

The
next
round
of
economic
sanctions
on
Iran,
which
will

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4
,
will
mainly
target
the
country's
oil
and
gas
industries.
These
sanctions
were
eased
after

the
2015
signing
of
the
Joint
Comprehensive
Plan
of
Action
(JCPOA),
commonly
known
as
the
Iran
nuclear
deal,
but
are
being
phased
back
in
following
President
Donald
Trump's
decision
to
withdraw
from

the
accord
six
months
ago.

Iranian
women
protest
in
Tehran
against
U.S.
President
Donald
Trump's
decision
to
walk
out
of
the
2015
nuclear
deal,
May
11,
2018.

REUTERS/Tasnim
News
Agency

Trump's
goal
in
reinstating
the
sanctions

is
to
kill
the
nuclear
deal,
to
bring
Iran's
economy
to
the
point
of
total
collapse,
to
contain
Iran's
regional
involvement
in
Syria,
Iraq
and
Yemen,
and,
[i](#)
[n](#)
[s](#)
[p](#)
[i](#)

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s
e
of
Iran's
ruling
regime.
The
White
House's
official
position
is
that,
by
increasing
economic
and
political
pressure,
it

aims
to
bring
Iran
back
to
the
negotiating
table
in
order
to
replace
the
JCPOA
with
a
new
d
e
a
l
that
bears
Trump's
name.

There
are
at
least
five

reasons
why
Trump's
strategy
will
fail.

First,
while
the
United
States
seeks
to
cut
Iran's
oil
exports
to
[Z](#)
[e](#)
[r](#)
[o](#),
it
has
become
clear
that
this
is
impractical;
there

is
no
viable
replacement
for
Iran's
2.5
million
barrels
per
day
in
oil
exports.

While
Saudi
Arabia
previously

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a
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i
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d
e
u
p
for
any
shortages,
experts
believe
that
Riyadh
and
its
allies

d
o
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o
t
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
c
a
p
a
c
i

t
y
to
fully
offset
the
loss
of
Iranian
oil.
Now
that
Iran's
oil
exports
h
a
v
e
d
r
o
p
p
e
d
to
an
estimated
1.5
million
bpd

–
down
from
more
than
2.5
million
before
the
U.S.
withdrawal
from
the
JCPOA
in
May

–
the
price
of
the
OPEC
reference
basket
has
gone
up
to
a
r
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n

d

\$76.

If

forecasts

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that

it

could

jump

to

\$100

per

barrel

are

correct,

the

price

hike

will

make

up

for

Iran's
loss
of
revenue
even
if
Tehran's
exports
are
cut
further
to
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Second,
Trump's
trade

war
with
China
and
the
U.S.
imposition
of
economic
sanctions
against
Russia
make
Beijing
and
Moscow
less
likely
to
work
with
Washington
on
Iran.
Moreover,
the
White
House
cannot
count
on
cooperation

from
the
European
Union,
which
initiated
nuclear
negotiations
with
Iran
in
2003
and
which
sees
the
JCPOA
as
one
of
its
signature
foreign
policy
achievements.
Further,
the
EU
increasingly
views
extraterritorial
sanctions

as

a

threat

to

its

own

identity

and

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French

Finance

Minister

Bruno

Le

Maire

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recently

that

the
“outcome
of
that
crisis
with
Iran
will
be
the
chance
for
Europe
to
have
its
own
independent
financial
institutions,
so
we
can
trade
with
whoever
we
want.”
In
the
past,
cooperation

with
all
major
powers
was
critical
to
creating
an
effective
Iran
policy.

Third,
U.S.
sanctions
have
laid
the
groundwork
for
a
historic
change
in
the
global
financial
system.
For
many
decades,

the
U.S.
dollar
has
dominated
the
international
financial
markets.

However,
American
withdrawal
from
the
JCPOA

has
encouraged
countries
such
as
Russia,
China,
India
and

T
u
r
k
e
y
to
use

their
local
currencies
to
trade
with
Iran.
If
Europe
succeeds
in
creating
a
financial
s
y
s
t
e
m
that
is
separate
from
the
U.S.
dollar,
other
states
can
use
euros

in
trade
with
Iran,
diminishing
U.S.
domination
of
global
markets.

Fourth,
the
remaining
signatories
to
the
JCPOA
view
the
nuclear
deal
as
a
means
to
counter
American

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This
is
due
to
the
fact
that
the
JCPOA
is
a
multilateral
agreement
backed
by
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1,

which
the
Trump
administration
exited
unilaterally
and

is
now
trying
to
p
u
n
i
s
h
other
nations
for
implementing.
Any
capitulation
to
Washington
on
this
issue
would
further
buttress
the
current
U.S.
approach.
To
avoid
this,
both

Iran
and
the
international
community
will
see
preserving
the
JCPOA
as
a
strategic
necessity.

Fifth,
powerful
U.S. **Iran**
allies **oil:**
U.S.
such **agrees**
as **several**
the **sanctions**
waivers
EU
and
Japan
continue
to
support
the
JCPOA.
Only
a

handful
of
regional
allies –
namely
Saudi
Arabia,
the
UAE
and
Israel –
s
u
p
p
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d
Trump's
decision
to
withdraw
from
the
deal
while
other
major
regional
players

such
as
Turkey,
Oman
and
Iraq
continue
to
support
the
accord.

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the
U.S. campaign in
Afghanistan

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Saudi
Arabia
has
been
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the
Tehran-
backed
Houthis
in

Yemen

and

Qatar

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These
developments
will
make
it
easier
for
Tehran
to
find
workarounds
to
sanctions
imposed
by
Washington.

For
the
past
six
decades,
the

United States has been the region's hegemonic power. However, Trump's unilateralist approach and the future of JCPOA may change the calculation by creating a rift among the transatlantic allies,

and
bringing
the
eastern
bloc
powers,
Europe
and
regional
powers
such
as
Iran,
Turkey
and
Iraq,
closer
together.
Moreover,
the
JCPOA
has
paved
the
way
for
other
world
powers
–
specifically
Europe,

China,
Russia
and
India
--
to
preserve
international
agreements
without
the
United
States.
This,
coupled
with
American
withdrawal
from
the
international
scene,
has
the
potential
to
transform
international
power
politics,
shifting
from

an
American-
led
system
to
a
multi-
polar world,
with
regional
actors
playing
a
more
substantial
role.

Against
this
backdrop,
the
next
round
of
U.S.
sanctions
against
Iran
is
likely
to
increase

Middle
East
tensions
–
and
unlikely
to
bring
Washington
closer
to
achieving
its
goals
on
Iran.

ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR

Seyed
Hossein
Mousavian
is
Middle
East
Security
and
Nuclear
Policy
Specialist
at
Princeton

University
and
a
former
spokesman
for
Iran's
nuclear
negotiators.

His
most
recent
book, "Iran
and
the
United
States:
An
Insider's
view
on
the
Failed
Past
and
the
Road
to
Peace"
was
published
in
2014.

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