تندروها در تل آویو و واشنگتن برای پرهیز از تحقق این تحول در پی انحراف پیشنهاد به سوی “آزادسازی منابع پولی” هستند. مارک دوبوویتز، مدیر اجرایی بنیاد دفاع از دموکراسی ها در این باره گفته است، “مهمترین نگرانی من اینست که اگر دولت، آجری را از رژیم تحریم ها بردارد، نمی توان آنرا دوباره سرجایش گذاشت.” وی طرح “آزادسازی منابع مالی” را روشی برای کمک مالی به ایران بدون لغو تحریم ها دانست.
حسین موسویان از چالش های مذاکرات هسته ای می گوید – شرق الاوسط – ۱۵ آبان ۱۳۹۲
We suggest possible initiatives for fissile material control that could serve as initial steps toward an eventual Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. These initiatives include actions that Israel, the only regional state with nuclear weapons, could take towards nuclear disarmament; and measures of collective restraint regarding fissile material production and use to be taken by all states of the region to foster confidence that their civilian nuclear activities are indeed peaceful in intent and not being pursued as a cover to develop nuclear-weapon options.
For Israel, these initial steps include ending production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, declaring its stockpiles of these materials, and placing increasing portions under international safeguards as steps toward their elimination. The eventual nuclear disarmament of Israel would be a necessary condition for any Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone and for a broader weapon of mass destruction free zone.
The regional measures that we propose would serve to bring a Middle East nuclear- weapon-free zone closer and make the zone more robust when it is in force. These measures include no separation of plutonium, no use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel, and no national enrichment plants. It would greatly strengthen the global nonproliferation regime if these measures were adopted worldwide, including by the nuclear weapon states.
All these measures are worth pursuing in their own rights and states should take initiatives to make progress on them wherever possible. Progress should not be held up by the imposition of linkages, time ordering or sequencing between steps.
Although we do not discuss chemical and biological weapons in this paper, it is critical that all countries in the region ratify and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This has become especially important after the use of chemical weapons in the civil war in Syria in 2013 and Syria’s subsequent decision to accede to the CWC, declare its stockpile and verifiably destroy its chemical weapons. Egypt and Israel should follow suit on the CWC. All three states also should ratify the BWC.
Finally, we propose that discussions be launched on the design of regional verification arrangements strong enough so that all countries in the region can have confidence in the absence of secret nuclear weapon programs. Similar verification arrangements also should be developed to increase confidence in the region that countries are complying with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.
Read Princeton University Press Release
“Fissile Material Controls in the Middle East: Steps toward a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Frank N. von Hippel, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Emad Kiyaei, Harold A. Feiveson and Zia Mian, Research Report No. 11 International Panel on Fissile Materials. Published by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 2013.
Although the contents of the Iranian package has been kept confidential, during two different conferences representatives of two members of the international delegation attending the recent nuclear talks in Geneva informed me that “the new Iranian nuclear package addresses all major concerns of the world powers.” Russia’s “Step-by-Step Proposal” from 2011, plus credible media reports and statements by former US officials engaged on the nuclear issue, reveal that the major demands of the world powers are twofold.
Firstly, they insist that Iran show the maximum level of transparency by implementing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol, Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 and cooperating with the IAEA to resolve the so-called “possible military dimension” issues.
Secondly, they want Iran to accept measures to prevent the chance of a “breakout” to a nuclear weapon: cap uranium enrichment at 5 percent, limit the number and type of centrifuges, accept a maximum ceiling on stockpiles of enriched uranium, ensure no reprocessing takes place at the heavy water facility in Arak, and forbid plutonium separation.
The Russian step-by-step plan contained all these major elements required by the world powers, and was welcomed by Iran because it includes two major Iranian demands: the recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment, and the lifting of sanctions. Reliable sources informed me that the Russian proposal failed because of US inability to provide sanctions relief in return for substantive Iranian measures.
All of the above suggests that a comprehensive deal on the nuclear issue is possible if the US and the world powers respects the rights of Iran under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and if Iran gets proportionate sanction relief in return for accepting their major demands. This, in effect, places the demands of both parties within a package and implements a step-by-step, proportionate, and reciprocal process.
To prevent such a breakthrough from materializing, hawks in Tel Aviv and Washington are pushing a misleading proposal on “freeing up funds.” “My biggest concern is that if the administration takes out a brick from the sanctions regime, you won’t be able to put it back together,” asserted Mark Dubowitz, Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He called the “freeing up funds” plan a way to offer a concession without changing the sanctions.
About USD 50 billion of Iran’s oil revenue is currently held in escrow accounts in countries that continue to import oil from Iran. Iran employs these assets to pay for imports from these countries. The resumption of nuclear negotiations has provided Israeli hawks and US hardliners the opportunity to freeze these funds entirely. Their suggestion that President Obama temporarily allow Iran access to those funds is most likely tied to nuclear concessions. Iran’s compliance will result in monetary rewards which leave the structure of the current unilateral and multilateral sanctions regimes imposed by United Nations, US, and Europeans intact.
Failure to comply, however, will result in the freezing of Iran’s assets abroad and placing it under a virtual embargo. Therefore, this proposal is in fact nothing but a Trojan horse. This policy not only blocks the nuclear deal, but would complicate the situation further at a time when—after a decade—the world powers and Iran are in a position to reach a final deal if the US can deliver real action on sanctions relief.
“Success is in sight, if sanctions can be lifted,” Hossein Mousavian, Asharq Al Awsat, November 6, 2013.
اسب تروجان آمریکایی‌ها پشت دروازه‌های ایران – خبرگزاری تسنیم – ۱۵ آبان ۱۳۹۲
آمریکا چگونه اعتماد هاشمی رفسنجانی و ظریف را پاسخ داد؟ – خبرگزاری تسنیم – ۳۰ مهر ۱۳۹۲
Iran defines its political system as independent from outside powers — of most significance, the US. This has been the case throughout the revolution and remains a focal priority, even as Iran seeks reconciliation with the West.
This edict of independence arises not only from Iran’s rich culture, but its resistance to outside pressure also stems from its system of theocracy. Ultimately, if Iran governed its state out of fear from US threats, then further threats would beget further concessions, costing Iran’s Islamic government its identity and independence.
Historical analysis evidences that once Iran sets a goal, it accomplishes its goal despite external pressure and obstacles.
“Rouhani is West’s best bet in Iran,” Hossein Mousavian and Shahir Shahidsaless, Gulf News, October 20, 2013.
The international diplomatic, economic and intelligence conflict over Iran’s nuclear program has now been in full flow for over a decade. Few crises have lasted this long at such tempo. It has involved complex games of diplomatic poker, missed opportunities and overplayed hands. Proposals have come and gone involving careful balancing of red lines and attempts to find common interest. With Hassan Rouhani’s election and his clear and articulated desire to find a breakthrough in the deadlock, expressed last month at the United Nations General Assembly and on his historic phone call with President Obama subsequently, it is time to take a step back and look at the situation afresh.
In this new publication, BASIC’s executive director, Paul Ingram, and former Iranian Ambassador to Germany, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, outline the current state of the nuclear dispute with Iran and suggest opportunities to take positive steps forward.
“Finding a way out of the nuclear dispute with Iran: back to basics,” Hossein Mousavian and Paul Ingram, British American Security Information Council, October 23, 2013.
