after the Bonn Conference, stunned us by including Iran in the “axis of evil” during his January 2002 State of the Union address. Talks continued but the Iranians’appetite for cooperation was diminished. Every person involved, from Khatami down, had the same feeling—betrayed! The word namaknashnas (a person one feeds, and later expresses betrayal rather than appreciation) was the word frequently used to characterize George Bush’s behavior.

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“How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, June 24, 2014.

Lectures

Asia Society: Iran and the US: Where Things Stand (Video)

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Ambassador Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian diplomat and nuclear negotiator, and Gary Sick, Iran expert and former National Security Council member, explore root causes of the misperceptions Iranians and Americans have of each other and the missed opportunities for dialogue over several decades. Hamid Biglari moderates the discussion.

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“Iran and the US: Where Things Stand,” Presentation at the Asia Society, June 3, 2014. (Video)

Lectures

Atlantic Council: Toward Better US-Iran Relations (Video)

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Lessons can be learned from 30 years of mistrust, misperception, and misconception that has persisted between the United States and Iran. While rapprochement is far from inevitable, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author, outlined the path to success for current negotiations while speaking at a South Asia Center panel. Mousavian argued that, rather than focusing on the nuclear dimension alone, the United States and Iran must complement negotiations with extensive unilateral dialogue on all outstanding issues, including human rights, terrorism, and regional cooperation. However, the underlying key to rapprochement is simply “to reciprocate goodwill with goodwill.” Fellow panelistJohn Marks, founder and president of Search for Common Ground, urged the need for significant people-to-people diplomacy for the two nations to reconcile with the past and enable alternative solutions. “To pursue a better future, we must face the past—understanding differences & acting on commonalities.”

“Without Iran, you would have never dismantled Syria’s chemical weapons,” said Mousavian, citing an example of how the United States and Iran can cooperate at the highest levels to solve the most challenging regional issues of the day. Emphasizing Iran’s role as a predominant regional actor and the United States’ role as a preeminent international actor, both nations ought to make up for the multitude of missed opportunities –most notably the lack of cooperation in Afghanistan. Mousavian emphatically endorsed the idea that Iranian Americans are a unique asset capable of shifting the tide in favor of rapprochement due to their ethnic links to Iran and cultural affinity to both nations. Alternatively, Marks suggests that the best way to eradicate, if not reduce, the fog of misperception is via “the exchange of technical expertise and scientific insights that can promote alternative solutions.”

Both speakers agreed that the two states stand on the brink of progress on the nuclear conflict. Peace on this issue alone, however, would be temporary and unstable if other sources of mistrust are ignored. For that reason, any resolution on the nuclear front “should be regarded as the foundation for greater cooperation or a grand bargain between the two states.” The Iranian-American relationship does not have to be a zero-sum game. “Peace between Iran as a regional power and the United States as a global power could lead to the creation of a framework for cooperation that would bring stability to the Middle East, from Lebanon in the west to Afghanistan in the east.”

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Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014. 

Event Coverage: “Toward Better US-Iran Relations,” Derek Davison, LobeLog, June 4, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014. (Video)

Lectures

Atlantic Council: U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future

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On Tuesday June 3, 2014, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted a conversation called “U.S.- Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future.” The discussion featured Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, and John Marks, President and Founder of Search for Common Ground. The conversation was moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Seyyed Hossein Mousavian began by separating the history of U.S.-Iran relations into three periods. The first period, between 1856 and 1953, was characterized by cordial relations between the two countries, where the U.S. supported Iranian independence and democracy. The second period, from 1953 to 1979, saw relations start to sour beginning with the American supported coup toppling democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. Mousavian calls this period the “dominant era,” a time where the American-backed Shah ruled as a dictator. The third and final period, from 1979 to present day, began with the Islamic Revolution that deposed the Shah. Mousavian said this era represented the “most hostile type of relations” between two countries, surpassing even U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

The question Mousavian posed was: why? Having spent time in both Iran and the U.S., Mousavian suggests that foreign policy experts in the U.S. and Iran are disconnected from one another and thus misunderstand each other. Despite the hostilities, Mousavian argues that every Iranian administration has approached the U.S. with a desire to normalize relations, but all efforts have failed. The objective now is to look to the future as Mousavian believes the current state of affairs between the U.S. and Iran cannot be maintained. In a Middle East region that is “on fire,” U.S.-Iran cooperation is necessary. Mousavian proposes that comprehensive negotiations should cover a range of issues, instead of the routine “piecemeal approaches.” Within this discussion, the U.S. must not insist on the nuclear issue being paramount, and must be willing to discuss other issues. Mousavian thinks rapprochement should begin with areas of common interest; the U.S., he argues, mistakenly tends to focus on issues of disagreement. After all, he recalls, Henry Kissinger once said that the U.S. and Iran have more common interests than any other two countries. Areas of mutual interest include stopping organized crime and drug trafficking, to supporting governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When inevitably the differences do arise, both countries must approach the areas of contention with flexibility. Finally, Mousavian believes American and Iranian politicians must recognize and apologize for past grievances that have polarized the countries from one another; otherwise, the relationship will be unable to move forward.

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Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless.

Part (1): Four major, interrelated elements shape Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the US

Page: 161

First, he wholeheartedly believes that regardless of all the ups and downs, pushes and pulls between Iran and the US, Washington’s ultimate intention is to topple Iran’s Islamic system and subordinate them within a Pax Americana, as it did during the Shah’s era after the 1953 coup. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains that the US, no matter which school of thought and party is in power or which president has taken office, intends to “wipe out the Islamic Republic”with all possible means at its disposal. The conclusion he draws from US rhetoric, policies, and behavior is that the US will not relent from its desire for regime change unless the current government surrenders its principles, religious beliefs, political structure, and independence. The United States’ tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and provision of material support, its covert operations, support for belligerent groups and the Islamic Republic’s opposition (including a budgetary provision), its denial of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment under the NPT, and its intrusive and paralyzing economic sanctions are all viewed by Ayatollah Khamenei as indisputable attempts to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. He maintains that the US’s primary objective is to undermine the Islamic government by fostering internal disorder and, ultimately, regime change.

The second element that shapes Ayatollah Khamenei’s disposition towards the US is his firm belief that US foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically regarding Iran, is overwhelmingly dominated by the pro-Israel lobby. From his point of view, even the president of the United States does not have any authority over US foreign policy. He is surprised that year after year, the president or other high-level officials of the most powerful country on earth attend American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) gatherings and report what they have done to undermine the Iranian government and satisfy pro-Israel lobby demands. Although there is in general a consensus within the nezam about Israel’s influence on US Middle East policy, some argue that it is the Zionists who determine the US foreign policy, and not Americans.

The third element shaping the Supreme Leader’s perception of the US is his extreme mistrust of American politics. The documents confiscated by students after seizing the US Embassy seemed to justify such a stance by many high-echelon Iranian politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei. According to those documents, the embassy was involved in espionage and the fostering of covert links to members of the new government and army.

Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei’s sees the American government and the system it represents as addicted to arrogance and hegemony. He feels that if a country is not seen as a “great power,” then a lord–serf relationship is the only kind of relationship that the US is prepared to accept.

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“Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, June 1, 2014.

Interviews

Book by former Iran official looks at Quds Force leader, Saudi king

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For the last few years, Al-Monitor’s Seyed Hossein Mousavian has been among the most prolific Iranian writers in the United States promoting US-Iran reconciliation and trying to explain his complicated and often maligned country to American audiences.

In a new book, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” Mousavian continues this mission while revealing new details of fruitless overtures by Iranian leaders to ease hostilities over the past two decades.

For students of this bitter history, the book — co-authored by Shahir ShahidSaless, a political analyst and freelance journalist who, like Mousavian, is also an Al-Monitor contributor — is most interesting for its vignettes and quotes from senior Iranian officials at crucial moments in US-Iran relations.

While “The road to peace between Iran and the US is truly a bumpy one,” détente, if not reconciliation, is not impossible, he writes. “I am confident that the dominant viewpoint inside [the system], including that of the supreme leader, is to end the hostilities with the US based on mutual respect, noninterference and mutual interest.”

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“Book by former Iran official looks at Quds Force leader, Saudi king,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Barbara Slavin, Al-Monitor, May 19, 2014.