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Articles, Publications

What Obama should say to King Salman during his visit

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The relationship between Iran and its southern Arab neighbors — namely, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states — has been turbulent for the past few decades. The GCC states were under the shadow of Iraq and Iran, the two prevailing powers in the Persian Gulf, for much of the 20th century, with the latter historically being the more dominant power. Stricken with internal disputes, weak central governments and rivalries among themselves, the Arab states along the Persian Gulf’s southern coast were never in a position to challenge the powers to their north.

The situation changed after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, which brought political Islam to the geopolitical scene. The autocratic Persian Gulf monarchies immediately felt threatened by this new political force, which had the potential to undermine their legitimacy and jeopardize their rule. Within this context, in 1981 they established the GCC, comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 had provided a convenient excuse to exclude Iraq and Yemen, notable omissions even though the latter does not border on the Persian Gulf, and Iraq has close to 40 miles of coastline.

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“What Obama should say to King Salman during his visit,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, September 4, 2015.

Articles, Publications

A rejection of the nuclear deal could lead to radicalism in Iran

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With the ongoing domestic in-fighting in the United States and Iran over the nuclear deal — which has already become legally binding by way of a U.N. Security Council resolution — it has become clear that Congress poses the biggest risk for the deal falling through. Congress’s ability to play a spoiler role comes not only from the power it has to scuttle the deal altogether but also from its efforts at fostering an uncertain atmosphere regarding the removal of sanctions on Iran.

The effectiveness of the nuclear deal will rely largely on the P5+1 instilling confidence in the global business community that sanctions have been removed and the country is open for business. Truly removing sanctions in a way that would have tangible benefits for Iran would require shaping expectations in such a way that businesses do not feel their investments are precarious and susceptible to the political machinations of Congress or a future U.S. president.

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“A rejection of the nuclear deal could lead to radicalism in Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, The Washington Post, August 28, 2015.

Articles, Publications

If Congress Rejects the Iran Deal, It Would Be a Historic Blunder

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The comprehensive nuclear agreement reached between Iran and six world powers represents a milestone achievement for the cause of global peace and security. Such a diplomatic resolution to a long-running dispute between rival powers has only rarely occurred in history. With this historic deal at hand, the dawn of a new age of relations between Iran and the United States is within sight.

 

The morphing of the Iranian nuclear dispute into a zero-sum battle in which war seemed an inevitability, coupled with the presence of prudent leadership in Tehran and Washington that understood this reality, spurred the diplomatic approach that led to this deal. This roughly 100-page agreement, meticulously crafted by the indefatigable diplomats of Iran and the P5+1, not only averts another catastrophic war in the world’s most volatile region, but sets new non-proliferation standards that can be applied throughout the world.

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“If Congress Rejects the Iran Deal, It Would Be a Historic Blunder,” Hossein Mousavian, Huffington Post, August 21, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Together, Iran and the United States can shape the Middle East’s future

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The historic deal negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 world powers will have far-reaching implications. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Middle East and indeed the world will never be the same. The peaceful resolution of what had become one of the most pressing crises of our time is a victory for the cause of stability and order in the Middle East.

As many observers have pointed out, this deal will be a major part of President Obama’s legacy. However, the reason behind its significance is not simply that it has resolved the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, a huge achievement in its own right, but that it has opened the door for a new US approach towards the Middle East.

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“Together, Iran and the United States can shape the Middle East’s future,” Hossein Mousavian, Telegraph, July 14, 2015.

Articles, Publications

The experts assess the Iran agreement of 2015

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This roughly 100-page agreement, meticulously crafted by the tireless and sagacious diplomats of Iran and the P5+1, represents a milestone achievement in the cause of non-proliferation. This deal ensures a fully transparent Iranian nuclear program in a verifiable way, adopts new sets of measures guaranteeing there can be no diversion towards weaponization in Iran, acknowledges Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil for peaceful purposes, and secures the removal of the draconian sanctions regime imposed on Iran.

Furthermore, this deal serves as a model for how to address future proliferation challenges throughout the world. A template has been created for how countries can develop nuclear energy programs without eliciting concern that they may develop nuclear weapons. Several principles can be enshrined into international non-proliferation law based on this agreement, including ceasing the production of plutonium and the separation of plutonium, halting the production of highly enriched uranium, and prohibiting the stockpiling beyond peaceful domestic needs of nuclear fuel.

Broader steps that can also be taken after the implementation of this agreement include establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, a longtime goal of Iran. The Middle East is already in an incredibly volatile state, and the possession of nuclear weapons by any power only serves to exacerbate instability and tension throughout the region. There is a clearly an urgent need for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, and this nuclear agreement sets a positive precedent in this regard.

This diplomatic agreement also marks a major step towards decreasing tensions and hostility between Iran and the United States. It can be used as a starting point to address other areas of conflict between the two nations, specifically on issues related to regional rivalries and security-related issues such as terrorism. Iran and the United States both stand to benefit immensely from increased cooperation with one another. By compromising on the nuclear issue, the door is opened.

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“The experts assess the Iran agreement of 2015,” Hossein Mousavian, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 14, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Why doesn’t Iran trust the US?

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Top-ranking diplomats from Iran and the world powers are currently engaging in intensive talks to narrow their differences and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by July 1. The main obstacle to attaining such an agreement is the fundamental lack of trust that exists between the two sides. If there was trust, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would have been enough to quell any concerns regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Currently, all sticking points are related to measures beyond the NPT. The sustainable solution is for both sides to take confidence-building measures to ease the suspicions they have of each other. While US qualms with Iran are well known in the West, it is vital for the US public to gain a better understanding of the reasons for Iranian antipathy toward the US government.

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“Why doesn’t Iran trust the US?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, June 23, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Building confidence, implications of the nuclear deal with Iran

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On April 2, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 reached a framework agreement that ensures intrusive transparency and confidence building measures on Iran’s nuclear program in return for a lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions and respecting the legitimate rights of Iran for enrichment, with continued talks until the June 30 deadline toward a comprehensive deal. This initial agreement is a positive step toward ending 12 years of contention over Iran’s nuclear program. The next few weeks will be particularly difficult, as thorny technical issues are negotiated and specific phasing out of sanctions is agreed upon. While the drama over the nuclear talks will continue for the next few weeks until the comprehensive agreement is reached and goes into effect, we have to look at the post-deal environment. This includes the implications for Iran’s nuclear program for the next ten to 25 years; confidence building and nuclear non-proliferation; and Iran’s relations with the West and the region.

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“Building confidence, implications of the nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Security Times, June 1, 2015.

Articles, Publications

How do we solve the Iran talks’ verification dilemma?

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After Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, expressed his opposition to the inspection of Iranian military facilities and the interrogation of Iranian scientists as part of any would-be nuclear deal, the issue quickly became the most controversial aspect of the nuclear negotiations in Iran. It is only natural that allowing foreign inspectors access to Iranian military facilities and making Iranian scientists vulnerable to such questioning would damage Iranian national pride, as it would in any country. In fact, this is a matter that threatens to scuttle the entire negotiating process.

This unprecedentedly invasive type of inspections hearkens back to the issue of possible military dimensions (PMD) to the Iranian nuclear program. Western concerns over PMD go back to even before 2003, when the Iranian nuclear program first came under international spotlight. In his 2006 book “State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration,” The New York Times journalist James Risen revealed that the CIA had attempted to plant evidence in Iran that would make it seem the country was pursuing nuclear weapons in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Such “evidence” could feasibly have been used as a pretext for military intervention against Iran. With that said, in 2011 the United States and its NATO allies released thousands of pages of documents and pictures to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that allegedly revealed there had been military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.

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“How do we solve the Iran talks’ verification dilemma?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, June 6, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Will Camp David spur regional cooperation?

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President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council leaders at Camp David on May 14 looks by all accounts like a face-saving attempt by Washington. A well-publicized, high-wire meeting, verbal reassurances, perhaps promises of more political support and some advanced military hardware, that’s all. Nothing more can and should be expected; they simply cannot prevent the nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) from going through.

The invitation to Washington, in the statement right before the nuclear framework agreement with Iran was announced in Lausanne April 2, was apparently meant to reassure the Arab states in the Persian Gulf that the deal with Tehran did not mean their abandonment. The psychological-emotional aspect of the suggestion was more than obvious. Initial expressions of Arab dissatisfaction with the expected deal — and more importantly, its longer term implications of a possible Iran-US rapprochement — signaled knee-jerk reactions to the development, bound to have quite serious repercussions for everybody: the United States, Iran and its Arab neighbors on the southern shore of the strategic Persian Gulf and on a larger scale, the greater Middle East. That much is certain, even if the exact nature of future developments have yet to unfold and the emerging regional power calculus is inevitably different from what it has been since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the onset of tension and animosity between Tehran and Washington.

 

“Will Camp David spur regional cooperation?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 14, 2015.