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After The Iran Nuclear Deal

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Overcoming a decade of failed nuclear negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany) signed an interim nuclear deal, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), in Geneva on November 24, 2013. The agreement put into motion talks to reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear non-proliferation. It could be a significant step toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone in the Middle East.

According to the interim agreement, Tehran “reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.” The comprehensive solution will build on interim steps and aims to resolve the decades-long nuclear dispute between Iran and world powers. It also paves the way for Iran “to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in conformity with its obligations therein.” To ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, the comprehensive agreement seeks to define a mutually agreed enrichment program with stringent transparency and verification mechanisms in place. The implementation of the agreement will be based on a mutually reciprocal, step-by-step process, to result ultimately in the comprehensive lifting of all unilateral, multilateral and UN Security Council sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.

If diplomacy fails and the interim deal reached in November 2013 does not produce a permanent solution, it will ultimately lead to heightened tensions, a possible all-out war, and force Iran to withdraw from the NPT. Now that against all odds, the United States and European Union have made a deal with Iran, skeptics and opponents have started mobilizing again—in both Tehran as well as in many other capitals, including Washington. In Iran, internal opposition to the deal is driven by concerns related to the hostile policies followed during Obama’s first term and by Israel’s continued challenge of Iran’s right to enrich its nuclear stockpile for energy use. In the United States, internal opposition to the deal and concern about Iranian behavior have been reinforced by two of its closest allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The deep uneasiness in those countries is tangible and immediate, for both see Iran as a mortal enemy, bent on Israel’s destruction and regional hegemony.

Finalizing a deal will require compromise by all parties. One of the key challenges will be the likely American insistence that Tehran make concessions far beyond the NPT requirements. Such demands to curb Iran’s nuclear program include dismantling a significant portion of existing centrifuges and low-enriched uranium stockpiles; closure of Fordo, Iran’s second enrichment site near the city of Qom; dismantling of the Arak heavy water research reactor; and intrusive inspections and monitoring that go beyond the NPT and the Additional Protocol. As an NPT member state, Iran would not accept targeted discrimination.

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“After The Iran Nuclear Deal,” Cairo Review, Hossein Mousavian. Published by the Cairo Review of Global Affairs, July 6 2014.

Articles, Publications

How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, exclusively sent to Iran Review.Org by Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 could have opened a new chapter in Iran–US relations. Iran was among the first countries to denounce the 9/11 Twin Tower terror attacks in New York. Immediately following the condemnation, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of Iran actively began to work within the new paradigm that was created by the September 11 terrorist attack and the subsequent US declaration of a “war on terror.” We were also concerned with the extremist Salafis and the Taliban, whose ideologies we viewed as hostile towards Shia Iran and also dangerous to the broader region.

During a fall 2012 conference in Berlin, James Dobbins told me that Hamid Karzai was the United States’ favored candidate to lead the new Afghan government. “Iranians also supported us,” Dobbins said.

Dobbins highlighted the role of Javad Zarif in the success of the Bonn Conference and the establishment of the new Afghan government. According to a report by Michael Hirsh, in an interview Dobbins,“pointed out that Karzai was a Pashtun from the south, like the majority of the Afghan population.” Tajiks from the Northern Alliance, historically rivals to the Pashtuns, led by Yunus Qanooni, tenaciously demanded the majority share in the new government “since they were the people that had captured Kabul according to Dobbins.” Dobbins  says “that by 4.00 a.m., they had reached a very critical moment. Nobody was able to change Qanooni’s mind. Zarif finally and authoritatively whispered in Qanooni’s ear that, ‘This is the best deal you can get.’ And Qanooni said, ‘OK.’”

Even after the creation of a new Afghan government at the Bonn Conference, talks continued. But suddenly, there came a veritable bombshell. President Bush, only a few weeks after the Bonn Conference, stunned us by including Iran in the “axis of evil” during his January 2002 State of the Union address. Talks continued but the Iranians’appetite for cooperation was diminished. Every person involved, from Khatami down, had the same feeling—betrayed! The word namaknashnas (a person one feeds, and later expresses betrayal rather than appreciation) was the word frequently used to characterize George Bush’s behavior.

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“How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, June 24, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Opinion: A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East

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The Middle East is witnessing too many challenges: a return of a regional cold war, the increasing role and weight of non-state actors, the threat of failed or failing states, the reemergence of strong transnationalism through the rise of Islamism and sectarianism, the rise and consolidation of jihadist terrorism on the shores of the Mediterranean, and the revival of sub-national identities fearful of the present or of the future. All of this threatens the fabric of existing states, providing an attractive space for interference, intervention, and confrontation by proxy.

The people of the Arab world, Iran and Turkey are forever condemned to live together in this region. They need to talk to, rather than about, each other. They are facing common threats, and they each have huge potential and influence in the region and beyond. Restoring peace and stability in the Middle East will not be possible so long as individual preferences and influences are not channeled into a coordinated approach to securing the common interest.

Once established, the conference would convene at the ministerial level at regular intervals; it could convene any other time at a lower level as well. It could also entrust small committees of experts and officials with exploring solutions to certain crises or ways to contain issues, or with developing confidence-building measures for such purpose. Such committees could, perhaps, report to the general conference with policy suggestions.

The four major regional powers—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Turkey—can and should take the initiative to launch such a process. This quartet, along with other countries in the region, have too many overlapping, intersecting and interdependent issues and areas of mutual interest. Such concerns can be better addressed within the framework of a conference such as we are proposing, which would give the opportunity to avoid new crises, contain existing ones, develop better understandings, and work out common approaches to problems.

Indeed, there are crises in this region that could escalate into war—and this is a region witnessing a proliferation of crises. Most of them are complex in nature, bringing together internal and external factors in a highly volatile Middle East. Even more, all sorts of links exist between these various crises.

The question that remains now is whether these four main powers will rise to this challenge and take the initiative to develop a comprehensive vision of the role of such a forum. Will they join forces with others to turn this idea into a working reality, or will they remain entangled in an increasingly fragmented Middle East?

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“Opinion: A Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian with Nassif Hitti, Asharq Al-Awsat, June 10, 2014.

Essays, Publications

Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy

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An early version of this article appeared online June 9 because of the high interest in the ongoing negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The version below, which also appears in the print edition of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, was updated to reflect minor editorial changes to the previously posted version. 

Iran is negotiating with a group of six states over the future of its nuclear program. In November 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to a Joint Plan of Action that seeks to reach a “comprehensive solution” by July 20, 2014. The goal is to agree on a set of measures that can provide reasonable assurance that Iran’s nuclear program will be used only for peaceful purposes and thus enable the lifting of international sanctions imposed on Iran over the past decade because of proliferation concerns.

A key challenge is to agree how to limit Iran’s uranium-enrichment program, which is based on gas centrifuges, in a way that would enable Iran to meet what it sees as its future needs for low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear research and power reactors while forestalling the possibility that this program could be adapted to quickly produce highly enriched uranium at levels and in amounts suitable for nuclear weapons.

This article proposes a compromise based on a two-stage approach that involves Iran maintaining a capacity for enriching a small amount of uranium annually for research reactor fuel in the short term and developing a potential enrichment capacity in the longer term that would be appropriate to fuel power reactors. Iranian supply needs for its power reactors will develop in 2021 if Tehran decides to fuel the existing Bushehr power reactor domestically, in whole or in part, rather than renewing its fuel supply contract with Russia or buying fuel from another foreign supplier.

The proposed compromise also reflects Tehran’s plan to shift from its current low-power, first-generation centrifuges to high-capacity machines that are still under development.

This article therefore suggests that, during the next five years, Iran should modernize its enrichment facilities and in doing so, keep its operating capacity at about the current level rather than begin to operate the many thousands of first-generation machines that it already has installed and continue setting up more. During this period, Iran could phase out its first-generation machines in favor of the second-generation centrifuges it already has installed but has not yet operated. At the same time, it could develop, produce, and store components for a future generation of centrifuges that would be suitable for commercial-scale deployment. These later-generation centrifuges would not need to be assembled, except for test machines, until at least 2019.

To maintain the confidence of the international community that there will be no diversion of centrifuge components to a secret enrichment plant, the current transparency measures that Iran has undertaken for its centrifuge program would continue. These transparency measures should become the standard for transparency for centrifuge production worldwide.

Finally, the article suggests that the five-year period created by this proposal be used as an opportunity by Iran, the P5+1, and other interested states to explore in a second stage of the negotiations a multinational uranium-enrichment arrangement that would see Iran deploy its advanced centrifuges in a new regional, multinational facility rather than a national enrichment plant. By committing to working on such multinational arrangements for the Middle East and, ultimately, around the world, Iran and the P5+1 could chart a path to greatly reduce the proliferation risks that stem from national control of enrichment plants, regardless of location.

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Latest Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, July/August, 2014.

Older Version:

“Agreeing on Limits for Iran’s Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Frank von Hippel. Published by Arms Control Today, June 9, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless.

Part (1): Four major, interrelated elements shape Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the US

Page: 161

First, he wholeheartedly believes that regardless of all the ups and downs, pushes and pulls between Iran and the US, Washington’s ultimate intention is to topple Iran’s Islamic system and subordinate them within a Pax Americana, as it did during the Shah’s era after the 1953 coup. Ayatollah Khamenei maintains that the US, no matter which school of thought and party is in power or which president has taken office, intends to “wipe out the Islamic Republic”with all possible means at its disposal. The conclusion he draws from US rhetoric, policies, and behavior is that the US will not relent from its desire for regime change unless the current government surrenders its principles, religious beliefs, political structure, and independence. The United States’ tacit support for Saddam Hussein’s invasion and provision of material support, its covert operations, support for belligerent groups and the Islamic Republic’s opposition (including a budgetary provision), its denial of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment under the NPT, and its intrusive and paralyzing economic sanctions are all viewed by Ayatollah Khamenei as indisputable attempts to bring about an end to the Islamic Republic. He maintains that the US’s primary objective is to undermine the Islamic government by fostering internal disorder and, ultimately, regime change.

The second element that shapes Ayatollah Khamenei’s disposition towards the US is his firm belief that US foreign policy in the Middle East, and specifically regarding Iran, is overwhelmingly dominated by the pro-Israel lobby. From his point of view, even the president of the United States does not have any authority over US foreign policy. He is surprised that year after year, the president or other high-level officials of the most powerful country on earth attend American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) gatherings and report what they have done to undermine the Iranian government and satisfy pro-Israel lobby demands. Although there is in general a consensus within the nezam about Israel’s influence on US Middle East policy, some argue that it is the Zionists who determine the US foreign policy, and not Americans.

The third element shaping the Supreme Leader’s perception of the US is his extreme mistrust of American politics. The documents confiscated by students after seizing the US Embassy seemed to justify such a stance by many high-echelon Iranian politicians, including Ayatollah Khamenei. According to those documents, the embassy was involved in espionage and the fostering of covert links to members of the new government and army.

Finally, Ayatollah Khamenei’s sees the American government and the system it represents as addicted to arrogance and hegemony. He feels that if a country is not seen as a “great power,” then a lord–serf relationship is the only kind of relationship that the US is prepared to accept.

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“Why Ayatollah Khamenei is Pessimistic about Relations with the United States,” Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, June 1, 2014.

Articles, Publications

US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity

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The talks between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany and Iran are moving “very slowly and with difficulty,” Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said May 16 after the conclusion of the latest round of negotiations in Vienna. The next day, lead Iranian negotiator and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted, “Back from Vienna after tough discussions. Agreement is possible. But illusions need to go. Opportunity shouldn’t be missed again like in 2005.”

A comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers, ending three decades of estrangement, hostility and sanctions, has never been closer, but it would be a tragedy if the current round of talks ended up on the list of missed opportunities between the United States and Iran, as I recount in my new book co-authored with Shahir Shahidsaless, “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.”

The current precarious state of affairs cannot be sustained. If no common ground is created between Iran and the United States and the other world powers on the nuclear issue, one of two scenarios with similar outcomes, is likely to occur. As pressures build over time, patience for long diplomatic processes will wane and military confrontation could take the place of diplomacy. Or, as the United States tightens sanctions even further, Iran’s retaliatory actions may lead to an inadvertent or deliberate confrontation. The already crisis-stricken Middle East and the potential for a wider military confrontation should give greater urgency for the opportunity not to be missed this time.

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“US, Iran cannot afford another missed opportunity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 26, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward

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Since reaching an interim nuclear deal last November, Iran and the world powers have been attempting to finalize a comprehensive nuclear deal by late July.

The Iranian stance on the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction was clearly expressed through a fatwa issued by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Addressing more than 120 heads of state and officials at the 16th Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran on August 30, 2012, he stated: “The Islamic Republic—logically, religiously and theoretically—considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.” Ayatollah Khamenei added that Iran “proposed the idea of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons, and we are committed to it.”

Iran has already declared its willingness to secularize that fatwa. Such a move would facilitate and expedite a final nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers. However, the fatwa, with its strong roots in Islamic belief, could also play a constructive role far beyond resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis.

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“Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa Shows the Way Forward,” Hossein Mousavian Asharq Al-Awsat, May 10, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty

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The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the sole internationally recognized treaty which has been dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty was recognized in 1970 as an international law. At that time, five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, the UK, Russia, China, and France) were nuclear-powered states. Following the conclusion of the NPT, three more countries, namely, India, Pakistan and North Korea, in addition to Israel developed nuclear weapons as well. These are also the sole countries that have so far refrained from accession to the NPT. At present, 189 countries are member states of this treaty and committed to creating a world free from nuclear weapons. The NPT is based on three major principles: 1. Nuclear disarmament, according to which big powers have been obligated to gradually destroy their arsenals of nuclear weapons; 2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and 3.Commitment of countries to promote peaceful nuclear activities.

Member states of the NPT have committed to hold an NPT review conference every five years in order to review performance of the parties to the treaty with regard to their treaty obligations. As a result, a preparatory committee was set up in New York, which meets every year to discuss the implementation of the treaty and take necessary decisions in this regard. At the moment, the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT is underway at the United Nations Office in New York (and will continue until May 9, 2014). An expert delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran is also present at the session.

During the NPT review conference in 2010, an action plan known as the NPT Action Plan was adopted by the participants. The action plan consisted of 64 actions, including 22 actions on the nuclear disarmament and 23 actions on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The rest of the plan was focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

A review of reports prepared by specialized international institutions will show that out of the aforesaid 64 actions stipulated in the NPT Action Plan, about 28 actions have been relatively implemented. The implementation of 21 actions has been very poor while the degree of progress on 15 other actions has remained practically at zero. The main point, however, is that most of those 28 actions that have been relatively implemented are related to promoting cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the contrary, those 15 actions, which have not been implemented yet, are all related to nuclear disarmament.

Let’s not forget that the first and foremost goal of the NPT is to create a world free from nuclear weapons. Now, more than 40 years after the treaty entered into force and despite the fact that 15 actions specified by the treaty and agreed upon by international community are related to nuclear disarmament, big powers have still retained more than 20,000 articles of nuclear weapons of which 90 percent is in the possession of the United States and Russia. As a result, the big powers have not only refused to fulfill their obligations with regard to the promotion of nuclear disarmament, but have also modernized their stockpiles of nuclear weapons during the past decades. Without a doubt, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are the biggest violators of the NPT while, at the same time, having the highest responsibility for the full implementation of the contents of the treaty.

During the past decade, big global powers have focused all the resources of international community on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program and have imposed the most brutal sanctions against the country in spite of the fact that Iran is a party to the NPT, has no nuclear weapons and, according to frequent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there has been no diversion in its nuclear energy program toward production of nuclear weapons. However, the same powers have been largely indifferent toward possession of nuclear weapons by countries like India, Pakistan and Israel, have taken no steps against them, and have even established strategic relations with them! At the same time, those big powers have never been taken to task for the violation of their obligations with regard to nuclear disarmament.

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“Proposals for Better Implementation of Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, May 7, 2014.

Essays, Publications

Future of US-Iran Relations

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Abstract: The election of Hassan Rouhani has been the start of a new path for Iran’s foreign policy, including its relationship with Washington. This paper discusses three schools of thought prevalent in Iran’s regime towards the US, ranging from those who believe America is addicted to hegemony, to those who believe there is inherent antagonism between Iran’s Islamic system and the West to those who represent a more moderate stance, including current President Hassan Rouhani. The paper concludes that if relations between Iran and the US improve, there will likely be pressure from the US on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its other allies in the region to minimize tension with Iran, particularly in order to solve conflicts in the region from Lebanon to Afghanistan without losing Saudi or Iran as allies.

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“Future of US-Iran Relations,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Dossier: Iran-US Rapprochement: Iran’s Future Role, Published by Al Jazeera, April 2014.