Articles, Publications

Why doesn’t Iran trust the US?

Top-ranking diplomats from Iran and the world powers are currently engaging in intensive talks to narrow their differences and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by July 1. The main obstacle to attaining such an agreement is the fundamental lack of trust that exists between the two sides. If there was trust, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would have been enough to quell any concerns regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Currently, all sticking points are related to measures beyond the NPT. The sustainable solution is for both sides to take confidence-building measures to ease the suspicions they have of each other. While US qualms with Iran are well known in the West, it is vital for the US public to gain a better understanding of the reasons for Iranian antipathy toward the US government.

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“Why doesn’t Iran trust the US?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, June 23, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Building confidence, implications of the nuclear deal with Iran

On April 2, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 reached a framework agreement that ensures intrusive transparency and confidence building measures on Iran’s nuclear program in return for a lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions and respecting the legitimate rights of Iran for enrichment, with continued talks until the June 30 deadline toward a comprehensive deal. This initial agreement is a positive step toward ending 12 years of contention over Iran’s nuclear program. The next few weeks will be particularly difficult, as thorny technical issues are negotiated and specific phasing out of sanctions is agreed upon. While the drama over the nuclear talks will continue for the next few weeks until the comprehensive agreement is reached and goes into effect, we have to look at the post-deal environment. This includes the implications for Iran’s nuclear program for the next ten to 25 years; confidence building and nuclear non-proliferation; and Iran’s relations with the West and the region.

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“Building confidence, implications of the nuclear deal with Iran,” Hossein Mousavian, Security Times, June 1, 2015.

Articles, Publications

How do we solve the Iran talks’ verification dilemma?

After Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, expressed his opposition to the inspection of Iranian military facilities and the interrogation of Iranian scientists as part of any would-be nuclear deal, the issue quickly became the most controversial aspect of the nuclear negotiations in Iran. It is only natural that allowing foreign inspectors access to Iranian military facilities and making Iranian scientists vulnerable to such questioning would damage Iranian national pride, as it would in any country. In fact, this is a matter that threatens to scuttle the entire negotiating process.

This unprecedentedly invasive type of inspections hearkens back to the issue of possible military dimensions (PMD) to the Iranian nuclear program. Western concerns over PMD go back to even before 2003, when the Iranian nuclear program first came under international spotlight. In his 2006 book “State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration,” The New York Times journalist James Risen revealed that the CIA had attempted to plant evidence in Iran that would make it seem the country was pursuing nuclear weapons in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Such “evidence” could feasibly have been used as a pretext for military intervention against Iran. With that said, in 2011 the United States and its NATO allies released thousands of pages of documents and pictures to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that allegedly revealed there had been military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program.

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“How do we solve the Iran talks’ verification dilemma?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, June 6, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Will Camp David spur regional cooperation?

President Barack Obama’s meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council leaders at Camp David on May 14 looks by all accounts like a face-saving attempt by Washington. A well-publicized, high-wire meeting, verbal reassurances, perhaps promises of more political support and some advanced military hardware, that’s all. Nothing more can and should be expected; they simply cannot prevent the nuclear deal between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) from going through.

The invitation to Washington, in the statement right before the nuclear framework agreement with Iran was announced in Lausanne April 2, was apparently meant to reassure the Arab states in the Persian Gulf that the deal with Tehran did not mean their abandonment. The psychological-emotional aspect of the suggestion was more than obvious. Initial expressions of Arab dissatisfaction with the expected deal — and more importantly, its longer term implications of a possible Iran-US rapprochement — signaled knee-jerk reactions to the development, bound to have quite serious repercussions for everybody: the United States, Iran and its Arab neighbors on the southern shore of the strategic Persian Gulf and on a larger scale, the greater Middle East. That much is certain, even if the exact nature of future developments have yet to unfold and the emerging regional power calculus is inevitably different from what it has been since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the onset of tension and animosity between Tehran and Washington.

 

“Will Camp David spur regional cooperation?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 14, 2015.

Articles, Publications

Is Iran really to blame for Yemen conflict?

The deaths of at least 1,000 Yemenis, including 115 children, and over 3,500 injuries has seemingly been the main result of the Saudi-led military strikes against the country. The conventional wisdom of these attacks on Yemen has been that it is the latest battlefield in a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such portrayals of the conflict often frame Iran as the aggressor, parroting claims that Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen was somehow forced due to Iranian meddling in its backyard. However, such assertions ignore not just the realities of Yemen’s internal politics, but also more than a little bit of history.

As the Yemen attack shows, Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy is bent on using Iran as a scapegoat to justify its ownaggressive policies. These policies appear geared at maintaining and expanding uncompromising Saudi hegemony across the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East. However, by aiming to preserve authoritarian governance in Yemen and further marginalizing vast segments of Yemeni society, Saudi Arabia is only damaging its own interests and opening the door for violence to spill over into its own territory. The Saudis should be cognizant that, just as it is with other crises in the Middle East, the only solution to the Yemeni conflict is a political solution based on addressing the concerns of all parties involved.

 

“Is Iran really to blame for Yemen conflict?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, May 8, 2015.

Articles, Publications

After nuclear deal, what’s next for Iran?

After more than a decade of roller-coaster talks, mostly marked with failure, both sides have finally arrived at a formula that would assure the international community of the strictly peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities, and terminate all unilateral and multilateral economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran.

While the political framework reflects the commitment, hard work, sound judgment and, above all, political will of all the parties involved — Iran as well as and the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany — it has been the direct interaction between Iran and the United States, the main two protagonists, particularly since September 2013, that has helped steer the process of negotiation toward the positive outcome. In a detailed discussion in my book “Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace” — covering more than 30 years of deeply felt and entrenched mutual distrust, hostility, name-calling, tension, tit-for-tat negative policies, measures and actions aimed at harming the other side — I have tried to depict an objective picture of the state of relations, or lack thereof, between the two capitals, including the numerous missed opportunities at rapprochement and ultimate detente between them. This particular aspect of the matter has not escaped the attention and eyes of pundits and keen Iran observers, including William Burns who has been personally involved in the nuclear talks for years.

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“After nuclear deal, what’s next for Iran?” Hossein Mousavian, Al Monitor, April 14, 2015.

Articles, Publications

How to Fix the Syrian Mess

The bloody conflict in Syria since early 2011—whether we call it a civil war or by any other name—has brought in its wake actual disaster with vast destruction of the country and its infrastructure and over 200,000 dead, 6.7 million internally displaced, 3.8 million refugees and 13 million people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance.

Staffan de Mistura, the third in a series of United Nations envoys tasked to find a solution for the Syrian conflict, has introduced an “action plan” aimed to make 2015 the year in which movement toward a political settlement of the conflict takes place.

As things stand, and given the factors that pushed the previous efforts and initiatives, including Geneva I and II, to failure, success of the new plan proposed by UN special envoy depends on a much larger political orchestration. As I see it, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) and the five relevant regional players—Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia/ GCC and Egypt (R5)—should adopt a fresh look and approach to the Syrian crisis. Overall, agreement on the following steps could pave the way for an exit from the current deadly impasse.

There are six steps that must be taken.

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“How to Fix the Syrian Mess,” Hossein Mousavian, The National Interest, March 24, 2015