“International Roles in Middle East Policies,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Raghida Dergham, Huffington Post, October 23, 2014.
Tag: Peaceful Settlement
Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution
During three decades, the United States exercised all measures, short of military intervention, to bring about regime change in Iran. For reasons that I have discussed in depth and extensively in my newly published book, “Iran and The United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” all efforts have failed and contrary to expectations today, Iran is the most stable and powerful country in the region.
The current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for the United States to revisit its three decades of failed policies toward Iran. Just recently, US Vice-President Joe Biden accused America’s key allies in the Middle East of allowing the rise of the Islamic State by supporting extremists with money and weapons to oust the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria.
Interestingly, Iran’s nuclear issue, which has become the Gordian knot in US-Iran relations, can, if resolved, be transformed to a springboard for strategic cooperation between the two states for the restoration of security and stability in the region.
To reach the final deal by Nov. 24, Iran and the EU3 negotiators have already been able to address three key areas of dispute: the future of the Arak heavy water reactor, the future of the Fordo enrichment plant and the issue of more expanded access to Iran’s nuclear-related facilities for International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. The support of the US Congress would be instrumental to the success of Iran’s nuclear negotiations to resolve the remaining disputed cases by Nov. 24, ending decades of animosity between Washington and Tehran and opening doors on an overdue cooperation aimed at combating the rise of terrorists and the emergence of the caliphate of terror.
“Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, October 14, 2014.
Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set
An understanding of the critical role and mind-set of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is essential for anyone wishing to assess the prospects of a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. It is important to note that the aims and policy choices espoused by the Supreme Leader have to be understood within the context of the immediate political circumstances at the time of his appointment as Supreme Leader and the evolution of global geopolitics since the end of the Cold War. Under the rule of the Shah of Iran, throughout most of the Cold War period, Iran’s role had been that of a client state under Western (U. S. ) hegemony. In fact, this had been Iran’s position in the world order for most of the last two centuries. This subservience was caused by its dependence on the rising Imperial powers of Great Britain and Russia and later the United States.
“Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set,” Hossein Mousavian in A. Maleki & J. Tirman (Eds.). U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue (pp. 37–56). Published by Bloomsbury Academic (10/2014).
Iran: Towards an Endgame? (Video)
Seyed Hossein Mousavian’s remarks at the 11th IISS Global Strategic Review with other panelists including: Professor Ghassan Salamé, Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs and Dr Gary Samore, the Former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Video (From minute 03:55 onward)
Iran: Towards an Endgame?
After a decade of failed nuclear talks, the EU3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action, on November 24, 2013. Iran and the Eu3+3 negotiators have made good progress towards a comprehensive deal, addressing some key issues such as the future of the Arak heavy-water reactor, the Fordo enrichment plant and increased access in Iran for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.
However, they could not yet agree on a comprehensive nuclear deal. As a result, the talks were extended through November 24, 2014 and while both sides pledged to continue complying with the conditions of the interim deal. A final deal must reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.
As the negotiators resume their talks over Iran’s nuclear program in New York, the world powers and Iran face a difficult task to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal within the next three months.
The most difficult remaining issues are how to define the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment program and a realistic timetable for sanctions removal.
The key elements of a comprehensive deal would be the followings:
1) Concerns related to the Heavy Water Reactor at Arak would be alleviated by technical conversion to reduce its capacity to produce plutonium from 10Kg to 1Kg per year. Moreover, Iran would make a long-term commitment to refrain from constructing a facility capable of recovering plutonium from the spent fuel.
2) Iran would accept convert Fordo into an R&D site for its centrifuges and other peaceful nuclear technologies.
3) Tehran would commit to fully implement the agreed upon transparency measures and enhanced monitoring, including ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol.
4) To define the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment program in consistent with its civilian practical needs, a resolution would involve:
• Limiting Iran’s enrichment level to below 5% and
• Tailoring its enrichment capacity to the practical needs of its civilian nuclear activities.
A possible compromise on the enrichment capacity could entail a phased approach as follows:
First, for a period to be agreed, Iran would maintain a capacity sufficient for enriching uranium for research reactor fuel.
Finally, Iran would keep its operating enrichment capacity at about the current level but would begin to phase out its first-generation of centrifuges machines in favor of more advanced, higher-capacity centrifuges which would make its enrichment program more cost effective.
These measures would create a window of 7 to 10 years period for confidence building, which in combination with intrusive inspections and monitoring, will ensure that Iran can verifiably maintain a peaceful nuclear program with a prolonged timeframe for a possible breakout.
5) Iran would receive international cooperation on its civil nuclear program.
6) The world powers would remove all nuclear related unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran.
7) Upon the implementation of the final step of the comprehensive agreement, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated the same of that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.
The Regional Implications of a nuclear Deal
Resolving the Iranian nuclear issue would be a success for both Iran and the world powers, and it could then serve as the basis for a broader agenda for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. With a broader vision, the world powers and Iran can agree on for the Middle East based on six principles:
1) No nuclear weapon in the Middle East
2) Ban on reprocessing, i.e. the separation of plutonium in the Middle East
3) No enrichment of uranium beyond 5% in the Middle East
4) No stockpile beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use
5) Establish a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel and,
6) Implement regional confidence building and verification measure on WMD non-proliferation by creating a regional authority like Euratom or the Argentine-Brazilian mutual inspection arrangements in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region.
Need for broader US-Iran engagement
The Iran nuclear issue is political in nature as illustrated by the exaggerated debate over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The fact is that the nuclear issue has been aggravated by Iran-US hostilities and, as long as this animosity continues, negotiations on nuclear issues alone will not lead to peace between Iran and the US.
Peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis could, however, open the door for broad dialogue and engagement between Iran and the US. The present policy of nuclear engagement will fail if neither Washington nor Tehran has a grand strategy for broad engagement.
A “Comprehensive Solution Package” for these two different dimensions of the US-Iran problem and the nuclear issue, is essential.
To reach a long lasting solution on the nuclear case, we need to contextualize the nuclear and other issues within a bilateral, regional, and international framework, recognizing the need to negotiate on other major differences between Tehran and Washington while simultaneously cooperating on issues of common interest.
Iran and the US have common interests in the “War on Terror” and peace and stability in the region. Whether they like it or not they are natural allies in Afghanistan because both capitals are seeking peace and stability in Afghanistan coupled with the safe exit of American troops at the end of 2014.
During 2001, under President Khatami, Iran and the US cooperated to overthrow the Taliban and successfully facilitated the formation of a national unity government in December 2001 through Iran’s involvement in the UN-sponsored talks in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Iran and the US are natural allies in Iraq and both have backed the previous and the current governments in Baghdad. Iran and the US indirect cooperation made the possible the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime in 2003.
They both oppose the efforts by the intolerable and uncontrollable fundamentalists of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or Daesh to dismantle Syria and Iraq and further divide the region along sectarian lines.
The deep-rooted mistrust between the US and Iran is a major obstacle to direct cooperation in fighting mutual enemies, making it impossible, for example for Iran’s Quds Force and the US CENTCOM to partner in the war against ISIS.
This animosity is why both sides have had to coordinate their respective moves indirectly. The recent fight over Amerli in eastern Iraq has been one of the most important battles against ISIS—where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force alongside with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters supported the ground attacks, while the US handled the airstrike resulting in defending this strategically located town.
President Obama in his address to the nation on the fight against ISIS said that American military power is unmatched, but he also confessed that it requires a broad coalition to “eradicate a cancer like ISIS.”
The fact is that without Iran’s active participation and cooperation, Washington’s international coalition against ISIS will fail for the same reasons it did after the 2001 war on terror against Al Qaeda and the 2011 international coalition on Syria.
Without Iran, no regional or international coalition aimed at addressing major crises in the Middle East would be successful. It is therefore time for the US, the world powers and the regional actors to engage with Iran and accept Iran’s regional power and influence.
The need for a transformation in IranUS broad dialogue from one side and Iran and the regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and GCC from the otherside,is no longer an option but an urgent necessity to halt and reverse the current trajectory towards further sectarianism, extremism and terrorism spreading throughout the region.
In fact, the current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for US-Iran and Iran-Regional countries to cooperate and to restore peace and stability from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean region and to the borders of India.
Despite the historical mistrust, the two administrations have been engaged in genuine and serious negotiations on the nuclear issue and such direct engagement has proved vital to reach the current unprecedented outcome.
The achievement thus far in the nuclear negotiations is an indication of what these two sides can attain by engaging directly and more broadly to tackle urgent regional developments.
“Iran: Towards an Endgame?” Presentation at the 11th IISS Global Strategic Review, September 20, 2014.
An Insider’s View to the Failed Iran-U.S. Relationship (Audio)
“An Insider’s View to the Failed Iran-U.S. Relationship,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Brian Lehrer, All Things Considered [WNYC Radio], July 21, 2014. (Audio)
Iran’s Nuclear Program: What’s at Stake as the Deadline Nears (Audio)
“Iran’s Nuclear Program: What’s at Stake as the Deadline Nears,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, John Hockenberry, The Take Away [WNYC Radio], July 16, 2014. (Audio)
Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace (Video)
From Iraq to Syria, from energy to counterterrorism, Iran and the United States share many common interests across the Middle East and ought to put aside their decades of hostility, said author and former Iranian diplomat Seyed Hossein Mousavian.
Speaking at an IPI Distinguished Author Series event on June 25th featuring his book Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, Mr. Mousavian said that both countries are to blame for their failure to reach a rapprochement after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but that today’s challenges in the Middle East are a unique opportunity for mending relations.
Mr. Mousavian said that in his book he had tried to explain the Iranian perspective of the relationship, a view that he said has so far been overlooked by the predominantly Western approach to US-Iran relations.
“Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” Presentation at the International Peace Institute (IPI), June 25, 2014.
Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy
An early version of this article appeared online June 9 because of the high interest in the ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The version below, which also appears in the print edition of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, was updated to reflect minor editorial changes to the previously posted version.
Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014. The goal is to agree on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and thus enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.
A key challenge is to agree how to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for nuclear weapons.
This article proposes a compromise based on a two-stage approach that involves Iran maintaining a capacity for enriching a small amount of uranium annually for research reactor fuel in the short term and developing a potential enrichment capacity in the longer term that would be appropriate to fuel power reactors. Iranian supply needs for its power reactors will develop in 2021 if Tehran decides to fuel the existing Bushehr power reactor domestically, in whole or in part, rather than renewing its fuel supply contract with Russia or buying fuel from another foreign supplier.
The proposed compromise also reflects Tehran’s plan to shift from its current low-power, first-generation centrifuges to high-capacity machines that are still under development.
This article therefore suggests that, during the next five years, Iran should modernize its enrichment facilities and in doing so, keep its operating capacity at about the current level rather than begin to operate the many thousands of first-generation machines that it already has installed and continue setting up more. During this period, Iran could phase out its first-generation machines in favor of the second-generation centrifuges it already has installed but has not yet operated. At the same time, it could develop, produce, and store components for a future generation of centrifuges that would be suitable for commercial-scale deployment. These later-generation centrifuges would not need to be assembled, except for test machines, until at least 2019.
To maintain the confidence of the international community that there will be no diversion of centrifuge components to a secret enrichment plant, the current transparency measures that Iran has undertaken for its centrifuge program would continue. These transparency measures should become the standard for transparency for centrifuge production worldwide.
Finally, the article suggests that the five-year period created by this proposal be used as an opportunity by Iran, the P5+1, and other interested states to explore in a second stage of the negotiations a multinational uranium-enrichment arrangement that would see Iran deploy its advanced centrifuges in a new regional, multinational facility rather than a national enrichment plant. By committing to working on such multinational arrangements for the Middle East and, ultimately, around the world, Iran and the P5+1 could chart a path to greatly reduce the proliferation risks that stem from national control of enrichment plants, regardless of location.
Latest Version:
“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, July/August, 2014.
Older Version:
“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, June 9, 2014.
Asia Society: Iran and the US: Where Things Stand (Video)
Ambassador Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian diplomat and nuclear negotiator, and Gary Sick, Iran expert and former National Security Council member, explore root causes of the misperceptions Iranians and Americans have of each other and the missed opportunities for dialogue over several decades. Hamid Biglari moderates the discussion.
“Iran and the US: Where Things Stand,” Presentation at the Asia Society, June 3, 2014. (Video)
Atlantic Council: U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future
On Tuesday June 3, 2014, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted a conversation called “U.S.- Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future.” The discussion featured Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, and John Marks, President and Founder of Search for Common Ground. The conversation was moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.
Seyyed Hossein Mousavian began by separating the history of U.S.-Iran relations into three periods. The first period, between 1856 and 1953, was characterized by cordial relations between the two countries, where the U.S. supported Iranian independence and democracy. The second period, from 1953 to 1979, saw relations start to sour beginning with the American supported coup toppling democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. Mousavian calls this period the “dominant era,” a time where the American-backed Shah ruled as a dictator. The third and final period, from 1979 to present day, began with the Islamic Revolution that deposed the Shah. Mousavian said this era represented the “most hostile type of relations” between two countries, surpassing even U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.
The question Mousavian posed was: why? Having spent time in both Iran and the U.S., Mousavian suggests that foreign policy experts in the U.S. and Iran are disconnected from one another and thus misunderstand each other. Despite the hostilities, Mousavian argues that every Iranian administration has approached the U.S. with a desire to normalize relations, but all efforts have failed. The objective now is to look to the future as Mousavian believes the current state of affairs between the U.S. and Iran cannot be maintained. In a Middle East region that is “on fire,” U.S.-Iran cooperation is necessary. Mousavian proposes that comprehensive negotiations should cover a range of issues, instead of the routine “piecemeal approaches.” Within this discussion, the U.S. must not insist on the nuclear issue being paramount, and must be willing to discuss other issues. Mousavian thinks rapprochement should begin with areas of common interest; the U.S., he argues, mistakenly tends to focus on issues of disagreement. After all, he recalls, Henry Kissinger once said that the U.S. and Iran have more common interests than any other two countries. Areas of mutual interest include stopping organized crime and drug trafficking, to supporting governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When inevitably the differences do arise, both countries must approach the areas of contention with flexibility. Finally, Mousavian believes American and Iranian politicians must recognize and apologize for past grievances that have polarized the countries from one another; otherwise, the relationship will be unable to move forward.
Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014.
“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014.
