“Time Running Out for Iran Nuclear Deal,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, John Hockenberry, Public Radio International, June 29, 2015.
Tag: P5+1
Too much at stake to walk away from Iran talks
“Too much at stake to walk away from Iran talks,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Michael Knigge, Deutsche Welle, June 29, 2015.
Iran & the US: The Way Forward
Ambassador Mousavian presented a speech to approximately 380 US military personnel, including colonels, at the US Army War College on June 18, 2015. In his speech, he discusses the following:
- Iran’s major national security threats and priorities
- 19 reasons why Iran distrusts the US
- The the origins of the Iranian nuclear program and current status of Iran’s nuclear talks
- 10 suggestions as a way forward for better US-Iran relations
“Iran & the US: The Way Forward,” The US Army War College, June 18, 2015.
Why doesn’t Iran trust the US?
Top-ranking diplomats from Iran and the world powers are currently engaging in intensive talks to narrow their differences and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by July 1. The main obstacle to attaining such an agreement is the fundamental lack of trust that exists between the two sides. If there was trust, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would have been enough to quell any concerns regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Currently, all sticking points are related to measures beyond the NPT. The sustainable solution is for both sides to take confidence-building measures to ease the suspicions they have of each other. While US qualms with Iran are well known in the West, it is vital for the US public to gain a better understanding of the reasons for Iranian antipathy toward the US government.
“Why doesn’t Iran trust the US?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, June 23, 2015.
The chance for failure of nuclear talks is low: Mousavian
“The chance for failure of nuclear talks is low: Mousavian,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Tehran Times, June 7, 2015.
How do we solve the Iran talks’ verification dilemma?
After Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, expressed his opposition to the inspection of Iranian military facilities and the interrogation of Iranian scientists as part of any would-be nuclear deal, the issue quickly became the most controversial aspect of the nuclear negotiations in Iran. It is only natural that allowing foreign inspectors access to Iranian military facilities and making Iranian scientists vulnerable to such questioning would damage Iranian national pride, as it would in any country. In fact, this is a matter that threatens to scuttle the entire negotiating process.
This unprecedentedly invasive type of inspections hearkens back to the issue of possible military dimensions (PMD) to the Iranian nuclear program. Western concerns over PMD go back to even before 2003, when the Iranian nuclear program first came under international spotlight. In his 2006 book “State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration,” The New York Times journalist James Risen revealed that the CIA had attempted to plant evidence in Iran that would make it seem the country was pursuing nuclear weapons in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Such “evidence” could feasibly have been used as a pretext for military intervention against Iran. With that said, in 2011 the United States and its NATO allies released thousands of pages of documents and pictures to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that allegedly revealed there had been military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.
“How do we solve the Iran talks’ verification dilemma?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, June 6, 2015.
Will Nuclear Deal Boost Iran Moderates or Hard-Liners?
“Will Nuclear Deal Boost Iran Moderates or Hard-Liners?” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, WSJ, May 28, 2015.
Quote:
“The nuclear issue would be the first step for testing whether the engagement policy is successful. If the U.S. continues the policy of engagement rather than confrontation, you would find Iran much more flexible and much more ready to cooperate on regional issues,” said Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who headed the foreign relations committee at Iran’s National Security Council until 2005 and is now a visiting scholar at Princeton University.
“But if the West and the regional powers push for more coercion policies against Iran, this would strengthen radicalism in Iran. The equation is clear.”
Will Camp David spur regional cooperation?
President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council leaders at Camp David on May 14 looks by all accounts like a face-saving attempt by Washington. A well-publicized, high-wire meeting, verbal reassurances, perhaps promises of more political support and some advanced military hardware, that’s all. Nothing more can and should be expected; they simply cannot prevent the nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) from going through.
The invitation to Washington, in the statement right before the nuclear framework agreement with Iran was announced in Lausanne April 2, was apparently meant to reassure the Arab states in the Persian Gulf that the deal with Tehran did not mean their abandonment. The psychological-emotional aspect of the suggestion was more than obvious. Initial expressions of Arab dissatisfaction with the expected deal — and more importantly, its longer term implications of a possible Iran-US rapprochement — signaled knee-jerk reactions to the development, bound to have quite serious repercussions for everybody: the United States, Iran and its Arab neighbors on the southern shore of the strategic Persian Gulf and on a larger scale, the greater Middle East. That much is certain, even if the exact nature of future developments have yet to unfold and the emerging regional power calculus is inevitably different from what it has been since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the onset of tension and animosity between Tehran and Washington.
“Will Camp David spur regional cooperation?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 14, 2015.
After nuclear deal, what’s next for Iran?
After more than a decade of roller-coaster talks, mostly marked with failure, both sides have finally arrived at a formula that would assure the international community of the strictly peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, and terminate all unilateral and multilateral economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran.
While the political framework reflects the commitment, hard work, sound judgment and, above all, political will of all the parties involved — Iran as well as and the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany — it has been the direct interaction between Iran and the United States, the main two protagonists, particularly since September 2013, that has helped steer the process of negotiation toward the positive outcome. In a detailed discussion in my book “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace” — covering more than 30 years of deeply felt and entrenched mutual distrust, hostility, name-calling, tension, tit-for-tat negative policies, measures and actions aimed at harming the other side — I have tried to depict an objective picture of the state of relations, or lack thereof, between the two capitals, including the numerous missed opportunities at rapprochement and ultimate detente between them. This particular aspect of the matter has not escaped the attention and eyes of pundits and keen Iran observers, including William Burns who has been personally involved in the nuclear talks for years.
“After nuclear deal, what’s next for Iran?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, April 14, 2015.
WWS Reacts: Iran and the Path to a Nuclear Agreement
“WWS Reacts: Iran and the Path to a Nuclear Agreement,” interview with Hossein Mousavian, Rose Huber, Princeton University, April 14, 2015.
