“When the Ayatollah Said No to the Nuke,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Gareth Porter, Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014.
Tag: Ayatollah Khamenei
Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set
An understanding of the critical role and mind-set of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is essential for anyone wishing to assess the prospects of a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. It is important to note that the aims and policy choices espoused by the Supreme Leader have to be understood within the context of the immediate political circumstances at the time of his appointment as Supreme Leader and the evolution of global geopolitics since the end of the Cold War. Under the rule of the Shah of Iran, throughout most of the Cold War period, Iran’s role had been that of a client state under Western (U. S. ) hegemony. In fact, this had been Iran’s position in the world order for most of the last two centuries. This subservience was caused by its dependence on the rising Imperial powers of Great Britain and Russia and later the United States.
“Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set,” Hossein Mousavian in A. Maleki & J. Tirman (Eds.). U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue (pp. 37–56). Published by Bloomsbury Academic (10/2014).
Asia Society: Iran and the US: Where Things Stand (Video)
Ambassador Hossein Mousavian, a former senior Iranian diplomat and nuclear negotiator, and Gary Sick, Iran expert and former National Security Council member, explore root causes of the misperceptions Iranians and Americans have of each other and the missed opportunities for dialogue over several decades. Hamid Biglari moderates the discussion.
“Iran and the US: Where Things Stand,” Presentation at the Asia Society, June 3, 2014. (Video)
Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States
The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless.
Part (1): Four major, interrelated elements shape Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the US
Page: 161
First, he wholeheartedly believes that regardless of all the ups and downs, pushes and pulls between Iran and the US, Washington’s ultimate intention is to topple Iran’s Islamic system and subordinate them within a Pax Americana, as it did during the Shah’s era after the 1953 coup. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains that the US, no matter which school of thought and party is in power or which president has taken office, intends to “wipe out the Islamic Republic”with all possible means at its disposal. The conclusion he draws from US rhetoric, policies, and behavior is that the US will not relent from its desire for regime change unless the current government surrenders its principles, religious beliefs, political structure, and independence. The United States’ tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and provision of material support, its covert operations, support for belligerent groups and the Islamic Republic’s opposition (including a budgetary provision), its denial of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment under the NPT, and its intrusive and paralyzing economic sanctions are all viewed by Ayatollah Khamenei as indisputable attempts to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. He maintains that the US’s primary objective is to undermine the Islamic government by fostering internal disorder and, ultimately, regime change.
The second element that shapes Ayatollah Khamenei’s disposition towards the US is his firm belief that US foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically regarding Iran, is overwhelmingly dominated by the pro-Israel lobby. From his point of view, even the president of the United States does not have any authority over US foreign policy. He is surprised that year after year, the president or other high-level officials of the most powerful country on earth attend American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) gatherings and report what they have done to undermine the Iranian government and satisfy pro-Israel lobby demands. Although there is in general a consensus within the nezam about Israel’s influence on US Middle East policy, some argue that it is the Zionists who determine the US foreign policy, and not Americans.
The third element shaping the Supreme Leader’s perception of the US is his extreme mistrust of American politics. The documents confiscated by students after seizing the US Embassy seemed to justify such a stance by many high-echelon Iranian politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei. According to those documents, the embassy was involved in espionage and the fostering of covert links to members of the new government and army.
Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei’s sees the American government and the system it represents as addicted to arrogance and hegemony. He feels that if a country is not seen as a “great power,” then a lord–serf relationship is the only kind of relationship that the US is prepared to accept.
“Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, June 1, 2014.
Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward
Since reaching an interim nuclear deal last November, Iran and the world powers have been attempting to finalize a comprehensive nuclear deal by late July.
The Iranian stance on the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was clearly expressed through a fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Addressing more than 120 heads of state and officials at the 16th Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran on August 30, 2012, he stated: “The Islamic Republic—logically, religiously and theoretically—considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.” Ayatollah Khamenei added that Iran “proposed the idea of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, and we are committed to it.”
Iran has already declared its willingness to secularize that fatwa. Such a move would facilitate and expedite a final nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers. However, the fatwa, with its strong roots in Islamic belief, could also play a constructive role far beyond resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.
“Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward,” Hossein Mousavian Asharq Al-Awsat, May 10, 2014.
Confidante of the new Iranian president (Japanese)
“Confidante of the new Iranian president,” Interview with Hossein Mousavian, Fumi Yoshida, Asahi Shimbun, June 28, 2013. (Japanese)
Iranian elections remain as relevant as ever
The Iranian constitution details the powers of the supreme leader and makes it clear that he plays the key role on foreign and domestic policies. However, his powers are not unlimited. There is a clear division of powers in the Iranian system of government, proper checks and balances, mitigating the influence and concentration of power into the hands of one person or institution.
“Iranian elections remain as relevant as ever,” Hossein Mousavian, Asharq Al-Awsat, June 11, 2013.
Next Iranian President Faces Economic, Foreign Policy Tests
For Iranians, the election is about the economy first, foreign policy second. The economic challenges include inflation, unemployment and devaluation of the national currency. Inflation is disproportionately hurting the lower and middle classes. While Iran’s Central Bank reports that the inflation rate for 2012 has been 27.4%, Steve Hanke, professor of Applied Economics at The Johns Hopkins University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington estimates that Iran experienced an inflation rate of 110% for the same period. This is quadruple the rate reported by the Central Bank.
“Next Iranian President Faces Economic, Foreign Policy Tests,” Hossein Mousavian, Al-Monitor, May 28, 2013.
La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato (Italian)
Dopo un decennio di stallo sulla questione nucleare, per trovare una soluzione è necessario avere ben chiare le cause di fondo dell’attuale crisi e l’eredità della storia. Prima della rivoluzione islamica del 1979, i paesi occidentali – e in particolare gli Stati Uniti – mantenevano ottimi rapporti con l’Iran e facevano a gara per aggiudicarsi i redditizi progetti di nuclearizzazione del paese, gettando così le basi per lo sviluppo della sua potenza atomica. In quel periodo, l’Occidente sosteneva che la tecnologia nucleare era di fondamentale importanza per Teheran. Nel 1976, il presidente Gerald Ford firmò una direttiva che consentiva all’Iran di acquisire la tecnologia necessaria a sviluppare un ciclo nucleare completo. Nel documento si legge: “L’introduzione dell’energia nucleare provvederà al crescente fabbisogno energetico dell’economia iraniana e renderà le riserve petrolifere del paese disponibili per l’esportazione o la trasformazione in prodotti petrolchimici”.
“La questione nucleare vista da Teheran: ipotesi di negoziato,” Hossein Mousavian, Aspenia, issue no. 60, pgs. 62-70. Published by the Aspen Institute, March 2013, (Italian).
Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons
Over a decade of negotiations between Iran and various world powers over Tehran’s nuclear programme have yielded little or no progress. Although all parties seek a peaceful resolution to this quagmire through diplomacy, all the major demands of the P5+1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council – the United States, Russia, China, France and the UK – plus Germany) go beyond the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Safeguard Agreement, the only viable and legitimate international framework for non-proliferation. In 2011, I proposed a peaceful solution based on the 2005 fatwa (religious decree) of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei banning the acquisition, production and use of nuclear weapons, and in 2012 Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi declared Iran’s willingness to transform the fatwa ‘into a legally binding, official document in the UN’, to secularise what many in the West see as a purely religious decree.1 Such a step would provide a sustainable legal and political umbrella for Iran to accept required measures; facilitate transparency and confidence-building measures; and help address doubts in the West about the commitment to the principles expressed in the fatwa in the context of Iran’s system of government, where politics and religion are intertwined.
“Globalizing Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons,” Hossein Mousavian, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 55:2, 147-162. Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 8, 2013.
