Articles, Publications

Ukraine crisis could strengthen Russia-Iran-China ties

Tensions between Russia and the West have simmered since Ukraine’s Russian-leaning president, Viktor Yanukovych, was ousted on Feb. 21. The crisis culminated when the Crimean Peninsula’s local government, with 60% of its inhabitants identifying themselves as ethnic Russians, called for a referendum on seceding the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine. While observers view the current Ukraine standoff as the gravest post-Cold War between the West and Moscow, the impasse over Iran’s nuclear crisis is also considered the greatest challenge to Iran-West relations.

Iran will remain neutral in this conflict, despite that the crisis in Ukraine may result in a favorable outcome to its future including the standoff with the West over its nuclear program. A senior Iranian official said, “Iran would surely stay out of this dispute [over Ukraine].” However, the crisis in Ukraine could have possible impacts on Russia-Iran relations.

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could result in NATO forces moving closer to Ukraine’s western borders. However, Russia is concerned that its withdrawal from Crimea may result in the West’s crawling of military forces toward the borders of Russia, thus jeopardizing its security and weakening its strategic depth. In the last two decades, Russia and Iran have been carefully watching the United States and NATO expanding their reach eastward by erecting military bases around the borders of the two countries, with near-total disregard for Moscow’s and Tehran’s legitimate security interests. In recent years, under Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule, both states have been resisting Western hegemony, seeking to mend their wounded pride and prestige and attempting to extricate themselves from what they perceived as a lack of international respect and influence. In 2005, Putin said that the fall of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. To give up on Ukraine and allow it to slip out of Russia’s orbit would be a monumental blow to Putin’s efforts for restoring Russia’s position in the international arena.

Since 2006, the United States has successfully amassed consensus among world powers with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the outcome of which were UN sanction resolutions, followed by unilateral US and EU sanctions. Now, a persistent Ukrainian crisis may bring to bear a number of scenarios.

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“Ukraine crisis could strengthen Russia-Iran-China ties,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, March 17, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran

The world powers are seeking a consensus that allows Iran to retain only a small and indigenousuranium enrichment program.Therefore they want to impose significant physical limits on the heavy water facilities, the number and type of centrifuges, the level of enrichment, the amount of stockpiled enriched uranium and the number of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment facilities — as well as install enhanced monitoring and verification measures.

However, these are demands that go beyond existing international nonproliferation commitments, and Iran is unlikely to accept.

The world powers’ limiting strategy poses a risk of pushing Iran to abandon its agreement with the P5+1, expel the IAEA inspectors, disable the IAEA’s monitoring equipment and ultimately build bombs. The bottom line is, the possibility of military confrontation with Iran is real if negotiators cannot agree on a final deal. Such confrontation could unleash terrible regional and international consequences. The world powers and Iran consider the following four scenarios in order to secure a final deal.

First, making Iran’s fatwa, or edict, operational. Iran is committed to a religious decree issued by the country’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei that bans the production, stockpiling and use of all weapons of mass destruction. Respecting its rights to peaceful nuclear technology means that Iran would have no reason to leave the NPT. This eliminates fears of an abrupt shutdown of monitoring the country’s nuclear program, because Iran would not withdraw from the NPT. In such eventuality, Iran and the world powers would forgo the limiting issues and discuss only transparency measures in the final deal.

Second, cooperating on a broad range of issues, including Iran’s enormous energy demands and potential. Such engagement and cooperation would remove all anxieties, not least Iran’s security concerns and the world powers’ fear that the Iranian nuclear program will be diverted toward weaponization.

Third, setting a realistic scope on limits to Iran’s nuclear program. Instead of making impossible demands, such as the closure of Iran’s enrichment site in Fordow or heavy water facilities in Arak, Iran and the P5+1 should agree on realistic limits guaranteeing nonproliferation for a specific confidence-building period. This would enable the IAEA enough time to address all technical ambiguities on the Iranian nuclear program.

Finally, considering a comprehensive vision for a nuclear-free Persian Gulf and Middle East. To actualize such a broad agenda, the world powers should first seek an agreement with Iran acceptable to other regional countries and then use the final deal with Iran as a model for the entire region.

Toward that end, the International Panel for Fissile Material, a team of independent nuclear experts from 15 countries, has proposed sensible measures: a ban on the separation or use of plutonium and uranium-233, restrictions on the use of high enriched uranium as a reactor fuel, limitations on uranium enrichment to less than 6 percent and agreement to a just-in-time system of uranium production rather than stockpiling enriched uranium. Both sides should agree to Iran’s adopting these courses of action.

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“Four scenarios to strike a final nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera America, March 15, 2014.

 

Articles, Publications

Diplomacy, not sanctions, key to deal with Iran

As the American Israel Public Affairs Committee holds its annual policy conference, it would do well to remember that the Obama administration’s diplomacy, not sanctions, has yielded better results, according to a former senior Iranian diplomat.

History shows that coercive US policies toward Iran over the past 35 years have not helped the United States neutralize perceived Iranian threats from any angle. On the contrary, those policies have contributed to creating new dimensions of security concerns and the elevation of those American security concerns that prevously existed.

Despite over three decades of this approach toward Iran, today, the country enjoys an unmatched stability and power in the region while Israel is more isolated than ever. Contrary to the escalation of hostilities, on occasions when the United States has adopted conciliatory tones toward Iran, there has been great success in protecting peace and stability in the region.

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“Diplomacy, not sanctions, key to deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, March 3, 2014.

Articles, Publications

How much nuclear power does Iran need?

The new round of Iran nuclear talks concluded on Feb. 20, where the world powers and Iran agreed on a framework, a plan of action and a timetable to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive agreement in the next four months. “We have had three very productive days during which we have identified all of the issues we need to address in reaching a comprehensive and final agreement,” European Union foreign policy head Catherine Ashton said.

One of the major challenges that negotiations would face, however, is to determine Iran’s real domestic demand for nuclear energy. The reason is that according to the Geneva interim agreement, the comprehensive solution should “involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon (emphasis added).”

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“How much nuclear power does Iran need?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, February 21, 2014.

Articles, Publications

A nuclear deal requires compromise from Iran and the west

At a meeting in Vienna on Tuesday, negotiators from Iran and six world powers will begin hammering out a long-term agreement that would resolve questions related to Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for respecting Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear technology and a gradual lifting of sanctions.

American insistence on “zero enrichment in Iran” is one reason for the failure of past talks. Last November’s deal was only possible because the US was prepared to be more realistic. A comprehensive agreement must offer something for both sides. Measures that go beyond the NPT may be required for a time to build confidence. But Iran cannot be expected to agree to them forever.

Any deal will have to involve compromise on four main issues.

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“A nuclear deal requires compromise from Iran and the west,” Hossein Mousavian, Financial Times, February 16, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Outlines of a Compromise

The world powers and Iran can agree on six principles:

No nuclear weapon in the Middle East.

A ban on production of plutonium and reprocessing in the Middle East.

Stopping the production of highly enriched uranium, with no enrichment beyond five percent in the Middle East.

No stockpiling beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use.

Establishment of a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel.

Regional confidence-building and verification measures by creating a regional authority in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region.

This would be the best path to reach the “comprehensive package” deal on the Iranian nuclear dilemma. The next six months of diplomacy will be decisive and the world powers and Iran should be open to pursuing an agenda of long-term co-operation. Iran’s nuclear deal has the potential to begin controlling fissile material in the Middle East and take meaningful steps toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

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“Outlines of a compromise,” Hossein Mousavian, The Security Times, January 31, 2014.

Essays, Publications

Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ)

Over a decade of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany) have failed. The window for a diplomatic resolution will be most opportune during the second term of President Obama and the election of moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. They have both voiced their readiness for a diplomatic resolution to the current standoff. There is, however, a risk that if the current US/Western policy of pressure politics continues, we will inch toward a military confrontation. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) and Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. The proposed paper will examine the prospects for a breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout capability. For the Iranians, their main demand includes recognition of their rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions. Any negotiated settlement on the Iranian nuclear file will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities, which will enhance non-proliferation efforts. These milestones will pave the way to strengthen the call for concerted efforts to realize the WMDFZ in the Middle East.

Read Policy Paper

“Solution to Iranian nuclear dossier & its role on the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ),” Hossein Mousavian, European University Institute, Policy Paper, No.22. Published by Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Program, December 2013.

Essays, Publications

Solving the Nuclear Conflict with Iran

Key Points:

  • The breakthrough in the negotiations with regard to the Iranian nuclear program was reached because the parameters of the negotiations have changed. This enabled rapprochement between Iran and the United States. The willingness of the P5+1 to accept limited enrichment and provide sanctions relief was key to securing Iranian consent.
  • A sustainable solution to the nuclear conflict with Iran can be agreed upon only on the basis of the NPT and necessitates an end to the discrimination of Iran compared to other member states. Measures that go beyond the provisions of the NPT can be complied with for a specified period of time as a confidence building measure.
  • A final deal can be reached if US-Iran relations are further improved to guarantee domestic US support for an agreement.

Read Policy Brief

“Solving the Nuclear Conflict with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Korber Policy Brief, No.2. Published by Korber Foundation, December 2013. 

Articles, Publications

Una nueva era nuclear en el golfo Pérsico (Spanish)

El enriquecimiento de uranio ha sido el foco de la disputa sobre el programa nuclear iraní entre este país y las potencias mundiales, especialmente Estados Unidos, desde el año 2003. Irán viene argumentando que el enriquecimiento es su “derecho inalienable” en virtud del Tratado de No Proliferación (TNP) y que detener ese proceso es una “línea roja” que no se puede cruzar. Estados Unidos se ha opuesto a la posición de Irán.

El 24 de noviembre, después de cuatro días de conversaciones maratonianas, Irán y el Grupo 5+1 (los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU más Alemania), firmaron finalmente el acuerdo provisional de Ginebra; debe interpretarse como el preámbulo para una solución integral y a largo plazo. Poco después, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores iraní, Mohamed Javad Zarif, aseguró en una conferencia de prensa, que hay en el acuerdo, en dos ocasiones, “una muy clara referencia sobre el hecho de que el programa de enriquecimiento iraní continuará y será parte de cualquier acuerdo, ahora y en el futuro”. Zarif estaba aludiendo a un texto en el Plan de Acción Conjunto que establece que el acuerdo final implicará “un programa de enriquecimiento definido de mutuo acuerdo, con límites prácticos y medidas de transparencia para garantizar el carácter pacífico del programa”.

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“Una nueva era nuclear en el golfo Pérsico,” Hossein Mousavian, El Pais, December 11, 2013. (Spanish)

Articles, Publications

Iran and the nuclear agreement: Trust but verify

The Joint Plan of Action signed in Geneva represents a serious step toward defusing the longstanding dispute between Iran and the West over Iran’s nuclear program. Both sides negotiated seriously and in good faith, overcoming substantial problems while achieving an important agreement.

For the interim agreement to work, however, both sides need to commit unequivocally to fully meeting the obligations on time. There is no room for delays, obfuscation, excuses.

This is not simply a matter of building trust or goodwill. Yes, an interim agreement has been reached, but with 30-plus years of deep distrust and enmity between Iran and the West as the backdrop. There is no sugarcoating the distrust or sense of victimization that pervades this agreement, and the feeling on both sides that the other will not fulfill its obligations or, more bluntly, will cheat.

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“Iran and the nuclear agreement: Trust but verify,” Daniel Kurtzer, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Thomas Pickering, Al-Monitor, December 6, 2013.