Vali Nasr and Hossein Mousavian write for Foreign Affairs:
It does not help that Iran also deeply distrusts Washington’s motivations. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently dismissed a U.S. demand tying its return to the JCPOA to future negotiations over regional issues, saying the United States is using the issue to drag its feet on rejoining the nuclear deal. Iran, he added, will not accept foreign meddling when it comes to its national security interests
“The U.S. failure to achieve its objectives and the Taliban’s re-emergence in Afghanistan is evident, but whether they represent a challenge or opportunity for Iran is still unclear.”
Si quiere evitar los errores cometidos por Trump, Biden deberá acabar con la política de máxima presión sobre Irán y promover el acercamiento entre este y los países del Golfo.
The pressing questions now are: how will Iran’s relations with the Arab Gulf states evolve next? What will be the destiny of the nuclear deal, and how will regional policies change under the next president, who is likely to be from the principlist faction?
But there is an alternative path forward: save the Iran deal. Under the agreement, Iran accepted the most comprehensive transparency measures and limits that a member state of the Nonproliferation Treaty has ever accepted. This model should be accepted by other countries pursuing nuclear-energy programmes. For the international community, therefore, preserving the Iran deal must be a vital first step towards strengthening the nonproliferation regime.
While Riyadh and Tehran focus on each other, smaller Gulf countries have cause for concern about the potentially hegemonic tendencies of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. As such, a regional security system should be based on the “zero hegemony” concept. Fostering dialogue and cooperation among Gulf states is necessary for any potential rapprochement.
The record of the JCPOA’s enforcement over the past five years demonstrates that the main threat to any nuclear agreement with Tehran emanates in large part from Washington’s desire to preserve most of its economic leverage over Iran and minimize the actual benefits of sanctions removal for the country. This is basically because the core dispute between the United States and Iran is about the region, not just the nuclear issue. Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the reimposition of unprecedented U.S. sanctions against Iran clearly bear out this assessment, as they were meant to regain and expand U.S. bargaining power against Iran in the hope of securing a better nuclear deal and addressing the regional issues.
Five years ago, after years of intensive negotiations, six world powers managed to sign the world’s most comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran. While the agreement was a political one, it was also ratified by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2231. And, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization tasked with verifying the agreement’s technical aspects, Iran was fully complying with the deal for about three years, until President Trump withdrew from it in May 2018. In response to the US violations of the nuclear agreement, Iran too reduced some of its commitments. Most recently, on January 4, Iran announced that it had increased its uranium enrichment levels to 20 percent.
