Tag: Nuclear Weapons

Essays, Publications

The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East

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After a decade of failed nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), they have finally fleshed out a temporary agreement that will hopefully restore trust in the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program among all parties. To do so, the temporary agreement must become the basis for renewed discussions on a final deal and the contours of a regional nuclear order in the Middle East. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear nonproliferation, a nuclear weapons−free zone (NWFZ), and a zone free of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.

This article examines the consequences of the breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout. Iran’s main demand includes respecting its rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions, as negotiated in the November 2013 interim agreement between it and the P5+1. Furthermore, a permanent settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities at the regional level, which will enhance nonproliferation efforts. These milestones, which are described in this article, will pave the way toward strengthening the call for concerted efforts to realize a WMDFZ in the Middle East and will help preserve the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in the future.

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“The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 529-544. Published by Global Governance, October 2014.

Articles, Publications

7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity

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Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are aiming to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program by Nov. 24. Iranian and US officials have confirmed that progress was made in the extremely complicated nuclear talks in mid-October in Vienna.

The progress achieved to date is unprecedented. US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman said Oct. 23, “We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable. We have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a possible text.” If a deal is not reached, it will mean no limits at all on Iran’s enrichment program and missing the best opportunity in a decade to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.

The following are seven reasons not to be too overly concerned about Iran’s breakout capability.

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“7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 4, 2014.

Lectures

Iran: Towards an Endgame? (Video)

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Seyed Hossein Mousavian’s remarks at the 11th IISS Global Strategic Review with other panelists including: Professor Ghassan Salamé, Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs and Dr Gary Samore, the Former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

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Video (From minute 03:55 onward)

Iran: Towards an Endgame?

After a decade of failed nuclear talks, the EU3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action, on November 24, 2013. Iran and the Eu3+3 negotiators have made good progress towards a comprehensive deal, addressing some key issues such as the future of the Arak heavy-water reactor, the Fordo enrichment plant and increased access in Iran for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. 

However, they could not yet agree on a comprehensive nuclear deal. As a result, the talks were extended through November 24, 2014 and while both sides pledged to continue complying with the conditions of the interim deal. A final deal must reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.

As the negotiators resume their talks over Iran’s nuclear program in New York, the world powers and Iran face a difficult task to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal within the next three months.

The most difficult remaining issues are how to define the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment program and a realistic timetable for sanctions removal.

The key elements of a comprehensive deal would be the followings:

1) Concerns related to the Heavy Water Reactor at Arak would be alleviated by technical conversion to reduce its capacity to produce plutonium from 10Kg to 1Kg per year. Moreover, Iran would make a long-term commitment to refrain from constructing a facility capable of recovering plutonium from the spent fuel.

2) Iran would accept convert Fordo into an R&D site for its centrifuges and other peaceful nuclear technologies.

3) Tehran would commit to fully implement the agreed upon transparency measures and enhanced monitoring, including ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol.

4) To define the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment program in consistent with its civilian practical needs, a resolution would involve:

• Limiting Iran’s enrichment level to below 5%  and
• Tailoring its enrichment capacity to the practical needs of its civilian nuclear activities.

A possible compromise on the enrichment capacity could entail a phased approach as follows:

First, for a period to be agreed, Iran would maintain a capacity sufficient for enriching uranium for research reactor fuel.
Finally, Iran would keep its operating enrichment capacity at about the current level but would begin to phase out its first-generation of centrifuges machines in favor of more advanced, higher-capacity centrifuges which would make its enrichment program more cost effective.

These measures would create a window of 7 to 10 years period for confidence building, which in combination with intrusive inspections and monitoring, will ensure that Iran can verifiably maintain a peaceful nuclear program with a prolonged timeframe for a possible breakout.

5) Iran would receive international cooperation on its civil nuclear program.

6) The world powers would remove all nuclear related unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran.

7) Upon the implementation of the final step of the comprehensive agreement, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated the same of that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

The Regional Implications of a nuclear Deal

Resolving the Iranian nuclear issue would be a success for both Iran and the world powers, and it could then serve as the basis for a broader agenda for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. With a broader vision, the world powers and Iran can agree on for the Middle East based on six principles:

1) No nuclear weapon in the Middle East
2) Ban on reprocessing, i.e. the separation of plutonium in the Middle East
3) No enrichment of uranium beyond 5% in the Middle East
4) No stockpile beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use
5) Establish a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel and,
6) Implement regional confidence building and verification measure on WMD non-proliferation by creating a regional authority like Euratom or the Argentine-Brazilian mutual inspection arrangements in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region.

Need for broader US-Iran engagement

The Iran nuclear issue is political in nature as illustrated by the exaggerated debate over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The fact is that the nuclear issue has been aggravated by Iran-US hostilities and, as long as this animosity continues, negotiations on nuclear issues alone will not lead to peace between Iran and the US.

Peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis could, however, open the door for broad dialogue and engagement between Iran and the US. The present policy of nuclear engagement will fail if neither Washington nor Tehran has a grand strategy for broad engagement.

A “Comprehensive Solution Package” for these two different dimensions of the US-Iran problem and the nuclear issue, is essential.

To reach a long lasting solution on the nuclear case, we need to contextualize the nuclear and other issues within a bilateral, regional, and international framework, recognizing the need to negotiate on other major differences between Tehran and Washington while simultaneously cooperating on issues of common interest.

Iran and the US have common interests in the “War on Terror” and peace and stability in the region. Whether they like it or not they are natural allies in Afghanistan because both capitals are seeking peace and stability in Afghanistan coupled with the safe exit of American troops at the end of 2014.

During 2001, under President Khatami, Iran and the US cooperated to overthrow the Taliban and successfully facilitated the formation of a national unity government in December 2001 through Iran’s involvement in the UN-sponsored talks in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Iran and the US are natural allies in Iraq and both have backed the previous and the current governments in Baghdad. Iran and the US indirect cooperation made the possible the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime in 2003.

They both oppose the efforts by the intolerable and uncontrollable fundamentalists of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or Daesh to dismantle Syria and Iraq and further divide the region along sectarian lines.

The deep-rooted mistrust between the US and Iran is a major obstacle to direct cooperation in fighting mutual enemies, making it impossible, for example for Iran’s Quds Force and the US CENTCOM to partner in the war against ISIS.

This animosity is why both sides have had to coordinate their respective moves indirectly. The recent fight over Amerli in eastern Iraq has been one of the most important battles against ISIS—where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force alongside with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters supported the ground attacks, while the US handled the airstrike resulting in defending this strategically located town.

President Obama in his address to the nation on the fight against ISIS said that American military power is unmatched, but he also confessed that it requires a broad coalition to “eradicate a cancer like ISIS.”

The fact is that without Iran’s active participation and cooperation, Washington’s international coalition against ISIS will fail for the same reasons it did after the 2001 war on terror against Al Qaeda and the 2011 international coalition on Syria.

Without Iran, no regional or international coalition aimed at addressing major crises in the Middle East would be successful.  It is therefore time for the US, the world powers and the regional actors to engage with Iran and accept Iran’s regional power and influence.

The need for a transformation in Iran­US broad dialogue from one side and Iran and the regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and GCC from the otherside,is no longer an option but an urgent necessity to halt and reverse the current trajectory towards further sectarianism, extremism and terrorism spreading throughout the region.

In fact, the current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for US-Iran and Iran-Regional countries to cooperate and to restore peace and stability from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean region and to the borders of India.

Despite the historical mistrust, the two administrations have been engaged in genuine and serious negotiations on the nuclear issue and such direct engagement has proved vital to reach the current unprecedented outcome.

The achievement thus far in the nuclear negotiations is an indication of what these two sides can attain by engaging directly and more broadly to tackle urgent regional developments.

“Iran: Towards an Endgame?” Presentation at the 11th IISS Global Strategic Review, September 20, 2014.

Speech Transcript

Video (From minute 03:55 onward)

Essays, Publications

After The Iran Nuclear Deal

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Overcoming a decade of failed nuclear negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), in Geneva on November 24, 2013. The agreement put into motion talks to reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation. It could be a significant step toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East.

According to the interim agreement, Tehran “reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.” The comprehensive solution will build on interim steps and aims to resolve the decades-long nuclear dispute between Iran and world powers. It also paves the way for Iran “to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in conformity with its obligations therein.” To ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, the comprehensive agreement seeks to define a mutually agreed enrichment program with stringent transparency and verification mechanisms in place. The implementation of the agreement will be based on a mutually reciprocal, step-by-step process, to result ultimately in the comprehensive lifting of all unilateral, multilateral and UN Security Council sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.

If diplomacy fails and the interim deal reached in November 2013 does not produce a permanent solution, it will ultimately lead to heightened tensions, a possible all-out war, and force Iran to withdraw from the NPT. Now that against all odds, the United States and European Union have made a deal with Iran, skeptics and opponents have started mobilizing again—in both Tehran as well as in many other capitals, including Washington. In Iran, internal opposition to the deal is driven by concerns related to the hostile policies followed during Obama’s first term and by Israel’s continued challenge of Iran’s right to enrich its nuclear stockpile for energy use. In the United States, internal opposition to the deal and concern about Iranian behavior have been reinforced by two of its closest allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The deep uneasiness in those countries is tangible and immediate, for both see Iran as a mortal enemy, bent on Israel’s destruction and regional hegemony.

Finalizing a deal will require compromise by all parties. One of the key challenges will be the likely American insistence that Tehran make concessions far beyond the NPT requirements. Such demands to curb Iran’s nuclear program include dismantling a significant portion of existing centrifuges and low-enriched uranium stockpiles; closure of Fordo, Iran’s second enrichment site near the city of Qom; dismantling of the Arak heavy water research reactor; and intrusive inspections and monitoring that go beyond the NPT and the Additional Protocol. As an NPT member state, Iran would not accept targeted discrimination.

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“After The Iran Nuclear Deal,” Cairo Review, Hossein Mousavian. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 6 2014.

Essays, Publications

Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy

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An early version of this article appeared online June 9 because of the high interest in the ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The version below, which also appears in the print edition of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, was updated to reflect minor editorial changes to the previously posted version. 

Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014. The goal is to agree on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and thus enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.

A key challenge is to agree how to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for nuclear weapons.

This article proposes a compromise based on a two-stage approach that involves Iran maintaining a capacity for enriching a small amount of uranium annually for research reactor fuel in the short term and developing a potential enrichment capacity in the longer term that would be appropriate to fuel power reactors. Iranian supply needs for its power reactors will develop in 2021 if Tehran decides to fuel the existing Bushehr power reactor domestically, in whole or in part, rather than renewing its fuel supply contract with Russia or buying fuel from another foreign supplier.

The proposed compromise also reflects Tehran’s plan to shift from its current low-power, first-generation centrifuges to high-capacity machines that are still under development.

This article therefore suggests that, during the next five years, Iran should modernize its enrichment facilities and in doing so, keep its operating capacity at about the current level rather than begin to operate the many thousands of first-generation machines that it already has installed and continue setting up more. During this period, Iran could phase out its first-generation machines in favor of the second-generation centrifuges it already has installed but has not yet operated. At the same time, it could develop, produce, and store components for a future generation of centrifuges that would be suitable for commercial-scale deployment. These later-generation centrifuges would not need to be assembled, except for test machines, until at least 2019.

To maintain the confidence of the international community that there will be no diversion of centrifuge components to a secret enrichment plant, the current transparency measures that Iran has undertaken for its centrifuge program would continue. These transparency measures should become the standard for transparency for centrifuge production worldwide.

Finally, the article suggests that the five-year period created by this proposal be used as an opportunity by Iran, the P5+1, and other interested states to explore in a second stage of the negotiations a multinational uranium-enrichment arrangement that would see Iran deploy its advanced centrifuges in a new regional, multinational facility rather than a national enrichment plant. By committing to working on such multinational arrangements for the Middle East and, ultimately, around the world, Iran and the P5+1 could chart a path to greatly reduce the proliferation risks that stem from national control of enrichment plants, regardless of location.

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Latest Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, July/August, 2014.

Older Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, June 9, 2014.

Interviews

Princeton experts propose possible solution on Iran centrifuges

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As American and Iranian officials meet June 9 in Geneva, a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators, Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, and several physicists at Princeton are proposing a possible solution to the dispute over how many centrifuges Iran can retain under a long-term nuclear agreement.

Their draft proposal, prepared for publication by the magazine Arms Control Today and made available to Al-Monitor, would permit Iran to transition from the rudimentary machines it currently employs to enrich uranium to more-advanced centrifuges over the course of five years. This would reduce the numbers of centrifuges Iran would require to meet the needs of even an expanded civilian reactor program, but it still raises concerns about Iran’s ability to “break out” and produce fuel for nuclear weapons.

To deal with these concerns, the authors — Mousavian, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel — suggest that Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, the P5+1 nations, explore creating a multilateral uranium enrichment facility that could supply Iran and other countries in the region with nuclear fuel. Such an arrangement, they say, “could provide a long-term solution to the proliferation concerns raised by national enrichment plants in the Middle East and elsewhere.”

With the interim agreement due to expire July 20, there is mounting pressure on all sides to resolve disputes over the scope of Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. If no deal is reached, the interim agreement can be renewed for six months, but political and bureaucratic realities argue for resolution by this fall, when the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, and US Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns are due to retire and Americans will vote in congressional elections that could flip control of the Senate to the Republicans. Without a deal, pressure is sure to increase in the US Congress for more sanctions legislation against Iran, which could embolden Iranian hard-liners.

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“Princeton experts propose possible solution on Iran centrifuges,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Barbara Slavin, Al-Monitor, June 9, 2014.

Essays, Publications

Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ)

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Over a decade of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany) have failed. The window for a diplomatic resolution will be most opportune during the second term of President Obama and the election of moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. They have both voiced their readiness for a diplomatic resolution to the current standoff. There is, however, a risk that if the current US/Western policy of pressure politics continues, we will inch toward a military confrontation. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The proposed paper will examine the prospects for a breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout capability. For the Iranians, their main demand includes recognition of their rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions. Any negotiated settlement on the Iranian nuclear file will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities, which will enhance non-proliferation efforts. These milestones will pave the way to strengthen the call for concerted efforts to realize the WMDFZ in the Middle East.

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“Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ),” Hossein Mousavian, European University Institute, Policy Paper, No.22. Published by Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Program, December 2013.

Essays, Publications

Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?

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This paper presents a comprehensive explanation as to why Iran is not after a nuclear bomb and provides twenty-five reasons to strengthen this position. Examples range from a chronology of Israeli accusations that claim Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; elaborating on the findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspectors of Iranian nuclear facilities; the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s viewpoint on nuclear weapons; the findings of US and other Western intelligence agency’s regarding the Iran’s nuclear capability; and instances of missed opportunity that have evaded a resolution of the nuclear dossier. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on a framework for diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff and its contribution to the realization of Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

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“Does Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?” Hossein Mousavian, International Studies Journal (ISJ), Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 129-142. Published by the International Studies Journal, November 2013.