Articles, Publications

7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity

Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are aiming to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program by Nov. 24. Iranian and US officials have confirmed that progress was made in the extremely complicated nuclear talks in mid-October in Vienna.

The progress achieved to date is unprecedented. US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman said Oct. 23, “We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable. We have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a possible text.” If a deal is not reached, it will mean no limits at all on Iran’s enrichment program and missing the best opportunity in a decade to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.

The following are seven reasons not to be too overly concerned about Iran’s breakout capability.

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“7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 4, 2014.

Interviews

Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the lead author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, has two objectives: to help American readers understand the Iranian perspective on the fraught US-Iranian relationship, and to advocate a sustained attempt to break the cycle of hostility that was triggered by the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Such is the suspicion on both sides of this relationship that some readers may wonder about the extent to which Mousavian’s descriptions of the Iranian perspective in this book, which was co-authored by Shahir Shahidsaless, can be trusted. This reviewer’s opinion is that Mousavian—a former Iranian ambassador who has been living in the US since 2009—whom the reviewer has known since 2004, is not trying to pull wool over anyone’s eyes. There is corroborating evidence for much of the information he advances. If in places the reader senses that he or she is not getting the full story, a respectable explanation is to hand: those who have worked at the heart of a government, as Mousavian has done, are bound to be “economical” with certain truths, as a British cabinet secretary once put it.

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“Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View,” Peter Jenkins, BBC Farsi, October 13, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution

During three decades, the United States exercised all measures, short of military intervention, to bring about regime change in Iran. For reasons that I have discussed in depth and extensively in my newly published book, “Iran and The United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” all efforts have failed and contrary to expectations today, Iran is the most stable and powerful country in the region.

The current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for the United States to revisit its three decades of failed policies toward Iran. Just recently, US Vice-President Joe Biden accused America’s key allies in the Middle East of allowing the rise of the Islamic State by supporting extremists with money and weapons to oust the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria.

Interestingly, Iran’s nuclear issue, which has become the Gordian knot in US-Iran relations, can, if resolved, be transformed to a springboard for strategic cooperation between the two states for the restoration of security and stability in the region.

To reach the final deal by Nov. 24, Iran and the EU3 negotiators have already been able to address three key areas of dispute: the future of the Arak heavy water reactor, the future of the Fordo enrichment plant and the issue of more expanded access to Iran’s nuclear-related facilities for International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. The support of the US Congress would be instrumental to the success of Iran’s nuclear negotiations to resolve the remaining disputed cases by Nov. 24, ending decades of animosity between Washington and Tehran and opening doors on an overdue cooperation aimed at combating the rise of terrorists and the emergence of the caliphate of terror.

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“Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, October 14, 2014.

Lectures

Iran: Towards an Endgame? (Video)

Seyed Hossein Mousavian’s remarks at the 11th IISS Global Strategic Review with other panelists including: Professor Ghassan Salamé, Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs and Dr Gary Samore, the Former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

Read Full Transcript

Video (From minute 03:55 onward)

Iran: Towards an Endgame?

After a decade of failed nuclear talks, the EU3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Iran signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action, on November 24, 2013. Iran and the Eu3+3 negotiators have made good progress towards a comprehensive deal, addressing some key issues such as the future of the Arak heavy-water reactor, the Fordo enrichment plant and increased access in Iran for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. 

However, they could not yet agree on a comprehensive nuclear deal. As a result, the talks were extended through November 24, 2014 and while both sides pledged to continue complying with the conditions of the interim deal. A final deal must reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.

As the negotiators resume their talks over Iran’s nuclear program in New York, the world powers and Iran face a difficult task to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal within the next three months.

The most difficult remaining issues are how to define the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment program and a realistic timetable for sanctions removal.

The key elements of a comprehensive deal would be the followings:

1) Concerns related to the Heavy Water Reactor at Arak would be alleviated by technical conversion to reduce its capacity to produce plutonium from 10Kg to 1Kg per year. Moreover, Iran would make a long-term commitment to refrain from constructing a facility capable of recovering plutonium from the spent fuel.

2) Iran would accept convert Fordo into an R&D site for its centrifuges and other peaceful nuclear technologies.

3) Tehran would commit to fully implement the agreed upon transparency measures and enhanced monitoring, including ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol.

4) To define the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment program in consistent with its civilian practical needs, a resolution would involve:

• Limiting Iran’s enrichment level to below 5%  and
• Tailoring its enrichment capacity to the practical needs of its civilian nuclear activities.

A possible compromise on the enrichment capacity could entail a phased approach as follows:

First, for a period to be agreed, Iran would maintain a capacity sufficient for enriching uranium for research reactor fuel.
Finally, Iran would keep its operating enrichment capacity at about the current level but would begin to phase out its first-generation of centrifuges machines in favor of more advanced, higher-capacity centrifuges which would make its enrichment program more cost effective.

These measures would create a window of 7 to 10 years period for confidence building, which in combination with intrusive inspections and monitoring, will ensure that Iran can verifiably maintain a peaceful nuclear program with a prolonged timeframe for a possible breakout.

5) Iran would receive international cooperation on its civil nuclear program.

6) The world powers would remove all nuclear related unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran.

7) Upon the implementation of the final step of the comprehensive agreement, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated the same of that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

The Regional Implications of a nuclear Deal

Resolving the Iranian nuclear issue would be a success for both Iran and the world powers, and it could then serve as the basis for a broader agenda for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. With a broader vision, the world powers and Iran can agree on for the Middle East based on six principles:

1) No nuclear weapon in the Middle East
2) Ban on reprocessing, i.e. the separation of plutonium in the Middle East
3) No enrichment of uranium beyond 5% in the Middle East
4) No stockpile beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use
5) Establish a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel and,
6) Implement regional confidence building and verification measure on WMD non-proliferation by creating a regional authority like Euratom or the Argentine-Brazilian mutual inspection arrangements in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region.

Need for broader US-Iran engagement

The Iran nuclear issue is political in nature as illustrated by the exaggerated debate over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The fact is that the nuclear issue has been aggravated by Iran-US hostilities and, as long as this animosity continues, negotiations on nuclear issues alone will not lead to peace between Iran and the US.

Peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis could, however, open the door for broad dialogue and engagement between Iran and the US. The present policy of nuclear engagement will fail if neither Washington nor Tehran has a grand strategy for broad engagement.

A “Comprehensive Solution Package” for these two different dimensions of the US-Iran problem and the nuclear issue, is essential.

To reach a long lasting solution on the nuclear case, we need to contextualize the nuclear and other issues within a bilateral, regional, and international framework, recognizing the need to negotiate on other major differences between Tehran and Washington while simultaneously cooperating on issues of common interest.

Iran and the US have common interests in the “War on Terror” and peace and stability in the region. Whether they like it or not they are natural allies in Afghanistan because both capitals are seeking peace and stability in Afghanistan coupled with the safe exit of American troops at the end of 2014.

During 2001, under President Khatami, Iran and the US cooperated to overthrow the Taliban and successfully facilitated the formation of a national unity government in December 2001 through Iran’s involvement in the UN-sponsored talks in Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Iran and the US are natural allies in Iraq and both have backed the previous and the current governments in Baghdad. Iran and the US indirect cooperation made the possible the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime in 2003.

They both oppose the efforts by the intolerable and uncontrollable fundamentalists of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or Daesh to dismantle Syria and Iraq and further divide the region along sectarian lines.

The deep-rooted mistrust between the US and Iran is a major obstacle to direct cooperation in fighting mutual enemies, making it impossible, for example for Iran’s Quds Force and the US CENTCOM to partner in the war against ISIS.

This animosity is why both sides have had to coordinate their respective moves indirectly. The recent fight over Amerli in eastern Iraq has been one of the most important battles against ISIS—where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force alongside with Kurdish Peshmerga fighters supported the ground attacks, while the US handled the airstrike resulting in defending this strategically located town.

President Obama in his address to the nation on the fight against ISIS said that American military power is unmatched, but he also confessed that it requires a broad coalition to “eradicate a cancer like ISIS.”

The fact is that without Iran’s active participation and cooperation, Washington’s international coalition against ISIS will fail for the same reasons it did after the 2001 war on terror against Al Qaeda and the 2011 international coalition on Syria.

Without Iran, no regional or international coalition aimed at addressing major crises in the Middle East would be successful.  It is therefore time for the US, the world powers and the regional actors to engage with Iran and accept Iran’s regional power and influence.

The need for a transformation in Iran­US broad dialogue from one side and Iran and the regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and GCC from the otherside,is no longer an option but an urgent necessity to halt and reverse the current trajectory towards further sectarianism, extremism and terrorism spreading throughout the region.

In fact, the current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for US-Iran and Iran-Regional countries to cooperate and to restore peace and stability from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean region and to the borders of India.

Despite the historical mistrust, the two administrations have been engaged in genuine and serious negotiations on the nuclear issue and such direct engagement has proved vital to reach the current unprecedented outcome.

The achievement thus far in the nuclear negotiations is an indication of what these two sides can attain by engaging directly and more broadly to tackle urgent regional developments.

“Iran: Towards an Endgame?” Presentation at the 11th IISS Global Strategic Review, September 20, 2014.

Speech Transcript

Video (From minute 03:55 onward)

Essays, Publications

After The Iran Nuclear Deal

Overcoming a decade of failed nuclear negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), in Geneva on November 24, 2013. The agreement put into motion talks to reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation. It could be a significant step toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East.

According to the interim agreement, Tehran “reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.” The comprehensive solution will build on interim steps and aims to resolve the decades-long nuclear dispute between Iran and world powers. It also paves the way for Iran “to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in conformity with its obligations therein.” To ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, the comprehensive agreement seeks to define a mutually agreed enrichment program with stringent transparency and verification mechanisms in place. The implementation of the agreement will be based on a mutually reciprocal, step-by-step process, to result ultimately in the comprehensive lifting of all unilateral, multilateral and UN Security Council sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.

If diplomacy fails and the interim deal reached in November 2013 does not produce a permanent solution, it will ultimately lead to heightened tensions, a possible all-out war, and force Iran to withdraw from the NPT. Now that against all odds, the United States and European Union have made a deal with Iran, skeptics and opponents have started mobilizing again—in both Tehran as well as in many other capitals, including Washington. In Iran, internal opposition to the deal is driven by concerns related to the hostile policies followed during Obama’s first term and by Israel’s continued challenge of Iran’s right to enrich its nuclear stockpile for energy use. In the United States, internal opposition to the deal and concern about Iranian behavior have been reinforced by two of its closest allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The deep uneasiness in those countries is tangible and immediate, for both see Iran as a mortal enemy, bent on Israel’s destruction and regional hegemony.

Finalizing a deal will require compromise by all parties. One of the key challenges will be the likely American insistence that Tehran make concessions far beyond the NPT requirements. Such demands to curb Iran’s nuclear program include dismantling a significant portion of existing centrifuges and low-enriched uranium stockpiles; closure of Fordo, Iran’s second enrichment site near the city of Qom; dismantling of the Arak heavy water research reactor; and intrusive inspections and monitoring that go beyond the NPT and the Additional Protocol. As an NPT member state, Iran would not accept targeted discrimination.

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“After The Iran Nuclear Deal,” Cairo Review, Hossein Mousavian. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 6 2014.

Lectures

Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace (Video)

From Iraq to Syria, from energy to counterterrorism, Iran and the United States share many common interests across the Middle East and ought to put aside their decades of hostility, said author and former Iranian diplomat Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

Speaking at an IPI Distinguished Author Series event on June 25th featuring his book Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, Mr. Mousavian said that both countries are to blame for their failure to reach a rapprochement after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but that today’s challenges in the Middle East are a unique opportunity for mending relations.

Mr. Mousavian said that in his book he had tried to explain the Iranian perspective of the relationship, a view that he said has so far been overlooked by the predominantly Western approach to US-Iran relations.

Watch Video

“Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” Presentation at the International Peace Institute (IPI), June 25, 2014.

Interviews

A compromise proposal for nuclear talks with Iran

As American and Iranian officials meet in Geneva to try to find a way through the impasse holding up a comprehensive multilateral deal onIran‘s nuclear programme, a group of Princeton University academics have sent them a proposed road-map on how to get around the blockage.

The Princeton report, published on the Arms Control Today website, focuses on the core issue that has proved most problematic in the four months of talks so far – Iran’s future capacity for enriching uranium. This has hitherto been such a gap to bridge because Iran and the West come at it from entirely different perspectives.

The Princeton compromise is a two-stage approach, allowing a very limited enrichment capacity for the existing research reactor in Tehran in the short term, but with the flexibility to expand that capacity to keep pace with the construction of future nuclear power stations in the long term. The existing contract for Russian nuclear fuel rods for Bushehr expires in 2021. If Tehran decides it wants to use it own rods after that, then its enrichment capacity would be stepped up as that deadline approaches, but not before 2019.

In the intervening five years, Iran would focus on modernising its enrichment plant, replacing the now ancient and inefficient IR-1 centrifuges, based on half-century old technology, with a new generation of IR-2m centrifuges, with about five times the capacity. As the new machines were installed in this first phase, total capacity would remain the same. Even more advanced centrifuges would be developed with an eye to the future.

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“A compromise proposal for nuclear talks with Iran,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Julian Borger, The Guardian, June 9, 2014.