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How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal

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The ninth round of talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group of world powers ended on Tuesday without a breakthrough to seal a deal over Iran’s nuclear programme ahead of a 24 November deadline.

“It would be wrong to speak about any kind of major progress” at the Oman talks, but “there was no setback, no disruption and no deadlock,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency.

Moreover, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, the West was facing a “make-or-break moment” to reach a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.

While the likelihood of reaching a comprehensive package is low, it is still possible for the sides to agree on the general outlines of a nuclear accord before the deadline.

At the moment the key sticking points to a deal are twofold: the need to resolve issues of uranium enrichment capacity, and the timing and pace of the removal of sanctions.

With major progress already achieved in previous rounds of talks, other questions such as limits on enrichment levels, size of uranium stockpiles, and allowing inspections at Iran’s Fordo nuclear plant can be resolved if the two inter-related issues can be worked out.

Three-phase approach

There are ways this can be done. The principle should be that transparency and confidence-building measures by Iran and sanctions relief by the world powers go hand-in-hand and can be adjusted in a reciprocal fashion. This could be achieved through a phased approach:

Phase one

For immediate implementation after a deal is signed. In this phase, Iran should:

  1. Agree to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which includes snap visits by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors – signed but suspended by Iran in 2007
  2. Agree to provisional implementation of the modified Subsidiary Arrangement (Code 3.1) to the IAEA’s Safeguards Agreement – requiring signatory states to report any decisions to build new nuclear facilities but suspended by Iran since 2007
  3. Continue to cap uranium enrichment at 5% as agreed in November 2013
  4. Begin converting the enrichment site at Fordo to an R&D site
  5. Begin technical conversions at the heavy water facility at Arak to limit the production of plutonium, (material which can be used in a nuclear weapon)
  6. Begin addressing the Possible Military Dimension issues (PMDs) of Iran’s nuclear programme with the IAEA
  7. Continue not to reprocess spent nuclear fuel at the Arak plant
  8. Begin limiting the current stockpiles of uranium to the level of practical needs
  9. Cap the enrichment capacity at the current operational level of about 9,400 centrifuges and not activate the other 12,000 already installed but not operational

These measures would guarantee the maximum level of Iran’s transparency and no so-called “breakout” capability – ie rush to make a bomb.

In return, the world powers should suspend all unilateral and multilateral sanctions.

Phase two

For implementation over a possible six-month period. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Complete a technical redesign of Arak heavy water facilities which would lower the current capacity of 10kg plutonium production to 1kg per year
  2. Complete conversion of Fordo as an R&D site
  3. Resolve PMD issues with the IAEA
  4. Approve Additional Protocol in the cabinet and submit to Parliament.

In return, the world powers should lift all sanctions imposed by European Union and the United Nations Security Council’s economic sanctions, while the US unilateral sanctions remain suspended.

Phase three

Phase three, as the final phase, should be completed before the end of President Barack Obama’s term in office. In this phase Iran should:

  1. Ratify the Additional Protocol by Parliament
  2. Approve at Cabinet level the Safeguard Agreement Code 3.1
  3. Commit to cap the level of the enrichment at 5% for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  4. Commit not to reprocess spent fuel at Arak for a longer period to be agreed by negotiations
  5. Commit to cap the stockpile of uranium at a level that is needed for domestic practical needs a longer period to be agreed by negotiations

‘Maximum transparency’

While Iran does not need to reprocess and enrich beyond 5% for many years, a longer period on these three phases would meet the world powers’ demand for longer duration of confidence-building measures on no “breakout”.

In return, the US should lift all unilateral sanctions suspended in phase one and the UNSC should lift the proliferation sanctions and normalise the Iranian nuclear dossier at the United Nations and the IAEA.

The P5+1 needs assurances of maximum transparency on the Iranian nuclear programme and confidence there will be no “breakout”.

Iran’s two main objectives are respecting its rights for peaceful nuclear technology, including enrichment, and lifting the unilateral and multilateral related sanctions.

This package includes the two key objectives of the world powers and Iran with a realistic timetable and proportionate reciprocations.

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“How Iran and world powers can reach nuclear deal,” Hossein Mousavian, BBC, November 16, 2014.

 

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7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity

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Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany are aiming to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program by Nov. 24. Iranian and US officials have confirmed that progress was made in the extremely complicated nuclear talks in mid-October in Vienna.

The progress achieved to date is unprecedented. US nuclear negotiator Wendy Sherman said Oct. 23, “We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable. We have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a possible text.” If a deal is not reached, it will mean no limits at all on Iran’s enrichment program and missing the best opportunity in a decade to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran.

The following are seven reasons not to be too overly concerned about Iran’s breakout capability.

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“7 reasons not to worry about Iran’s enrichment capacity,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, November 4, 2014.

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A chance for mainstream Islam to unite against ISIS

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There are few happy consequences of the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which has swept across Iraq and Syria since the beginning of the year. A rare shaft of light, however, is to be found in the rapprochement between the two biggest branches of the Islamic mainstream.

Shia and Sunni Islam have been at odds for most of the past decade. But the self-declared caliphate of terror known as Isis presents them with a common challenge. And they are beginning to put aside their differences in an effort to meet it.

The grand clerics of both schools – the Shia from Tehran, Qom and Najaf, and the Sunni from Riyadh and Cairo – have called upon their followers to take up arms against Isis. Political leaders have also declared their support for an intensified campaign. When the Iranian and Saudi foreign ministers met in New York in September, both diplomats hailed the opening of a new chapter in relations between their countries.

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“A chance for mainstream Islam to unite against ISIS,” Hossein Mousavian, Financial Times, October 23, 2014.

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Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution

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During three decades, the United States exercised all measures, short of military intervention, to bring about regime change in Iran. For reasons that I have discussed in depth and extensively in my newly published book, “Iran and The United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace,” all efforts have failed and contrary to expectations today, Iran is the most stable and powerful country in the region.

The current crisis in the Middle East, which is embroiled in civil wars, sectarian conflicts and the rise of the most dangerous version of terrorism, has created a new geopolitical context for the United States to revisit its three decades of failed policies toward Iran. Just recently, US Vice-President Joe Biden accused America’s key allies in the Middle East of allowing the rise of the Islamic State by supporting extremists with money and weapons to oust the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria.

Interestingly, Iran’s nuclear issue, which has become the Gordian knot in US-Iran relations, can, if resolved, be transformed to a springboard for strategic cooperation between the two states for the restoration of security and stability in the region.

To reach the final deal by Nov. 24, Iran and the EU3 negotiators have already been able to address three key areas of dispute: the future of the Arak heavy water reactor, the future of the Fordo enrichment plant and the issue of more expanded access to Iran’s nuclear-related facilities for International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. The support of the US Congress would be instrumental to the success of Iran’s nuclear negotiations to resolve the remaining disputed cases by Nov. 24, ending decades of animosity between Washington and Tehran and opening doors on an overdue cooperation aimed at combating the rise of terrorists and the emergence of the caliphate of terror.

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“Animosity between US, Iran not conducive to nuclear resolution,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, October 14, 2014.

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Urgent need for improved Saudi-Iran relations

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Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the two key regional powers have the responsibility to seriously engage in a dialogue to achieve a comprehensive agreement on issues of tension and mutual interest. Reviving Iran-Saudi relations is to the benefit of both countries and the region as a whole — in terms of security, stability, socioeconomic vitality and managing the crises in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. They could form a bilateral committee at the foreign ministerial level to bring to the table areas of contention and mutual interest in the framework of regional developments. The items for discussion could include the conflicts in which both parties are involved, mutual security concerns and regional policies.

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“Urgent need for improved Saudi-Iran relations,” Hossein Mousavian, Gulf News, August 16, 2014.

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Netanyahu’s Gaza war: Changing Aims but Predictable Consequences

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The US failure to secure a firm ceasefire in the Gaza, as a result of the objections from Egypt and Israel, reflects the new geopolitical reality in the region.

Whether Israel’s rejection of Washington’s diplomacy is a prevailing trend remains to be seen. But it is apparent, now more than ever, that the interests of the US and Israel have started to diverge at a quickening pace and maybe even conflict. The outcome of such an eventuality is that Israel would take the liberty of advancing its interests without any consideration for international laws and norms as well as the consequences of its acts for US interests.

Against this backdrop, you do not have to be a genius to realize that Israel’s current acts only result in the radicalization of the Palestinian movement, possibly the emergence of the third Intifada, and the strengthening of jihadi movements in the region as a whole.

Even the Arab states who side with Israel, either with their obvious acts and policies, or by remaining as mute spectators, must know that they are just adding fuel to the flame of jihadi extremism that will eventually come back to haunt them.

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“Netanyahu’s Gaza war: Changing Aims but Predictable Consequences,” Hossein Mousavian and Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran Review, August 15, 2014.

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Collapse of the Arab world necessitates a regional solution

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The Arab world is in turmoil. The Arab Spring, which raised hopes and dreams for a wave of democratic reforms throughout the Middle East, is turning into a cold winter.

The new US policy in the Middle East departs from the policies of the past decades whereby it does not wish to heavily invest money and blood for the long term. Meanwhile, the United States’ hegemonic position in the region is on the verge of collapse. Because of the current crises in the region, Washington cannot count on its Arab allies nor can US allies count on the United States as a superpower capable of helping them confront the challenges they are facing. US President Barack Obama is clever enough to remain cautious about embroiling the United States in new adventures. While the key regional players — Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — struggle with domestic challenges, a new geostrategy is urgently needed. Iran and the United States should overcome their differences to lead the international community in helping prevent further state collapse within the Arab world.

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“Collapse of the Arab world necessitates a regional solution,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, July 31, 2014.

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A dose of realism is needed to resolve Iran’s nuclear crisis

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By Sunday, the world will know whether Tehran and six world powers have found a path towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme.

Following last November’s interim agreement, the US and its fellow world powers should not miss this chance to seal a comprehensive deal. There is much at stake if the talks fail – and much to be gained from a deal, both in the region and beyond.

Significant obstacles remain. First among them is the demand for Iran to make commitments far beyond those required by the signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. These include the closure of the enrichment site at Fordow, a potential source of weapons-grade uranium; modification of the Arak heavy water reactor, curbing its ability to produce plutonium that could be used for weapons; and submission to monitoring procedures well beyond international protocols. The US, UK, Russia, China, France and Germany – known as the P5+1 – are also seeking to prevent Iran producing fuel for its nuclear power plants; a ban on peaceful nuclear-related research and development; and limitations on missile capability.

Finally, the P5+1 insist it could take 20 years to implement parts of the deal, particularly the removal of sanctions. In other words, Iran is being asked to make significant concessions in return for a promise that sanctions will be loosened in the next two decades. This is not realistic; nor does it play to the long-term interests of the P5+1.

By accepting these demands, the administration in Tehran – the first to engage with the US after decades of enmity – would be committing political suicide. Moreover, a two-decade implementation period would endanger the entire arrangement, placing it at the mercy of political changes in Tehran and Washington.

A dose of realism is urgently needed. The interim deal became possible because the US abandoned its unrealistic “zero-enrichment” policy. Iran, too, has shifted its stance. It is ready to accept the maximum level of transparency based on NPT rules. It is even willing to be flexible over temporary and voluntary measures beyond the NPT rules, such as extra assurances that it will not divert its nuclear programme towards weaponisation.

Furthermore, as proposed by Princeton University’s nuclear scientists, technical changes to the design of Iran’s planned Arak heavy water research reactor could remove its output of potential material for nuclear weapons. In this way, annual plutonium production could be cut to less than a kilogramme, far below the 8kg or so needed for a bomb.

But the demand to close the underground Fordow facility is unrealistic as long as Washington and Israel insist “all options are on the table” to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons. Fordow is the only facility that would be out of reach of an Israeli or US military strike.

The most challenging issue is agreeing an enrichment capacity consistent with Iran’s practical needs for civilian nuclear power plants and peaceful nuclear research reactors.

To resolve these disputes, steps must be agreed that could be face-saving for both parties, such as limiting uranium enrichment to levels of less than 5 per cent purity; keeping stocks of enriched uranium to a minimum; and using Fordow as an R&D facility to neutralise it as a military threat. Moreover, both sides could agree to replace over a period of a few years the first generation of centrifuges with a smaller number of more efficient uranium-enrichment centrifuges. In the transition period, the total operating enrichment capacity would be limited to the level of Iran’s practical needs.

In a final deal, both sides need to agree on a step-by-step plan founded on proportionate reciprocation. For example, before President Barack Obama leaves office, it is vital that substantial sanctions are lifted. And direct talks between Iran and the US are necessary to any deal.

With Syria and Iraq on the verge of collapse, and Afghanistan facing domestic turmoil, the rise of extremist Sunni terrorism poses a grave and immediate threat to the region and the nations of the P5+1. Washington and Tehran – the central international and regional leaders – have a strong mutual interest in
co-operating on these crises. If a comprehensive nuclear deal is reached, significant barriers to doing so will be removed.

“A dose of realism is needed to resolve Iran’s nuclear crisis,” Hossein Mousavian, Financial Times, July 14, 2014.

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US and Iran security cooperation could help save Iraq

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While the highest US officials, including Obama, call the rise of terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq a threat to US national security, this deep mutual security concern can form the pillar of cooperation between Iran and the United States. Together, they face terrorists who not only have claimed territory but also obtained hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from the central bank of Mosul.

Tehran and Washington’s common interests on managing the current crisis in Iraq include:

  1. Preventing an all-out sectarian war.
  2. Opposing the collapse of the post-Saddam Hussein political system in Iraq.
  3. Securing the safe passage of oil from the Persian Gulf region.
  4. Preventing the breakup of the state system in the Middle East.
  5. Avoiding further US military involvement in the Persian Gulf.
  6. Keeping oil resources out of the hands of terrorists.
  7. Preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq.
  8. Forming a more inclusive government to avoid sectarian violence and shape unity against terrorists and insurgents.

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“US and Iran security cooperation could help save Iraq,” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, July 10, 2014.

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How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001

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The text of this article has been selected from: “Iran and the United States; the Failed Past and the Road to Peace”, authored by Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, exclusively sent to Iran Review.Org by Seyed Hossein Mousavian.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 could have opened a new chapter in Iran–US relations. Iran was among the first countries to denounce the 9/11 Twin Tower terror attacks in New York. Immediately following the condemnation, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of Iran actively began to work within the new paradigm that was created by the September 11 terrorist attack and the subsequent US declaration of a “war on terror.” We were also concerned with the extremist Salafis and the Taliban, whose ideologies we viewed as hostile towards Shia Iran and also dangerous to the broader region.

During a fall 2012 conference in Berlin, James Dobbins told me that Hamid Karzai was the United States’ favored candidate to lead the new Afghan government. “Iranians also supported us,” Dobbins said.

Dobbins highlighted the role of Javad Zarif in the success of the Bonn Conference and the establishment of the new Afghan government. According to a report by Michael Hirsh, in an interview Dobbins,“pointed out that Karzai was a Pashtun from the south, like the majority of the Afghan population.” Tajiks from the Northern Alliance, historically rivals to the Pashtuns, led by Yunus Qanooni, tenaciously demanded the majority share in the new government “since they were the people that had captured Kabul according to Dobbins.” Dobbins  says “that by 4.00 a.m., they had reached a very critical moment. Nobody was able to change Qanooni’s mind. Zarif finally and authoritatively whispered in Qanooni’s ear that, ‘This is the best deal you can get.’ And Qanooni said, ‘OK.’”

Even after the creation of a new Afghan government at the Bonn Conference, talks continued. But suddenly, there came a veritable bombshell. President Bush, only a few weeks after the Bonn Conference, stunned us by including Iran in the “axis of evil” during his January 2002 State of the Union address. Talks continued but the Iranians’appetite for cooperation was diminished. Every person involved, from Khatami down, had the same feeling—betrayed! The word namaknashnas (a person one feeds, and later expresses betrayal rather than appreciation) was the word frequently used to characterize George Bush’s behavior.

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“How Iran Won the Afghanistan Deal with the US in 2001,” Hossein Mousavian, Iran Review, June 24, 2014.