Interviews

Princeton experts propose possible solution on Iran centrifuges

As American and Iranian officials meet June 9 in Geneva, a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators, Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, and several physicists at Princeton are proposing a possible solution to the dispute over how many centrifuges Iran can retain under a long-term nuclear agreement.

Their draft proposal, prepared for publication by the magazine Arms Control Today and made available to Al-Monitor, would permit Iran to transition from the rudimentary machines it currently employs to enrich uranium to more-advanced centrifuges over the course of five years. This would reduce the numbers of centrifuges Iran would require to meet the needs of even an expanded civilian reactor program, but it still raises concerns about Iran’s ability to “break out” and produce fuel for nuclear weapons.

To deal with these concerns, the authors — Mousavian, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian and Frank von Hippel — suggest that Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, the P5+1 nations, explore creating a multilateral uranium enrichment facility that could supply Iran and other countries in the region with nuclear fuel. Such an arrangement, they say, “could provide a long-term solution to the proliferation concerns raised by national enrichment plants in the Middle East and elsewhere.”

With the interim agreement due to expire July 20, there is mounting pressure on all sides to resolve disputes over the scope of Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. If no deal is reached, the interim agreement can be renewed for six months, but political and bureaucratic realities argue for resolution by this fall, when the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, and US Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns are due to retire and Americans will vote in congressional elections that could flip control of the Senate to the Republicans. Without a deal, pressure is sure to increase in the US Congress for more sanctions legislation against Iran, which could embolden Iranian hard-liners.

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“Princeton experts propose possible solution on Iran centrifuges,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Barbara Slavin, Al-Monitor, June 9, 2014.

Lectures

Atlantic Council: U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future

On Tuesday June 3, 2014, the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center hosted a conversation called “U.S.- Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future.” The discussion featured Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, diplomat and author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, and John Marks, President and Founder of Search for Common Ground. The conversation was moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

Seyyed Hossein Mousavian began by separating the history of U.S.-Iran relations into three periods. The first period, between 1856 and 1953, was characterized by cordial relations between the two countries, where the U.S. supported Iranian independence and democracy. The second period, from 1953 to 1979, saw relations start to sour beginning with the American supported coup toppling democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. Mousavian calls this period the “dominant era,” a time where the American-backed Shah ruled as a dictator. The third and final period, from 1979 to present day, began with the Islamic Revolution that deposed the Shah. Mousavian said this era represented the “most hostile type of relations” between two countries, surpassing even U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

The question Mousavian posed was: why? Having spent time in both Iran and the U.S., Mousavian suggests that foreign policy experts in the U.S. and Iran are disconnected from one another and thus misunderstand each other. Despite the hostilities, Mousavian argues that every Iranian administration has approached the U.S. with a desire to normalize relations, but all efforts have failed. The objective now is to look to the future as Mousavian believes the current state of affairs between the U.S. and Iran cannot be maintained. In a Middle East region that is “on fire,” U.S.-Iran cooperation is necessary. Mousavian proposes that comprehensive negotiations should cover a range of issues, instead of the routine “piecemeal approaches.” Within this discussion, the U.S. must not insist on the nuclear issue being paramount, and must be willing to discuss other issues. Mousavian thinks rapprochement should begin with areas of common interest; the U.S., he argues, mistakenly tends to focus on issues of disagreement. After all, he recalls, Henry Kissinger once said that the U.S. and Iran have more common interests than any other two countries. Areas of mutual interest include stopping organized crime and drug trafficking, to supporting governments in both Iraq and Afghanistan. When inevitably the differences do arise, both countries must approach the areas of contention with flexibility. Finally, Mousavian believes American and Iranian politicians must recognize and apologize for past grievances that have polarized the countries from one another; otherwise, the relationship will be unable to move forward.

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Event Coverage: “U.S.-Iran Relations, Past, Present and Future,” POMED, June 3, 2014.

“US‐Iran Relations Past, Present and Future,” Presentation at the Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014.

Articles, Publications

US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity

The talks between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Iran are moving “very slowly and with difficulty,” Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said May 16 after the conclusion of the latest round of negotiations in Vienna. The next day, lead Iranian negotiator and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “Back from Vienna after tough discussions. Agreement is possible. But illusions need to go. Opportunity shouldn’t be missed again like in 2005.”

A comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers, ending three decades of estrangement, hostility and sanctions, has never been closer, but it would be a tragedy if the current round of talks ended up on the list of missed opportunities between the United States and Iran, as I recount in my new book co-authored with Shahir Shahidsaless, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.”

The current precarious state of affairs cannot be sustained. If no common ground is created between Iran and the United States and the other world powers on the nuclear issue, one of two scenarios with similar outcomes, is likely to occur. As pressures build over time, patience for long diplomatic processes will wane and military confrontation could take the place of diplomacy. Or, as the United States tightens sanctions even further, Iran’s retaliatory actions may lead to an inadvertent or deliberate confrontation. The already crisis-stricken Middle East and the potential for a wider military confrontation should give greater urgency for the opportunity not to be missed this time.

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“US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 26, 2014.

Interviews

Book by former Iran official looks at Quds Force leader, Saudi king

For the last few years, Al-Monitor’s Seyed Hossein Mousavian has been among the most prolific Iranian writers in the United States promoting US-Iran reconciliation and trying to explain his complicated and often maligned country to American audiences.

In a new book, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” Mousavian continues this mission while revealing new details of fruitless overtures by Iranian leaders to ease hostilities over the past two decades.

For students of this bitter history, the book — co-authored by Shahir ShahidSaless, a political analyst and freelance journalist who, like Mousavian, is also an Al-Monitor contributor — is most interesting for its vignettes and quotes from senior Iranian officials at crucial moments in US-Iran relations.

While “The road to peace between Iran and the US is truly a bumpy one,” détente, if not reconciliation, is not impossible, he writes. “I am confident that the dominant viewpoint inside [the system], including that of the supreme leader, is to end the hostilities with the US based on mutual respect, noninterference and mutual interest.”

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“Book by former Iran official looks at Quds Force leader, Saudi king,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Barbara Slavin, Al-Monitor, May 19, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the sole internationally recognized treaty which has been dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty was recognized in 1970 as an international law. At that time, five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, the UK, Russia, China, and France) were nuclear-powered states. Following the conclusion of the NPT, three more countries, namely, India, Pakistan and North Korea, in addition to Israel developed nuclear weapons as well. These are also the sole countries that have so far refrained from accession to the NPT. At present, 189 countries are member states of this treaty and committed to creating a world free from nuclear weapons. The NPT is based on three major principles: 1. Nuclear disarmament, according to which big powers have been obligated to gradually destroy their arsenals of nuclear weapons; 2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and 3.Commitment of countries to promote peaceful nuclear activities.

Member states of the NPT have committed to hold an NPT review conference every five years in order to review performance of the parties to the treaty with regard to their treaty obligations. As a result, a preparatory committee was set up in New York, which meets every year to discuss the implementation of the treaty and take necessary decisions in this regard. At the moment, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT is underway at the United Nations Office in New York (and will continue until May 9, 2014). An expert delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran is also present at the session.

During the NPT review conference in 2010, an action plan known as the NPT Action Plan was adopted by the participants. The action plan consisted of 64 actions, including 22 actions on the nuclear disarmament and 23 actions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The rest of the plan was focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

A review of reports prepared by specialized international institutions will show that out of the aforesaid 64 actions stipulated in the NPT Action Plan, about 28 actions have been relatively implemented. The implementation of 21 actions has been very poor while the degree of progress on 15 other actions has remained practically at zero. The main point, however, is that most of those 28 actions that have been relatively implemented are related to promoting cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the contrary, those 15 actions, which have not been implemented yet, are all related to nuclear disarmament.

Let’s not forget that the first and foremost goal of the NPT is to create a world free from nuclear weapons. Now, more than 40 years after the treaty entered into force and despite the fact that 15 actions specified by the treaty and agreed upon by international community are related to nuclear disarmament, big powers have still retained more than 20,000 articles of nuclear weapons of which 90 percent is in the possession of the United States and Russia. As a result, the big powers have not only refused to fulfill their obligations with regard to the promotion of nuclear disarmament, but have also modernized their stockpiles of nuclear weapons during the past decades. Without a doubt, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the biggest violators of the NPT while, at the same time, having the highest responsibility for the full implementation of the contents of the treaty.

During the past decade, big global powers have focused all the resources of international community on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program and have imposed the most brutal sanctions against the country in spite of the fact that Iran is a party to the NPT, has no nuclear weapons and, according to frequent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there has been no diversion in its nuclear energy program toward production of nuclear weapons. However, the same powers have been largely indifferent toward possession of nuclear weapons by countries like India, Pakistan and Israel, have taken no steps against them, and have even established strategic relations with them! At the same time, those big powers have never been taken to task for the violation of their obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament.

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“Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, May 7, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran

The world powers are seeking a consensus that allows Iran to retain only a small and indigenousuranium enrichment program.Therefore they want to impose significant physical limits on the heavy water facilities, the number and type of centrifuges, the level of enrichment, the amount of stockpiled enriched uranium and the number of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment facilities — as well as install enhanced monitoring and verification measures.

However, these are demands that go beyond existing international nonproliferation commitments, and Iran is unlikely to accept.

The world powers’ limiting strategy poses a risk of pushing Iran to abandon its agreement with the P5+1, expel the IAEA inspectors, disable the IAEA’s monitoring equipment and ultimately build bombs. The bottom line is, the possibility of military confrontation with Iran is real if negotiators cannot agree on a final deal. Such confrontation could unleash terrible regional and international consequences. The world powers and Iran consider the following four scenarios in order to secure a final deal.

First, making Iran’s fatwa, or edict, operational. Iran is committed to a religious decree issued by the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei that bans the production, stockpiling and use of all weapons of mass destruction. Respecting its rights to peaceful nuclear technology means that Iran would have no reason to leave the NPT. This eliminates fears of an abrupt shutdown of monitoring the country’s nuclear program, because Iran would not withdraw from the NPT. In such eventuality, Iran and the world powers would forgo the limiting issues and discuss only transparency measures in the final deal.

Second, cooperating on a broad range of issues, including Iran’s enormous energy demands and potential. Such engagement and cooperation would remove all anxieties, not least Iran’s security concerns and the world powers’ fear that the Iranian nuclear program will be diverted toward weaponization.

Third, setting a realistic scope on limits to Iran’s nuclear program. Instead of making impossible demands, such as the closure of Iran’s enrichment site in Fordow or heavy water facilities in Arak, Iran and the P5+1 should agree on realistic limits guaranteeing nonproliferation for a specific confidence-building period. This would enable the IAEA enough time to address all technical ambiguities on the Iranian nuclear program.

Finally, considering a comprehensive vision for a nuclear-free Persian Gulf and Middle East. To actualize such a broad agenda, the world powers should first seek an agreement with Iran acceptable to other regional countries and then use the final deal with Iran as a model for the entire region.

Toward that end, the International Panel for Fissile Material, a team of independent nuclear experts from 15 countries, has proposed sensible measures: a ban on the separation or use of plutonium and uranium-233, restrictions on the use of high enriched uranium as a reactor fuel, limitations on uranium enrichment to less than 6 percent and agreement to a just-in-time system of uranium production rather than stockpiling enriched uranium. Both sides should agree to Iran’s adopting these courses of action.

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“Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2014.

 

Articles, Publications

How much nuclear power does Iran need?

The new round of Iran nuclear talks concluded on Feb. 20, where the world powers and Iran agreed on a framework, a plan of action and a timetable to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive agreement in the next four months. “We have had three very productive days during which we have identified all of the issues we need to address in reaching a comprehensive and final agreement,” European Union foreign policy head Catherine Ashton said.

One of the major challenges that negotiations would face, however, is to determine Iran’s real domestic demand for nuclear energy. The reason is that according to the Geneva interim agreement, the comprehensive solution should “involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon (emphasis added).”

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“How much nuclear power does Iran need?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, February 21, 2014.