Publications

Articles, Publications

What’s holding up Iran nuclear deal?

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A diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue — the sooner the better — will remove the threat of any future military conflagration in the Middle East, already in tumult with the ongoing ugly violence in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. An ultimate failure of the nuclear negotiations, whether torpedoed by the Israel-US Congress joint effort or other naysayers, would play in the hands of certain quarters in Iran to push for withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty — an eventuality that I presume few people would like to face after the North Korean affair.

With the stakes as high as they are, both with the nuclear dossier and the situation in the region, it is incumbent on the US Congress to act in a way to give diplomacy a real chance and regional stability a real boost. The bottom line is clear: Both sides need each other. The United States without Iran would continue to see its problems in the region remain unresolved or even aggravated, and Iran without the United States would continue to suffer in other ways.

 

 

“What’s holding up Iran nuclear deal?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, January 7, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Why geopolitical shifts dictate nuclear deal with Iran

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Although a week of high-level talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna made good progress, negotiators failed to reach an agreement and instead set a new deadline of March 1, 2015, for a framework agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and a July 1 deadline for the final agreement, including annexes.

As a result of the tectonic developments in the Middle East in recent years, the geopolitics of the region have shifted significantly. Amid 35 years of all-out sanctions and pressure on Iran, the outcomes of the Middle East’s ebbs and flows include Iran’s emergence as the most stable country in the area and as a regional power, Arab countries either in turmoil or vulnerable to unrest and destabilization and the unprecedented rise of violent extremist groups. These developments could serve as the impetus for an Iranian-Western rapprochement, despite the inconclusive talks in Vienna.

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“Why geopolitical shifts dictate nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 27, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Ankara tries to recast war on terror

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While the emergence of terrorism in unprecedented forms has sent tremors of anxiety around the globe, Turkey unyieldingly swims against the tide. Despite its Nato membership, it adamantly refuses to participate in multilateral actions with the United States and its allies, Arab countries, Iran, Russia and Syria. While these countries have not acted in unison, they are engaged in a massive endeavour aimed at bringing down Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and eliminating terrorist groups.

The question, then: “What motivates Turkey to act unilaterally despite further isolating itself from the global community?”

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“Ankara tries to recast war on terror,” Hossein Mousavian, Gulf News, November 16, 2014.

Articles, Publications

How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal

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The ninth round of talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group of world powers ended on Tuesday without a breakthrough to seal a deal over Iran’s nuclear programme ahead of a 24 November deadline.

“It would be wrong to speak about any kind of major progress” at the Oman talks, but “there was no setback, no disruption and no deadlock,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency.

Moreover, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, the West was facing a “make-or-break moment” to reach a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.

While the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive package is low, it is still possible for the sides to agree on the general outlines of a nuclear accord before the deadline.

At the moment the key sticking points to a deal are twofold: the need to resolve issues of uranium enrichment capacity, and the timing and pace of the removal of sanctions.

With major progress already achieved in previous rounds of talks, other questions such as limits on enrichment levels, size of uranium stockpiles, and allowing inspections at Iran’s Fordo nuclear plant can be resolved if the two inter-related issues can be worked out.

Three-phase approach

There are ways this can be done. The principle should be that transparency and confidence-building measures by Iran and sanctions relief by the world powers go hand-in-hand and can be adjusted in a reciprocal fashion. This could be achieved through a phased approach:

Phase one

For immediate implementation after a deal is signed. In this phase, Iran should:

  1. Agree to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which includes snap visits by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors – signed but suspended by Iran in 2007
  2. Agree to provisional implementation of the modified Subsidiary Arrangement (Code 3.1) to the IAEA’s Safeguards Agreement – requiring signatory states to report any decisions to build new nuclear facilities but suspended by Iran since 2007
  3. Continue to cap uranium enrichment at 5% as agreed in November 2013
  4. Begin converting the enrichment site at Fordo to an R&D site
  5. Begin technical conversions at the heavy water facility at Arak to limit the production of plutonium, (material which can be used in a nuclear weapon)
  6. Begin addressing the Possible Military Dimension issues (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear programme with the IAEA
  7. Continue not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel at the Arak plant
  8. Begin limiting the current stockpiles of uranium to the level of practical needs
  9. Cap the enrichment capacity at the current operational level of about 9,400 centrifuges and not activate the other 12,000 already installed but not operational

These measures would guarantee the maximum level of Iran’s transparency and no so-called “breakout” capability – ie rush to make a bomb.

In return, the world powers should suspend all unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

Phase two

For implementation over a possible six-month period. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Complete a technical redesign of Arak heavy water facilities which would lower the current capacity of 10kg plutonium production to 1kg per year
  2. Complete conversion of Fordo as an R&D site
  3. Resolve PMD issues with the IAEA
  4. Approve Additional Protocol in the cabinet and submit to Parliament.

In return, the world powers should lift all sanctions imposed by European Union and the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions, while the US unilateral sanctions remain suspended.

Phase three

Phase three, as the final phase, should be completed before the end of President Barack Obama’s term in office. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Ratify the Additional Protocol by Parliament
  2. Approve at Cabinet level the Safeguard Agreement Code 3.1
  3. Commit to cap the level of the enrichment at 5% for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  4. Commit not to reprocess spent fuel at Arak for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  5. Commit to cap the stockpile of uranium at a level that is needed for domestic practical needs a longer period to be agreed by negotiations

‘Maximum transparency’

While Iran does not need to reprocess and enrich beyond 5% for many years, a longer period on these three phases would meet the world powers’ demand for longer duration of confidence-building measures on no “breakout”.

In return, the US should lift all unilateral sanctions suspended in phase one and the UNSC should lift the proliferation sanctions and normalise the Iranian nuclear dossier at the United Nations and the IAEA.

The P5+1 needs assurances of maximum transparency on the Iranian nuclear programme and confidence there will be no “breakout”.

Iran’s two main objectives are respecting its rights for peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and lifting the unilateral and multilateral related sanctions.

This package includes the two key objectives of the world powers and Iran with a realistic timetable and proportionate reciprocations.

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“How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal,” Hossein Mousavian, BBC, November 16, 2014.

 

Essays, Publications

Iran: Assessing New, Emerging Geopolitics in the Middle East

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The Middle East has experienced profound changes since the Afghanistan War in 2001, which have brought about the emergence of new actors and new challenges for the region. For the ambassador and researcher at Princeton University, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the international threat represented by the expansion of terrorism in Iraq and Syria has opened a new path of hope in the negotiations on the Teheran nuclear programme, given that it is a sufficient incentive both to forge new alliances and for Iran to reach a security and cooperation agreement with the USA and its allies for stability in the region.

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“Iran: Assessing New, Emerging Geopolitics in the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, European Institute of the Mediterranean: IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014. Published by IEMed, November 2014.

Essays, Publications

The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East

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After a decade of failed nuclear negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), they have finally fleshed out a temporary agreement that will hopefully restore trust in the peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program among all parties. To do so, the temporary agreement must become the basis for renewed discussions on a final deal and the contours of a regional nuclear order in the Middle East. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran will have a profound impact on nuclear nonproliferation, a nuclear weapons−free zone (NWFZ), and a zone free of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.

This article examines the consequences of the breakthrough in nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1. A negotiated settlement will be based on the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with measures to address key demands from all parties involved. For the P5+1, this includes transparency and verification over the nature of the Iranian nuclear program, ensuring there will be no breakout. Iran’s main demand includes respecting its rights under the NPT, including enrichment and lifting sanctions, as negotiated in the November 2013 interim agreement between it and the P5+1. Furthermore, a permanent settlement on the Iranian nuclear issue will inevitably introduce modified and newly formulated measures and technical modalities at the regional level, which will enhance nonproliferation efforts. These milestones, which are described in this article, will pave the way toward strengthening the call for concerted efforts to realize a WMDFZ in the Middle East and will help preserve the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in the future.

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“The Solution to the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and Its Consequences for the Middle East,” Hossein Mousavian, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 529-544. Published by Global Governance, October 2014.

Articles, Publications

7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity

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Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are aiming to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program by Nov. 24. Iranian and US officials have confirmed that progress was made in the extremely complicated nuclear talks in mid-October in Vienna.

The progress achieved to date is unprecedented. US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman said Oct. 23, “We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable. We have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a possible text.” If a deal is not reached, it will mean no limits at all on Iran’s enrichment program and missing the best opportunity in a decade to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.

The following are seven reasons not to be too overly concerned about Iran’s breakout capability.

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“7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 4, 2014.

Articles, Publications

A chance for mainstream Islam to unite against ISIS

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There are few happy consequences of the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which has swept across Iraq and Syria since the beginning of the year. A rare shaft of light, however, is to be found in the rapprochement between the two biggest branches of the Islamic mainstream.

Shia and Sunni Islam have been at odds for most of the past decade. But the self-declared caliphate of terror known as Isis presents them with a common challenge. And they are beginning to put aside their differences in an effort to meet it.

The grand clerics of both schools – the Shia from Tehran, Qom and Najaf, and the Sunni from Riyadh and Cairo – have called upon their followers to take up arms against Isis. Political leaders have also declared their support for an intensified campaign. When the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers met in New York in September, both diplomats hailed the opening of a new chapter in relations between their countries.

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“A chance for mainstream Islam to unite against ISIS,” Hossein Mousavian, Financial Times, October 23, 2014.

Articles, Publications

Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution

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During three decades, the United States exercised all measures, short of military intervention, to bring about regime change in Iran. For reasons that I have discussed in depth and extensively in my newly published book, “Iran and The United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” all efforts have failed and contrary to expectations today, Iran is the most stable and powerful country in the region.

The current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for the United States to revisit its three decades of failed policies toward Iran. Just recently, US Vice-President Joe Biden accused America’s key allies in the Middle East of allowing the rise of the Islamic State by supporting extremists with money and weapons to oust the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria.

Interestingly, Iran’s nuclear issue, which has become the Gordian knot in US-Iran relations, can, if resolved, be transformed to a springboard for strategic cooperation between the two states for the restoration of security and stability in the region.

To reach the final deal by Nov. 24, Iran and the EU3 negotiators have already been able to address three key areas of dispute: the future of the Arak heavy water reactor, the future of the Fordo enrichment plant and the issue of more expanded access to Iran’s nuclear-related facilities for International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. The support of the US Congress would be instrumental to the success of Iran’s nuclear negotiations to resolve the remaining disputed cases by Nov. 24, ending decades of animosity between Washington and Tehran and opening doors on an overdue cooperation aimed at combating the rise of terrorists and the emergence of the caliphate of terror.

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“Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, October 14, 2014.

Essays, Publications

Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set

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An understanding of the critical role and mind-set of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is essential for anyone wishing to assess the prospects of a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington. It is important to note that the aims and policy choices espoused by the Supreme Leader have to be understood within the context of the immediate political circumstances at the time of his appointment as Supreme Leader and the evolution of global geopolitics since the end of the Cold War. Under the rule of the Shah of Iran, throughout most of the Cold War period, Iran’s role had been that of a client state under Western (U. S. ) hegemony. In fact, this had been Iran’s position in the world order for most of the last two centuries. This subservience was caused by its dependence on the rising Imperial powers of Great Britain and Russia and later the United States.

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“Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set,” Hossein Mousavian in A. Maleki & J. Tirman (Eds.). U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue (pp. 37–56). Published by Bloomsbury Academic (10/2014).